Network security monitoring for financial services

Network security monitoring for financial services: why the cardholder data environment and DORA shape the design

Open source sensors can meet the monitoring expectations a bank, card processor or fintech faces under PCI DSS and DORA, but only when sensor placement, retention and daily review are designed around the cardholder data environment (CDE) and the payment networks that feed it. The design question is not which tool to install. It is where each sensor sees traffic into and out of the CDE, how long packet capture and metadata are kept, and who reviews the alerts and records that review. A self-hosted estate gives you control over all three, and it also means you own the evidence for each one. DORA sets no certification scheme. Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 has applied since 17 January 2025 and is directly applicable, but no authority issues a DORA certificate for network monitoring. Your deliverable is evidence: the sensor inventory, the rule and update history, the register of information entries for every ICT provider involved, and the records showing that monitoring ran and alerts were handled. Ask your implementation partner to design the evidence set before the first sensor is racked, not after an examiner asks for it.

The short platform answer is Suricata and Zeek sensors, with Security Onion as the console that combines them with Elasticsearch and Elastic Fleet. Security Onion's repository is licensed under the Elastic License 2.0, which is source-available rather than OSI-approved, so have legal review its terms against your use. Security Onion 3.x supports only Oracle Linux 9, and Security Onion 2.4 reached end of life on October 1, 2026, so confirm your operating system standard and upgrade path before committing. Security Onion Pro adds OIDC single sign-on, LUKS encryption and FIPS mode, which many financial buyers will ask about. Confirm current feature availability directly with the vendor.

Which financial monitoring requirements drive the build

This table maps each financial monitoring requirement to its source and to the build decision it forces. Read each row as a question to confirm with your QSA, regulator, auditor or counsel, because the source sets the requirement and the assessor or regulator decides how it applies to your environment. The main takeaway is that PCI DSS and DORA shape where sensors sit and how evidence is kept, while contract and data location terms decide whether a partner can host them.

Requirement	Source	What it means for the build
IDS at the CDE perimeter and critical points	PCI DSS v4.0.1 (PCI SSC, 11 June 2024), requirement 11.5	Place Suricata sensors at the cardholder data environment boundary and critical internal points. Keep NIDS signatures current. Confirm the exact points with your QSA.
Daily review of IDS alerts and logs	PCI DSS v4.0.1 log review requirements (confirm control IDs with your QSA)	Route alerts into a documented daily review queue. Keep triage records and suppression justifications so the review can be shown to an assessor.
Scope for processors and service providers	PCI SSC FAQ 1004 and PCI DSS applicability statement	If a partner or hosted SOC can access cardholder data or could affect the CDE, it is in scope. Agree a written responsibility matrix before deployment.
Assessment route and attestation	PCI SSC FAQ 1220 (Report on Compliance or Self-Assessment Questionnaire with Attestation of Compliance)	The payment brands and acquirer decide who validates. Confirm whether a Report on Compliance or a questionnaire applies, and what monitoring evidence each requires.
Continuous ICT monitoring for financial entities	DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, applicable since 17 January 2025 (Articles 2 and 64), with Article 9	Monitoring must feed the ICT risk framework on an ongoing basis. Confirm with the competent authority the monitoring depth, metrics and review frequency they expect.
Contracts, register and data location for hosted sensors	DORA Article 28(3), Article 28(8) and Article 30(2)	List each sensor or partner service in the ICT register. Write down where packet captures are processed and returned, and keep a tested exit plan for critical functions.
Authorized user activity logging and MFA	FTC Safeguards Rule, 16 CFR 314.4(c), for non-bank lenders under FTC jurisdiction	Forward identity, admin and access logs to the monitoring stack. Any MFA exception needs written approval by the Qualified Individual. Confirm applicability with counsel.
IT general control areas supporting SOX	SEC Release 33-8810 (June 2007), ICFR guidance	Monitor computer operations and access to programs and data in in-scope systems. Confirm with the external auditor which systems and log sources form the evidence.
Encryption of stored packet captures	FTC Safeguards Rule, 16 CFR 314.4 (encryption at rest and in transit)	Packet captures can hold customer data, so plan disk encryption from the start. Security Onion Pro lists LUKS encryption and FIPS mode, and the open edition needs OS-level encryption.

