Private PKI RFP questions

Questions to put to PKI vendors and implementation partners on key ceremonies, HSM support, automation, revocation, migration, lifetimes and support, with what good answers contain and the red flags to watch for.

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Private PKI RFP questions to ask before you choose a vendor or partner

This section gives a regulated organization a way to compare open-source builds, implementation partners and managed services on equal terms when it needs a private certificate authority. Write the requirements first, then send the same questions to every bidder, ask each one for evidence rather than assertions, and score the answers against a rubric agreed before the responses arrive. Use the same rubric for a self-built option, so that the internal team is held to the standard it is asking vendors to meet. The questions below apply whether the CA is step-ca, OpenBao PKI or FreeIPA Dogtag. Each platform handles issuance, storage and revocation differently, so the answers will differ, but the questions do not. Ask every bidder to name the exact product and release they would deploy, then confirm the license terms in the project's own repository, such as the step-ca license file, before accepting any claim about commercial support or redistribution.

Ask for evidence that matches each answer: a sample root key ceremony script, a redacted revocation runbook, a recovery test record and the HSM or cloud KMS configuration the bidder has used before. Confirm with each bidder which items they will deliver as part of the fixed-scope work and which remain the client's responsibility. DeployOpen plans, implements, hardens and documents self-hosted platforms inside the client's own infrastructure and prepares systems and evidence for compliance assessments, but it does not issue audit reports, attestations or certifications. Independent auditors and certification bodies make those determinations, so the RFP should ask every bidder how their evidence will be presented to the assessor, not whether it will pass.

How should the root key ceremony and hierarchy be run?

Who should attend and witness a root key ceremony?

A root key ceremony should have named participants for each role, and the roles should be separate from one another. Typically this includes a ceremony administrator who runs the script, key custodians who hold the activation material, one or more witnesses from security or audit who are not operators, and a recorder who writes the log. Ask each bidder to list the roles, state which people may hold more than one role, and explain how the witness is kept independent of the operators. Confirm whether the witnesses must sign the ceremony record and whether an internal audit or compliance representative must be present for the event.

Should the root certificate authority stay offline?

Yes, in most designs the root CA stays offline and signs only intermediate certificates during ceremonies, which keeps its private key away from any network. The root is brought up only when a new issuing CA is needed, when the root must be renewed or when a revocation must be published. Ask the bidder how the offline machine is built, where its key material is stored between ceremonies, how it is physically secured, and how signed artifacts move to the online systems, for example through removable media with checksums. Also ask what the bidder does if the root must be brought online during an incident.

How should the hierarchy split root and issuing CAs?

A common pattern is an offline root CA that signs one or more online issuing CAs, and the issuing CAs sign end-entity certificates for services, devices and users. Separate issuing CAs can match trust zones, such as internal services, machine identity and staff devices, so that a compromise or a policy change in one does not affect the others. Ask the bidder to draw the hierarchy, state the path length constraints and name the certificate policy each CA enforces. Ask which platform will host each CA, for example step-ca, OpenBao PKI or FreeIPA Dogtag, and how trust is distributed to clients.

How are key custodians chosen and kept accountable?

Key custodians should be chosen by role and clearance, not by convenience, and no single person should be able to activate the root key alone. A dual control model requires a threshold of custodians, such as an M-of-N split of key shares or smart card holders, to be present together. Ask the bidder who selects custodians, how their identity is verified before the ceremony, how their share is stored, how replacements are onboarded when someone leaves, and how rotation of custodians is recorded. Ask whether the custodian list is reviewed on a schedule and who approves changes.

What evidence should a ceremony produce?

A ceremony should produce a written, approved script that lists every step, the expected output of each command and the checks performed. It should also produce a signed log with timestamps, the names of attendees, the hardware and software versions used, the hashes of the artifacts created, and the storage location of each key share. Ask the bidder to show a sample script and log template, explain how the logs are sealed and retained, and state who can access them later. Confirm with your auditors which format they expect before the first ceremony, because the evidence is what assessors review.

How long should the root certificate remain valid?

The root lifetime is a policy decision that should be written into the certificate policy before the root is generated. Longer root lifetimes reduce the number of ceremonies but increase the period a single key must be protected and the difficulty of replacing it when algorithms change. Ask the bidder to propose a root lifetime, a plan for issuing a replacement root before the old one expires, and how the overlap period is handled so that existing services keep trusting certificates during the transition. Ask also how the bidder plans to retire intermediates and how long each issuing CA is expected to remain in service.

