Why teams run an open source threat intelligence platform
Indicators of compromise arrive from many directions: commercial and open feeds, vendor advisories, sector peers, and the indicators your own incident responders extract during investigations. Without a single system of record, the same IP address or file hash lives in a spreadsheet, a SIEM watchlist, and an analyst's notes, and nobody can say which entries are still valid. MISP suits indicator sharing and sector communities, while OpenCTI suits structured knowledge and relationship modeling. Both can be self-hosted inside your own cloud accounts, data centers, or air-gapped networks, so sensitive intelligence about your environment never has to leave your control.
The reason this matters to operations is the SIEM connection. An intelligence platform only changes outcomes when its indicators reach the detection layer, whether that is Wazuh, Security Onion, or another SIEM your team already runs. Before committing to a design, confirm with your SOC which export formats and push or pull methods the SIEM supports, how often indicators must refresh to stay useful, and who owns the decision to expire stale entries so that old indicators do not generate false positives for months.
Self-hosting also changes who carries the sharing risk. Feeds you pull from a sector community may contain material you are not allowed to re-share, and your own sightings may be sensitive enough that you want to choose each sharing partner deliberately. Ask your candidate partner to document the distribution rules you will apply, the roles that can publish or import data, and how the platform's licensing fits your plans. MISP is licensed under AGPL-3.0 and OpenCTI's Community Edition under Apache License 2.0, while its Enterprise Edition uses a separate license, so review the OpenCTI license terms before you assume a feature is included.
Requirements to agree before choosing a platform
A threat intelligence platform is only as useful as the agreements behind it. The cards below cover the decisions that shape the choice between MISP, OpenCTI and any other option, and each one needs a named owner before architecture work starts. Settle them in this order, because later choices such as sharing model and retention depend on the earlier ones.
Intelligence sources and feeds in scope
Decide which feeds are in scope: commercial reports, open feeds, information sharing communities, internal sensor data such as malware analysis results, and incident records. Record the licensing terms of each feed, because some restrict redistribution or storage outside the organization. Ask the threat intelligence lead to sign off, and ask legal to confirm that each feed's license allows storage and sharing on the platform you plan to run.
Indicator consumers and their workflows
List who uses indicators and for what: the SOC for detection content, incident response for investigation pivots, fraud teams for account and payment indicators, and vulnerability teams for exploitation context. Each group needs different fields, formats and update speeds, which affects whether the platform must export to SIEM and firewall tooling. The SOC manager and incident response lead should sign off on the consumer list and the export formats each one needs.
External sharing and community obligations
Decide whether indicators must go to external communities, sector information sharing bodies, or partners, or whether the platform stays internal. Sharing changes the security model, because outbound feeds and peer synchronization need approvals, filtering and a record of what left the network. Confirm with legal and the CISO whether any sharing agreement restricts what can be published, and whether it requires a specific data format.
Data classification and handling rules
Indicators often contain internal details: victim names, internal hostnames, customer account identifiers or screenshots from investigations. Classify each indicator type and decide which tags, fields and attachments are allowed to leave the platform. Set handling rules for access, export and deletion. The data protection officer and the CISO should approve these rules, and the rules should be written down before any feed is connected.
Retention and expiry of indicators
Decide how long indicators stay active, when they expire, and how long supporting records such as reports, sightings and analyst notes are kept. Retention affects storage growth, detection noise and the evidence you can produce for past incidents. Ask legal and records management to confirm any minimum retention obligations that apply to incident records, and ask the SOC to confirm how long detections need stale indicators to remain queryable.
Ownership and sign-off model
Name one accountable owner for the platform, one owner for feed curation, and one approver for each sharing decision. Without these roles, indicators accumulate, false positives go unreviewed and nobody can answer who approved an outbound release. Document the owners in the project charter and confirm the approval path with the CISO before a partner is selected, since the partner's scope depends on who will run the platform after go-live.
