Open source identity governance for SOX ITGC access controls: what auditors test
If you are responsible for showing that ICFR access controls work in financially significant systems, the first thing to accept is that SOX does not publish an IT control catalog. The SEC's guidance in Release 33-8810 says the IT general controls relevant to your evaluation depend on your own facts and circumstances, so the function you build has to cover the access controls management can rely on, not a list handed down by a regulator. Those controls are usually grouped around four records: approved provisioning, timely removal of leavers, periodic user access reviews and segregation of duties (SoD) in the ledger, ERP and reporting systems that feed financial statements. midPoint can generate the evidence for each of these from one governed identity record, provided the requests, approvals, removals, campaign decisions and SoD rule results are retained with timestamps and approver identities.
External auditors test ICFR under PCAOB AS 2201, and they assess the IT risks behind it under AS 2110. AS 2110 names unauthorized access to data, access that persists after termination and IT personnel holding privileges beyond their duties as risks to internal control over financial reporting. AS 2201 describes operating effectiveness testing as a combination of inquiry, observation, inspection of documentation and re-performance of the control. It also asks whether the control operates as designed and whether the person performing it has the authority and competence to do so. In practice, that means an auditor will ask who approved an access grant, see the approval recorded, sample leavers and trace their removal dates, and try to re-perform a review or SoD check from the records. Design your midPoint configuration so each of those steps can be walked end to end.
Confirm three things before you scope this work: which systems your auditor treats as financially significant, which of those systems midPoint can reach through a supported connector, and which controls management intends to rely on. DeployOpen plans, configures and documents these controls and prepares the evidence, but the external auditor issues the opinion on ICFR and DeployOpen does not issue audit reports, attestations or certifications. Ask your auditor early which populations and sample sizes they expect, because those answers determine what midPoint must log and how long it must keep it.
Which SOX access controls midPoint must support and how to configure them
This table maps the access risks auditors examine under SEC Release 33-8810, COSO Principle 11 and PCAOB AS 2110 to the midPoint functions that address them. Read each row as a control objective, the midPoint capability that supports it, and the decisions your ITGC owners must make before configuration starts. midPoint runs the workflow and keeps the records, but it does not decide which access is appropriate.
| Control area | What midPoint must do | Items ITGC owners must define |
|---|---|---|
| Access to programs and data (Release 33-8810) | Provision accounts and entitlements to financially significant systems only through configured request and approval flows, and record each change with requester, approver and timestamp | Which systems are in ICFR scope, the entitlement catalog for each, and who may approve each one |
| Unauthorized access (AS 2110, B4) | Connect to target systems through ConnId connectors such as Active Directory, LDAP, database and SCIM targets, so accounts created outside the approved path are detected in reconciliation | Authoritative source for identities, reconciliation frequency, and the response owner for each unmatched account |
| Access persisting after termination (AS 2110, B4) | Run leaver rules driven from the HR source to disable or remove accounts across connected systems, and log the time each removal completes | Termination trigger definition, maximum allowed removal window, and handling for contractors and rehires |
| Segregation of duties (AS 2110, B4; COSO Principle 11) | Evaluate SoD policies at request time and during certification, and flag conflicting entitlement combinations for review or rejection | Conflict matrix of incompatible functions, approved exceptions and compensating controls, and who signs off on exceptions |
| Periodic user access reviews (COSO Principle 11; AS 2201 operating tests) | Run certification campaigns on a defined cadence, route decisions to managers and system owners, apply revocations, and retain decisions and reviewer identity | Review cadence, population scope per system, reviewer assignment rules and the threshold for re-review of unanswered items |
| Privileged and administrator accounts | Tag privileged roles in the role model, include them in separate certification campaigns and report accounts with privileges beyond their assigned duties | Definition of privileged functions, approval authority, and the frequency of privileged account review |
| Evidence for re-performance (AS 2201, paragraph 45) | Keep request history, approval records, reconciliation reports and campaign results in exportable form that an auditor can sample and recompute | Retention period, evidence owner, and the sample populations the audit team will request |
| Change control over midPoint itself | Configuration changes to roles, policies and connectors are made through a controlled process, and the platform is kept on a supported release line such as the 4.8 long-term support release | Change approval process, test environment requirements and the upgrade window agreed with the auditors |
Which open-source platforms fit SOX access controls
midPoint is the component that holds the joiner, mover and leaver logic, the role model, access requests, approvals, certification campaigns and the segregation of duties rules that auditors ask to see. It is an identity governance and administration platform written in Java and developed by Evolveum, and it is licensed under the European Union Public License 1.2 or later. Evolveum states that midPoint has no enterprise edition, so the software itself carries no license fee, while connector work, role modeling and support are paid separately.