Does the bidder provide a written ceremony plan and training?

A credible bidder should deliver a ceremony plan before any key is generated, including a rehearsal on non-production hardware. The plan should cover equipment checks, environment setup, the approval chain, contingency steps if a custodian is unavailable, and the rollback path if a step fails. Ask whether the bidder runs a rehearsal, who trains the custodians and whether that training is repeated for new custodians. Confirm which parts of the plan are delivered as fixed scope and which become recurring work when the root is renewed or a new issuing CA is added.

Can an in-house team run the ceremony without a partner?

An in-house team can run a ceremony if it has trained custodians, a tested script, an offline environment and independent witnesses, but the first ceremony is usually the hardest because the design decisions are made then. Ask yourself whether your organization has staff who can document and rehearse each step and whether the audit function can review the evidence. DeployOpen plans, documents and hardens self-hosted platforms in the client's own environment, and the scope of any PKI engagement is agreed in writing before work starts, so ask for the written scope, deliverables and timeline before deciding on an internal or partner-led ceremony.

Which HSM and key storage options should the proposal support?

An on-premises hardware security module holds the CA private key inside tamper-resistant hardware on your own premises or in your own data center. This option gives the security team direct control over key custody, and it usually carries the most operational work because the HSM, its firmware, its partitions and its administrator cards become part of the CA's lifecycle.

  • Supported models: Require the vendor to list each HSM make, model and firmware version it supports for the step-ca, OpenBao or FreeIPA Dogtag configuration you plan to use. Ask for the exact integration method (PKCS#11 or another interface) and the client library version.
  • Backup and recovery: Ask how key material is backed up, whether it is wrapped under a key that stays in the HSM, who holds the backup cards or credentials, and how a restore is tested before it is needed.
  • Transit protection: Confirm how the CA server authenticates to the HSM, how the connection is encrypted, and where the HSM sits relative to the network segments that reach the CA.
  • Manufacturer confirmation: Require the vendor to provide written confirmation from the HSM manufacturer that the chosen model and firmware work with the CA software and its signing algorithms.

Support for a given HSM must be verified against the current documentation of the CA product and the HSM vendor, not assumed from a general compatibility statement. Ask for the document version and date that the proposal relies on.

Which certificate issuance and renewal paths are automated?

Does step-ca support ACME for automated certificate renewal?

Yes. step-ca is Smallstep's open-source online certificate authority for automated issuance and renewal of private X.509 and SSH certificates, and it supports ACME for automated renewal. Clients that speak ACME, such as common ACME agents and Kubernetes cert-manager, can request and renew certificates without manual steps. Confirm the exact ACME client support you need with the client vendors and test renewal against your own load balancers and appliances before you commit. The step-ca license is Apache-2.0, and the license file is in the smallstep/certificates repository. Ask your implementation partner to show a renewal run for each platform class in your inventory, not only a successful issuance from a test host.

Which platforms can get automated renewal and by which method?

The answer depends on what each platform can run, so ask for a coverage matrix with one row per platform. A typical matrix for a private PKI project lists the following:

  • Web servers and reverse proxies: ACME agent or step client on the host, with a reload hook.
  • Kubernetes ingress and internal services: cert-manager with an ACME or CA issuer, and trust bundles mounted into pods.
  • mTLS service workloads: short-lived certificates from a provisioner, renewed by a sidecar or agent.
  • Network devices: often vendor-specific enrollment, so confirm whether SCEP, EST or an API is supported before you assume automation.
  • Windows and Linux endpoints: FreeIPA certmonger for enrolled Linux hosts, and Windows auto-enrollment only where your domain design supports it.

For each row, record the renewal method, the owner and the failure alert. Gaps in this matrix are where expired certificates usually come from.

How does SCEP or API enrollment work for devices that cannot run an agent?

Devices that cannot run an agent usually enroll through a protocol the device already speaks, or through an API called by a management system. SCEP-style enrollment is common for network gear and mobile devices, while some platforms call a REST API from a provisioning script. Confirm with each device vendor which protocol it supports, which certificate profile it accepts and how it stores the private key. Also confirm whether the enrollment endpoint sits on a network that the device can reach during provisioning. The first sentence of your RFP answer should name the protocol per device model, not a general claim about IoT or appliance support. Ask for the enrollment test results on the hardware you actually run.

