GDPR vs PCI DSS: which to pursue first and when to do both
For a European merchant or payment provider, the practical question is which obligation to start with, because most card businesses carry both. PCI DSS applies to account data through the payment brand programs that govern the merchant's acquiring relationship, and the GDPR applies by law to all personal data the business handles. Cardholder names, email addresses, billing histories and customer account IDs are personal data under the GDPR even when the card number itself is not in play. Start by confirming with your acquirer and the relevant brands which PCI DSS validation level and Self-Assessment Questionnaire or Report on Compliance apply to you, and separately map where personal data sits across your systems.
When the cardholder data environment is your largest exposure, PCI DSS usually comes first because it sets the most specific technical controls and it is enforced through your payment relationships. Prioritize scope reduction, since a smaller environment makes every later requirement cheaper to meet. Be careful with the shortcut that encryption solves scope: PCI SSC FAQ 1086 says strong encryption meets Requirement 3.5.1 but does not by itself take the data out of scope. The GDPR still applies in full where the card environment is out of PCI DSS scope. Analytics, customer service tools and marketing systems that hold personal data need a lawful basis, rights handling and Article 33 breach readiness with a 72-hour supervisory notice clock, whatever their PCI status.
Doing both well means reusing evidence rather than producing it twice. Access control, logging, key management and vulnerability testing often serve both frameworks, so design those controls once and document them against each. Neither is a substitute for the other. A passing PCI DSS assessment does not demonstrate a GDPR lawful basis, and GDPR work does not produce a PCI DSS Attestation of Compliance. Note the penalty structures differ: the PCI SSC does not impose penalties, so financial consequences come from payment brand programs, while GDPR fines for Article 32 infringements can reach EUR 10 million or 2% of total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher. Ask your acquirer to confirm which of your obligations they enforce.
How the GDPR and PCI DSS differ on scope, proof and enforcement
This table compares the GDPR and PCI DSS on who they bind, what data they cover, the proof each produces, who enforces them and what fines can follow. Read it as two different kinds of obligation: the GDPR is law for personal data, while PCI DSS is a payment brand rulebook for account data, so most merchants face both.
| Dimension | GDPR | PCI DSS |
|---|---|---|
| Owner and legal status | Regulation (EU) 2016/679, binding EU law applying in all Member States and under the EEA Joint Committee Decision for Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway | Industry standard owned and maintained by the PCI Security Standards Council, not law; obligations arrive through payment brand programs and contracts |
| Who must comply | Controllers and processors handling personal data of people in the EU and EEA, regardless of sector or size | Entities that store, process or transmit cardholder data or sensitive authentication data, or could affect that environment; the payment brands decide who must validate |
| Data covered | Any personal data, including data not tied to payments | Cardholder data and sensitive authentication data within the cardholder data environment and connected systems |
| Version in force | Regulation text dated 27 April 2016; not amended as of October 2026, with Omnibus proposals still in procedure | PCI DSS v4.0.1 is the only active version; v4.0 retired 31 December 2024; a request for comments ran to 20 July 2026 with no new release date |
| Proof produced | No audit, attestation or certificate is required; Article 42 certification is voluntary and does not reduce responsibility | A Report on Compliance by a Qualified Security Assessor or a Self-Assessment Questionnaire, each with an Attestation of Compliance; certificates are not accepted as validation |
| Who enforces | Independent national supervisory authorities; the EDPB issues guidelines and binding dispute decisions | The PCI SSC does not enforce; individual payment brands run enforcement and set consequences |
| Fine ceilings | Up to EUR 10 million or 2% of worldwide annual turnover for Article 32 security failures; up to EUR 20 million or 4% for core principles and transfers | No fines from the PCI SSC; financial consequences come from each payment brand program, so ask your acquirer which terms apply |
| What to confirm | Ask your supervisory authority or counsel how Article 32 applies to your processing and which Article 42 schemes exist in your Member State | Ask your acquirer which validation level and brand program apply to your channels and whether a QSA or SAQ path fits your scope |
Why encryption alone does not take card data out of PCI scope
Encrypting cardholder data does not remove it from PCI DSS scope. PCI SSC FAQ 1086 (updated March 2026) confirms that encrypting cardholder data with strong cryptography meets Requirement 3.5.1, but encryption alone does not take the data out of scope. The systems that store the ciphertext, the systems that hold or can reach the keys, and the systems that decrypt the data remain part of the cardholder data environment. For a merchant, the practical decision is whether to reduce scope by tokenizing or hashing data before it reaches its own systems, not whether encryption is in place. Confirm with your QSA or acquirer which systems they treat as in scope once encryption is applied.