- Governance scope: midPoint owns provisioning decisions and records of who approved what, which is the evidence the approved provisioning control depends on.
- Connector coverage: midPoint uses the ConnId framework, with documented connectors for LDAP, Active Directory, CSV, DatabaseTable, Microsoft Entra ID and SCIM2, and further connectors at varying support levels.
- Java requirements: midPoint recommends Java 25 for version 4.11 and later and Java 21 for 4.10 and older.
- Support horizon: midPoint 4.8 (Curie) is the long-term support release, supported until 17 October 2028, which suits a control environment that cannot change versions often.
- Deployment: midPoint can run on Linux in a virtual machine or from Docker images, and multi-node deployments need a sticky HTTP load balancer and a shared central database.
Confirm with the vendor and your own environment that the connectors for your general ledger, procurement and financially significant applications are supported at the level your auditors expect, not only listed in the catalog.
midPoint does not act as a single sign-on or access management server. Evolveum states that it does not implement the server side of OAuth2, OpenID Connect or SAML, although its own user interface can authenticate against external SSO services. Authentication, session control and multi-factor enforcement therefore need a separate component. Keycloak and authentik are two open-source options that fit this layer, and the choice depends on the protocols and directory integrations your applications already use.
- Keycloak: an Apache 2.0 licensed server supporting OpenID Connect, OAuth 2.0 and SAML 2.0, with LDAP and Active Directory user federation. The current release is 26.8.1, published October 13, 2026.
- authentik: MIT licensed except the authentik/enterprise directory, which carries a separate enterprise license. Confirm which features your design depends on are outside that directory.
- Operating model: Keycloak plans four minor releases a year, and its Operator documentation strongly recommends manual approval mode for updates, which keeps upgrades under change control.
- Division of duties: the SSO server controls how users sign in, while midPoint controls which accounts and entitlements exist, so each control maps to a different test.
Confirm how application access decisions in your financial systems will be enforced, whether through SSO claims, application-side roles or both, because that determines what midPoint has to synchronize.
midPoint uses PostgreSQL as its native repository database, and the project recommends running it on a separate database server rather than on the midPoint host. The repository holds the identity data, role assignments, approval history and task records that your auditors will sample, so its backup, access control and availability design are part of the SOX evidence picture. Plan this layer with the same change discipline as the governance application.
- Separate server: keeping the database on its own host limits the blast radius of a midPoint incident and simplifies backup scheduling.
- Shared database for clusters: multi-node midPoint deployments depend on one shared central database, so its failover design matters for continuity of provisioning.
- Restricted access: only the midPoint service and designated administrators should hold database privileges, and those privileges should be reviewed like any other administrative access.
- Backups and restores: test a restore, not only the backup job, because an unrecoverable repository undermines the population an auditor needs.
- Version alignment: match the PostgreSQL version to midPoint's documented requirements for your release line, and confirm this in the current system requirements page.
Ask your partner to show a tested restore of the midPoint repository and the audit trail it holds before go-live.
Most SOX access questions concern people, but financially significant systems also run service accounts, integration credentials and API keys that midPoint or its connectors must use. Where those credentials are stored in configuration files or shared spreadsheets, they fall outside the access review and the leaver process. OpenBao, licensed under MPL-2.0 and hosted under the OpenSSF, manages, stores and distributes secrets, certificates and keys, and can hold the connector credentials midPoint uses. It is worth adding only where that problem exists in your environment.