How do provisioners control who can request a certificate?

In step-ca, provisioners define how a requester proves identity before the CA signs a certificate. The supported provisioner types include ACME, OIDC, cloud instance identity and JWK, and each one can carry its own policy on names, lifetimes and allowed key usages. A request authorized through OIDC is tied to a person or group in your identity provider, while a cloud instance identity provisioner ties the request to a virtual machine. In OpenBao, the equivalent control is the auth method plus the PKI role that defines allowed domains and TTLs. Ask the partner to document each provisioner or role, who owns it, how it is audited and how a provisioner is revoked when a team changes.

Who is paid for the automation work in a private PKI project?

Costs come from three groups: the software licenses (step-ca and OpenBao are open source, so the license cost is zero for the core product), the infrastructure to run the CA and key protection, and the labor to integrate each platform. The integration labor is the largest and most variable item, because every platform needs its own renewal hook, test and runbook. Your internal team may pay for ongoing renewals, monitoring and certificate lifecycle operations, while an implementation partner is paid for the written scope. DeployOpen implements, integrates and documents self-hosted platforms in your environment under fixed scope agreed in writing. Ask any bidder to price each row of the coverage matrix separately so you can see what automation costs per platform.

What happens when an automated renewal fails?

A failed renewal is only a risk if nobody sees it before expiry. Ask how each path reports failure: ACME client logs, cert-manager status conditions, step-ca audit logs, and an independent expiry monitor that scans the endpoints themselves. The monitor should not depend on the same CA or automation path it is checking. Ask the partner to show the alert chain for one forced failure, including who receives it and how long it takes to reach a person. Also confirm the fallback when the CA is unreachable during renewal, since short lifetimes leave less time to recover. Your RFP should require a written runbook for each platform class.

Can we do the certificate automation ourselves after handover?

Many teams can run renewal automation after handover if the platform classes are few and the runbooks are complete. The skills needed are ACME client configuration, Kubernetes and cert-manager administration, and enough understanding of your provisioners to change policy safely. The harder part is keeping the coverage matrix current as new platforms arrive. Ask the bidder which parts they hand over, what training is included, and whether support or upgrades are offered as a retainer. DeployOpen offers ongoing support, upgrades and continuous testing as retainers, and it documents the systems it builds so your team can operate them. Ask for a handover checklist that names each renewal path, its owner and its test cadence.

How revocation and expiry should be designed

Revocation and expiry are where a private PKI either holds up under pressure or fails quietly. The items below cover how relying parties learn a certificate is no longer valid, how a compromised key is replaced, and how expiry is caught before it causes an outage. Ask each vendor and partner to show these in their design, not just in a feature list.

CRL publication and hosting

A certificate revocation list is only useful if relying parties can download it reliably. Ask where CRLs are published, which URLs are embedded in issued certificates, and how clients inside a segmented network reach them. FreeIPA's documentation says the first server handles certificate renewal and CRL publication by default, so confirm which node is the publisher in a replicated topology and what happens if that node is down. Ask how the CRL update interval is set and how stale CRLs are detected.

OCSP responder availability

An OCSP responder gives a near real-time status answer, but it adds a service that must stay up for validation to succeed. Ask whether the design includes OCSP at all, how many responders run, and whether they sit behind the same load balancing and monitoring as the CA. Ask what relying parties do when the responder cannot be reached, because the answer determines whether an outage blocks logins or only delays them. Ask for the fail-open or fail-closed policy in writing.

Short lifetimes and revocation need

Short-lived certificates reduce how long a stolen certificate remains useful, which can reduce reliance on revocation for some workloads. Ask which certificate classes the vendor proposes to issue with short lifetimes, how renewal is automated for each, and whether revocation is still required for the remaining long-lived certificates. A good answer separates the two groups and states which revocation mechanism covers each one. Ask what happens when renewal fails for a short-lived certificate and how long the workload keeps working.

Compromised key revocation and reissue

When a private key or host is compromised, the team needs a tested path to revoke the old certificate and issue a replacement. Ask for the runbook: who decides to revoke, how the reason code is recorded, how affected certificates are found in the inventory, and how new certificates reach services without a full outage. Ask whether the CA key itself has a documented compromise procedure that includes re-establishing trust across clients and whether that procedure has been rehearsed.

