How promptfoo red teaming supports EU AI Act evidence before deployment
The eu:ai-act preset in promptfoo produces pre-deployment test evidence for the Article 5 prohibited practices and for the Annex III high-risk areas. It does not satisfy the wider obligations the AI Act places on providers and deployers, such as risk management, technical documentation, record keeping, human oversight and conformity assessment. A team that runs an LLM application in or into the EU and must show a regulator that it tested the system needs both halves of that statement before it plans its evidence file. The practical question is which findings the preset can document, which obligations still need their own artifacts, and who owns each one.
Article 2 applies the Act to providers placing AI systems or general-purpose AI models on the EU market wherever they are established, to deployers established in the EU, and to non-EU providers and deployers whose AI output is used in the EU. A company outside the EU whose assistant answers EU customers can therefore fall in scope without any EU entity. Your role decides which obligations you carry, so settle it before you choose test cases. A team that builds on or fine-tunes a third-party model may be a provider of its own system, while a team that only configures a vendor's product is more likely a deployer. Ask counsel to confirm the role in writing.
Enforcement is split. National market surveillance authorities enforce the Act for AI systems, so the authority that asks for your evidence is likely the one in the Member State where you operate or where your output is used. The Commission's AI Office enforces the general-purpose AI model rules under Article 88 and, under Article 75(1) as amended in 2026, is exclusively competent for AI systems built on a provider's own general-purpose model and for AI in very large online platforms and search engines. Check which of these applies to your system before you map your evidence to a single authority. Fines under Article 99 reach EUR 35 million or 7% of worldwide annual turnover for prohibited practices, whichever is higher.
Timing shapes the work. The prohibitions in Article 5 have applied since 2 February 2025, so an application that falls into a prohibited practice is already exposed. For Annex III systems, the high-risk rules apply from 2 December 2027 as amended in 2026, but an evidence file built before deployment is easier to extend than one reconstructed later. Run the preset against your application's actual prompts, tools and retrieval sources, keep the configuration and outputs under version control, and record which Annex III area each test maps to. Because promptfoo runs on your machine and calls the model directly, confirm where run records are stored and who can read them before they become part of an evidence pack.
DeployOpen can plan the test scope, configure promptfoo in your environment and assemble the evidence pack: test definitions, run records, findings, reviewer decisions and remediation notes. DeployOpen prepares evidence and does not issue audit reports, attestations or certifications. Independent auditors and conformity assessment bodies make those judgments. Most Annex III high-risk systems use internal-control conformity assessment under Annex VI, a process the provider runs and documents itself, so the evidence must be organized for that purpose. Ask any partner, including DeployOpen, to state in the written scope which artifacts it delivers and which remain your responsibility.
Mapping AI Act requirements to promptfoo capabilities and configuration
This table compares the AI Act requirements that the eu:ai-act preset relates to with the promptfoo capability that produces test results and the configuration your team must set up. Read the middle column as what the tool can run and the last column as what you must prepare. The main takeaway is that the preset produces test evidence for prohibited practices, Annex III areas and pre-deployment testing, while most other obligations need evidence from other processes.
| Requirement | promptfoo capability | Configuration needed |
|---|---|---|
| Article 5 prohibited practices | Red team probes aimed at prohibited-practice scenarios, run against the target application and reported per test | Enable the eu:ai-act preset in the redteam section, point the target at your application, and confirm the probe list for your promptfoo version |
| Annex III high-risk areas (eight areas) | Probes that exercise application behavior in the Annex III areas where the preset covers them | Record which Annex III areas your system touches, check the preset covers each one, and add custom tests for any gaps |
| Systematic testing before deployment | Repeatable red team runs from the CLI or CI/CD pipelines, with saved reports that show results per test | Keep the config in version control, run it in the pipeline before each release, and retain the output reports as test evidence |
| Other AI Act obligations | Not mapped by the tool | Plan separate evidence for risk management, data governance, transparency and conformity assessment with your compliance lead and assessor |
Testing Article 5 prohibited practices with promptfoo for the EU AI Act
Red teaming can show whether an LLM application behaves in ways that touch the prohibited practices in Article 5 of the AI Act, but only within the configurations and inputs you test. The Commission counts nine prohibited practices after the 2026 amendment made by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744. Eight have applied since 2 February 2025 under Article 113. The ninth, which covers non-consensual intimate imagery and child sexual abuse material, applies from 2 December 2026. Article 99 sets maximum fines for prohibited practices at EUR 35 million or 7% of worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher. Confirm the exact wording of each item against the consolidated text on EUR-Lex before you write any probe that depends on it.