- Scope: use OpenBao for secrets that midPoint connectors and other integrations need, not as a replacement for the identity governance platform.
- Ownership: each service account should have a named owner who is included in certification campaigns, which OpenBao does not provide on its own.
- Rotation: rotate connector credentials on a documented schedule and record the rotation as change evidence.
- Current release: OpenBao v2.7.1 was published on October 1, 2026.
- Alternatives: other secrets platforms exist with different licenses, so compare licenses and support terms before selecting one.
Confirm with your auditors which service account populations they will sample and how the owner of each account will be evidenced during certification.
What evidence auditors ask for from midPoint and which component produces it
Which midPoint records show that access was approved before it was granted?
Approval evidence comes from the approval history attached to each access request in midPoint, which should record who requested the access, who approved or rejected it, when they decided, and what was granted. Auditors use it to test that privileged or financially significant access is approved by someone with the authority to approve it before provisioning runs. They pull a sample of requests and match each grant to an approved decision with an earlier timestamp. If approvals happen in a ticketing tool, the auditor needs a clear link between that ticket and the midPoint request. Confirm with your auditor which approval artifacts they accept, how long they must be retained, and whether they expect an export or a screen capture. Confirm the exact fields your midPoint version records.
How do auditors test that leavers lost access on time?
Auditors compare the termination date in the authoritative HR source with the time each in-scope account was disabled or removed. In midPoint, the evidence is the provisioning and reconciliation history for each user, showing the status change and the resulting operation on each target system, with timestamps. A gap between HR termination and deprovisioning is an exception the auditor documents. The test population should come from HR terminations in the period, not only from accounts midPoint already processed, because leavers who were never processed would otherwise be missed. Confirm with your auditor the timeliness threshold they will apply, which target systems are in scope, and how they want orphaned accounts reported. Also confirm that the HR feed is retained, since the start of the clock depends on it.
What evidence shows every user was included in an access review?
Completeness evidence is the campaign record showing the population at launch: every user and entitlement in scope, the reviewer assigned to each item, each decision, and the items that expired without a response. In midPoint, certification campaign reports and their stage history provide this, and decisions are kept with reviewer identity and time. Auditors usually test completeness by comparing the campaign population with an independent extract from the target system taken on the same date. Any difference should be explained through reconciliation or documented as an exception. Confirm with your auditor the review period, the number of campaigns they will sample, and the detail they expect, including whether revoked access must show its actual removal in the target system. Confirm that the extract method can be repeated exactly.
Which midPoint reports show segregation of duties conflicts for financial systems?
Segregation of duties evidence has two parts: the rule set that defines conflicting access, and the output of running that rule set against current assignments. In midPoint, conflicts are modeled as rules, and the report of matches shows which identities hold combinations the rules forbid. Each detected conflict should show either a remediation or an approved exception with a named approver, a reason and an expiry date. Auditors test that the rule set was reviewed and that the scan ran at the dates they test. Confirm whether your rules are built into midPoint policy, implemented as custom reports, or both. Confirm with your auditor which system roles they consider conflicting, because SEC guidance leaves relevance to each company's facts and circumstances, and confirm where the exception register is kept.
How do you prove changes to access rules were authorized and logged?
Auditors look for evidence that changes to roles, policies, connectors and approval workflows were authorized and recorded. midPoint records object changes in its audit log, which should identify who made each change, when, and the before and after values where the version captures them. Those records should be exported to write-once or centrally controlled storage so administrators cannot alter them. Each change should link to an approved change ticket, and the sample should include changes to role definitions that grant financially significant access. Confirm with your auditor the period they will test. Confirm in your environment whether the audit log captures the fields they need and how long records stay in the system before export. Review who holds administrator access to midPoint, since that group can alter configuration.
How do you prove the account population used for testing is complete?