Expiry monitoring and alert routing

Most certificate outages come from expiry that nobody noticed. Ask which inventory feeds the expiry monitor, how far ahead alerts start, and who is paged when a renewal fails or an alert stays open. Ask whether alerts cover certificates issued outside the main CA, such as appliances and vendor-managed endpoints. Request a test showing an alert from the monitor reaching the on-call channel, and ask how the team confirms that the alert path itself is still working.

Revocation testing and evidence

Revocation that has never been exercised is likely to fail when it matters. Ask how the vendor or partner tests CRL and OCSP responses, how often revocation drills run, and what records are kept. The evidence should include test dates, revoked serial numbers, the time to propagate status to relying parties, and any failures with their fixes. Ask the team to show a sample record from a past test. This evidence also supports assessors who review revocation controls.

How to test a migration from an existing CA

A migration from an existing CA should prove, platform by platform, that the new CA issues trusted certificates before any consumer depends on it, and that the old root can be restored if something breaks. The sequence below is what a careful partner should follow and what each step should produce as evidence.

  1. Inventory certificates, chains and consumers

    The partner builds a complete inventory of every certificate issued by the existing CA, including its chain, expiry date, key type, issuing profile and the systems that load it. Discovery should combine CA database exports, network scans of listening services and configuration reviews of load balancers, Kubernetes clusters, endpoints and applications. The step is complete when each certificate has an owner, a consuming system and a documented chain, and when the team can list which trust stores each system relies on. Ask the vendor to show a sample of the inventory format before work starts.

  2. Stand up the new CA in parallel

    The new CA, whether step-ca, OpenBao PKI, FreeIPA Dogtag or another platform, is deployed alongside the existing CA with its own root or an intermediate chained to an approved hierarchy, as agreed in the design. Key custody, HSM or KMS integration and access controls are tested before any certificate is issued. The step closes with a documented test issuance, a successful revocation test and a verified CRL or OCSP response, so the team knows the new CA works before it carries live traffic. Confirm with the vendor who holds the key ceremony records for this stage.

  3. Build trust bundles that keep both roots

    Before any leaf certificate changes, the partner publishes trust bundles that include both the existing root and the new root or intermediate. Each bundle is tested against a representative client on each platform, including mobile devices, legacy operating systems and embedded systems where trust stores are managed separately. The step produces a validated bundle per platform and a record of which clients accept which chain. The old root stays trusted until every consumer is confirmed, so this is the step that prevents a broad outage.

  4. Move issuance platform by platform

    The partner moves issuance for one platform at a time, such as internal web services, Kubernetes ingress, service mesh workloads, VPN gateways or endpoints, starting with a low-impact pilot. Each move switches the automation client to the new CA, confirms a renewal from the new CA completes end to end, and watches for handshake failures in logs. The step is complete for a platform when renewals have succeeded through at least one full cycle and the owner has signed off. Ask the vendor how they define that sign-off and who records it.

  5. Document rollback for each step

    For every platform, the partner writes a rollback procedure that names the configuration to revert, the trust bundle to restore and the person who authorizes the change. Rollback is rehearsed in a test environment before production use, and the rehearsal result is recorded. The output is a runbook that an operator can follow during an incident without the implementation team present. Ask the vendor to describe rollback in writing for each step, including how long a rollback would take to complete in your environment, and to state which steps can be reversed without reissuing certificates.

  6. Handle chains that cannot be reissued

    Some certificates cannot be reissued without downtime, for example embedded devices, appliances with fixed trust stores, or systems where the private key cannot be rotated without a vendor process. The partner should list these in the inventory, then choose a path for each: extend the old chain's validity under the old root where policy allows, install a cross-signed bridge, schedule a maintenance window with the owner, or retire the system. Ask the vendor how they will record the decision, who approves it, and what monitoring confirms the exception does not expire unnoticed.

  7. Retire the old CA's issuance last

    Only after every platform has completed its move and every exception has an approved path does the partner stop issuance from the old CA. The old CA's private key and root remain archived under the agreed custody rules, and the old root stays in trust stores until its last certificate has expired or been replaced. The step closes with a reconciliation report showing that the inventory has no certificates still chained to the retired issuer, and with the archived key records filed for audit. Ask the vendor to confirm how they will provide this reconciliation as a deliverable.