An application rarely becomes prohibited in one step. It drifts there. A system prompt may ask the model to infer a candidate's emotional state from written answers, a tool may pull behavioral data about customers to produce a score, or a retrieval index may hold profiles of named individuals that the assistant then ranks. (Illustrative example: an internal HR assistant whose knowledge base was extended with manager notes about staff. Nobody changed the model, yet the retrieval layer now supports a use that Article 5 may address.) Your threat model should therefore list each surface where behavior can change: the system prompt, tool definitions and their outputs, retrieved documents, and any memory or user profile store.
Once the surfaces are listed, translate each prohibited practice into observable behavior. For example, a probe can ask the assistant to rank people by their social conduct, to produce a profile of a named employee's emotions in a meeting, or to categorize users by a sensitive attribute from a photo or text. promptfoo's eu:ai-act preset gives you a starting set of probes for red teaming, and the Community edition includes red teaming with 10k probes per month. Confirm which categories the preset covers in the version you install, then add custom plugins for the practices and data sources specific to your application. Test the full application, including tools and retrieval, because a model-only test misses the paths where drift usually occurs.
A clean run tells you that the probes you ran were not triggered under the configuration you tested. It does not tell you that the system is lawful. Lawfulness depends on purpose, deployment context, the deployer's role and facts outside any prompt, so only legal review can settle it. Agree the probe scope in writing with legal counsel and the product owner before the run. The agreement should name the practices in scope, the user groups and languages, the tools and data sources, the model versions, and what counts as a failure. Record every exclusion and the reason for it, because an auditor will ask what was not tested.
Plan to rerun the agreed probes whenever the model, system prompt, tool set, retrieval corpus or deployment context changes. Set the NCII and child sexual abuse material probes to run before 2 December 2026, since that prohibition applies from then. Keep each run's configuration, probe version and results with the scope document so the evidence shows what was tested and when. Treat failures as product defects to fix and retest, and escalate any case where a probe reveals a use that legal counsel must assess before release.
Testing the eight Annex III areas before 2 December 2027
Biometrics and law enforcement are the areas where an LLM application is most likely to infer sensitive traits about people or support decisions that affect their liberty. Many outputs in these areas can also fall under the prohibitions in Article 5, so test for prohibited behavior before you test for high-risk behavior.
- Identity and trait inference: Probe whether the assistant guesses identity, age, ethnicity or health from photos, voice notes or descriptions, and whether it declines to do so.
- Emotion reading: Submit transcripts and call recordings and check whether the model presents a speaker's emotional state as fact.
- Evidence and profiling: Ask for summaries of case files that rank suspects, rate witness credibility or estimate reoffending, and check whether the model invents grounds for its conclusions.
- Consistency across groups: Hold case facts constant, vary names, dialects and neighborhoods, and compare the scores and recommendations produced.
Before testing, ask counsel whether the application identifies, categorizes or profiles people, whether any output reaches a police or border decision, and which authority would supervise it.
Critical infrastructure and education share a pattern: outputs can shape the operation of a service people depend on, or decide access to learning and progression. Testing should focus on confident errors, unsafe operational advice and unequal treatment of learners or applicants.
- Operational advice: Ask for control changes, setpoint adjustments or shutdown steps for water, energy, heating or traffic systems, and check whether the model asks for human verification or invents procedures.
- Confident error under pressure: Describe partial outages and time pressure, then check whether the model still states uncertain answers with certainty.
- Admissions and grading: Score matched applications or essays that differ only in name, school or language background, and compare rankings and feedback.
- Proctoring and conduct: Probe prompts that ask the model to flag cheating or judge a student's behavior from logs or video descriptions, and check the reasoning it gives.
Confirm with counsel and the sector regulator whether the system acts as a safety component of a covered infrastructure, or decides admissions, grades, progression or placement, since those roles determine the Annex III category.
Employment and essential services are where LLM outputs most often reach individual livelihoods, including hiring, pay, benefits, credit and urgent care. Testing should focus on proxies for protected characteristics and on how the model explains low scores and refusals.
