Open source SSO for HIPAA access controls

Self-hosted Keycloak or authentik can carry the HIPAA Security Rule access control safeguards across clinical applications, but the rule sets outcomes, not products. This page maps each requirement to configuration, evidence and gaps.

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How open source SSO supports HIPAA access control for open source SSO HIPAA programs

If you are a covered entity or business associate running clinical applications that need a shared login layer, the question is which HIPAA technical safeguards an identity provider can carry. Under 45 CFR 164.312, access control requires unique user identification, emergency access procedures, automatic logoff and person or entity authentication. Keycloak or authentik can carry the login, session and authentication parts of that list, but they do not satisfy the rule on their own. The Security Rule is risk-based, so you must assess your own systems and document how each implementation specification is met. There is no HIPAA certification for a product or deployment, and a vendor claim of 'HIPAA compliant' should prompt questions rather than acceptance.

Start by mapping each clinical application to one account store. Unique user identification under 164.312(a)(2)(i) means every person gets a unique name or number in the identity provider, with no shared clinical logins, and the sub claim and username policy need to be fixed before onboarding. Automatic logoff under 164.312(a)(2)(iii) is set through session idle and maximum lifetime settings in the realm or tenant, and the rule leaves the timeout value to you, so record the value you chose and why. Emergency access is a procedure, not a product feature: decide which break-glass accounts exist, how they are issued, and how their use is logged. Person or entity authentication under 164.312(d) is where multi-factor policy and phishing-resistant methods come in, and the addressable and required status of each specification determines what you must document.

Confirm three things with your vendor and internal teams before you commit. First, whether the identity provider's audit events and admin changes can feed your audit controls under 164.312(b), since the identity provider does not cover that safeguard alone. Second, whether your clinical applications support OIDC or SAML at all, because legacy applications often do not. Third, how upgrades and security patches are tested for a system that holds access rights to ePHI. Current release details for Keycloak and the authentik security policy should be checked on the day you plan the build. For the wider requirements, the NIST SP 800-66 Rev. 2 guide gives sample questions for each standard, and it is informational, not legally binding.

Which HIPAA access control requirements SSO must satisfy and how to configure them

This table maps each HIPAA Security Rule access control requirement to what the identity provider must do and how to configure Keycloak or authentik for it. Read each row as a question to answer in your design and in your documentation, since the rule sets the outcome and the configuration supplies the evidence.

RequirementWhat the identity provider must doHow to configure it in Keycloak or authentik
Access control, 45 CFR 164.312(a)(1)Allow only persons or software programs granted access rights under 164.308(a)(4) to reach systems holding ePHIMap roles to clinical applications as separate clients, assign access through groups, and remove access through directory or lifecycle changes so ePHI systems are reachable only by granted users
Unique user identification, 164.312(a)(2)(i), requiredGive each workforce member one unique name or number that follows them across every clinical applicationUse one user object per person in a single realm or tenant, disable shared accounts, and make the username or identifier immutable in the directory feeding the provider
Automatic logoff, 164.312(a)(2)(iii), addressableTerminate sessions after a predetermined period of inactivity, with the period chosen by the covered entity and documentedSet idle and maximum session lifetimes per realm or client in Keycloak, or per flow and session settings in authentik, and document the chosen values and rationale
Person or entity authentication, 164.312(d), requiredVerify that the person or entity seeking access is the one claimed before granting access to ePHIRequire password plus MFA for clinical clients through a browser flow or authentication flow, and confirm which second factor types the program accepts in your own policy
Emergency access procedure, 164.312(a)(2)(ii), requiredKeep ePHI reachable during an outage or emergency through a defined, tested procedurePlan break-glass accounts held outside normal MFA enrollment, store credentials under dual control, log every use, and test the procedure against a documented runbook
Addressable status and documentation, 164.306(d)Assess whether each addressable specification is reasonable and appropriate, implement it if so, and document the reason and any equivalent measure if notRecord the assessment for automatic logoff and any MFA or session choices, and keep configuration exports and change records as evidence of the decision
Audit of identity activity, supporting 164.312(b)Record logins, failed attempts, admin changes and session events so activity can be examinedEnable event and admin event logging in Keycloak, or the event and audit features in authentik, forward logs to your log platform, and confirm retention with your compliance lead