How Suricata and Zeek cover a payment network

Sensor placement decides what a payment network monitoring stack can see, so it is the first decision to document. Place Suricata sensors on the boundary of the cardholder data environment (CDE), on the links between the CDE and corporate networks, and on every connection to acquirers, card schemes and processors. Each sensor needs a tap or a span port that copies traffic without sitting in the payment path. Record the chosen tap or span point, the link speed it handles, and the traffic it cannot see, such as encrypted tunnels that terminate before the sensor. Confirm with your network team and your assessor which segments count as in scope before you finalize the diagram, because PCI DSS requirement 11.4 testing and the segmentation evidence depend on the same map.

Suricata and Zeek answer different questions, and a payment team needs both. Suricata matches traffic against signatures and rules, so it flags known malicious payloads, scanning and command-and-control patterns that a rule author has already described. Zeek writes protocol and connection logs for every session it sees, including DNS queries, TLS metadata, HTTP requests and connection duration and volume. Those logs support questions that no signature covers, such as a new outbound destination from a point-of-sale subnet at an unusual hour. Keep a written rule set policy that names the rule sources, the update cadence, the person who approves changes and the tuning records for suppressed alerts. Stale signatures give false confidence, and undocumented suppressions are the first thing an assessor questions.

Full packet capture from Security Onion turns an alert into an answer. When an analyst pivots from a Suricata alert or a Zeek log entry to the underlying packets, they can confirm what data moved and whether cardholder data or authentication material was exposed. Packet capture also contains sensitive content, so define retention periods, who may access the stored captures, and how access is logged before the sensors go live. Confirm the storage sizing for your traffic volume with the vendor and your partner, since the Security Onion hardware documentation sets minimums rather than capacity for a busy acquirer link. Financial institutions also need to show that a DORA Article 9 monitoring process runs continuously, so keep alert triage and investigation records alongside the captures.

Which open source platforms fit a financial services NSM stack

A financial services network monitoring stack usually combines a sensor engine, a metadata and analysis layer, a SIEM for correlation, and a triage workflow. The platforms below cover those roles, and each one carries a license or operational caveat that the security, compliance and procurement teams should review before the design is fixed.

Security Onion as the sensor platform

Security Onion bundles Suricata, Zeek, osquery and the Elastic stack into one Linux distribution, which suits a team that wants a single console for alerts, hunting and full packet capture. For production, the Distributed deployment with a manager, sensor nodes and search nodes is the recommended design. Check the license first: the repository is under the Elastic License 2.0, which is source-available rather than OSI open source. Version 3.x supports only Oracle Linux 9. Pro adds OIDC single sign-on, LUKS encryption and FIPS mode, which many financial teams will need.

Suricata for cardholder perimeter alerts

Suricata is the signature-based intrusion detection and prevention engine that many payment environments use at CDE boundaries and other chokepoints. It is licensed under GPL-2.0, which carries no commercial licensing fee but does carry copyleft obligations if you modify and distribute the code. Inline IPS mode changes the risk profile, since a bad rule can block legitimate payment traffic, so start in detection mode. Rule sources, suppression and threshold tuning decide how many alerts reach the daily review.

Zeek for protocol metadata

Zeek produces structured logs for connections, DNS, HTTP, TLS and file activity, which helps investigators reconstruct what happened after a Suricata alert. Zeek is distributed under a BSD-style license from the Regents of the University of California, so the license terms are simpler for internal modification. The main cost is engineering: scripts, log shipping and retention sizing are your responsibility. Confirm with the assessor how Zeek metadata will be retained alongside packet capture for the same period.

Wazuh for SIEM correlation

Wazuh adds host-based log collection, rule-based correlation and XDR capabilities alongside network telemetry, so network alerts can be joined with endpoint and authentication events in one place. Its core repository is GPL-2.0. Network monitoring alone rarely satisfies a log review requirement, so a SIEM with defined retention and alert review records is usually needed. Confirm which Wazuh modules, agents and storage tiers your environment requires before sizing the cluster.

Shuffle for triage and enrichment

Shuffle is a SOAR platform that can automate alert enrichment, ticket creation and first-line triage, which reduces manual handling of the daily review queue. It is licensed under AGPL-3.0, so if you run a modified version and make it available to users over a network, the source-sharing terms apply. Document each playbook, its approvals and its failure handling, because automated actions on payment systems need change control. Confirm which actions require a human decision.