Which open source platform fits which team
This table compares MISP and OpenCTI on the workload each handles best, their licensing, release currency and operating effort. Read it to match a platform to the team that will run it and the sharing or analysis work it must support. The main takeaway is that the choice depends on who consumes intelligence and whether enterprise features are required.
| Decision factor | MISP | OpenCTI |
|---|---|---|
| Best-fit workload | Indicator sharing, community exchange and feed distribution between organizations | Knowledge graph of threat actors, campaigns and reports for analyst workflow and investigation |
| License | AGPL-3.0; review obligations if you modify and host it for others | Community Edition under Apache License 2.0; Enterprise Edition under a separate license |
| Enterprise feature needs | Confirm sharing groups, sync and access features against the project documentation for your deployment | Confirm which capabilities you need are in the Community Edition before assuming Enterprise Edition license terms |
| Latest release cited | v2.5.50 (published October 10, 2026) | 7.261016.0 (published October 16, 2026) |
| Data model | Event and attribute model centered on indicators and their context | STIX-based graph model linking entities, relationships and observables |
| Connector and feed effort | Feed pulls and sync partners drive ongoing tuning and false positive review | Connector count and import jobs drive ongoing maintenance and upgrade testing |
| Operating effort | Moderate, mainly feed curation, sharing agreements and event hygiene | Moderate to higher, with more components, connector upkeep and analyst workflow configuration |
| Typical team | Threat intelligence or SOC teams exchanging indicators with peers or sector groups | CTI analysts producing reports and mapping adversary activity across intelligence sources |
How the threat intelligence platform connects to the SIEM
The connection between a threat intelligence platform and the SIEM runs in two directions, and both matter. Indicators such as IP addresses, domains, file hashes and URLs flow from the platform into the SIEM, where they feed lookup tables and detection rules. Matches seen in logs flow back, so the platform can record a sighting against the indicator and add context about where and when it appeared. Plan for both directions from the start, because a one-way feed produces a list of indicators nobody can prove were useful.
In a typical self-hosted design, the common log sources are Wazuh (an open source XDR and SIEM platform) and Security Onion, which bundles Suricata, Zeek and the Elastic stack for network security monitoring and log management. Suricata alerts and Zeek logs from network sensors are often the richest source of sightings, while endpoint and host data usually comes through the SIEM agent. The exact connector path depends on the SIEM product, its version and the MISP or OpenCTI release you deploy. Confirm with the vendors and the project documentation which export, API or file-based method each combination supports, and whether it runs natively or needs a script or middleware. Do not assume a native integration exists until you have tested it in a non-production environment.
Before go-live, agree on three decisions with the SOC: which indicator types are pushed to the SIEM and how often, whether lookups block, alert or only annotate events, and who reviews a sighting that matches a high-confidence indicator. Test with a known indicator that you can safely insert into a lab log, and confirm that the match appears in the SIEM and the sighting appears in the platform. Record the expected result so the test becomes evidence for the audit trail.
Reference architecture components and how they connect
A self-hosted threat intelligence platform is a set of connected parts rather than a single application. The components below show where data enters, where it is stored and enriched, how it leaves for sharing and detection, and how it stays recoverable and observable. Each one needs its own sizing decision, and the vendor documentation for your chosen platform should be the baseline for every figure.
Platform host and database
The application server runs the threat intelligence platform's web interface, API and core services, and it depends on a relational database for events, attributes, users and sharing rules. Plan the host and database as a pair. Ask the vendor for the supported database engines and versions, the recommended CPU and memory for your expected indicator volume, and whether the platform supports high availability for its database. Confirm how upgrades change database schema so that rollback is possible.
Search and object storage backend
Platforms of this type rely on a search index and, in some deployments, object storage for attachments, reports and exported bundles. OpenCTI, for example, requires supporting services that the operator must deploy, patch and size. Confirm with the vendor which search and storage components are mandatory, which are optional, and how index size grows with the number of observables and relationships you ingest. Storage growth is often the largest recurring cost driver.
Feed and connector workers
Workers pull feeds, STIX or MISP objects, and third-party enrichment sources on a schedule, then normalize and deduplicate them before they reach the platform. Each connector is a separate process that can fail silently, so the design must include health checks and alerting per connector. Ask the vendor which connectors are maintained by the core project, which come from the community, and how credentials for paid or licensed feeds are stored and rotated.
Sharing and export interface
This layer controls which indicators leave the organization and to whom. It covers sharing groups, distribution levels, trusted partner synchronization and automated exports to firewalls, EDR or SIEM tools. Access control here must be explicit: define which roles can publish, which can export, and which feeds are restricted by traffic light protocol or equivalent marking. Confirm how the platform logs exports, because those logs are the evidence you will need when a partner asks where an indicator came from.