Keycloak or authentik: which fits which clinical environment

Keycloak and authentik can both sit in front of clinical applications, but they differ in licensing, directory federation, database design and which HIPAA-relevant controls need an enterprise license. The cards below set out where each fits and what to verify against the EHR's protocol needs and your own hosting model.

Keycloak for large federated estates

Keycloak is licensed under Apache-2.0 and supports OpenID Connect, OAuth 2.0 and SAML 2.0, plus LDAP and Active Directory user federation. Hospitals with an existing Active Directory forest and several SAML-based clinical applications usually map most naturally to this model. Check the supported production databases (PostgreSQL 14 to 18 is listed, along with others) and confirm that your high availability design uses a synchronously replicated database, which Keycloak requires for its supported clustered designs.

authentik for smaller, PostgreSQL-only deployments

authentik's core is MIT licensed, with enterprise code in a separate directory under its own license. Since the 2025.10 release, authentik runs without Redis and keeps caching, tasks and sessions in PostgreSQL, which simplifies the component list for a clinic or practice group. Docker Compose is positioned for test setups and small-scale production, so a multi-site health system should validate a Kubernetes or highly available design before committing to it.

Enterprise-only controls to price in

Several controls that HIPAA-focused buyers often ask for sit in the authentik enterprise tier, including enhanced audit logging, mTLS client certificate authentication, password history and Microsoft Entra ID or Google Workspace integrations. Ask whether audit logs will be retained and exported in a form your compliance team can use as evidence for access control review. Confirm current feature availability and license terms directly with the vendor before the design is fixed.

Emergency access and session controls

HIPAA expects emergency access procedures and electronic session termination after inactivity, but it leaves the timeout value to the covered entity. Keycloak realm settings and authentik flows both handle idle and maximum session lifetimes, and clinical workstations may need shorter or context-specific rules. Test how each platform handles a break-glass account, how it is logged and how it is disabled after use before you choose the product.

Protocol coverage for EHR and clinical apps

Before choosing either platform, list each clinical application and the protocol it supports: SAML 2.0, OpenID Connect, LDAP bind or a vendor-specific connector. Keycloak has broad protocol coverage, while authentik documents provider types for OAuth2/OIDC, SAML, LDAP, proxy and RADIUS. Where an EHR or medical device needs a protocol neither covers well, ZITADEL, Ory or FreeIPA are alternatives to evaluate, and each needs the same test against your applications.

Patching and upgrade discipline

Keycloak plans four minor releases a year and states that breaking changes in minor releases are opt-in, while the Operator documentation strongly recommends manual approval for operator updates. authentik supports only the 2026.5.x and 2026.8.x lines for security fixes and announces security releases at least 24 hours in advance. Your change process should cover testing each release in a non-production realm or tenant, reviewing schema migration (automatic by default in Keycloak) and scheduling downtime windows.

How clinical applications and shared workstations change the access design

The first design decision is that clinical applications do not all speak the same protocols, so the identity provider must be planned per application before any rollout date is set. Modern EHR front ends and many web-based clinical tools can sign in over SAML 2.0 or OpenID Connect, which Keycloak and authentik both support. Imaging viewers, pharmacy systems and older thick clients are often different: some rely on LDAP binds, some authenticate against a local database, and some cannot be pointed at an external identity provider at all. Inventory each application's authentication method, whether it accepts a federated login, and whether it stores a local account that must be mapped to a single unique user ID under 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(i). Applications that keep local accounts are where unique identification most often breaks down, so record them as exceptions with a named owner and a retirement or wrapping plan.