Population completeness is the step auditors check before they sample. The population must include every account with access to an in-scope financial system, taken directly from the target system, and it must reconcile to midPoint's view of the same accounts. Reconciliation reports list accounts that exist only in the target system, often called orphans, and accounts midPoint manages that are missing from the target. Auditors commonly ask how the extract was generated, when, by whom, and whether its query filters were approved. Keep the query, its parameters and the output together with a timestamp so the auditor can re-run it. Confirm with your auditor which systems and account types are in scope, including service and shared accounts, and whether they will accept a system-generated report as the population.
How do auditors test these controls, and what should we confirm?
Auditors test operating effectiveness under PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 (now AS 2201) by combining inquiry of personnel, observation of operations, inspection of documentation and re-performance of the control. For these controls, inquiry covers how approvers and reviewers are chosen, observation covers a live provisioning or certification run, inspection covers the approval, review and change records described above, and re-performance means the auditor repeats a sample of decisions from the evidence. DeployOpen prepares the controls, reports and evidence for that testing. It does not issue audit reports, attestations or certifications. Before go-live, confirm with your auditor the sample sizes, retention period, export format, and whether they will treat midPoint reports as system-generated information they must validate. Agree the re-performance steps in writing before the first test period.
What tooling alone does not satisfy in a SOX ITGC program
midPoint can automate and record much of the access control work auditors test, but the evidence only counts if management owns the assessment, the business owns role risk, and people perform reviews with authority. The cards below cover the gaps that remain after the platform is live.
Management's ICFR assessment stays manual
Section 404 requires management to assess internal control over financial reporting each year, and no software produces that conclusion. midPoint can supply the provisioning history, certification records and orphaned account reports that management reviews. The assessment itself needs a documented scope, a framework such as COSO, and a named owner who signs off. Confirm early which controls management will rely on and who writes the conclusion.
Role design and risk ownership stay with the business
Deciding which roles can post journal entries, approve payments or change master data is a business and finance decision. midPoint enforces the role model it is given, but it does not know which combinations break segregation of duties in your ERP. Business process owners must approve the role catalog and the conflict rules before go-live. Ask who signs each role definition and how changes to it are recorded.
HR data quality limits leaver timing
Timely removal of leavers depends on the HR system recording the termination date and the reason for it. If HR enters a departure late, or enters a contractor as an employee, midPoint will act on the wrong data at the wrong time. Check how terminations, transfers and contractor end dates reach midPoint, and how a mismatch between HR and directory accounts is detected and reported. Reconciliation reports only help if someone reviews the exceptions.
Applications without connectors need compensating controls
Financially significant systems often include legacy ledgers, custom reporting tools and spreadsheets that no connector covers. Accounts in those systems must still be provisioned, removed and reviewed, so they need a manual procedure or a compensating control with its own evidence. Inventory every in-scope application before the control design is written. Ask the partner which target systems rely on manual steps and how those steps are logged.
Operating effectiveness depends on reviewers with authority
Auditors test whether a control works as designed and whether the person performing it has the authority and competence to do so. A manager who approves a certification for staff they do not supervise, or a delegate without financial system knowledge, creates an operating deficiency even when the tool worked. Define reviewer assignments, delegation rules and escalation for unanswered reviews. Confirm that reviewers can be shown to hold the authority the control requires.
Auditors decide sufficiency
Whether midPoint evidence is sufficient depends on the auditor's testing approach, sample sizes and the risk assessment for each application. Auditors may inquire, observe, inspect documents and re-perform the control, and they decide which of these to rely on. Agree the evidence format, population definitions and retention period with your external auditor before the first review cycle. Ask the implementation partner to document how each control can be re-performed from the stored records.
Which systems and access need SOX scope and how to decide
SEC guidance says management only needs to evaluate the IT general controls necessary for the proper and consistent operation of other controls that address financial reporting risks. That means the scope starts from the financial statements, not from the IT estate. Work backward from the significant accounts and their business processes, identify the automated controls and reports those processes depend on, and then trace which applications, databases, operating systems and infrastructure accounts can change the data or the logic behind them. Anything that only affects operational efficiency can stay out of the access scope, but the reasoning for each exclusion should be written down, because the SEC guidance says the relevant ITGC aspects vary with each company's facts and circumstances and no published catalog settles the question for you.