SIEM link
The SIEM link pushes indicators into detection rules and pulls matched events back as sightings or context. Most integrations run through a push or pull API, a syslog or file export, or a custom connector that your team or implementation partner builds. Confirm which direction data flows, how often indicators refresh, how expired indicators are removed from the SIEM watchlists, and how the SIEM's own storage and ingest limits affect the volume you send.
Backup and monitoring
Backups must cover the database, search indexes, object storage and configuration, and restore tests should run on a schedule. Monitoring should track connector failures, queue backlog, certificate expiry, disk growth and failed logins to the administrative interface. Ask the vendor for its recommended backup method for each component, the consistency guarantees between database and search index, and the metrics or logs the platform exposes for integration with your existing monitoring stack.
Build, partner or SaaS by team situation
Teams with threat intelligence analysts and platform engineers can usually run MISP or OpenCTI as their own system of record. Analysts keep control over which sources are ingested, how indicators are scored and which communities or partners receive sharing. Platform engineers own hosting, backups, upgrades and integration with the SIEM. The main cost is recurring staff time, since analysts spend hours each week reviewing feeds, retiring stale indicators and tuning enrichment, and that time competes with investigations.
- Data control: indicators, sightings and sharing rules stay inside your environment, and sharing agreements are your decision.
- Feed effort: analysts curate sources continuously, so the budget is a standing allocation of hours rather than a one-time project.
- Upgrades: engineers schedule MISP and OpenCTI releases, test connectors and plan rollback.
- Cost structure: mostly internal salaries plus infrastructure. Licensing for MISP (AGPL-3.0) and OpenCTI Community Edition (Apache License 2.0) carries no per-seat fee, but Enterprise Edition terms are separate and should be checked.
- Ask your partner: how they would hand off feed runbooks and whether they will train analysts on connector maintenance.
Before committing, confirm that your analysts have time in their plans for curation, not only for investigation.
Teams with platform engineering skills but no dedicated intel analysts can deploy the same open-source platforms, yet they will struggle to decide which feeds deserve trust and how indicators should expire. The platform works, but without curation the store fills with low-quality or duplicate indicators that the SIEM then has to match against. A common pattern is to start with a small set of well-known feeds, assign one named owner for curation, and bring in outside help for scoring rules and sharing policy.
- Data control: the platform still keeps data in your environment, but you rely on external sources whose terms you must review.
- Feed effort: engineers can automate ingestion, yet someone must review false positives and decide retention, which is an ongoing duty.
- Upgrades: routine patching fits platform operations, while schema or connector changes may need outside support.
- Cost structure: engineering time for build and operations, plus fees for any partner curation retainer. Feed subscriptions, where used, are a separate recurring line.
- Ask your partner: whether they provide curation guidance, scoring templates and a written feed review cadence.
Confirm who will own false positive decisions on day one, because that owner determines whether the SIEM integration stays useful.
Teams that prefer a managed commercial threat intelligence service buy curated feeds, hosted platforms and vendor-run updates. This reduces the staff time needed for curation and upgrades, but the vendor sets many terms: where data is stored, which sharing communities you join, how long indicators are retained and how exports work. Exit terms and data portability become important contract points, since moving years of indicators and sightings out of a hosted service can be difficult.
- Data control: data sits with the vendor, so review residency, subprocessors, deletion and export rights in the contract.
- Feed effort: the vendor maintains sources, though your team still tunes which indicators reach detection tools.
- Upgrades: handled by the vendor on its schedule, which you should map against your change control rules.
- Cost structure: recurring subscription, usually priced by feed, volume, users or seats. Quotes should show each recurring element separately.
- Ask your vendor: how exports work, what happens to data at termination and which integrations are included.
Before signing, ask for a written list of what the subscription excludes, since integration and onboarding work are often billed separately.
Many teams combine an open-source core with a managed or partner-supplied feed layer. The platform stays self-hosted so sharing and indicator history remain under your control, while selected commercial or community feeds are subscribed separately. This split keeps the system of record in-house and limits the curation load to the sources you choose to trust. It also means two sets of terms to track, one for the software and one for each feed.