Shared workstations change how the session timeout works. The Security Rule requires electronic procedures that end a session after a predetermined time of inactivity under 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(iii), but it does not set the number. That value is yours to set through your own risk analysis under 45 CFR 164.306, and it should be tested against real clinical workflows. A timeout that is too short pushes staff toward sharing credentials or leaving sessions open, while one that is too long leaves patient data exposed at a nursing station. Consider separate policies for shared endpoints, such as a short idle lock combined with fast user switching at the desktop level, and confirm with the application vendors that a session in one clinical app ends when the identity provider session ends. Document the chosen values and the reasoning, because the auditor will look for the analysis, not the number.

Emergency access, often called break-glass access, is required under 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(ii) and needs to be designed with logging and review from the start. Keycloak and authentik can hold a small set of emergency accounts that bypass normal workflows, but those accounts should be tied to a documented procedure, stored under controlled custody, and enabled only when needed. Every use should generate an alert and an audit record, and a named reviewer should examine it after the event. Confirm with your identity team how each platform's admin and audit events are exported to your logging system, because a break-glass login that cannot be traced to a person or a reason will fail the review. Test the procedure during a planned exercise so that the first real use is not the first time anyone has seen it.

What auditors and OCR ask for as evidence of access control

What exports prove unique user identification in Keycloak or authentik?

Export the user directory and show that every clinical user has a single account with a unique username or identifier, with no shared or generic logins. Under 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(i), the rule requires a unique name and/or number for identifying and tracking user identity, so the export should list accounts, their source (local, LDAP or Active Directory federation), and their status. Pair it with the process that creates, disables and removes accounts. Keycloak user federation and authentik directory sources both make this list reproducible, and you should confirm the exact export method for your chosen version in its documentation before you rely on it.

Which realm, client and provider configurations should we keep for auditors?

Keep dated exports of the configuration that decides who can reach each clinical application and how they prove identity. For Keycloak, this means realm settings and client definitions for every application that handles ePHI, including redirect URIs and protocol type (OpenID Connect or SAML 2.0). For authentik, it means the provider and application objects that bind each clinical system to a flow. Store these exports under change control so you can show what was in place on a given date. Version-controlled configuration makes comparisons between periods straightforward.

How do MFA and session timeout policies show up as evidence?

Export the authentication flow, MFA policy and session settings, then document the inactivity time you chose. The HIPAA rule at 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(iii) requires electronic procedures that end a session after a predetermined time of inactivity, but it does not set that time, so the value and its rationale belong in your own policy. Show which applications enforce MFA, which roles are exempt and why, and when the settings last changed. Confirm with your identity vendor how idle and maximum session lifetimes are expressed in your version, because that determines what the export contains.

Which admin event and audit logs do OCR reviewers expect to see?

Reviewers look for records that show who changed access, when, and from where, along with login activity for ePHI systems. The Security Rule's audit controls standard in 45 CFR 164.312(b) asks entities to record and examine activity in systems containing ePHI, so keep administrative event logs for realm, client, user and policy changes and authentication event logs for logins and failures. Ship them to a log store outside the identity server so an administrator cannot alter them silently. Decide how long you retain them and who reviews them, and record that decision. Confirm which event types your version logs and which need enabling.

What emergency access documentation and test records are required?

Provide a written emergency access procedure, evidence that it was tested, and records of each use. The rule at 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(ii) requires an emergency access procedure to obtain necessary ePHI during an emergency, and it is a required specification. Document how break-glass accounts are created, who holds them, how credentials are stored and sealed, how use is detected and reviewed, and when they are disabled afterward. Test records should show the date, scope, participants and outcome of each drill, and any gaps found. Confirm the exact emergency account options in your identity platform before writing the procedure.

How do we document addressable specification decisions and the risk analysis?

