Open source SSO for CMMC identification and authentication: what the four IA practices ask
Consider a defense contractor running a CUI enclave that needs workforce login to satisfy IA.L2-3.5.1 through IA.L2-3.5.4 in the CMMC Level 2 model. A self-hosted identity provider such as Keycloak or authentik can serve these four practices, but it does not make the organization compliant on its own. Compliance depends on how the identity provider is configured, how every system in the enclave is connected to it, and whether the resulting evidence is complete. Level 2 is the NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 requirement set for CUI, and it is assessed against the objectives in NIST SP 800-171A (June 2018), not against the product. The work is preparing systems, configuration and evidence so an assessor can test each objective. The program status also needs to be settled before scoping begins. On 13 July 2026 the Department of War suspended CMMC Phase II, which had been scheduled to start 10 November 2026 and would have required Level 2 C3PAO certification for applicable contracts. Phase I self-assessments, SPRS postings, annual affirmations and DFARS 252.204-7012 obligations remain in place. The DoW CIO page dated 17 October 2026 describes implementation as paused in Phase 1, while the eCFR text of 32 CFR 170.3(e) still contains the original schedule. Confirm with your contracting officer which assessment type applies to your contracts before choosing a target. The four practices are IA.L2-3.5.1 (identify users, processes and devices), IA.L2-3.5.2 (authenticate them before access), IA.L2-3.5.3 (MFA for privileged local and network access and for non-privileged network access) and IA.L2-3.5.4 (replay-resistant network authentication). Each maps to specific objectives in NIST SP 800-171A, so the identity provider design should be traced objective by objective. Ask your implementation partner to deliver a mapping that shows which configuration, log or screenshot satisfies each objective, and which objectives remain with your own policies or other systems.
Which IA practices an identity provider must satisfy, and how to configure each
This table maps each CMMC Level 2 identification and authentication practice to the function an identity provider must perform, the NIST SP 800-171A objectives an assessor tests, and the Keycloak or authentik configuration that supports it. Read it as a checklist of what the identity provider can prove and what still needs endpoint, certificate or process evidence. The main takeaway is that identity configuration covers most of the IA family but not device identification on its own.
| Practice | What the identity provider must do | Assessment objectives and configuration in Keycloak or authentik |
|---|---|---|
| IA.L2-3.5.1 (identify users, processes and devices) | Give every user, service account and process acting for a user a unique identity in the enclave directory, with no shared logins. | Objectives: users, processes acting for users, and devices. Configure one identity per person, dedicated service accounts with owners, and disable shared accounts. Device identity needs endpoint or certificate controls outside the identity provider. |
| IA.L2-3.5.2 (authenticate before access) | Verify each user, process and device before granting access to organizational systems. | Objectives: authenticate each user, each process acting for a user, and each device. Configure OIDC or SAML clients so every application requires a successful login, and use client credentials or certificates for service accounts. Confirm device authentication with the network or endpoint layer. |
| IA.L2-3.5.3 (MFA for privileged and network access) | Require multifactor authentication for local and network access to privileged accounts and network access to non-privileged accounts. | Objectives: identify privileged accounts, then apply MFA to local privileged access, network privileged access and network non-privileged access. Use a Keycloak authentication flow or an authentik authentication stage bound to privileged groups, and confirm local console or SSH MFA with the host integration. |
| IA.L2-3.5.4 (replay-resistant authentication) | Use authentication mechanisms that resist capture and reuse of credentials for network access to privileged and non-privileged accounts. | Objective: replay-resistant mechanisms are implemented for network access. Prefer WebAuthn or passkey factors in Keycloak or authentik, and avoid relying on one-time codes alone. Confirm that the protocol and token lifetimes are set in the configuration export assessors will review. |
| Evidence an assessor expects | Final-form records showing the identity model, MFA policy and access decisions for the enclave. | Realm or tenant configuration exports, group and role membership lists, authentication flow definitions, and MFA enrollment records. Drafts do not count, so version and date the exports. |
| Where it usually fails | Shared accounts, service accounts with passwords that never rotate, and MFA applied only to the web portal. | Applications that bypass the identity provider, local administrator logins on hosts, and legacy protocols that skip the MFA flow. Test each path before the assessment. |
| Scope boundary | The identity provider must run inside the CUI enclave, with its database and administrative console in scope. | Confirm with the assessor how the identity provider, its PostgreSQL database and its logs are scoped, and whether any external identity service touches CUI. |
Which self-hosted identity platforms fit a CUI enclave
Four identity platforms are commonly considered for SSO inside a CUI enclave, and each one carries a different license, feature split and support model. The choice affects which CMMC identification and authentication practices you can evidence without relying on a paid tier or an unsupported configuration. Confirm each point below in writing with the vendor and your assessor before you commit.