What certificate lifetime strategy fits a private CA?

How should a proposal set certificate lifetimes for TLS, mTLS, SSH and devices?

A sound proposal sets a separate lifetime for each certificate type, based on how the certificate is renewed and what happens if it expires. Ask the bidder to show a table with one row per type and columns for maximum lifetime, renewal trigger, renewal method and owner. Typical patterns are short-lived workload and mTLS certificates renewed automatically, shorter-lived SSH user certificates issued at login, and longer device certificates where the device may have limited connectivity. The proposal should name the exact values it recommends and explain why, rather than a single default applied everywhere.

How do short certificate lifetimes affect dependency on the CA?

Shorter lifetimes reduce the window of exposure for a stolen key, but every renewal depends on the CA being reachable. If the CA or its issuing path fails, certificates that renew often expire sooner in the outage timeline. Ask how the proposal sizes that risk: how long renewals can be deferred, whether issuing CAs run in more than one place, how the CA is backed up and restored, and what the runbook says when renewal fails. Ask for the expected behavior during a CA outage, tested rather than described.

Which renewal automation must cover a short-lifetime design?

Short lifetimes only work when renewal is automated for every certificate that uses them. Ask the bidder to list each platform and certificate type, the protocol used (for example ACME in step-ca, cert-manager issuers, or OpenBao PKI API calls), and the systems that still need manual renewal. Each manual item becomes a fixed expiry risk with an owner. Ask for the coverage percentage the bidder can document from your inventory, and for the list of exceptions with a compensating control for each one.

How is the lifetime policy written into certificate profiles?

The policy should live in the CA configuration, not only in a document. In step-ca, lifetime limits and allowed names are set per provisioner. In OpenBao PKI, they are set on roles. In FreeIPA, certificate profiles govern issuance. Ask the proposal to map each certificate type to its profile, show the configuration keys or role settings that enforce the maximum, and state who may change them and how changes are approved. Ask for a test showing that a request exceeding the limit is refused.

How does the proposal document lifetime rules for assessors?

Assessors look for a written certificate policy or practice statement, a record of how it is enforced, and evidence that it is followed. Ask the bidder to produce a lifetime standard that names each certificate type, its maximum lifetime, renewal method, exception process and review cycle. Ask how issuance logs and inventory exports will show compliance with that standard over time. DeployOpen prepares these controls and evidence for assessment, but auditors and certification bodies issue the findings, so confirm with your auditor which format they expect.

How often should lifetime settings be reviewed after go-live?

Review should happen on a fixed schedule and after any change to the platform, the certificate types or the regulations that apply. Ask the proposal to define the review cadence, the people who sign off, and the data they check, such as expiry reports, renewal failure counts and exception registers. Ask how a lifetime change is rolled out to existing certificates, and whether the plan covers certificates that cannot be renewed automatically. Confirm the cadence against your own internal policy and any framework you are assessed against.

What should a buyer ask a partner to estimate lifetime-related effort?

Effort depends mostly on how many platforms need automated renewal, how many certificate types exist, and how much of the current estate is undocumented. Ask the partner for an itemized estimate covering inventory discovery, automation per platform, CA configuration of profiles and provisioners, monitoring of expiry, and runbooks for renewal failure. Ask which items are one-time and which recur, such as reviews, upgrades and certificate monitoring retainers. Any figure in the quote should trace back to the written scope, and you should ask what changes the price.

Can we run a short-lifetime design ourselves after handover?

Your team can run it if the handover covers the operations that keep renewals working. Ask the partner what runbooks, configuration exports, monitoring dashboards and training are included, and how the CA backup and restore process is tested. Confirm who holds the keys to change profiles and who approves changes. Ask whether ongoing support, upgrades and continuous testing are offered as a retainer, and what that covers for your staff who will own the system day to day.

What operational support and high availability should you require?

A private CA is only as trustworthy as its availability, recoverability and the people who run it. The cards below cover the six areas a bidder should answer in writing, from failover design to the support model, and they connect because a failed node, a bad restore or a slow patch can each lead to expired or untrusted certificates.