PCI SSC FAQ 1089 draws a narrower line for hashing. Hashed primary account number (PAN) that is transferred to and stored in a separate environment is no longer cardholder data in that environment, but the systems that perform the hashing stay in scope. In an illustrative design, a payment service hashes the PAN at the point of capture and sends only the hash to an analytics database in a segregated network. The analytics database can fall outside the assessed environment, while the capture service, its hashing function and any system holding the salt or key material stay in the assessment. Ask your QSA to review the data flow diagram and the network segmentation evidence before assuming the separate environment is out of scope.
The GDPR reads differently. Article 32(1) requires measures appropriate to the risk, taking into account the state of the art and implementation costs, and names pseudonymisation and encryption as examples. The same encryption or pseudonymization control can therefore satisfy Article 32 for personal data while leaving the PCI DSS scope of the cardholder data environment unchanged. A controller should record both results separately: the Article 32 risk assessment and the PCI DSS scope decision. Treating a GDPR control as a PCI scope reduction is a common planning error, and it can leave the assessment underestimated.
Where GDPR and PCI DSS work overlaps and where it does not
GDPR and PCI DSS both expect security of processing, logging, testing and tight supplier control, so one control set can serve both. The overlap ends where the GDPR adds duties PCI DSS does not address, and where evidence from one assessment does not automatically satisfy the other.
Shared security of processing controls
Access restriction, logging, vulnerability management and regular testing appear in both frameworks. GDPR Article 32 asks for measures appropriate to the risk, including regular testing of effectiveness, while PCI DSS sets specific requirements for the cardholder data environment. Map each control once, then check whether the PCI requirement is stricter in the card environment and whether the GDPR applies the same control to personal data outside it. Confirm any mapping with your QSA or payment brand before you rely on it.
Encryption and pseudonymization decisions
Encryption is named in GDPR Article 32 as a security measure, and PCI SSC FAQ 1086 confirms that encrypting cardholder data meets Requirement 3.5.1 but does not take the data out of PCI DSS scope. Pseudonymization is a GDPR concept that PCI DSS does not use as a scope reducer on its own. Hashed PAN in a separate environment can leave cardholder data scope under FAQ 1089, but the systems that perform the hashing stay in scope. Decide each control against both scope questions separately.
Incident response that meets both duties
A cardholder data breach can trigger payment brand and acquirer processes, while a breach of personal data can trigger the GDPR 72-hour notice to the supervisory authority under Article 33(1). The two clocks start from different facts and reach different recipients. Build one incident runbook that records the time of awareness, assesses personal data and card data separately, and names who notifies the supervisory authority and who notifies the payment brands. Test the runbook with your legal, security and payments teams.
Service provider and processor contracts
PCI DSS requires responsibilities to be defined between merchants and service providers, and the GDPR requires a written contract with each processor under Article 28. A single contract can cover both if it names the cardholder data handled, the personal data handled, the security measures, breach notice terms and audit or evidence rights. Check that the processor's PCI responsibility matrix and its GDPR processing terms do not contradict each other on who controls the data.
Evidence reuse across assessments
PCI SSC FAQ 1567 allows a QSA to rely on SOC 2 or SOC 3 evidence after independently reviewing it, which can reduce duplicate evidence work. The FAQ says nothing about the GDPR, so GDPR evidence such as records of processing, data protection impact assessments and rights request logs must be produced separately. Ask your QSA which SOC 2 evidence they will accept, and ask your data protection officer or legal team which records a supervisory authority would expect.
Obligations PCI DSS does not cover
The GDPR requires a lawful basis for processing, transparency to data subjects, and handling of rights requests such as access and erasure, with responses due within one month under Article 12(3). PCI DSS governs how account data is protected in the cardholder data environment and does not set these duties. A PCI assessment can pass while these GDPR duties remain open, so review them as a separate workstream. Confirm the scope of each duty with your data protection officer or supervisory authority.