MISP or OpenCTI as optional intelligence feeds

MISP and OpenCTI can store indicators from sharing communities, commercial feeds and internal investigations, then push them into detection rules. MISP is licensed under AGPL-3.0, and OpenCTI offers a Community Edition under Apache-2.0 alongside a separate Enterprise Edition license. Indicator sharing can expose customer or counterparty data, so decide what leaves your environment before enabling sharing. Confirm that feed licenses allow use in your detection stack and in any external reporting.

How a financial services NSM rollout moves from scope to daily review

This sequence takes a financial entity from a defined cardholder data environment and DORA scope to a Security Onion deployment with documented sensor coverage, controlled packet capture and a repeatable daily IDS log review that produces evidence.

Define scope and map the cardholder data environment
Before any hardware is ordered, the team lists the systems that store, process or transmit cardholder data, the systems that could affect their security, and the connected networks, cloud accounts and service providers in each path. The QSA or internal assessor confirms the boundary, because it determines which segments need sensors. DeployOpen's role is to document the scope and agree it in writing. The step is done when the boundary, the in-scope network segments and the critical functions under DORA are signed off by the compliance owner.
Design sensor placement and tap points
The network team maps where traffic can be observed without disrupting payment flows, such as span ports or network taps at the CDE perimeter, on links between segments and at egress to payment networks and service providers. Each point is recorded with its link speed and expected traffic volume, and the team confirms that the sensor hardware meets the Security Onion minimums for sensor nodes. The step is done when a placement diagram and a sensor bill of materials have been reviewed by the network and security owners.
Build the Distributed deployment
The team installs a Distributed Security Onion deployment with a manager node, the sensor nodes chosen in the placement design and search nodes for analysts. Receiver nodes are added where pipeline redundancy matters, and the team documents that search nodes stop indexing if the manager is unreachable, so monitoring of that dependency is part of the build. Installation runs on x86-64 hardware and, where networks have no internet access, from the airgap ISO. The step is done when every node reports healthy and test traffic appears in the console from each sensor.
Load rule sources and set a tuning baseline
The team selects the NIDS rule sources, confirms their licensing and update path and loads them into Suricata through the Detections interface. During a baseline period, the security engineers review alert volume by rule and by segment, then apply suppressions and thresholds for documented benign traffic. Each change is recorded with a reason and an approver. The step is done when the baseline, the tuning log and the list of rules enabled for the CDE are approved by the security owner.
Set packet capture retention and access controls
Packet capture can contain cardholder data and authentication details, so the team sets retention periods, storage encryption and the role model for who may search or export captures. Security Onion Pro adds data-at-rest encryption and FIPS mode, and the team confirms whether those features are needed for the entity's assessment. Access to the console is tied to named accounts, and the team verifies that capture access is logged. The step is done when the retention standard, the access matrix and a test of the capture access logs are documented and approved.
Run and evidence the daily IDS log review
An analyst follows a written procedure each day to review IDS alerts from the CDE sensors, record the disposition of each alert, escalate confirmed activity into the incident process and note any sensor that stopped reporting. The procedure states who covers absences and what happens when no alerts arrive from a sensor. The step is done when the first review cycles produce dated records that a QSA or internal assessor can sample, and the team has confirmed that the procedure matches the PCI DSS requirement it is meant to satisfy.
Hand over with an upgrade and continuity plan
The team transfers the runbooks, architecture diagrams, tuning log and access matrix to the operations owner and agrees the upgrade process for Security Onion, including how changes are tested before reaching the CDE. The plan covers the DORA contract and exit requirements for any partner, the register entry for the service and the version lifecycle, since end-of-life dates for Security Onion releases affect upgrade paths. The step is done when the operations owner accepts the handover in writing and the upgrade plan has been tested in a non-production environment.

Packet capture retention and the data it holds

Packet capture is the part of a financial services monitoring design that most often creates a compliance problem nobody planned for. Full packet capture on a payment network can contain primary account numbers, card data in transit, personal data from customer sessions, and credentials sent in clear text by legacy systems. Before any sensor is switched on, the retention period, who may query the capture, where it is encrypted, and how it is deleted should be written into a standard that the Qualified Individual or security owner signs off. Confirm with your counsel and assessor how these settings map to the PCI DSS requirements that govern stored account data in your environment, because the capture store may itself fall inside the cardholder data environment.