- Data control: your indicator store and sharing rules stay inside your environment, while feed providers see only what you query or subscribe to.
- Feed effort: reduced, because curated sources arrive in a form your platform can import.
- Upgrades: you still own the platform lifecycle, so the operational load does not disappear.
- Cost structure: subscription for feeds plus recurring staff and infrastructure for the platform.
- Ask your partner: how feed licenses map to MISP or OpenCTI import methods and whether redistribution is allowed.
Review each feed license for redistribution and sharing terms before you connect it to a community sharing group.
How a threat intelligence platform rollout runs
The sequence moves from agreed data handling rules to a single-platform pilot, then to enrichment, SIEM integration and sharing, and finally to an operating model someone owns. Each phase closes with a written output, so the platform reaches daily use only after the rules for what it ingests, shares and retains are settled.
Agree scope and data handling rules
Before any feed is connected, the security lead, legal or privacy contact and the teams that will consume intelligence agree in writing which sources are in scope, what may be shared externally, what is classified as sensitive or personal, and how long indicators and sightings are retained. DeployOpen can draft this with your team, but the decisions belong to your organization. The step is done when a signed scope and data handling agreement exists and names the platform owner and the sharing contacts.
Run a single-platform pilot with one or two feeds
Deploy MISP or OpenCTI in your own cloud account, data center or air-gapped network, configure authentication and backups, and connect one or two feeds that match the agreed scope, such as an open community feed or a commercial feed your team already licenses. The pilot tests ingestion, deduplication and how analysts search the data. The step is done when the pilot runs on the target hosting model, a restore from backup has been tested, and the team has written down the feed volume and the problems it surfaced.
Define enrichment and curation rules
Analysts and the platform owner write the rules that turn raw indicators into usable intelligence. These cover confidence scores, expiry periods for indicators, tagging taxonomies, how false positives are retracted, and which enrichment sources are queried automatically. Rules are tested against the pilot data so that known benign infrastructure does not flood alerts. The step is done when a curation standard is approved, each feed has a named owner, and the expiry and retraction behavior has been demonstrated on sample data.
Test SIEM export and lookups
Connect the platform to the SIEM that already runs in your environment, whether that is Wazuh, Security Onion or a commercial product. Test two directions: exporting selected indicators to detection rules or watchlists, and querying the platform during alert enrichment. Confirm that exported indicators carry their confidence and expiry fields, and that lookups fail safely when the platform is unavailable. The step is done when a test alert shows enriched context from the platform and the export job's results have been reviewed against the curation standard.
Onboard consumers and sharing agreements
Identify the internal consumers, such as the SOC, incident responders, vulnerability management and fraud teams, and create accounts with roles that match their work. If intelligence will be shared with partners, industry groups or other organizations, document the sharing rules, the traffic light or distribution classifications in use, and the legal basis for each sharing relationship. The step is done when each consumer group has tested access, and each external sharing relationship has a written agreement and an approved distribution list.
Hand over to operations
Transfer the platform to the team that will run it, with runbooks for patching, backups, feed onboarding, user management, certificate renewal and incident response for the platform itself. Agree who reviews feed quality on a recurring basis and who decides when a feed is retired. Confirm which parts of ongoing support are handled internally and which are covered by a retainer with a partner. The step is done when the operations team has performed one supervised runbook task, and the feed review schedule and escalation contacts are recorded.
What ongoing feed curation takes
How many threat intelligence feeds should we onboard at first?
Start with a small set of feeds you can review and explain, then add more only when analysts can show what each one contributes. Recurring analyst time grows with every feed because each one adds indicators to triage, overlaps with others and changes format over time. Good first candidates are feeds tied to your sector, your technology stack and any sharing communities you already belong to. Track, per feed, how many indicators it adds, how many reach a detection, and how many analysts close as false positives. A feed that produces volume but no confirmed detections costs more than it returns. Ask your implementation partner to document the onboarding criteria so the list can be reviewed on a schedule rather than debated in each incident.
Who reviews false positives from threat intelligence indicators?
Ownership usually sits with a named threat intelligence or detection engineer, with SOC analysts reporting false positives through a defined channel. The time spent depends on how often indicators are matched against benign traffic, such as shared CDNs, cloud provider ranges or widely used software update hosts. Each false positive should trigger a short record: the indicator, the feed, the matched asset and the reason it was benign. Those records drive allowlists, feed suppression rules and rescoring. Without that loop, the same false positives return every week. Confirm in writing who owns the review queue, how fast analysts expect a response and who can approve a change to a shared allowlist.