In practice, a financially significant application is one where a user can post, approve, or alter a transaction or a reported figure. The general ledger, subledgers, consolidation tools and their reporting layers are the usual starting points. The database behind each one matters because a privileged database account can change balances without touching the application, and the infrastructure accounts that administer servers, hosting platforms and the identity provider itself can reach the same data. In an midPoint deployment, the scope also includes the connectors and the midPoint repository, since a mis-mapped role or a failed deprovisioning run can grant or leave access in a financial system. Confirm the inventory against the source of each account type, and record which target systems midPoint will provision to, which it will only read from, and which it will not touch at all.
Agree this scope with the external auditor before build starts. Auditors assess IT risks under AS 2110 and test operating effectiveness under AS 2201, so a control designed around a system the auditor later considers significant will show up as a design gap, and retrofitting it during the testing period is expensive. Ask the auditor to confirm which applications and database layers they consider in scope, how they want privileged infrastructure accounts treated, and what population evidence they expect from midPoint for each system. Put the agreed list, the exclusion rationale and the auditor's confirmation in the project record before any connector is configured.
How much does SOX access control automation cost and how long does it take?
Does midPoint have a license fee for SOX access control automation?
midPoint itself has no license fee, and Evolveum states that it has no enterprise edition: every line of midPoint code is published under open source licenses. The cost of a SOX access control program is therefore the work around the software: connector development and testing, role modeling, data cleanup, infrastructure, support and the implementation itself. Ask any partner to separate these lines in a quote so you can see who is paid for each piece. Evolveum offers Product Support and Platform Subscriptions as optional recurring services, and those are priced separately from any implementation work.
What are the one-time and recurring costs of running SOX access controls in midPoint?
One-time costs usually include the initial implementation: connector setup for each financially significant system, role design, cleanup of orphaned and excess accounts before go-live, testing and the first certification campaign. Recurring costs include the hosting and database infrastructure, patching and upgrades, periodic reviews of connectors and roles as systems change, and any support subscription you choose. Ask the quote to state which items recur, how often each recurring item is billed or performed, and who keeps the environment running after handover.
What drives the cost of SOX identity governance up or down?
The main drivers are the number of financially significant systems that need a connector, whether each connector is supported, community or custom, how many roles must be modeled from existing access, and how messy the starting data is. Other factors include the number of source systems for HR data, the number of approvers and review owners, and how many segregation of duties rules the auditor expects. Organizations with clean HR records, a small set of well-documented applications and an agreed role catalog usually have a smaller scope than those with many legacy applications and undocumented entitlements.
What does the client need to provide before a SOX access control project starts?
Before work begins, the client should provide an authoritative HR source with reliable joiner, mover and leaver events, a list of in-scope financially significant systems with named application owners, and access to the entitlement data for each system. Management must also agree on the control design with the external auditor, including what evidence the auditor will re-perform and who signs off on certification results. Internal audit and the auditor should be involved early, because a design the auditor rejects late in the project costs more to fix than one agreed at the start.
Can our internal team implement SOX access control automation in midPoint without a partner?
Yes, a capable internal team can implement midPoint, since the software is open source and the documentation is public. The effort lies less in installation than in the skills needed for connector configuration, role modeling, reconciliation of existing accounts, and documenting controls in a form an auditor can test. Midpoint runs on Linux in a virtual machine or from Docker images, uses PostgreSQL as its repository database, and needs Java 21 or 25 depending on version. Ask yourself whether your team has these skills, whether it can support the environment through upgrades and whether it can staff the work alongside existing responsibilities.
What should we ask for in a fixed-scope quote for SOX access control automation?