Encryption is the first decision to make concrete. The FTC Safeguards Rule at 16 CFR 314.4 requires covered non-bank financial institutions to encrypt customer information at rest and in transit, so a packet store that holds customer data is in scope even when no one is intentionally recording it. In Security Onion Pro, LUKS data-at-rest encryption is an add-on feature sold with the paid edition. In the free edition, the encryption layer is your responsibility, typically full-disk encryption on the sensor and search nodes plus key custody under your existing secrets process. Ask the partner to show where keys live, who can unlock a volume after a reboot, and how a lost key is handled. GDPR data minimization under Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 points the same way: capture only what detection needs, and keep it only as long as the documented purpose requires.

Platform version also shapes what you can retain. Security Onion 3.0.0, released March 31, 2026, replaced Stenographer with Suricata for full packet capture and supports only Oracle Linux 9. If you run Security Onion 2.4, which reached end of life on October 1, 2026, an in-place move to 3 is possible only on Oracle Linux 9 after full packet capture is migrated to Suricata. Other distributions need a fresh install. Treat the upgrade as a change to your retention design: re-test capture size, retention and deletion on the new component before old captures are discarded, and record the decision in the change log your assessor will review.

Deployment limits: hosting, air gaps and data residency

A data center deployment gives the financial entity direct control over sensor placement, storage and retention for packet capture that may hold cardholder data or account details. Security Onion runs on x86-64 hardware only, so the first decision is whether existing servers meet the minimums in the hardware documentation. A Distributed design, with a manager node, sensor nodes and search nodes, is the recommended production layout, and the manager is a dependency: if it goes down, search nodes stop indexing because they cannot reach Redis, so plan redundancy for the manager and use receiver nodes where pipeline load balancing is needed.

Hardware fit: Confirm x86-64 processors and the per-role minimums for sensor, manager and search nodes before ordering hardware.
Manager dependency: Size and protect the manager as the single point that search indexing relies on, and document the recovery order after an outage.
Updates by ISO: Where the site has an internet path, updates can run normally, but change control should still record which package set was applied.
Vendor access: If a partner supports the system from outside the site, the data location clauses in the contract must name where any data is processed.
Operating system support: Security Onion 3.0.0 supports only Oracle Linux 9, so confirm the host OS before any build.

Confirm with the implementation partner which site hosts the manager, how the search nodes fail over, and who holds administrator access to the data center.

Evidence assessors and regulators ask to see

This table maps each evidence item an assessor or regulator may request to what it proves and the component that produces it. Read it as a checklist for the monitoring stack: items marked as sampled are the ones auditors typically pull individual records from, so confirm the exact format and sampling method with your QSA or internal auditor before the assessment.

Evidence item	What it proves	Producing component
IDS rule sets and versions in use	Which NIDS signatures were active on each sensor on a given date, supporting PCI DSS 11.5 signature currency	Security Onion Console Detections with Suricata rule sources and version history; sampled
Alert and suppression tuning records	Every change to a rule, threshold or suppression has a stated reason and an approver, so tuning does not silently hide CDE traffic	Security Onion Detections change log plus the ticket system; sampled
Daily review logs for IDS alerts	Named analysts reviewed alerts each working day, with dispositions recorded and escalations linked to incidents	SOC case management or SOAR (for example Shuffle) case records; sampled by day
Packet capture retention settings	The configured retention period and storage limits for full packet capture, and that the settings match the policy the entity documented	Security Onion configuration export and Suricata full packet capture settings; confirm retention with the assessor
Sensor coverage map for the CDE	Which network segments, span or tap points and payment network links are observed, and where gaps are accepted	Architecture diagram maintained with sensor inventory and tap records from the deployment
Sensor health and packet loss records	Sensors were running and capturing traffic across the review period, with gaps identified	Security Onion health dashboards and system logs
Console access logs	Who logged into the monitoring console, when, and what privileged actions they took, supporting access control reviews	Security Onion Console audit and authentication logs; Security Onion Pro OIDC single sign-on if licensed
Detection change history	Rule and configuration changes to the monitoring stack were authorized and tested before deployment	Version control or change records for the Security Onion deployment and its rules
DORA register and exit plan references (where a partner runs the stack)	The ICT service is recorded in the register of information, and a tested exit path exists for the monitoring service	Partner contract, DORA register entry and documented exit strategy kept by the financial entity

What financial teams ask before running NSM with open source

What does open source network monitoring cost a financial institution?