How are indicator expiry and decay set in MISP or OpenCTI?
Expiry and decay are policy decisions that you set per indicator type and source, not defaults to accept unchanged. An IP address observed in a botnet may be useful for days, while a file hash or a certificate fingerprint may remain relevant longer. Define a validity window for each indicator type, then decide whether expired indicators are disabled, removed from detection exports or only down-scored. Revisit those windows after you review detection outcomes, since a window that is too long floods the SIEM and one that is too short misses recurring infrastructure. Confirm which decay and revocation functions your chosen version of MISP or OpenCTI supports before you write the policy.
How do sharing tags and TLP markings get applied to indicators?
Every indicator should carry a handling marking, typically a Traffic Light Protocol label, and a sharing scope that tells the platform where it may leave your organization. Set defaults at import so that feeds and analysts do not rely on memory. Review markings when you share with partners, because an indicator derived from a restricted report may need a stricter label than the feed it came from. In MISP, sharing groups and distribution levels control this; in OpenCTI, marking definitions and access rules play a similar role. Analyst time here comes from exceptions, such as indicators that arrive unmarked or mixed-source records. Ask your partner to document the marking standard and test that exports respect it before any external sharing starts.
How are stale and duplicate indicators retired?
Retire indicators through scheduled expiry, deduplication jobs and a periodic review of what the SIEM actually matched. Duplicates arise when several feeds report the same value with different context, so merge them into one object that keeps all sources and sightings. Stale records should leave detection exports even if they remain in the archive for investigation history. Measure how many indicators are removed each cycle and how many were matched after expiry, since that number shows whether your windows are right. Keep an audit trail of deletions and disablements so that analysts can explain why an indicator stopped firing during an investigation. Confirm the exact deduplication and archival behavior in the release you deploy.
What recurring work does feed curation add to the team's week?
The recurring work falls into four areas: reviewing new or changed feeds, triaging false positives, tuning expiry and sharing rules, and checking that exports still reach the SIEM. The main cost drivers are the number of active feeds, the volume of indicators per feed, how many detections depend on intelligence, and how often sharing partners change their requirements. Staffing estimates should come from your own alert volumes and sample reviews, not from a generic ratio. Ask any implementation partner to separate one-time configuration from ongoing curation, to name the roles that do each task and to explain what a quote includes after go-live, such as support, upgrades and content maintenance under a retainer.
Can our own team run feed curation after the platform goes live?
Often yes, if one or two people own the platform and the review routines are written down. Most of the ongoing effort is judgment on false positives and sharing rules, which benefits from analysts who know your environment. Teams struggle when no one owns the schedule, when upgrades are deferred, or when the platform is run by people who did not build the feed logic. Before deciding, document the feed list, expiry policy, marking standard and review cadence, then test whether a new analyst can follow them. A partner can build the runbooks, train the owners and offer a retainer for upgrades and periodic reviews, with the split agreed in a written scope.
Compliance evidence a threat intelligence platform supports
This table maps the evidence a self-hosted threat intelligence platform can produce to two US requirements, the HIPAA Security Rule and the FTC Safeguards Rule. Read each row as a question the assessor will ask, the evidence to prepare, and the gaps to confirm before the platform holds regulated data. DeployOpen prepares these systems, controls and records for an independent assessor, who decides whether they are sufficient.