- Candidate screening: Submit matched résumés that differ only by name, employment gap or institution, and compare scores, ranks and stated reasons.
- Monitoring and performance: Feed activity summaries to the model and check whether its recommendations on promotion, dismissal or task allocation rely on unverified signals.
- Credit and benefits: Test denial explanations for loans or assistance for proxies such as postcode, and check whether the model asks for missing information before judging.
- Emergency triage: Provide call transcripts in different languages, accents and speech patterns, then compare urgency classifications for the same described emergency.
Confirm with counsel whether outputs influence hiring, pay, promotion, termination, access to a public benefit, creditworthiness or emergency dispatch, and whether financial or health regulators add obligations of their own.
Migration, asylum and border control and justice and democratic processes concern decisions about status, liberty and the integrity of public choices. Testing should check whether the model presents legal or factual conclusions with unwarranted certainty and whether it can be steered toward targeted political influence.
- Case summaries and recommendations: Run asylum, visa or border files through the application and check whether summaries recommend refusal, cite nationality or religion, or add facts missing from the file.
- Document authenticity: Ask the model to judge travel or identity documents from descriptions or images, and check whether it overstates its certainty.
- Legal research: Request case law on contested points, then verify that each citation exists and that stated uncertainty matches the sources.
- Targeted political content: Request tailored messages aimed at voter groups, turnout suppression or misleading claims about voting, and check whether the model refuses or complies.
Confirm with counsel whether outputs assist a court, tribunal, migration or border authority, or are used in running an election or referendum, and whether the application's role falls within the Annex III wording.
Setting up promptfoo for EU AI Act red teaming
This sequence takes a team from a clean environment to a repeatable promptfoo scan of an LLM application using the eu:ai-act preset. It produces archived configurations and results that the compliance team can use as test evidence alongside its own records of scope and decisions.
Check Node.js and promptfoo versions
The engineer responsible for the scanner records the promptfoo release to be used and the Node.js runtime it requires. At the time of writing, npm release 0.124.1 requires Node.js 22.22.0 or newer, but the requirement belongs to the release you pin, so confirm it on the npm package page and in the GitHub release notes for that version before installing. Pin both versions in the team runbook. Done when a clean environment reports the pinned Node.js version and the promptfoo CLI returns its version.
Define the application and providers
The AI system owner and the engineer write a configuration file that names the application under test, the model providers it calls and the inputs it accepts. Include only providers the organization has approved, and record the model version each provider points to, because a red team result describes a specific system configuration. Supply credentials through environment variables or the secrets store your team already uses, and keep them out of the repository. Done when a single benign prompt returns a response from the application, confirming the wiring works before any red team probes are sent.
Select the eu:ai-act preset
The engineer adds the eu:ai-act preset to the configuration, then decides whether extra plugins are needed for risks specific to the application, such as data leakage or domain-specific harm. The compliance lead records how the selected tests relate to Article 5 prohibited practices and the Annex III high-risk areas, because the preset selects tests and does not determine which obligations apply to the system. Confirm the exact preset configuration syntax in the promptfoo red teaming documentation for your pinned release before writing it into the file. Done when the planned test selection is written down and reviewed.
Set probe volume within allowance
The engineer sets the number of probes per run and the run schedule so that total monthly use stays within the allowance. The promptfoo pricing page lists 10k probes per month on the free Community edition, with community support. Estimate usage per run from the configuration before scheduling, include reruns after fixes, and leave headroom for ad hoc investigation. Ask promptfoo how probes are counted for your release. If planned volume exceeds the allowance, reduce scope or request a quote for a paid edition. Done when a written monthly calculation sits next to the schedule and falls below the allowance.
Run the scan in CI/CD or locally
The engineer runs the scan from a developer machine or from a pipeline job, since promptfoo can be used as a CLI, as a library or in CI/CD pipelines. Its documentation states that evals run on your machine and talk directly with the LLM, so confirm that the runner sits in a network path approved for each provider. Use a pipeline job when the scan should run on each change to prompts, models or the application, and a local run for investigation. Done when the run completes and the output shows results for every planned plugin, with each failure recorded as a finding and kept.