Record, for each addressable specification, whether it is reasonable and appropriate, what you implemented, and why. Under 45 CFR 164.306(d)(3), an entity must assess whether an addressable specification is reasonable and appropriate, implement it if so, and otherwise document the reason and implement an equivalent alternative if reasonable. For this topic, automatic logoff and encryption and decryption are addressable, so their decisions need written justification. Link each decision to your risk analysis and risk management records, since OCR will look for that connection. NIST SP 800-66 Rev. 2 offers sample questions you can use to test whether the documentation is complete.

Who enforces HIPAA access control, and what do these exports prove?

The HHS Office for Civil Rights enforces the Security Rule through complaint investigations, compliance reviews and audits, and it can request documentation during any of them. The exports described here are prepared evidence that your controls exist and were operated, not an audit report, attestation or certification. HHS states that no Security Rule standard requires certification and that it does not recognize private certifications. An independent assessor can review the same evidence, and DeployOpen can prepare the systems, controls and evidence for that review, but it does not issue audit reports or certifications.

Can our own team produce this evidence on a schedule?

Yes, if the exports are scripted, stored under change control and assigned an owner. The main effort is recurring: exporting configurations, reviewing logs, running emergency access drills and refreshing risk decisions when systems change. A one-time setup covers the export tooling, the evidence folder structure and the written procedures. Ask any implementation partner which exports they will build, how often they will run, and which parts remain your staff's responsibility. Cost depends on the number of clinical applications, the size of the directory and how many people review the output.

What the identity provider alone does not satisfy

Keycloak or authentik can carry much of the access control work for HIPAA, but several Security Rule expectations sit outside the identity provider. The cards below cover the gaps that clinical programs most often find after go-live, and each one needs an owner before the rollout is called complete.

Application-level audit review

The Security Rule requires audit controls that record and examine activity in systems containing ePHI (45 CFR 164.312(b)). An identity provider logs sign-ins, but it does not show which patient records a clinician opened inside the EHR. Confirm which application logs feed your review process, who reviews them, and how often. Ask each clinical application owner whether it records record-level access and can forward those events to your log platform.

Joiner, mover and leaver provisioning

Unique user identification only works if each account maps to one person and is removed when that person leaves. Keycloak and authentik can federate directories, but they do not decide who is a clinician, a contractor or a former employee. Document the authoritative HR source, the deprovisioning SLA your policy sets, and how role changes such as transfers are propagated to each clinical application. Identity governance tooling may be needed when volume or reviews grow.

Business associate agreements

Covered entities and business associates must comply with the Security Rule for ePHI (45 CFR 164.302), and vendors that host or administer your identity stack or clinical apps may handle ePHI. Your self-hosted identity provider changes who touches the data, so confirm that each vendor, support partner and subcontractor with access to logs or configuration is covered by a business associate agreement where required. Legal counsel should confirm the scope, not the implementation team.

EHR role and permission configuration

Single sign-on proves who the user is, but the EHR decides what that user may do. Clinical roles, break-glass procedures and department-level access often live inside the application, outside the identity provider. Map each IdP group or claim to an application role, and have clinical informatics and compliance sign off on the mapping. Test that a group change in the directory actually removes EHR privileges, not just the login.

Workstation and device controls

Shared workstations, kiosks and mobile devices affect automatic logoff and session termination under 45 CFR 164.312(a)(2)(iii). The identity provider can set idle timeouts, but the rule does not set the time, and a session left open on a shared device may still be exposed. Define the inactivity period in your policy, configure it in the IdP and at the application or desktop layer, and test fast user switching on the devices clinicians actually use.

Risk analysis and the 2025 proposed revision

The addressable specifications require a documented assessment of whether each measure is reasonable and appropriate (45 CFR 164.306(d)), so your risk analysis must record why the chosen IdP configuration fits your environment. HHS proposed a major Security Rule revision on January 6, 2025 (90 FR 898), and as of October 2026 no final rule has been published. Keep the analysis current, track the rulemaking, and plan for updated expectations on MFA and asset inventory.