High availability for the issuing CA

Ask how the issuing CA behaves when one node fails and how long issuance stays unavailable during failover. Confirm the storage backend and HA mode for the chosen component: for OpenBao, integrated storage (Raft) and PostgreSQL are the officially supported HA backends, with an active node holding a lock and standbys forwarding or redirecting requests. For FreeIPA, ask how many replicas run Dogtag per datacenter and which server handles renewal and CRL publication. Request a written failover test result, not a diagram.

Backup and restore tested on schedule

A backup that has never been restored is an assumption. Ask who runs restore tests, how often, and on which environment, and whether the test covers the CA signing keys, the issuance database and the revocation data. For FreeIPA, ask how the team avoids restoring an outdated backup into an active replica topology, since that can break replication. Require the restore runbook and the date of the most recent successful test in the proposal.

Patching and upgrade procedure

Ask for the written procedure for applying security fixes to the CA software, the auth backends and the operating system, including how a node is drained, patched and returned to service without interrupting issuance. Confirm how the bidder tracks security advisories for each component and how long a critical fix may wait before it is applied. For example, FreeIPA 4.13.4 fixed two CVEs, so a bidder should show how it would have handled a release like that.

Monitoring and on-call coverage

Ask which signals are monitored (issuance errors, failed renewals, CRL publication, replication lag, HSM or KMS reachability and certificate expiry) and who receives each alert. Confirm the hours covered by on-call staff, the escalation path to the CA owner and whether the bidder works in your time zone during an outage. Ask for the alert list and the thresholds used, so you can compare them with your own inventory and expiry policy.

Incident runbooks for CA compromise and outage

Ask for separate runbooks for a suspected compromise of an issuing CA key and for a loss of issuance service. The compromise runbook should cover revocation, CRL distribution, reissuance and trust store changes; the outage runbook should cover fallback issuance, certificate renewal windows and communication. Ask the bidder to walk through both with a tabletop exercise before go-live, and to name who holds authority to declare an incident.

Support model and contract scope

Clarify whether the work is a fixed-scope project, an ongoing retainer or both. A fixed-scope project covers agreed deliverables and timelines set in writing before work starts, while a retainer covers continuing operations, upgrades and support. Ask which parts of the operating model fall under each, who is responsible for key ceremonies and renewal planning after handover, and how the written scope handles new services or platform changes.

What audit evidence should the vendor provide?

The first thing an assessor asks for is the CA policy and certificate practice statement, the document that says which certificates the CA issues, to whom, under which lifetimes and who may approve exceptions. Ask each vendor to show a current version of this pair, and to show how the document maps to the configured profiles in step-ca, OpenBao PKI or FreeIPA Dogtag. A policy that describes a design the running system does not implement is a finding in its own right. Also request the key ceremony records for the root and each issuing CA, including witnesses, the custody arrangement for the HSM or cloud KMS keys, and the signed scripts or checklists used during the ceremony.

Next, ask for the operational records that show the CA was used as documented: the certificate inventory with issuer, subject, serial number, profile, expiry and owner, plus issuance and revocation logs that carry the requester identity and the approval path. Confirm which system is the system of record for each log, how long it is retained and whether a copy leaves the CA host. For access, request the list of CA administrators, the access reviews performed on that list and the evidence of unique user identification for every administrative action. The HIPAA Security Rule at 45 CFR 164.312 requires unique user identification and audit controls for systems holding ePHI, and the FTC Safeguards Rule at 16 CFR 314.4 requires logging of authorized user activity. If the PKI is in scope for either regime, these logs must be designed in from the first day, because retrofitting them after issuance has started leaves gaps that cannot be recovered.

DeployOpen prepares these artifacts, including the policy drafts, ceremony documentation, inventory exports and access review records, so that the environment can be assessed. It does not issue audit reports, attestations or certifications. An independent auditor or certification body decides whether the evidence is sufficient for a given framework. Before signing a contract, ask the vendor which evidence they will hand over at go-live, which they will keep producing during operations and who owns the retention period. Confirm the retention settings for each log in writing with your assessor, because the required period depends on the framework and on your own policy.

How to compare build, partner and managed service answers

When your own team builds the CA, the answers that matter are about capacity and continuity. Your staff will hold the root and issuing keys, run the ceremonies and operate the automation, so the RFP responses you write or receive should show who is accountable for each step after launch. Ask your team to describe the process in its own words rather than citing a tool's feature list.