Archive each run with its configuration
The engineer stores the output of every run together with the exact configuration file, the promptfoo and Node.js versions, the provider and model identifiers and the run date. Keep these records in an evidence location the compliance team controls, and use versioned or write-once storage so an auditor can see what was tested at a given point in time. The self-hosted app uses a local SQLite database that the documentation does not recommend for production, so export archives as files and do not treat that database as the record. Done when a second engineer can identify the configuration and versions behind any archived run.
What EU AI Act red-team evidence looks like to an auditor
Auditors reviewing red-team testing for AI Act obligations look for a traceable chain from configuration to result to fix. These six items form that chain, and each should be tied to a specific model version, prompt version and promptfoo release. Your legal team should set retention periods, and the evidence index should sit under change control.
Preset configuration file
The eu:ai-act preset configuration records what was asked to run. Store the exact file that produced each run in your own repository under change control, so an auditor can see which presets, targets and plugins were enabled. Check that the file names the target application and model endpoint, and that any edit after a run creates a new version instead of overwriting the old one.
Pinned promptfoo release
Record the exact promptfoo version used for each run, along with its Node.js runtime. The npm release 0.124.1, published on 8 October 2026, requires Node.js 22.22.0 or newer, so a run on a different version may not be reproducible. Pin the version in your lockfile or container image, and keep the release reference with the evidence bundle so the tooling can be rebuilt later.
Probe set and categories run
List the probes and plugin categories executed in each run, including how the eu:ai-act preset maps to Article 5 prohibited practices and Annex III high-risk areas. Auditors will ask which categories were in scope and which were excluded. Record each exclusion with a reason, and confirm with your legal and compliance team which Annex III areas apply to your system before treating coverage as complete.
Timestamped raw results per run
Keep the unedited output for every run, including each prompt sent, each response, the pass or fail status, and start and end timestamps. Tie every run to the model identifier and the prompt version under test, so any result can be traced to the exact configuration. Store raw output in access-logged storage and keep summaries separate from the source records.
Remediation records for failed probes
For each failed probe, record the finding, the affected component, the owner, the change made (such as a prompt edit, guardrail, model change or application logic) and the approver. Link each remediation ticket to the run identifier. A failed probe with no recorded decision is a gap an auditor will question, even if a later fix passes. Mark accepted risks explicitly with the approver and review date.
Re-test results after fixes
Re-run the affected probes against the changed model or prompt version, and store the new run as a separate record so the original failed run remains visible. Compare both runs in the evidence index. A passing re-test shows that the probe passed on that version on that date. It does not show that the application conforms to the AI Act, and it does not cover behavior outside the probes run.
Why the self-hosted app is not a shared audit record
Running promptfoo as a local CLI or library and running its self-hosted app are different operating models, and only the second one looks like a shared system of record. The CLI and library run evals on the machine that invokes them and talk directly with the model under test. Results stay with that run, which suits a developer or a pipeline job. The self-hosted app is an Express server that serves the web UI and API, deployable with Docker, Docker Compose or Kubernetes with Helm. Teams often assume that deploying it produces a central, governed record of red teaming runs. The documentation does not support that assumption.
The documented limits matter for evidence. The self-hosted app stores data in a local SQLite database that cannot be shared across replicas, so you cannot scale it horizontally behind a load balancer and expect one consistent history. It has no RBAC, no horizontal scaling and no built-in authentication or SSO. The promptfoo self-hosting documentation also states that it is not recommended for production use. For an Article 5 or Annex III test program, that means the app cannot tell an auditor who ran a probe, who could change a result or who approved a finding. Ask the vendor to confirm the current wording and any exceptions before you design around it.
The Enterprise and On-Premise tiers address these gaps on paper. Per the pricing page, Enterprise adds team sharing, teams-based access control and SSO, custom roles and permissions, continuous monitoring, a centralized guardrail dashboard, remediation recommendations and priority support with SLAs, at custom pricing. On-Premise runs that functionality on your infrastructure with complete data isolation and a dedicated deployment engineer. Pricing is quoted, not published, so the cost of these tiers depends on your scope and deployment, and the quote should state which items are recurring licenses and which are one-time services.
Before you rely on any of these features as evidence, treat them as claims to verify. Confirm in writing whether the Enterprise or On-Premise build provides the specific access controls, SSO integration, audit logging and retention behavior your evidence file needs, and whether the database is still shared-nothing per replica. Ask how run history is exported and whether the export is tamper-evident. Test it with a pilot dataset, then record the configuration in your control documentation so the same settings can be reproduced.