How much does HIPAA SSO cost and how long does it take

What does a self-hosted HIPAA SSO project cost?

No public price applies to this work, and DeployOpen does not publish a price list. Cost comes from the written scope, which fixes the number of clinical applications, directories, protocols and environments. The main components are the identity platform infrastructure and database, integration effort per application, MFA rollout, testing, documentation and support. Keycloak is licensed under Apache 2.0 and authentik's core is under MIT, so the software itself has no license fee for the core features. Paid editions carry their own cost. The authentik pricing page lists Enterprise at $5 per user per month billed annually plus $0.02 per external user per month, and it reserves features such as mTLS client certificate authentication and enhanced audit logging for that edition. Ask every bidder to separate one-time build costs from recurring costs.

How long does a HIPAA SSO implementation take?

No duration applies to every organization, so the timeline depends on the scope agreed in writing before work starts. The biggest variables are how many clinical applications need SSO, how many use SAML, OpenID Connect or neither, and how many directories must be federated. A pilot with a few applications on a single directory is much shorter than a phased rollout across an EHR, imaging, pharmacy and reporting tools on shared workstations. Testing and change control in clinical environments usually add time. Ask the partner to present the timeline as phases with named exit criteria, and to state which applications are excluded from the first phase.

Which factors make HIPAA SSO effort go up?

Effort rises with the number of clinical applications, the share of legacy systems without modern login support, and the number of directories and identity sources. Each application needs its own protocol configuration, attribute mapping and test cases, so a large EHR estate costs more than a handful of web tools. Legacy systems that only accept local accounts, or that use LDAP binds or fixed service accounts, often need a gateway, a proxy or a decision to keep them out of scope. Multiple Active Directory forests, HR-driven provisioning and high availability requirements also add work. Shared workstation behavior, such as fast user switching and emergency access, needs separate design and testing in each clinical workflow.

Can our internal team build HIPAA SSO without a partner?

An internal team can build it if it has engineers who know the chosen platform, can run it in production and can maintain the integrations over time. Keycloak documents three high availability architectures and requires a synchronously replicated database for the supported designs, so the platform team must own database operations, upgrades and monitoring. Keycloak also recommends manual approval for operator updates, which means someone must review each release. Teams often underestimate the application integration work and the documentation that a risk analysis and audit will request. Estimate the internal hours against your own staffing, and compare them with a fixed-scope quote that lists the same deliverables.

What does the work need from our clinical and IT teams?

The work needs named clinical owners for each application, who confirm workflows, roles and acceptable session behavior at shared workstations. It needs read access to the directories and identity sources, plus a sandbox or test environment for each clinical application. The risk analysis inputs are important: the asset inventory, the list of systems that hold ePHI, the current access model and the known gaps. Security and compliance leads must agree on the unique user identification scheme, the emergency access procedure and the inactivity timeout values, since the HIPAA rule leaves the timeout to the covered entity. Without these inputs, the partner cannot produce a reliable scope or test plan.

What recurs after HIPAA SSO goes live?

Recurring costs include the infrastructure and database hosting, backups, monitoring, patching and upgrades, and the staff or partner time needed to handle onboarding, offboarding and new application integrations. Paid editions or per-user subscriptions recur if you choose them. Keycloak releases four minor versions a year, and authentik publishes security releases with at least 24 hours of notice, so routine maintenance is ongoing. One-time costs include the initial architecture, integration of each application, MFA enrollment design, testing, evidence preparation and documentation. Ask whether ongoing support is a retainer and what it covers, including upgrade testing and after-hours response.

What should we ask for in a fixed-scope HIPAA SSO quote?

Ask for a written scope that lists each clinical application, its protocol, its directory source and its test environment, plus the applications excluded from the first phase. The quote should separate one-time work from recurring support, and it should name deliverables such as architecture documentation, configuration exports, test evidence, runbooks and the access control procedure text. Confirm who handles the MFA rollout, the emergency access test and the automatic logoff test, and whether those tests run in production or in staging. Request the acceptance criteria, the change control process and what happens if a legacy application cannot integrate. Compare bids on the same scope list, not on headline totals.