How breach notice and rights deadlines differ in practice
This sequence shows a readiness reviewer which GDPR clocks run in parallel during a personal data incident or rights request, and where PCI DSS hands the reporting path to the payment brands and the acquirer. It produces a dated record the team can test before a real event.
Establish the awareness point for each incident
The first step is fixing the moment the controller becomes aware of a potential personal data breach, because the Article 33(1) clock for notifying the supervisory authority within 72 hours starts there. Assign a named owner, usually the privacy lead with security, to log the time of first awareness, the source of the report and the initial scope. The output is a timestamped incident record that a reviewer can check against the clock. Confirm internally how awareness is defined, since a readiness review will test whether staff escalate quickly enough to meet the deadline.
Assess whether the breach is notifiable
Next, the privacy and security leads decide whether the breach is likely to result in a risk to individuals and therefore needs supervisory authority notice, and whether it requires notice to affected individuals under Article 34. Record the categories of data, the approximate volume of records and individuals, likely consequences and the containment steps taken. The output is a documented assessment, including reasons if notice is not made, which the reviewer should be able to read without the original responder present. Keep this assessment separate from any card brand reporting, which follows its own path.
Notify the supervisory authority within the window
Where the assessment requires it, the controller submits notice to the competent supervisory authority within 72 hours of awareness under Article 33(1). If the notice cannot include every detail within that window, the controller provides information in phases and records the reasons for the delay. The owner is the controller's data protection lead, with legal review. The output is a copy of the submitted notice, the submission time and any follow-up correspondence, all stored with the incident record so the reviewer can match the timing to the awareness point.
Inform affected individuals where Article 34 applies
If the breach is likely to result in a high risk to individuals, the controller communicates it to the affected people in clear language under Article 34. The communication should describe the likely consequences and the measures taken or proposed, and name a contact point. The owner is the privacy lead, with customer communications support. The output is the notice text, the distribution method and the list of recipients or the method used for a public notice. A readiness reviewer should confirm that the template exists before an incident, not that it is drafted during one.
Log and route data subject rights requests
Rights requests arrive through channels that are often outside the security team, so the process must capture each request on receipt and assign it to a responder. The owner is the privacy operations lead. The output is a request register showing the receipt date, identity verification steps, the request type and the status. Confirm the internal calendar that tracks the Article 12(3) response period, which allows one month from receipt, extendable by two months in complex or numerous cases with notice to the individual. Reviewers will sample this register to test whether clocks are actually watched.
Meet the Article 14 information duty for third-party data
When personal data were not collected from the individual, Article 14 requires the controller to provide the information listed in that article within one month, subject to the exceptions it sets out. The owner is the privacy lead working with the teams that acquire or buy data. The output is a register of third-party data sources, the notice content for each and the dates the notice was given. A readiness review should check that the sources feeding the register are complete, because data arriving from brokers or partners is the usual gap.
Map the PCI DSS reporting path separately
PCI DSS does not set its own breach notice clock in the way the GDPR does. Incident response expectations come through the payment brands, the acquirer or processor contract and the QSA process during assessment. Confirm with your acquirer the brand-specific reporting path, the parties to notify, the required timelines and the forensic investigator requirements, and record the answers in the same incident runbook. The output is a written reporting matrix that shows which notices go to supervisory authorities, which go to individuals, and which go to card brands or acquirers, so one incident does not get reported on the wrong clock.
Test the combined sequence before it is needed
Finally, run a tabletop exercise that starts with a single event affecting both card data and personal data, and walk it through each clock. The owner is the incident response lead with privacy and payments representatives. The output is a dated exercise report listing where each deadline was met, missed or unclear, and the corrective actions assigned. Repeat the test after material changes to systems, vendors or payment flows. This is the evidence that shows the sequence works in practice, and it is the document a reviewer will ask to see first.