  • Root key custody: Name the people who can initiate a key ceremony, the witnesses required and where the offline root material is stored and backed up.
  • On-call coverage: State who responds when an issuing CA fails or a renewal job breaks, and whether that person has tested the restore path.
  • Skills and knowledge transfer: Identify which engineers can rebuild the hierarchy from documentation alone, since staff turnover is the most common single point of failure.
  • Exit path: Document how the CA would be replaced or migrated if the chosen software is no longer maintained, including how existing certificates stay trusted during the transition.
  • Key material boundaries: Confirm whether any key or backup leaves the environment, for example to a cloud KMS or an off-site vault, and who approves that.

Check that each answer names a person or role, not only a team, and that the on-call and exit answers have been exercised at least once.

Answers that should worry you

A proposal that answers the questions in this guide with vague language is a warning sign in its own right. The cards below describe the replies that most often hide a design gap, and what to ask for in writing before you shortlist a vendor or partner.

No written ceremony plan

A vendor who says the root key will be generated securely, without a written ceremony plan, has not yet defined who holds which key share, where the ceremony runs, how it is witnessed and what gets recorded. Ask for the ceremony script, the roles, the witness procedure and the evidence package produced at the end. If the root is never meant to touch a network, the plan should say how it is kept offline.

HSM support without a named model

An HSM claim with no supported model listed tells you nothing about whether the CA keys will be protected in hardware as proposed. Ask for the exact device models, firmware versions and integration method, and confirm the vendor has tested them with the CA software in your version. Step-ca can use an HSM, cloud KMS or YubiKey for CA keys, so ask which of these the proposal actually uses.

Automation coverage described as possible

Phrases such as "we can automate that" usually mean a custom script will be written later, not that the platform handles the workload. Ask which platforms, device types and services are automated on day one, which need manual enrollment, and who maintains each integration after handover. Require a list that names each workload, the protocol used (such as ACME) and the renewal owner.

Revocation that has never been tested

If the proposal describes CRL or OCSP publication without a recent test of a revoked certificate being rejected by a real client, revocation is unproven. Ask how revocation is published, where clients fetch it, how long a relying party can accept a revoked certificate, and what happens if the publication point is unreachable inside a segmented network. Request the test record, not a diagram.

Lifetimes without a renewal dependency plan

Short certificate lifetimes are only safe when renewal works reliably. A proposal that sets lifetimes but does not name what depends on renewal, such as the CA, the ACME endpoint, the DNS path and the client agent, leaves expiry as the most likely outage. Ask for the dependency map, the alert thresholds for failed renewals and the fallback plan for a CA outage.

Support without written response commitments

Support described as "included" or "available on request" gives no basis for operational planning. Ask for the support hours, severity definitions, response and restoration targets, who performs CA key operations after a failure, and whether the commitments are in the signed scope. Commitments that are not written into the agreement should not be counted as part of the offer.

No named components or versions

A proposal that refers to "our PKI stack" without naming the CA software, its version, the database or storage backend and the client agents cannot be assessed or patched. Ask for a bill of materials with exact product names, versions, licenses and the upgrade path. For example, a proposal built on FreeIPA should state the release line and the Dogtag component it relies on.

How to score PKI vendor and partner responses

This table sets out the criteria, weights and full-mark evidence for scoring PKI vendor and implementation partner responses. Fix the weights before responses arrive, and read each partial answer against the full-mark column to see what is still missing. Full marks should only be awarded when the response includes written evidence, since a verbal assurance on key ceremony or revocation design rarely survives an assessor's review.