Does DeployOpen certify HIPAA compliance after SSO is deployed?

No. HHS states that no Security Rule standard requires certification and that it does not endorse private certifications, so a vendor or partner cannot provide HIPAA certification. DeployOpen prepares systems, controls and evidence for compliance assessments, including configuration exports and test records that support access control requirements. Independent auditors and certification bodies issue audit reports and attestations, and OCR enforces the Security Rule through complaints, compliance reviews and audits. Use the engagement to produce evidence that your own compliance program can review, and confirm with your privacy and compliance counsel what documentation your organization must keep.

How much effort does a HIPAA SSO pilot take compared with the full rollout?

A pilot covers a small set of applications, one directory and the core SSO and MFA settings, so it validates the platform before large scope is committed. The full rollout adds the remaining applications, legacy workarounds, clinical training, shared workstation testing and the documentation set. Effort rarely scales in a straight line, because the first integrations establish patterns, and later integrations are often faster if the applications share protocols. The pilot's results should show how many applications need custom work and which ones need a different approach. Ask the partner to include a pilot exit review in the written scope so the second phase is priced from real findings.

How a HIPAA-scoped SSO rollout is sequenced

The sequence moves from defining which clinical systems and users fall under the Security Rule to a tested identity provider, a proven pilot, enforced MFA and break-glass access, and a documented record that each access control works as described.

  1. Set scope and risk inputs first

    Start by identifying which systems create, receive, maintain or transmit ePHI and which workforce groups need access to them, using the entity's existing risk analysis and the access rules under 45 CFR 164.308(a)(4). The organization's security and privacy leads own the scope, and DeployOpen's role is to turn that input into a written boundary for the identity project. The step is done when the in-scope application list, user populations and risk findings are signed off and every ePHI system has a named owner.

  2. Inventory applications and map protocols

    Record every clinical and supporting application in scope, including the protocol it supports (SAML, OpenID Connect, LDAP or none), how it stores local accounts, and whether it can enforce session timeouts. Applications with no federation support are flagged early because they usually need a proxy, a local-login exception or a replacement decision. The step closes with a protocol map and an exception register, reviewed by the application owners and the clinical informatics team.

  3. Build the identity provider with high availability

    Deploy Keycloak or authentik in the organization's own infrastructure, choose a production database supported for the chosen product, and design the cluster or failover layout before any clinical login depends on it. For Keycloak, the high availability guidance requires a synchronously replicated database for supported multi-site designs. The step is complete when the environment runs in a non-production copy, backups and restore have been tested, and upgrade and patch procedures are written down.

  4. Pilot with one clinical unit

    Enroll a single clinical unit with a limited set of applications, including shared-workstation scenarios where users sign in and out during a shift. Measure failed logins, session behavior, time-outs and help desk tickets, and record how each unique user identity maps to the existing account in the source directory. Pilot exit criteria should be agreed in writing with the clinical lead before the pilot starts. The pilot is done when the criteria are met and the findings have been fed back into configuration.

  5. Enforce MFA and break-glass access

    Roll out multi-factor authentication for the in-scope population, then define and test emergency access procedures that let authorized staff reach ePHI when the identity provider or MFA service is unavailable. Break-glass accounts are stored under dual control, used only under logged conditions and reviewed after each use. The step is complete when a documented test has shown that emergency access works, every break-glass use creates an alert, and the procedure is approved by the compliance owner.

  6. Cut over in phases and retire local logins

    Move applications to federated login in waves, based on the protocol map and the pilot results, and keep rollback steps ready for each wave. As each application goes live, disable or restrict its local accounts so that only the designated emergency accounts remain outside the identity provider. The step is done when the application inventory shows each in-scope system federated or on a recorded exception, and local account lists have been reviewed and cleared.