Ask for a written scope that lists each in-scope system, each connector and its support status, the role model deliverables, the cleanup approach, and the certification campaigns to be configured. The quote should state the deliverables for the control evidence, the testing approach, the acceptance criteria and the responsibilities of the client. Request separate line items for implementation, infrastructure setup, any support or subscription and any post-go-live work. Also ask how changes to scope are priced and what happens if the auditor requests additional evidence after the design is agreed. DeployOpen agrees scope, deliverables and timelines in writing before work starts.
How long does a SOX access control implementation in midPoint typically take?
The duration depends on the number of in-scope systems, the quality of HR and entitlement data, the number of roles to design, and how quickly the auditor and application owners respond. No timeline is published here for a generic implementation, so ask any partner to show a schedule tied to your system list and milestones. A useful plan includes an early discovery phase, a pilot with one or two systems, a first certification campaign and an auditor walkthrough before the control period you need to evidence. Timelines should follow from the written scope rather than from a generic estimate.
Does automating SOX access controls reduce audit fees for newly exempt issuers?
The SEC estimated in its 2020 release on accelerated filer definitions (Release 34-88365) that an issuer newly exempt from the Section 404(b) auditor attestation would save about $210,000 per year on average, made up of roughly $110,000 in audit fees and $100,000 in other costs. This is a regulatory estimate for a specific group of issuers, not a promise about your organization. Whether automation lowers your audit or internal costs depends on your filer status, your existing controls and what the auditor is willing to rely on. Confirm your filer status and auditor expectations before you build a business case.
How a SOX access control rollout moves from scoping to first audit cycle
The sequence turns a set of financially significant systems into a midPoint deployment whose provisioning, removals, reviews and SoD decisions leave evidence an auditor can re-perform across a full fiscal year.
Scope financially significant systems with the auditor
Management, the internal audit team and the external auditor agree which applications, databases, operating system layers and privileged accounts touch financial reporting, using the company's own ICFR risk assessment. DeployOpen documents the agreed scope and maps each system to the controls it supports. The step is done when the auditor has confirmed the in-scope list in writing, because every later control design decision depends on it. Ask the auditor which IT general control areas they expect to test and whether they want the scope frozen before the first campaign.
Clean up accounts and orphaned access
Before midPoint takes over provisioning, the team pulls account and entitlement lists from each in-scope target and compares them with the HR source of record. Accounts without an owner, shared accounts, dormant accounts and access held by people who have already left are flagged, and each finding is assigned a disposition: remove, reassign or document as an exception. The step closes when the reconciliation report shows every remaining account linked to a current identity, so the first population an auditor samples is not already contaminated with orphaned access.
Model roles from observed access
Business owners and system owners review the entitlements that people actually hold and group them into roles that match job functions and financial process responsibilities. Each role gets a named owner, a description and an approver. Roles are kept deliberately small enough that an approver can judge them. The output is an approved role catalog stored in midPoint, plus a record of which entitlements were excluded and why. Confirm with the business owners that the catalog covers privileged roles in the financially significant systems separately.
Connect authoritative sources and target systems
The team connects the HR system as the authoritative source for joiners, movers and leavers, then connects each in-scope target through the ConnId connectors midPoint supports, such as LDAP, Active Directory, Microsoft Entra ID, SCIM2 or database connectors where the target requires them. Each connector is tested against a non-production copy of the target, and the test results, mapping definitions and reconciliation outcomes are kept. The step is done when a test leaver in the HR source produces a documented removal in every connected target. Confirm connector status for each application, since some connectors are community or experimental rather than supported.
Configure approvals and segregation of duties rules
Access request workflows are set up so that each role or entitlement requires a defined approver, and the approver cannot be the requester or the person being granted access. Segregation of duties rules are written against the conflict matrix the business has agreed, covering combinations such as creating and approving payments or maintaining vendor master data and approving invoices. Rule exceptions require a named compensating control and an expiry. The step produces the approval configuration, the SoD rule set and a test log showing that conflicting requests are blocked or routed for exception handling.