Keycloak under Apache-2.0
Keycloak is licensed under Apache-2.0 and is a CNCF incubating project. It supports OpenID Connect, OAuth 2.0 and SAML 2.0, and it federates LDAP and Active Directory, which matters when identity stays in an enclave directory. Clustering is documented, but both supported high availability designs need a synchronously replicated database, so plan that database inside the enclave. The current release is 26.8.1. Confirm with the vendor whether any feature you need for MFA or audit logging is outside the core distribution, and whether a FIPS-validated build applies to your configuration.
authentik with a split license
authentik's core code is MIT licensed, but the authentik/enterprise directory falls under a separate enterprise license. Several features that enclave teams often expect, including LDAP, RADIUS and SCIM providers, appear in the provider documentation, while the pricing page places Microsoft Entra ID, Google Workspace, mTLS client certificate authentication, privileged access management and enhanced audit logging in the enterprise tier. Check each control you plan to evidence against the license split, not the marketing summary. Since 2025.10 it runs on PostgreSQL without Redis, which simplifies the enclave database.
ZITADEL under AGPL-3.0
ZITADEL is licensed under AGPL-3.0, and its README lists SSO, MFA, passkeys with FIDO2 and WebAuthn, SAML 2.0 and SCIM. Those phishing-resistant options map well to the MFA practices for privileged and network access. The AGPL network clause means that if you modify ZITADEL and offer it to users over a network, you must make your modified source available. Enclave operators should have counsel review that obligation before any custom change. Confirm which passkey and WebAuthn options your assessor will accept as evidence.
Ory Kratos and Hydra as a pair
Ory Kratos handles identity and user management, while Ory Hydra acts as the OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect server. Both are Apache-2.0 and released v26.2.0 on March 20, 2026. The split means you build the login flows, MFA screens and administrative consoles yourself, which adds design and test effort that a packaged identity provider would include. Choose this pair when your team wants to own the authentication user experience, and document how each MFA step and session rule is enforced and logged.
FIPS and assessor-accepted configurations
Neither the open-source releases nor the enterprise tiers should be assumed FIPS-validated for your enclave. The authentik pricing page lists FIPS compliance under Enterprise Plus, so confirm whether that covers the exact build and cryptographic modules you run. For Keycloak, ask Red Hat or your integrator whether the supported distribution changes the picture. Ask each vendor which configuration your C3PAO has accepted before, and get the answer in writing. Do not rely on a default configuration as evidence.
How the identity provider fits inside the CUI enclave
The identity provider sits inside the CUI enclave scope, not beside it. The Keycloak server, its database, its admin console and paths, and its logs all handle authentication decisions and records about users who reach CUI systems, so an assessor will expect them to be documented, protected and included in the system security plan. The database deserves particular attention. Keycloak supports PostgreSQL 14 to 18 in production, and the database holds realm configuration, user records and credentials, so it must sit in the same boundary with the same access controls. Confirm with your assessor and your own environment whether log shipping to a SIEM outside the enclave counts as a data flow that needs its own controls.
Federation is where scope most often gets underestimated. If the identity provider trusts an Active Directory forest, a cloud directory or an external IdP, every trust relationship becomes a path an assessor will trace to see who can assert an identity into the enclave and how that assertion is validated. Map each federation source, the attributes it can set, and who administers the trust, and record it. Keycloak documents three high availability designs, and both supported designs for multi-site setups depend on a synchronously replicated database. Keep the replication topology in the boundary diagram, because a replica outside the enclave would expand scope. Upgrades belong in the same plan: Keycloak applies schema migrations automatically at startup by default, so test each upgrade on a non-production copy of the realm and database before touching the production identity provider.