| Requirement | What the assessor expects | Evidence to prepare | Where it usually fails |
|---|---|---|---|
| Audit controls (45 CFR 164.312) | Records of who viewed, created, edited or exported indicators and sharing events in systems holding ePHI-related data | Exported audit logs from the platform, forwarded to the SIEM with timestamps and user identity | Audit logging is off by default or only covers the web interface, not API or sync activity |
| Unique user identification (45 CFR 164.312) | Each analyst and automated connector has an individual identity, with no shared accounts | User roster tied to the identity provider, with API keys assigned to named service owners | Shared admin accounts and long-lived API tokens with no owner or rotation record |
| Access control on indicator sharing (45 CFR 164.312) | Sharing groups, feeds and exports limited to people and partners who need them | Documented sharing groups, role mapping and a periodic review of who can share externally | Sharing rules set once at install and never reviewed as partners change |
| Monitoring of authorized user activity (16 CFR 314.4) | Logs that show what authorized users did, reviewed at a defined cadence | Log retention settings, SIEM alert rules for admin and export actions, review records | Logs are collected but no one reviews them, so the monitoring control is not operating |
| Multi-factor authentication (16 CFR 314.4) | MFA for every individual accessing the platform, including administrators | Identity provider configuration showing MFA enforcement for platform login | Local platform accounts bypass the central identity provider and skip MFA |
| Encryption in transit and at rest (16 CFR 314.4) | Protected connections for feeds and sharing, and encrypted storage for stored indicators and exports | TLS configuration for web and sync endpoints, storage encryption settings, key custody notes | Feed connectors or database backups carry data without encryption |
| Retention of audit and sharing records | Defined retention periods for audit logs and sharing history, applied consistently | Written retention schedule and evidence that backups and SIEM copies follow it | Retention is set in the SIEM but not in the platform, so records age out unevenly |
What to ask an implementation partner before signing
Start with the platform and edition. Ask the partner whether they recommend MISP, OpenCTI or both, and why. Get the edition named in writing. OpenCTI ships a Community Edition under the Apache License 2.0 and an Enterprise Edition under a separate license, so ask which features the design depends on, which edition supplies them, and who checks the license terms against your intended use. Confirm the exact release each component will be deployed at, and ask how the partner will track new releases during the engagement. Do not accept a version that is not stated in the agreement.
Next, ask how the SIEM connector is built and tested. Ask which direction indicators flow (import into the SIEM lookup tables, export from the threat intelligence platform, or both), which SIEM product and version the connector targets, and whether the partner will test it with sample indicators and known benign events before go-live. Ask who owns the connector code after handover and whether it is documented well enough for your own staff to modify. Also ask how false positives from imported indicators will be measured and reported during the first weeks of operation.
Then cover feed licensing, sharing and curation. Ask the partner to list every external feed in scope and the terms each one carries, including any restriction on redistribution through a sharing community. Ask who signs sharing agreements and who approves which indicators leave your organization. Finally, ask who curates indicators after go-live, how many hours of analyst time the partner expects that to take, and whether that work is in the fixed scope or a separate retainer. Close with upgrade and backup duties: who applies platform updates, who restores the database from backup, and how the partner will prove a restore works. Ask that the scope document list deliverables, acceptance criteria and dates, and that no work begins until you have signed it.
How much effort and cost does a self-hosted threat intelligence platform take?
What are the main cost drivers for a self-hosted threat intelligence platform?
The software licence is usually the smallest part of the cost, because MISP and OpenCTI Community Edition are open source. The larger costs are the infrastructure to host the platform, the people who install, integrate and maintain it, and the time spent curating feeds. Infrastructure cost depends on the number of feeds, indicator volume, retention period, and whether you run a single instance or a high availability pair. Labor cost depends on how many integrations you build (SIEM, EDR, ticketing, sharing partners) and how much analyst time goes into reviewing indicators. Ask any partner to split the quote into one-time items (design, installation, integration, initial feed setup, documentation and training) and recurring items (hosting, patching, upgrades, feed review and support). Ask for the assumptions behind each line, such as indicator volume and number of users.
Can our own team build and run a threat intelligence platform without outside help?
A team with Linux, container and database experience can install MISP or OpenCTI, but the harder work is operational: keeping the platform patched, connecting it to the SIEM, deciding which feeds to trust, and writing sharing rules that match your legal and contractual obligations. Before you decide, check whether your team has an owner for the platform, time for feed curation each week, and someone who can answer for sharing decisions. If those roles are already stretched, a fixed-scope implementation with a partner can cover the build and handover while your staff keep ownership. DeployOpen implements and documents self-hosted open-source platforms inside the client's own infrastructure, and it supports them through retainers when the client wants ongoing help.
How long does a threat intelligence platform rollout take?