Who assesses each framework and what the assessment produces
This table compares who checks each regime, what document or decision results, and how often the proof is refreshed. Read it to see which obligations produce a validation document that your acquirer or customers may ask for, and which produce nothing a third party can hand over.
| Question | PCI DSS | GDPR |
|---|---|---|
| Who assesses compliance | A Qualified Security Assessor completes a Report on Compliance, or the entity completes a Self-Assessment Questionnaire, both on PCI SSC templates | No audit or assessor is required. Supervisory authorities enforce the law through investigations and fines |
| Proof produced | A Report on Compliance or Self-Assessment Questionnaire, each with an Attestation of Compliance | No attestation or certificate is required by law. Any proof is the controller's own accountability records |
| Certificates | Not recognized as validation under PCI SSC FAQ 1220 | Article 42 certification is voluntary, issued for at most three years by accredited bodies or supervisory authorities, and does not reduce controller responsibility |
| Who sets the validation rules | The individual payment brands decide which entities must validate and run their own enforcement programs | The law itself, enforced by independent national supervisory authorities and coordinated through the European Data Protection Board |
| Validation cycle | Set by your acquirer or payment brand program. Confirm the reporting date and the cadence with them | No recurring validation cycle. Compliance is continuous, and the controller must be able to demonstrate it at any time |
| Cross-border enforcement | Not applicable. Payment brand programs govern validation | Regulation (EU) 2025/2518 sets additional procedural rules for cross-border cases and applies from 2 April 2027 |
| Reuse of other audits | A QSA may reuse evidence from a SOC 2 or SOC 3 audit after independently reviewing it | No formal reuse route. Evidence from other audits can support accountability records if it covers the processing in scope |
What non-compliance costs under each framework
The GDPR puts fines on the table directly, while PCI DSS does not. Under Article 83, infringements of Article 32, the security of processing duty, carry fines of up to EUR 10 million or 2% of total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher. Infringements of the principles, lawful basis, data subject rights and transfer rules carry the higher ceiling of EUR 20 million or 4% of turnover, whichever is higher. A merchant or payment provider should read these as ceilings set by a supervisory authority, not as expected amounts. The practical question for a readiness review is which of your processing activities would fall under the higher tier, such as a failure to honor rights requests within the one-month deadline in Article 12(3) or unlawful cross-border transfers.
The PCI Security Standards Council does not impose fines and publishes no cost estimate for PCI DSS compliance. Financial consequences come from the individual payment brand programs, which decide which entities must validate and run any enforcement, as set out in PCI SSC FAQ 1015. Your acquirer and the card brands are therefore the parties to ask which penalties or assessments apply to your merchant level or provider role, and under what conditions. Confirm those terms in writing before you size the exposure, because they are not set by the standard itself.
Cost drivers differ between the two regimes. For PCI DSS, the cost of validation grows with the number of systems in the cardholder data environment, the number of locations and payment channels in scope, and how many controls you must evidence through a ROC or SAQ. Reducing scope, for example by tokenizing or hashing PAN as described in the scope FAQs, lowers both assessment effort and recurring cost. For the GDPR, the main cost drivers are the size of the affected data set, the sensitivity of the data, the controls in place at the time of an incident and the turnover on which a fine would be calculated. Ask any QSA or counsel to price exposure against your own scope and controls, not against a generic figure.
Which combination fits merchants, acquirers and service providers
A merchant that redirects shoppers to a hosted payment page, or embeds a payment provider's iframe, usually keeps card numbers out of its own systems. In that model the provider's page collects account data directly, so the merchant's PCI DSS scope is typically much smaller and the merchant often validates through a shorter self-assessment questionnaire with an Attestation of Compliance. Under the GDPR, the merchant is usually the controller for customer identity, order and delivery data, and the payment provider often acts as a processor or, for some data, as its own controller. The merchant should still review how the page is loaded, because script changes on its own site can bring its environment back into scope.
- Scope depends on integration method: a redirect or iframe that keeps card fields off the merchant's servers is different from a server-side integration that receives card numbers.
- Validation route: a merchant in this model commonly completes a self-assessment questionnaire, but the exact type depends on the payment brand and acquirer rules.
- GDPR role: the merchant is usually the controller for order and customer records, and the processor contract should cover the payment provider's use of shopper data.
- Script and page controls: changes to the payment page or third-party scripts can change PCI DSS scope and should be reviewed before release.
- Data outside the card flow: names, addresses and order history still fall under GDPR security and rights duties even when card data stays off the merchant's systems.