Evidence assessors ask for from the identity layer
This table lists the artifacts an assessor is likely to request from a self-hosted identity provider for IA.L2-3.5.1 through IA.L2-3.5.4, and which component produces each one. Read each row as a question to answer before the assessment: can you export this artifact today, and does it show the final configuration rather than a draft? Assessors score a requirement as MET only when evidence is in final form, so treat every export as a dated snapshot tied to a change record.
| Evidence artifact | Producing component | What it shows and where it usually fails |
|---|---|---|
| Identity inventory and unique account records | Identity provider user store, federated directory (LDAP or Active Directory) | Shows each user, process or service account with a unique identifier (3.5.1). Fails when shared or generic accounts exist without an owner or documented purpose. |
| Realm or tenant configuration exports | Keycloak realm export, authentik blueprints, ZITADEL instance configuration | Shows clients, protocols, token lifetimes and authentication settings (3.5.2). Fails when the exported config differs from production because changes were made in the admin console only. |
| Privileged account list and MFA enrollment status | Identity provider group membership and credential reports | Shows which accounts are privileged and that each has MFA enrolled for local and network access (3.5.3). Fails when admin roles sit outside the group that the MFA policy covers. |
| MFA policy for network and web access | Authentication flows and conditional MFA rules in the identity provider | Shows MFA required for network access to privileged and non-privileged accounts (3.5.3). Fails when a legacy protocol path, such as direct LDAP bind, bypasses the flow. |
| Passkey and WebAuthn configuration | Identity provider WebAuthn or passkey policy, FIDO2 authenticator settings | Shows replay-resistant mechanisms for network access (3.5.4). Fails when passkeys are allowed alongside a one-time code path that is not evaluated against the same policy. |
| Admin event and login audit logs | Identity provider event store, log forwarder to the SIEM such as Wazuh | Shows authentication successes, failures and administrative changes with timestamps. Fails when logs stay on the identity host, roll over before the retention period, or lack a documented review. |
| Access review records | Identity governance tool or documented manual review tied to the identity provider | Shows that group and role memberships for CUI systems were reviewed and corrected. Fails when reviews are not signed and dated. |
| SSP entries and POA&M items for IA controls | System Security Plan, Plan of Action and Milestones | Describes how each IA requirement is implemented and any open gaps. Fails when the SSP describes a configuration that the exports do not match. |
| Change records for identity stack upgrades | Ticketing system, deployment pipeline, release notes | Shows tested upgrades, approvals and rollback steps for Keycloak, authentik or ZITADEL. Fails when patches are applied to production without a recorded test or approval step. |
What an identity provider alone does not satisfy
A self-hosted identity provider covers the authentication path for applications that speak SAML or OIDC. The assessment objectives for IA.L2-3.5.1 through IA.L2-3.5.4 also reach devices, local logins, legacy systems, shared accounts and vendor access, and each of those needs its own control and evidence inside the CUI enclave.
Device identification under 3.5.1
IA.L2-3.5.1 asks you to identify users, the processes acting for them, and devices. An IdP identifies people and their applications, but it does not identify a laptop, a plant controller or a printer unless you bind device identity through certificates, device registration or a directory join. Inventory every device that can reach the enclave and confirm which identity source vouches for each one. Ask your assessor how they expect device identity to be demonstrated.
Local and console logins bypass the IdP
Operating system logins, hypervisor consoles, firewall administration and database local accounts often authenticate against their own stores. IA.L2-3.5.3 requires MFA for local access to privileged accounts as well as network access, so a web SSO flow with MFA does not cover a root shell on a server. Map every privileged local login path, decide whether it federates or uses a second factor at the host, and record the decision in the SSP.
Legacy applications without SAML or OIDC
Older line-of-business tools, thick clients and some appliances cannot redirect to an external IdP. Options include a reverse proxy or gateway that enforces authentication in front of the app, LDAP binding where the application supports it, or a documented compensating control with a restricted network path. Each option changes which 3.5.2 and 3.5.4 objectives the application can meet, so list these applications early and confirm each one with the owner.
Shared and service accounts
Shared mailboxes, break-glass accounts, batch jobs and integration service accounts often have passwords that no single person owns. Each needs an identity record, a named owner, a documented reason for existence and a control that proves someone authenticated before use. Where a shared account cannot take MFA, you must show how access is restricted and logged. Confirm with your assessor how they will sample these accounts.
Vendor and contractor access
Support engineers and integrators who log in from their own networks create network access that must meet 3.5.3 and 3.5.4 even though the company does not employ them. Federate their accounts through your IdP or a brokered identity source, enforce MFA and replay-resistant methods on that path, and remove access when the engagement ends. Ask each vendor how their staff authenticate and whether that method meets the objectives.