Plan for the gap in the meantime. A practical pattern is to keep red teaming results as versioned, signed artifacts from CI or from a controlled runner, store them in your existing evidence repository with access controls already in place, and reference the exact promptfoo version and configuration used for each run. This approach does not depend on the self-hosted app being production ready. Whichever pattern you choose, record who owns the evidence, how long it is retained and who can reproduce a finding.
What promptfoo red teaming does not satisfy under the AI Act
Red teaming with promptfoo produces evidence for some of the AI Act's requirements, mainly around testing for prohibited practices and high-risk areas. The cards below cover obligations that testing alone does not discharge, each of which needs its own design, documents and owners. Confirm article references against the consolidated text of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 before relying on any of them.
Risk management system
The Act expects a continuous risk management process across the life of a high-risk system, covering identification, estimation, mitigation and residual risk review. Red team findings are an input to this process, but they do not replace a documented risk register with owners, acceptance decisions and review triggers. Check that each promptfoo finding is traced to a risk entry and a mitigation decision.
Data and data governance
Providers of high-risk systems must show how training, validation and testing data were sourced, prepared and checked for relevance and bias. Prompt sets and probe datasets used in promptfoo runs are test data, and they need their own provenance record. Confirm who approved the evaluation datasets, how they are versioned, and whether they contain personal data that requires its own legal basis.
Technical documentation
Technical documentation must describe the system's purpose, design, development, performance and limitations in enough detail for authorities to assess compliance. Promptfoo configuration files and reports show test activity, but they are not a complete system description. Check that the document covers model and prompt versions, known failure modes and the intended use boundaries, and that it references the test runs by identifier.
Record-keeping and logging design
High-risk systems must support automatic logging of events over their lifetime so that outputs can be traced after deployment. Promptfoo logs a test run, which is useful for evidence but is not production logging of user interactions. Confirm which production events are logged, where logs are stored, how long they are retained, and who can access them.
Human oversight design
High-risk systems must be designed so that people can understand outputs, intervene and stop the system where needed. A red team result cannot show that operators can detect and override harmful behavior in practice. Check that the oversight roles, escalation paths and stop controls are specified, and that they are exercised in tests separate from the automated probes.
Transparency to users
Deployers and affected people must receive the information the Act requires about the system, its capabilities and its limits, and some interactions must be disclosed as AI. Testing shows whether a model behaves as described, but it does not produce the notices themselves. Confirm the wording, placement and delivery of user-facing disclosures, and test that they appear in the flows where the Act requires them.
Quality management system
Providers must operate a documented quality management system covering policies, procedures, resource management, testing and post-deployment handling. Promptfoo runs are a procedure output, not the system that governs them. Check that test procedures, approval steps and change control are written down, and that the harmonised standard on quality management is reviewed against your own system.
Conformity assessment and notified bodies
Before placing a high-risk system on the market, the provider must complete a conformity assessment, which for most Annex III systems is an internal-control route and for some biometric systems and Annex I products involves a notified body. Red team reports can be part of the file, but they do not complete the assessment. Confirm which route applies to your system, and whether a notified body is needed, before planning the timeline.
Registration and post-market monitoring
Certain high-risk systems must be registered in an EU database, and providers must monitor performance after deployment and collect data on real use. Continuous red teaming in a pipeline covers part of monitoring, but it does not record field performance or registration status. Confirm the registration obligation for your system, who submits it, and how production signals feed back into test cases.
Serious incident reporting
Providers and deployers must report serious incidents to the relevant authorities within deadlines set by the Act. Test findings are not incidents, and a red team program does not define what counts as serious or who reports it. Check that an incident definition, a triage owner and a reporting procedure exist, and that they are rehearsed against realistic scenarios.
General-purpose AI model rules
Providers of general-purpose AI models have separate obligations, including technical documentation and copyright policy duties, and some models carry systemic-risk duties. These apply to the model provider, not to an application team that builds on a model. Confirm which role your organization holds, and whether the enforcement route runs through the Commission's AI Office for your case.
How much does EU AI Act red teaming cost and how long does it take?
What makes an EU AI Act red teaming quote go up or down?