Confirm with your acquirer or payment brand which questionnaire applies to your integration method and whether the payment provider's responsibility matrix covers the requirements you rely on.
A merchant that stores, processes or transmits primary account numbers in its own systems sits inside the cardholder data environment. Such a merchant generally has a broader validation route, and the acquirer or payment brand decides whether a Report on Compliance by a Qualified Security Assessor or a self-assessment questionnaire applies based on transaction volume and channel. Encryption of stored card data meets the relevant requirement, but encryption alone does not remove the systems that use the keys or the data from scope. Under the GDPR, the merchant is the controller for customer data and must meet the security duties of Article 32 for all personal data, including card-linked records.
- Encryption does not shrink scope: encrypted cardholder data still counts toward PCI DSS scope, and systems that handle keys or decrypt the data remain in scope.
- Hashing requires care: a hashed PAN stored in a separate environment may not be cardholder data there, but the systems that perform the hashing remain in scope.
- Validation route: the acquirer or payment brand sets whether a ROC or an SAQ applies, and each route ends with an Attestation of Compliance.
- GDPR security: Article 32 names encryption and pseudonymization as examples of appropriate measures, and the merchant must show that they fit the risk.
- Shared evidence: a QSA may reuse SOC 2 evidence after independent review, which can reduce duplicated work if the merchant holds such a report.
Confirm with your acquirer which validation route applies, the scope of your cardholder data environment and whether your data flows create GDPR processor relationships with any service provider.
A payment processor or service provider that stores, processes or transmits cardholder data for other entities, or that could affect the security of their cardholder data environment, falls within PCI DSS for its own services. Its validation is typically assessed through a ROC by a Qualified Security Assessor, and its customers will ask for its Attestation of Compliance and responsibility matrix. Under the GDPR, a service provider acting on a client's instructions is usually a processor, which requires a written contract under Article 28 and records of processing under Article 30. Where the provider also decides purposes for some data, it may be a controller for that processing, so the role must be mapped activity by activity.
- Service provider obligations: PCI DSS applies to service providers in their own right, not only through their clients' assessments.
- Processor contract: Article 28 sets the terms a processor agreement must contain, including security and assistance with breach duties.
- Responsibility matrix: clients need a clear split of which PCI DSS requirements the provider covers and which remain with the client.
- Records and scope: Article 30 records should match the systems and data flows that the PCI assessment covers.
- Breach timing: a processor must support the controller's 72-hour notice to the supervisory authority under Article 33, so incident contacts should be agreed in advance.
Confirm with your payment brands and clients which validation route and responsibility matrix apply to your services, and check whether your GDPR role differs by processing activity.
Acquirers and issuers take part in card payments under contracts with payment brands, and they manage merchant or cardholder relationships that create their own PCI DSS duties. The PCI Security Standards Council does not enforce compliance or set penalties; the individual payment brands decide which entities must validate and run enforcement programs. Under the GDPR, an acquirer or issuer usually acts as a controller for the personal data it uses for its own regulated purposes, such as account management, fraud prevention and legal obligations. Its role for merchant onboarding data and vendor data may also differ, so the controller and processor map needs to be drawn for each data set.
- Brand-driven obligations: the applicable validation requirements come from the payment brand rules and the acquirer's agreements, not from the PCI SSC alone.
- Controller role: acquirers and issuers commonly decide purposes and means for cardholder and account data they hold for their own functions.
- Processor oversight: when they use outsourced processors for card operations, they need Article 28 contracts and oversight of those providers.
- Enforcement exposure: financial consequences for non-compliance come from payment brand programs, while GDPR fines come from supervisory authorities under Article 83.
- Cross-border data: transfers to third countries need a valid mechanism under Chapter V of the GDPR.
Confirm with the relevant payment brands which validation obligations apply to your institution and which controller and processor roles your legal team has documented for each dataset.
Doing both in an order that shares evidence
The sequence below scopes card data and personal data once, makes shared encryption and pseudonymization decisions, and builds one evidence set that feeds both the PCI DSS assessment and GDPR accountability records.