Policy, SSP and demonstrated evidence
NIST SP 800-171A assesses each objective with evidence in final form, so a configured IdP is not enough on its own. Your System Security Plan must describe how each identification and authentication practice is implemented, and your evidence must show it operating: exported MFA enrollment reports, login policies, privileged account lists and access reviews. Confirm with your contracting officer which obligations currently apply, since on 13 July 2026 the Department of War suspended CMMC Phase II and started a 60-day review, while Phase I self-assessments and DFARS 252.204-7012 obligations remain in place.
Questions buyers ask before hiring help with CMMC SSO
What does CMMC SSO work cost and what drives the price?
The price is set by the written scope, not by a list price, because DeployOpen does not publish one. The main cost drivers are the number of applications that must sign in through the identity provider, how many directories must be federated, how much MFA enrollment support staff need, whether the identity provider runs inside a CUI enclave you already operate or one that must be built, and how much evidence preparation is in scope. Ask for a quote that separates one-time work (design, integration, hardening, documentation) from recurring costs (infrastructure, patching, upgrades, support retainers), and ask which of your own staff time is assumed.
How long does a CMMC identity rollout usually take?
Duration depends on scope: the count of applications, the number of user populations, whether legacy applications without SAML or OIDC support need work, and how quickly your change windows and application owners can respond. A small scope with one directory and a few web applications is far shorter than an enclave-wide rollout with privileged access controls. Ask the implementation partner to break the timeline into phases with written deliverables and to state which dependencies on your side could move the dates.
Can our in-house team implement CMMC identification and authentication controls?
Yes, many organizations do this internally, provided they have engineers who can operate Keycloak, authentik or ZITADEL, a directory administrator, and staff who can produce evidence in final form. The harder parts are usually the time to integrate every application, the upgrade and patch cadence, and documenting the configuration in a way that an assessor can trace to the assessment objectives in NIST SP 800-171A. Compare your capacity for those tasks against the scope before deciding.
What does the client need to provide for an SSO engagement?
Expect to provide directory access for the identity sources to be federated, named application owners who can confirm login flows and test changes, a documented inventory of systems inside the enclave, and change windows for cutover and rollback. You will also need someone who owns the MFA enrollment process and the help desk procedures for lost tokens. Confirm these inputs in the written scope so that delays are visible early.
Will an assessor accept a self-hosted identity provider for CMMC Level 2?
CMMC does not name specific products. Assessors look for evidence that each requirement's assessment objectives are met, including identification of users, processes and devices, authentication before access, MFA for privileged local and network access and for non-privileged network access, and replay-resistant network authentication. A self-hosted identity provider can support those objectives if its configuration, logs and change records are retained and reviewed. Confirm the exact evidence expectations with your C3PAO and against the NIST SP 800-171A assessment objectives before design is final.
How does the 2026 CMMC phase suspension affect our timing?
On 13 July 2026 the Department of War suspended CMMC Phase II, which had been scheduled to start 10 November 2026 and would have required Level 2 C3PAO certification for applicable contracts, and started a 60-day review by a CMMC Reform Task Force. Phase I self-assessments, SPRS postings, annual affirmations and DFARS 252.204-7012 obligations remain in place. As of 17 October 2026, the DoW CIO page says implementation is paused in Phase 1 and may only require self-assessments at Levels 1 and 2. Because the schedule is changing, confirm with your contracting officer which assessment your contracts require and when, and do not plan around a single date.
Does DeployOpen certify our CMMC enclave?
No. DeployOpen plans, implements, hardens and documents the identity controls and prepares evidence for compliance assessments, but it does not issue audit reports, attestations or certifications. Level 2 certification assessments are performed by C3PAOs authorized or accredited by the CMMC Accreditation Body, currently The Cyber AB, and Level 3 assessments are performed by DCMA DIBCAC. Ask any implementation partner to state this boundary in writing and to explain how evidence will be handed to your assessor.
Do we need a separate identity provider for the CUI enclave?
Often it is simpler to run a dedicated identity provider inside the enclave, so that authentication for CUI systems does not depend on a connection to an outside service. The decision depends on how your enclave boundary is drawn, which directories must be trusted, and how the identity provider is hosted and administered. Confirm the boundary with your assessor before you decide, because it determines which systems are in scope for the assessment.