The software license is not the main cost. Most of the spend goes to sensor hardware and taps at each monitored point, storage for packet capture and metadata, and analyst time for rule tuning and alert triage. Hardware and storage are largely one-time purchases that are refreshed over time, while tuning, review and upgrades recur every year. Costs rise with link speed, the number of sites and the length of packet capture retention. If you add Security Onion Pro, it is sold on 1 to 5 year terms and adds OIDC single sign-on, LUKS encryption, FIPS mode and professional support. Ask any partner for a quote that separates hardware, storage, tuning labor, Pro terms and ongoing support, so the recurring and one-time items are clear.

How long does an NSM rollout take in a regulated bank?

The timeline depends on scope, and no fixed duration applies to every institution. The main drivers are how many cardholder data environment segments and payment network zones need sensors, whether taps can be installed in existing change windows, how many sites are involved, and whether the environment is air-gapped or internet-restricted. Architecture sign-off, change approvals and the first round of alert tuning often take longer than the technical build. Your scope and milestones should be written down before work starts, so you can measure progress against them. Ask any implementation partner to show the phases, dependencies and the change windows they assume.

Can a small security team run Security Onion alone?

A small team can run it, but only if it has dedicated analyst capacity and a documented daily review process. Security Onion is a platform with several components, including the manager, search and sensor nodes, detection rules and Suricata full packet capture, and each needs ownership. The Distributed deployment is the recommended production design, which means someone must maintain that architecture, tune the NIDS rules and handle upgrades. PCI DSS requires a documented, repeatable process for reviewing IDS output, so the review must be assigned to named people with backup coverage. If that capacity is not available, a partner can handle build, tuning and support under a written scope.

Is Security Onion open source enough for procurement?

Security Onion is free to use, but its repository is licensed under the Elastic License 2.0, which is a source-available license and not an OSI-approved open-source license. Procurement teams with a policy that requires OSI-approved licenses should flag this before selection and get legal review. Components such as Suricata (GPL-2.0) and Zeek (BSD-style license) carry their own licenses, so the full stack has several license terms to review. Ask your legal and procurement teams to confirm how the ELv2 terms apply to your intended use, including any commercial hosting or redistribution, and record the decision in your third-party software register.

What does Oracle Linux 9 mean for an existing Security Onion install?

Security Onion 3.0.0 supports only Oracle Linux 9, so the operating system choice now determines your upgrade path. Security Onion 2.4 reached end of life on October 1, 2026. Installations of 2.4 on Oracle Linux 9 can upgrade to 3 after full packet capture moves from Stenographer to Suricata. Installations on other distributions need a fresh install rather than an in-place upgrade. Before planning, confirm your current version and operating system, check the end-of-life notice, and schedule a test upgrade in a non-production environment. Any change to packet capture will need its own validation, since retained capture data and detection behavior must still meet your retention rules.

Does a tool like Security Onion make us PCI DSS or DORA compliant?

No tool grants compliance. PCI DSS compliance is validated by a Qualified Security Assessor through a Report on Compliance, or by a Self-Assessment Questionnaire where that applies, and the payment brands decide who must validate. DORA compliance is assessed by your competent authority through supervision, and DORA provides no certification scheme. A sensor deployment supplies evidence, such as IDS configuration, alert records, review logs and retention settings, that assessors and supervisors can examine. Your team still needs to define the controls, document the processes and show that they operate. Ask your assessor early which evidence they expect to see.

What should we ask a partner before signing an NSM engagement?

Ask for a written scope that lists sensor locations, the protocols and segments covered, the retention periods for packet capture and metadata, and the tuning and review responsibilities. Ask how they will document daily IDS review for PCI DSS and how that evidence will be stored. For DORA, ask how the arrangement will be recorded in your register of information and how the contract addresses service locations, data processing and exit. Ask how upgrades and end-of-life moves will be handled, and what support is included after go-live. DeployOpen plans, implements, tunes and documents self-hosted open-source platforms inside your own infrastructure, and its engagements are fixed-scope with agreed deliverables and timelines.

Questions to ask an NSM implementation partner in financial services

Start with the cardholder data environment map. Before any sensor is placed, ask the partner how they will trace payment flows from authorization to settlement, identify every system that stores, processes or transmits cardholder data, and find the systems that could affect the security of that environment. Ask for the written data flow diagram, the list of network segments with their sensor points, and the change process for when a new processor, acquirer link or service provider connection appears. A partner who starts with hardware sizing before this mapping is skipping the step that determines whether the IDS covers the traffic the assessor will ask about. Confirm who owns the diagram after handover and how it is kept current.