Map cardholder data and personal data together
Run one data discovery exercise that records where primary account numbers, sensitive authentication data and other personal data enter, move, are stored and leave your environment. The privacy team and the PCI assessment lead should own this jointly, with system owners confirming each flow. Define the cardholder data environment and the connected systems that could affect it, since PCI DSS scope extends beyond systems that hold card data. The step is done when one inventory lists each system, data category, purpose and flow, and both teams have signed off on it.
Test scope reduction before relying on it
Review any encryption, tokenization or hashing design against the PCI SSC guidance before treating it as a scope reducer. Encrypting cardholder data with strong cryptography meets Requirement 3.5.1, but encryption alone does not take the data out of PCI DSS scope. Hashed PAN moved to a separate environment stops being cardholder data there, yet the systems that perform the hashing stay in scope. Record which systems remain in scope and why. The step is done when the scope decision is written down and the QSA has reviewed the approach.
Set encryption and pseudonymization decisions for both regimes
Choose the cryptographic controls, key management arrangements and any pseudonymization design once, then check each choice against both sets of obligations. Article 32(1) of the GDPR names pseudonymisation and encryption among measures appropriate to the risk, alongside ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience, and regular testing of effectiveness. PCI DSS sets its own requirements for cryptography and key management. Document each decision with the requirement it satisfies in each framework, so one design record serves both reviews. The step is done when the design record maps every control to the relevant GDPR and PCI DSS provision.
Align one incident response process to both clocks
Build a single incident procedure that triages events touching card data, personal data or both. It should include the GDPR notification path to the supervisory authority within 72 hours of becoming aware of a notifiable breach (Article 33(1)), along with the separate payment brand and acquirer reporting steps that PCI DSS programs require. Assign decision owners, define evidence capture and test the procedure with a tabletop exercise. The step is done when the exercise has produced a timeline and each reporting path has a named owner. Confirm the payment brand and acquirer notification requirements with them directly.
Choose the defined or customized approach with the QSA
PCI DSS v4.x lets an entity meet each requirement through the defined approach or, for entities with robust security and risk management, the customized approach, which meets a stated objective in a different way. The 51 future-dated requirements became effective on 31 March 2025, so they are no longer optional best practices. Decide which approach applies to each requirement and document the reasoning, then confirm the chosen approach with your QSA before testing begins. The step is done when the QSA has accepted the approach for each requirement in writing.
Build the shared evidence library
Collect configuration exports, access reviews, logs, vulnerability results, policies and test results once, tagging each item with the PCI DSS requirement and the GDPR article it supports. Where a SOC 2 or SOC 3 report exists, the QSA may reuse that evidence after independently reviewing it, which can reduce duplicated work. The library should be controlled, dated and owned. The step is done when every evidence item has both tags and an owner, and the gaps list is reviewed by both teams.
Prepare the ROC or SAQ and the GDPR records
Prepare the PCI DSS assessment on the official ROC or SAQ template, with the Attestation of Compliance issued through the assessor or your own process. Separately, maintain the GDPR records of processing and the security documentation the controller must be able to demonstrate. Cross-reference both from the shared library so each statement traces to one evidence item. Remember that a PCI AOC is not a GDPR certificate, and the GDPR requires no attestation. The step is done when both documents cite the same evidence set and the records of processing match the card data flows in the inventory.
Common questions before hiring outside help on GDPR and PCI DSS
Can the GDPR and PCI DSS share one compliance program?
Partly. Both expect access control, logging, encryption, incident response and vendor oversight, so one control inventory can serve both. They diverge on purpose and proof. PCI DSS is a payment brand rulebook validated through a ROC or SAQ with an Attestation of Compliance, while the GDPR is law covering all personal data, requires no certificate, and adds duties such as lawful basis, data subject rights and the 72-hour supervisory authority notice. Map shared controls once, then keep a separate evidence set for each regime. Ask any partner to show that mapping in writing before work starts.
What drives the cost of GDPR and PCI DSS work, and what should a written quote include?
Cost follows scope: the number of systems in the cardholder data environment, the number of processing activities and data stores containing personal data, how many third parties handle data, and how much evidence is missing today. For PCI DSS, the assessment itself is paid to a Qualified Security Assessor or to whoever completes the SAQ, and the PCI SSC publishes no cost estimate. For the GDPR, costs fall on documentation, records, contracts and technical controls, and no assessor fee is required. A written quote should list deliverables, systems in scope, assumptions about the client team, retesting, and what is one-time versus recurring, such as annual assessments and retainers.