What to confirm with your assessor and contracting officer before you build
Before you configure anything, confirm with your C3PAO or the program office which NIST SP 800-171A assessment objectives they will test for IA.L2-3.5.1 through IA.L2-3.5.4. The objectives are specific: 3.5.1 covers users, processes acting for users and devices, 3.5.2 requires authentication of each of those identities before access, 3.5.3 covers MFA for local and network access to privileged accounts and network access to non-privileged accounts, and 3.5.4 asks for replay-resistant mechanisms on network access. Ask whether the assessor expects evidence for each objective separately, and whether service accounts and device identities that bypass the IdP will be treated as in scope. Those answers decide how you map identity sources to requirements in the System Security Plan. Next, settle the assessment boundary. Ask whether the identity provider, its database, its administrative console and its logging pipeline sit inside the CUI enclave or are treated as external service providers with their own evidence. A self-hosted Keycloak or authentik instance outside the enclave can authenticate enclave users only if the boundary, the trust relationships and the connection paths are documented and assessed. Also ask which FIPS-validated cryptography the platform and its TLS termination use, and whether the assessor expects the validation certificate numbers, the module versions and the configuration that enforces FIPS mode. Get those answers in writing before you choose a deployment pattern. Finally, confirm the active schedule and how the SSP will describe identity. The DoW CIO "About CMMC" page says implementation is paused in Phase 1 and may only require self-assessments at Levels 1 and 2, while the eCFR text of 32 CFR 170.3(e) still contains the original four-phase schedule. Ask your contracting officer which requirement applies to your contract, whether Level 2 certification is required now, and which NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 version governs. Then ask the assessor how identity configuration exports, MFA enrollment records and authentication logs should be retained as final-form evidence.
How an SSO rollout for CMMC proceeds in phases
The sequence moves from defining the CUI enclave and its accounts to a tested identity provider, enforced MFA and replay-resistant authentication, federated applications, and a pre-assessment review of evidence in final form.
Scope the CUI enclave and applications
Start by defining which systems store, process or transmit CUI and which identities can reach them. Your team and the integration partner list every application in the enclave, note whether each supports SAML, OpenID Connect or only local login, and record the network paths between enclave and corporate networks. The step closes with a signed scope statement that names the systems in the assessment boundary, so every later control has a defined target.
Inventory accounts, groups and devices
Build an inventory of user accounts, service and process accounts, privileged roles, and the devices allowed to authenticate into the enclave. Identify which accounts are privileged, which are shared or non-person, and where each identity currently lives, such as Active Directory, local directories or spreadsheets. The output is a reconciled identity register that maps each account to an owner, a role and a directory source, which becomes the baseline for IA.L2-3.5.1 and the privileged account list used for IA.L2-3.5.3.
Deploy the identity provider in a non-production environment
Install the chosen identity provider, such as Keycloak, authentik or ZITADEL, inside the enclave's infrastructure, not in a shared external tenant. Decide the database platform, confirm it is one of the supported production databases for the product, and set the high availability design, including whether a synchronously replicated database is available across the nodes. Document the install method, version pinning and the upgrade approach, such as manual operator approval for Keycloak. The step closes when a non-production instance starts, survives a node restart in a test, and reports health metrics to your monitoring.
Configure MFA and replay-resistant factors
Configure the authentication flows that cover privileged local and network access and non-privileged network access. Enable multifactor authentication for each path, and select replay-resistant factors such as FIDO2 or WebAuthn passkeys where the product supports them, with TOTP only where the assessment team accepts it. Confirm enrollment, recovery and token reset procedures, and document which factor each account class uses. The step closes with a test matrix that shows a login attempt for each account class and factor, with the result recorded.
Federate applications and enforce access
Connect each enclave application to the identity provider over the agreed protocol, and remove or disable local accounts that duplicate central identities. Bind application access to groups or roles rather than individual grants, and block direct logins that bypass the identity provider where the application allows it. Applications that cannot use SAML or OpenID Connect need a documented compensating path, such as a proxy or a jump host, and an owner who accepts the residual risk. The step closes when each in-scope application passes a login test through the identity provider and a disabled-account test.
Collect evidence in final form
Export and retain the artifacts that show each requirement is operating: configuration exports, realm or policy settings, MFA enrollment reports, audit logs of authentication events, the account inventory and the test records. Store them as final, dated and signed versions under change control, because the assessment treats draft evidence as insufficient. Map each artifact to the matching assessment objective for IA.L2-3.5.1 through IA.L2-3.5.4 so reviewers can find it. The step closes with an evidence index that the control owner has reviewed.