Next, ask how daily IDS log review is documented and who signs it off. The partner should propose a written review procedure that names the reviewer role, the alert queues in the Security Onion Console, the triage record format, the escalation path, and the retention period for review records. Ask how Suricata rule changes and tuning decisions in the Detections interface are approved and logged, since a suppressed rule is a decision an assessor may question. Ask for the sign-off roles separately from the analysts doing the work, and confirm that the partner will train your staff to run the review rather than doing it on your behalf after the project ends.

Ask how packet capture is handled where cardholder data may appear in payloads. Full packet capture is useful for investigations, but it can hold primary account numbers and sensitive authentication data, so the partner should explain the access restrictions, the storage location, the capture scope per segment, and whether encryption at rest is included in the base build or depends on the Security Onion Pro tier. Confirm the retention period with your compliance lead before the design is fixed. Also ask how they handle upgrades: the partner should describe how a version change preserves capture and index data, how they test an upgrade on a non-production node, and which end-of-life dates apply. Security Onion 2.4 reached end of life on October 1, 2026, so ask which version they will deploy and why. The partner should also state clearly that DeployOpen does not issue attestations, Reports on Compliance or DORA attestations. Those come from your Qualified Security Assessor or auditor. Ask for the evidence pack they will prepare for that assessor instead, and for the contract terms covering where data is processed, data return on exit, and a tested exit plan for the monitoring service under DORA Articles 28 and 30.

How DeployOpen scopes and supports NSM for financial services

This sequence shows how a financial services team moves from a written scope to a monitored, documented and supported network security monitoring service running inside its own infrastructure. Each step ends with a named output the team can review before the next one starts.

Define scope and compliance boundaries
DeployOpen's engineers meet the security, compliance and network teams to map which networks, payment flows and cardholder data environment segments are in scope, which regulations and assessment obligations apply, and which functions are critical or important for DORA purposes. The team confirms the data classes that packet capture may contain. The output is a written scope document that lists systems, boundaries, deliverables and timelines, agreed by both parties before any work begins.
Survey sensor placement and traffic
DeployOpen reviews network diagrams, switch and firewall configurations, and the available tap or span points at the CDE perimeter, payment network boundaries and key internal segments. The team checks link speeds, expected peak traffic and whether sensors can reach the required monitoring points without affecting production. The output is a sensor placement plan that the client's network and security owners sign off on.
Size hardware and storage
Using the platform's published minimum hardware requirements as a baseline, DeployOpen sizes manager, search and sensor nodes for the traffic profile and sets storage for metadata and full packet capture against the retention period the compliance owner has defined. The team confirms that the hardware is x86-64 and that the design fits the client's data center, cloud account or isolated network. The output is a bill of materials and a storage model that the client can validate against its procurement process.
Implement and harden the platform
DeployOpen installs the chosen Security Onion deployment type, typically the distributed design for production, and configures Suricata and Zeek sensors, the console, authentication, encryption and access controls in the client's environment. Hardening follows the client's baseline, and the team records each configuration decision. The output is a running stack with a hardening record and access model that the client's security team has reviewed.
Tune rules and document alert handling
DeployOpen loads the agreed NIDS rule sources, sets suppression and threshold tuning for known benign payment-system traffic, and documents how each alert category is triaged, escalated and closed. The team builds the review workflow that supports daily review of IDS logs for in-scope systems. The output is a tuning log and a written alert handling procedure that the SOC can run without DeployOpen present.
Prepare evidence for assessments
DeployOpen assembles the operational records that assessors commonly request, including configuration baselines, sensor coverage maps, review logs, retention settings, change records and access reviews for the monitoring platform. The team maps these artifacts to the relevant PCI DSS, DORA and client policy requirements. Independent auditors and certification bodies decide whether the evidence is sufficient, and DeployOpen does not issue audit reports or attestations. The output is an evidence pack organized by requirement.
Test the monitoring stack
DeployOpen runs security testing against the monitoring platform and its integrations, including its interfaces, APIs and the detection pipeline, and checks that expected test traffic produces the intended alerts in the SOC queue. Findings are logged with severity and remediation owners. The output is a test report and a remediation list that the client accepts before handover.
Support upgrades and continuous operation
After handover, the client may keep DeployOpen under a retainer for platform upgrades, rule maintenance, configuration changes, periodic testing and documentation updates. Upgrade planning follows the vendor's end-of-life dates and the client's change control process. The output is a maintained service record that shows what changed, when it was tested and who approved it.

Network security monitoring for financial services