How long does readiness take, and what sets the pace?
Duration depends on the starting point, not on a fixed template. The biggest variables are how well card data flows are documented, whether encryption or tokenization already removes systems from scope, how many third-party processors need contract review, and how quickly the client can make changes. For the GDPR, deadlines a readiness review should test include acting on rights requests within one month, extendable by two months under Article 12(3), and notifying the supervisory authority within 72 hours under Article 33(1). Ask a partner to show a dated plan with client-side dependencies called out, and confirm the timeline against your own environment.
What does the work require from our own team?
Expect to supply three things. First, a data inventory that lists personal data and cardholder data flows, storage locations and retention periods. Second, named system owners who can confirm configurations, access lists and change history. Third, an acquirer or payment brand contact who can confirm which validation level and reporting route applies to your business. Without these, assessors and advisers spend time reconstructing facts rather than testing controls. Ask the partner to list every client-side input in the written scope so that delays are visible early.
Can our internal team do this alone, and where must the QSA be independent?
An internal team can prepare documentation, close control gaps and run the GDPR programme alone, provided it has the skills and time. A PCI DSS ROC, however, must be completed by a Qualified Security Assessor, and the QSA's independence from the work it assesses matters. Where an organization outsources design or remediation, the QSA still needs to assess independently. Engaging DeployOpen to plan, implement and document controls does not replace that assessor. Confirm with your acquirer which validation route applies, and confirm the QSA's independence rules with the QSA company before you sign.
Can DeployOpen issue a PCI DSS validation or a GDPR certificate?
No. DeployOpen does not issue audit reports, attestations or certifications. PCI DSS validation comes from a ROC completed by a Qualified Security Assessor or from an SAQ with an Attestation of Compliance, and the PCI SSC notes that certificates are not recognized as validation. The GDPR requires no certificate, and Article 42 certification is voluntary, issued by accredited certification bodies or supervisory authorities. DeployOpen can prepare systems, controls and evidence for these assessments, which is the work that makes an independent assessment faster to complete.
Who enforces the GDPR and PCI DSS, and what does non-compliance cost?
The GDPR is enforced by independent national supervisory authorities, and Article 83 sets the maximum fines: up to EUR 10 million or 2% of total worldwide annual turnover for infringements such as Article 32, and up to EUR 20 million or 4% for the more serious tier, whichever is higher in each case. PCI DSS has no regulator fines. The PCI SSC does not enforce compliance or impose penalties, and any financial consequences come from individual payment brand programs. Your exposure under PCI DSS therefore depends on your acquirer and brand agreements, which you should review directly.
How DeployOpen prepares readiness for both frameworks
DeployOpen plans, implements, documents and supports self-hosted open-source platforms inside the client's own infrastructure, and prepares systems and evidence for compliance assessments. For GDPR vs PCI DSS, the work starts with a written scope that separates the cardholder data environment from the wider personal data estate, then builds and documents controls for both.
How we scope
- Engagements are fixed-scope, with scope, deliverables and timelines agreed in writing before work starts.
- The written scope maps which systems store, process or transmit cardholder data and which hold other personal data.
- Scope covers the boundary decisions that determine PCI DSS scope, including how encrypted or hashed card data is handled.
How we build
- Controls for Article 32 security and PCI DSS requirements are implemented in the client's own cloud, data center or air-gapped network.
- Security testing of applications, APIs and infrastructure checks whether the encryption, access and logging controls work as designed.
- Breach notification and data subject request procedures are built into runbooks with the 72-hour and one-month clocks mapped.
How we hand over
- Deliverables include system documentation, control evidence and a record of the decisions that set scope boundaries.
- Documentation is handed over so the client's own staff can explain controls to a QSA, an auditor or a supervisory authority.
- DeployOpen prepares systems, controls and evidence for assessments but does not issue audit reports, attestations or certifications.
How we support
- Ongoing support, upgrades and continuous testing are available as retainers after handover.
- Retainers can cover re-testing after changes to the cardholder data environment or to personal data processing.
- Ask for a written quote tied to the agreed scope, listing what is one-time setup and what recurs under a retainer.