CriterionWeightWhat full marks requireWhat a partial answer looks like
Root key ceremonyHighWritten ceremony script, named roles with separation of duties, witnessed key generation, signed ceremony log and offline storage of the rootSays keys are generated securely but offers no script, witness model or record of past ceremonies
Key storage and HSM supportHighNamed HSM or cloud KMS models, FIPS or equivalent validation status stated by the vendor, documented key backup and recovery, and a clear statement of where CA keys liveLists HSM support as a feature without naming supported devices, or leaves backup and recovery of CA keys undescribed
Automation coverageHighIssuance and renewal through ACME, API and native agents for each platform in the inventory, with a tested list of supported clients and a plan for the restCovers web servers and Kubernetes only, with manual steps for network devices, legacy Windows services and appliances
Revocation designHighDocumented CRL and OCSP publication, distribution paths reachable from every client, a tested revocation procedure and a stated plan for clients that cannot reach revocation servicesMentions revocation exists but does not explain how relying parties check status or how a compromised device is removed
Migration from an existing CAMediumInventory-based migration plan, dual trust period, certificate re-issuance order, handling of existing chains and a rollback path, with examples from comparable estatesOffers to import certificates without addressing trust store changes, overlapping chains or the old CA's continued revocation duties
Certificate lifetime strategyMediumLifetime per certificate class with reasons, renewal windows tied to automation, and a plan to shorten lifetimes over time as renewal is provenUses one default lifetime for every certificate class without stating how renewal failures are caught before expiry
Operational support and evidenceMediumNamed runbooks for CA outage, key rotation and incident response, monitoring and expiry alerts, audit log retention, and sample evidence packs an assessor can reviewOffers support hours or generic SLAs without runbooks, sample logs or a described handover from build to run

What buyers ask before hiring outside help for private PKI

Before engaging a partner, most buyers want to know how much effort the work takes and what drives it. The honest answer is that effort follows the shape of the environment, not the name of the CA software. The main drivers are the number of platforms that need certificates (Kubernetes clusters, load balancers, Linux hosts, network devices, endpoints), the HSM choice for the root and issuing keys, the depth of the hierarchy (one root with one issuing tier, or an offline root with several subordinate CAs), and the migration scope if certificates already exist under another CA. Each platform adds its own enrollment path, trust distribution and renewal test. Ask the partner to break the estimate down by these drivers in the written scope, and to state which assumptions the figure depends on.

Internal staff can run a private PKI themselves, but the skills needed are specific: key ceremony discipline, certificate profile design, revocation and CRL distribution, backup and restore of CA keys, and incident response for a compromised issuing CA. Check whether your team has done a root key ceremony with documented witnesses, and whether anyone can restore a CA from backup in a test environment within a defined window. Also confirm who is on call when an automated renewal fails. A partner can build the system and train operators, but ongoing ownership stays with your organization unless you contract a retainer for support and upgrades.

A fixed-scope engagement runs to a timeline agreed in writing before work starts, and that plan should list the phases, the environments touched and the acceptance tests for each. Ask for the milestones that depend on your side, such as access approvals and change windows, because those often set the pace more than the build itself. Before the work starts, the client typically needs to supply a certificate inventory or a discovery scan of current certificates, network paths between the CA, the platforms and the monitoring tools, named owners for each platform, and approved change windows for trust store updates and cutovers. Request a written scope and quote that states what is included, what is excluded, and which client inputs must arrive by which date.

How DeployOpen scopes, delivers and supports PKI evaluations and implementation

DeployOpen plans, implements, integrates, hardens, documents and supports self-hosted open-source platforms inside your own cloud accounts, data centers or air-gapped networks. For private PKI RFP questions, we turn your answers into a written scope with named deliverables before any build work starts.

How we scope

  • Map your hierarchy, key custody and HSM requirements to a written scope before any platform is chosen
  • Agree which PKI tools, issuance protocols and client platforms are in scope, with each one named
  • Set out how revocation, audit logging and lifetime policy will be documented and tested in the agreement

How we build

  • Deploy the chosen CA platform inside your environment, including root key ceremony support and HSM or KMS key storage
  • Wire ACME, cert-manager or API issuance into the platforms you named, and test renewal and revocation end to end
  • Document configuration, runbooks and evidence as the build proceeds so assessors can trace each control

How we hand over

  • Deliver the design, configuration records, runbooks and test results listed in the signed scope
  • Walk your operations and security teams through issuance, renewal, revocation and CA recovery procedures
  • Prepare the control and evidence set for your auditors, who remain the party that issues any report or attestation

How we support

  • Engagements are fixed-scope, so changes to hierarchy, lifetimes or platforms go through a written change request
  • Ongoing upgrades, monitoring and continuous testing are available as a retainer after handover
  • Confirm response expectations, maintenance windows and escalation paths in the agreement before work begins

Talk to our team.

Tell us what you're working on, whether it's a deployment, an audit, a security test or a cyber range. You'll speak with an engineer who can help you scope it.

  • 30-minute call: free, with no obligation.
  • NDA on request: we can sign before you share details.
  • Clear next steps: a scope and plan after the call.