Run a pre-assessment review
Before any formal assessment, walk through the requirements against the NIST SP 800-171A objectives with an internal reviewer who did not build the system. Check each objective for a configured control, an operating record and a final-form artifact, and log gaps in a plan of action with owners. Confirm with your assessor or the assessment body which evidence formats they accept. DeployOpen prepares systems and evidence for review but does not issue assessment results. The step closes when the gap log is empty or each open item has an accepted plan and owner.
Where to read the control text and the current CMMC status
This sequence points the team to the authoritative control text and the current program status before any design decision is made, so the identity provider is scoped against requirements that are final and dated. Each step ends with a written record that the team can trace back to a source.
Read the NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 requirement text
The compliance lead and the identity architect read the Identification and Authentication family in NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2, focusing on requirements 3.5.1 through 3.5.4. This is the control language that CMMC Level 2 incorporates, so it defines what the identity provider must support. Done when the team has a one-page list of each requirement in its own words, with the identity-related duties it creates.
Map requirements to assessment objectives
Next, the same team reads NIST SP 800-171A, which breaks each requirement into the points an assessor checks. Requirement 3.5.3 has separate objectives for privileged local access, privileged network access and non-privileged network access, so the design must address each one. Done when every objective has a named owner and a candidate piece of evidence, such as a configuration export or an access log.
Confirm the program rule and CMMC levels
The compliance lead reads the CMMC Program rule in 32 CFR Part 170 to confirm that Level 2 is NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 for controlled unclassified information and how the requirement identifiers are formatted. The rule also governs scoring, plans of action and how assessments are conducted. Done when the team has recorded which sections apply to its contracts and which assessment path its sponsor expects.
Check the current program status with the DoW CIO
The compliance lead checks the DoW CIO About CMMC page for the current implementation status, because that page is maintained by the program office. The team should confirm with its contracting officer which requirements apply to current solicitations. Done when the team has a dated note stating the implementation status it checked and the person who confirmed it.
Review the 13 July 2026 Department of War release
The compliance lead reads the Department of War release of 13 July 2026, which suspended Phase II and started a review. The release states that Phase I self-assessments, SPRS postings, annual affirmations and DFARS 252.204-7012 obligations remain in place, which affects what evidence the team must keep now. Done when the team has listed which obligations are active today and which timelines are on hold.
Record conflicts between sources for counsel
The team compares the DoW CIO statements with the eCFR text, because the regulation text may still show the original phase schedule while the program office describes a different status. Where sources disagree, the team does not pick one silently. Done when a short memo lists each conflict, the source for each side and the question sent to counsel or the contracting officer.
Set the scope baseline for the identity design
With the requirement, objective and status records in hand, the architect defines which accounts, applications and networks the identity provider will serve inside the CUI enclave. This baseline becomes the reference for every later design choice. Done when the scope statement is signed by the compliance lead and the identity owner, and it cites the source documents by title and access date.
How DeployOpen scopes, delivers and supports CMMC identity work
DeployOpen plans, implements, integrates, hardens, documents and supports self-hosted open-source identity platforms inside the client's own infrastructure, including CUI enclaves. For CMMC identification and authentication, the work starts with a written scope that maps each identity control to a configured, evidenced setting in the identity provider.
How we scope
- Written scope lists the applications, directories and enclave boundaries that the identity provider will cover for CUI access
- Requirements are mapped to IA.L2-3.5.1 through IA.L2-3.5.4 and the NIST SP 800-171A objectives the client must evidence
- Scope names which platform is in use, such as Keycloak, authentik or ZITADEL, and which edition and license terms apply
How we build
- Deploy the identity provider in the client's enclave with MFA enforced for privileged and network access paths
- Configure replay-resistant authentication and document each setting, client and realm export used as assessment evidence
- Test login, MFA enrollment, lockout and failover paths against the written scope before handover
How we hand over
- Deliver configuration exports, runbooks, architecture diagrams and an evidence index mapped to each assessed requirement
- Document the upgrade procedure and the database backup and restore process for the identity stack
- Train the client's administrators to run, review and change the configuration without DeployOpen
How we support
- Ongoing support, upgrades and continuous testing are available as retainers agreed in writing
- Upgrades are tested in a non-production copy of the enclave before they reach CUI systems
- DeployOpen prepares evidence for assessments but does not issue audit reports, attestations or certifications, which independent assessors provide