The rollout length is set in the written scope, not by a fixed rule, so ask each partner for phase-by-phase durations tied to deliverables. A typical sequence covers requirements and sharing policy, infrastructure build, platform installation and hardening, feed onboarding, SIEM connection, analyst training and handover. Timelines grow with the number of integrations, the number of sharing communities, any air-gapped or data residency constraints, and how quickly your change approvals run. Feed onboarding often takes longer than the technical install, because each source needs validation before it reaches detection. Confirm the start conditions in the scope, including access to cloud accounts, network paths, identity provider configuration and named reviewers.
What does our security and platform staff need to provide during the project?
Expect to supply a named technical owner, an analyst who understands your detection workflow, and a platform or infrastructure contact who can approve hosting, network rules and backup targets. Security staff must define which indicator types matter, which sources are trusted, how long indicators should live, and what can be shared externally. Platform staff provide virtual machines or Kubernetes capacity, storage, DNS, certificates, and a path to the SIEM. Ask for a RACI (responsible, accountable, consulted, informed) table in the scope so each deliverable has one owner on each side. Plan for these people to be available in review sessions, not only at kickoff, because most rework comes from unclear sharing and retention decisions.
Should we choose MISP or OpenCTI for our threat intelligence platform?
MISP is a mature open source threat intelligence and sharing platform licensed under AGPL-3.0, and it fits teams that focus on indicator sharing, event exchange and communities. OpenCTI, maintained by Filigran, is built around a knowledge graph of threat actors, campaigns, malware and relationships, and its Community Edition is licensed under Apache License 2.0. Choose MISP when sharing with peers and sector communities is the main goal. Choose OpenCTI when analysts need to model relationships and track adversary activity over time. Many organizations evaluate both against a few real use cases from their own alerts before committing. Check the current versions on the project repositories, since both move quickly.
Do enterprise editions or paid threat feeds add cost we should plan for?
Yes, they can. OpenCTI ships an Enterprise Edition under a separate OpenCTI Enterprise Edition License, so confirm which features your requirements depend on and whether they are in the Community Edition. Commercial threat feeds, premium sharing communities and vendor connectors are separate contracts with their own fees and terms, and they often recur every year. Some open source components include enterprise directories with separate licences, so check the license file for any component you plan to use. Ask each partner and vendor to list every licence, subscription and feed that the design needs, with the term, renewal date and who holds the contract. Also confirm whether the design depends on any feed that restricts redistribution, because that affects what you can share.
What ongoing feed curation effort should we expect after go-live?
Feed curation is the recurring work that keeps indicators useful. Analysts review new sources, retire feeds that create noise, tune expiry and scoring, and check that enrichment and false positive rules still match your environment. The effort rises with the number of feeds, the rate of indicator churn, and how many alerts reach your SIEM from intelligence matches. Agree on a review cadence, owner and metrics in the scope, such as how many indicators reach analysts and how many are closed as false positives. Ask the partner whether curation is included in support, or whether it is a separate retainer, and what happens when a feed changes its format or licence.
How DeployOpen works on this
DeployOpen plans, implements, customizes, integrates, hardens, backs up, documents and supports self-hosted open-source platforms inside your own cloud accounts, data centers or air-gapped networks. For a threat intelligence platform, that means a written scope covering which feeds, sharing communities and SIEM connections are in play before any infrastructure is built.
How we scope
- Agree in writing which intelligence sources, sharing communities and internal teams the platform will serve.
- Confirm whether MISP, OpenCTI or both fit, including the OpenCTI Community Edition or Enterprise Edition decision.
- Document the SIEM connection points, data retention expectations and who curates indicators after go-live.
How we build
- Deploy the chosen platform in your environment with hardened configuration, access controls and encrypted storage.
- Build feed ingestion, enrichment and export workflows, then test indicator flow into the SIEM with representative data.
- Run security testing against the platform and its APIs before handover, and record the results in the engagement documentation.
How we hand over
- Deliver architecture diagrams, runbooks for feed onboarding, backup and upgrade procedures, and access configuration records.
- Walk your analysts and platform engineers through indicator curation, sharing rules and troubleshooting.
- Provide evidence artifacts that show how the platform was configured, tested and operated, for your own audit preparation.
How we support
- Offer ongoing support, upgrades and continuous testing as a retainer after the fixed-scope engagement ends.
- Track upstream releases of the platform and its dependencies, and plan upgrades with your change process.
- Ask any partner to confirm response expectations, upgrade cadence and who holds administrator credentials in writing.