Run the first certification campaign
The first user access review covers every in-scope system and every privileged account. Reviewers are assigned by midPoint to managers and application owners, each reviewer must decide on every line item, and unreviewed items are escalated under the campaign rules. The campaign records who reviewed what, the decision, the date and any revocation that followed. The step is complete when revocations are carried out in the target systems and the campaign report is signed off by the control owner. Ask the auditor whether they want to see the campaign configuration as well as the completed results.
Retain evidence through a full fiscal year
The team sets up recurring evidence collection: provisioning and removal logs, approval records, SoD exception registers, periodic review reports and the change history of roles and rules. Each evidence type is stored with a retention period agreed with the auditor, and the control owner runs a periodic check that the logs are complete. Production changes to midPoint, including upgrades within the supported release line, go through change management and are recorded. The step is done when the auditor can select a sample from any point in the fiscal year and re-perform the control from stored records without asking the team to reconstruct them.
Which authoritative sources and standards define the SOX access baseline
Auditors do not test midPoint against a published SOX IT general control catalog, because none exists. The access baseline comes from three sources that the team should read before designing any control: the PCAOB standard that governs the auditor's risk assessment, the PCAOB standard that governs how the auditor tests controls, and the SEC interpretive guidance that management follows when it evaluates its own controls. Each one shapes a different part of the evidence you will need to produce.
The first is PCAOB AS 2110, which explains how auditors identify IT risks to internal control over financial reporting. Its discussion of IT risks names unauthorized access to data, improper changes to data, access that persists after a person leaves, and IT personnel holding privileges beyond their duties as risks that break segregation of duties. For an identity governance design, this tells you which joiner, mover, leaver and privilege scenarios the auditor expects you to handle in financially significant systems. The PCAOB risk assessment standards filing is the primary text to read with your external auditor.
The second is PCAOB AS 2201, which sets out how the auditor tests whether a control operates. It combines inquiry, observation, inspection of documentation and re-performance, and it asks whether the person performing a control has the authority and competence to do so. This is why an approval recorded in midPoint must show who approved the request and whether that approver owns the entitlement. The PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 filing covers this. Release 33-8810, the SEC management guidance, tells management that it needs to evaluate only the IT general controls necessary for other financial reporting controls to work, and it names access to programs and data as one area to consider. Confirm with your auditor how they scope the access controls for each in-scope application before you finalize the control matrix.
How DeployOpen scopes, delivers and supports SOX access controls
DeployOpen plans, implements, customizes, integrates, documents and supports self-hosted open-source platforms inside the client's own infrastructure. For SOX access controls, that means building midPoint around the provisioning, removal, review and segregation of duties evidence that external auditors will test, and preparing that evidence for the assessment without issuing any audit opinion.
How we scope
- Written scope fixes which financially significant systems, connectors and access controls are in and out
- Scope records the authoritative HR source and the systems that feed joiner, mover and leaver events
- Engagements are fixed-scope, with deliverables and timelines agreed in writing before work starts
- Quotes follow from the written scope, so the reader should ask which assumptions each figure depends on
How we build
- Configure midPoint connectors for each in-scope system, with entitlement mappings reviewed against the role model
- Clean up orphaned and excess accounts before go-live so the first population an auditor samples is reconciled
- Build approval, certification and segregation of duties rules, then test them against documented control objectives
- Integrate midPoint with the directories and SSO services the organization already runs in its own environment
How we hand over
- Document each control: owner, frequency, inputs, approval steps, exception handling and the evidence it produces
- Provide a walkthrough of the evidence an auditor can re-perform, including certification decisions and removal logs
- Hand over runbooks for upgrades, backups and the PostgreSQL database that holds midPoint state
- Confirm with the client's auditors which evidence formats and sample periods they expect before handover
How we support
- Ongoing support, upgrades and continuous testing are available as retainers after handover
- Plan midPoint upgrades on the long-term support track and test each change against the controls before release
- Re-run access review campaigns and reconciliations on the cadence the written scope sets
- Support the internal control team through each audit cycle without taking over management's assessment of ICFR