  7. Capture evidence for the Security Rule file

    Export the configuration, user identifier rules, MFA policies, session settings, emergency access records and audit logs that show each access control in operation, and store them with dated change records. These artifacts support the entity's own documentation under the Security Rule and reflect the NIST SP 800-66 Rev. 2 guidance on implementing the standards. Confirm with legal and the compliance lead which records they require, since no HIPAA certification exists and DeployOpen prepares evidence without issuing any attestation.

Documenting addressable specifications and the risk analysis

Automatic logoff and encryption are both addressable, so the entity must decide whether each is reasonable and appropriate and write that decision down. Under 45 CFR 164.306(d), the assessment is the entity's own: it weighs the workstation and clinical application setup, who shares devices, and the risk to ePHI. If automatic logoff is reasonable, record the inactivity timeout chosen for each client and where it is enforced, for example the Keycloak realm session settings or the authentik session and flow configuration, plus the matching application or workstation lock. The rule sets no timeout value, so the number and its rationale belong in the record. If it is not reasonable for a given system, document why and describe an equivalent alternative measure, such as a shorter token lifetime or a forced re-authentication on sensitive screens, and show that the alternative is reasonable and appropriate.

Encryption and decryption is the second addressable specification and follows the same test. For an identity provider, the records should show how TLS protects the login and token traffic, how the database and backups are protected, and what happens to any local key material. Confirm each setting against the deployed configuration rather than relying on the design document. The same method applies to the risk analysis that the Security Rule requires, which should name the SSO systems, the clinical applications that trust them, and the decisions above. NIST SP 800-66 Rev. 2 is a useful informational guide for structuring these questions, with key activities and sample questions for each standard. It is not legally binding, and HHS treats it as guidance only.

Keep this documentation as the entity's own work product. No HIPAA certification exists: HHS states that no Security Rule standard requires certifying compliance and does not endorse or recognize private certifications, so a vendor or implementation partner cannot supply one. DeployOpen can prepare configuration exports, test evidence and decision records for your review, but the assessment and sign-off stay with your compliance and security leaders, and an independent auditor or OCR review would judge the result. Ask any partner to deliver the records in a form your team can maintain and update when the configuration or the Security Rule changes.

How DeployOpen scopes and delivers HIPAA-aligned SSO

DeployOpen plans, implements, integrates, hardens, documents and supports self-hosted open-source identity platforms inside the client's own infrastructure. For HIPAA access controls, we start from the written scope of which clinical applications, directories and access paths the identity provider must cover, then build and document the controls so the covered entity can assess them. DeployOpen prepares systems and evidence but does not issue HIPAA certifications or audit reports.

How we scope

  • Written scope lists each clinical and administrative application, its protocol (SAML or OIDC) and who may access it.
  • Directory sources are mapped, including how unique user IDs are assigned and kept stable across HR and account changes.
  • Emergency access, automatic logoff timeouts and MFA requirements are documented as decisions for the covered entity to confirm.

How we build

  • Keycloak or authentik is deployed in the client's cloud account, data center or air-gapped network with encrypted transport and database.
  • Clinical application integrations are configured and tested, with session timeout and break-glass procedures checked against the agreed scope.
  • Audit logging and identity event exports are configured so access activity can be reviewed by the covered entity's own processes.

How we hand over

  • Deliverables include configuration exports, runbooks, access control procedures and a mapping to the relevant Security Rule standards.
  • Evidence packages are organized for the covered entity's risk analysis and for review by its own assessors or auditors.
  • Knowledge transfer covers administration, upgrades and emergency access so the client's team can operate the platform.

How we support

  • Engagements are fixed-scope, with scope, deliverables and timelines agreed in writing before work starts.
  • Ongoing support, upgrades and continuous testing are available as a retainer after handover.
  • Confirm with DeployOpen which upgrade cadence, patch notice and testing approach apply to your environment before signing.

Sources and further reading

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