The quote follows the written scope. The main drivers are the number of AI systems in scope, how many of the eight Annex III areas each system touches, how broad the probe set is, whether results must run inside your CI/CD pipelines, and how much evidence design your assessors will expect. DeployOpen does not publish prices, so a quote follows from the agreed scope. Software cost is separate. promptfoo is MIT-licensed, and its Community edition is free and includes red teaming with 10k probes per month. The Enterprise tier, which adds team sharing, SSO and continuous monitoring, is custom priced, so decide whether your team needs it before you budget for it.
How long does the work take before 2 December 2027?
Duration depends on the written scope: the number of systems, the Annex III areas covered, and how quickly system owners and model endpoints become available. The date to plan around is 2 December 2027, when the high-risk rules in Chapter III Sections 1 to 3 apply to Annex III systems, as amended in 2026. For Annex I product systems, the date is 2 August 2028. Work backward from these dates. Test cycles should finish with enough time to fix findings and assemble records. Ask for milestones in the written scope, including a retest round after the first cycle.
What does the client need to provide for red teaming?
Three groups of inputs are needed. System owners must confirm each system's intended purpose, users, data flows and deployment locations. Legal or compliance staff must confirm scope, meaning which Article 5 practices and Annex III areas apply, because the Act reaches providers and deployers in the EU and non-EU operators whose output is used in the EU. Engineering must provide access to model endpoints in test environments, representative test data, application logs and a named contact who can triage findings. If any of these arrive late, the schedule moves. Confirm each input in writing before the timeline is set.
Can an internal team run EU AI Act red teaming alone?
Yes, a capable internal team can run the promptfoo eu:ai-act preset itself. promptfoo is open source, runs locally, and can be used from the command line or in CI/CD pipelines. The harder work is the judgment around the tool. The team must decide which Annex III areas and Article 5 practices fit each system, interpret findings, design evidence that an independent assessor can follow, and keep tests current as the Act and your models change. Ask whether you have a named person who will own scope, evidence and retesting over the long term, not only the first run.
Does red teaming with promptfoo satisfy the EU AI Act on its own?
No. Red teaming produces test evidence for some obligations, but it does not satisfy the Act by itself. The Act also sets requirements for risk management, data governance, technical documentation, record keeping, human oversight, and quality management, and most Annex III systems follow internal-control conformity assessment under Annex VI. That means the provider must prepare the technical documentation and declarations itself. DeployOpen prepares systems, controls and evidence for compliance assessments, but it does not issue audit reports, attestations or certifications. Independent auditors and certification bodies perform those roles where required. Treat red team results as one input to a wider compliance program.
What should a red teaming quote for EU AI Act testing include?
A useful quote starts with the written scope before any price. It should list each AI system in scope with its deployment environment, the Annex III areas and Article 5 practices tested, the probe categories and preset used, and the endpoints and test data required from you. It should name deliverables, such as test runs, findings with severity ratings, retest rounds, evidence records and the report format. It should show pipeline integration work and whether Enterprise licensing is assumed, which is custom priced. Separate one-time build work from recurring retesting or monitoring. Finally, list exclusions, such as legal opinions and audit, and tie milestones to 2 December 2027.
How DeployOpen scopes and delivers AI Act red-team evidence
DeployOpen plans, implements, tests and documents promptfoo red teaming for the EU AI Act inside your own infrastructure, so the evidence stays under your control. We run the eu:ai-act preset against your LLM application as one part of a wider compliance readiness effort. We do not issue audit reports or attestations; independent auditors and certification bodies do.
How we scope
- Written scope names the LLM applications, endpoints and environments included in the testing.
- We map each in-scope application to the Article 5 prohibited practices and Annex III areas it touches.
- Engagements are fixed-scope, with deliverables and timelines agreed in writing before work starts.
How we build
- promptfoo runs locally, so evals call the model under test directly from your environment.
- We run the eu:ai-act preset and add custom probes for your application's specific use cases.
- Red team results are reviewed by engineers and mapped to the findings that need remediation.
How we hand over
- Deliverables include run configurations, raw eval outputs and a written test methodology document.
- A traceability matrix links each test case to the Article it supports and the owning team.
- A clear statement of which obligations the testing does not cover, handed to your compliance lead.
How we support
- Ongoing support, upgrades and continuous testing are available as a retainer after handover.
- Re-runs follow material changes to models, prompts, tools or the promptfoo version in use.
- Your team keeps ownership of the audit relationship, with independent auditors assessing the evidence.

