What PCI DSS for containers and Kubernetes requires and what it costs
PCI DSS v4.0.1 has no container-specific requirements. Your cluster is assessed against the same requirements as any other system component in the cardholder data environment, and the PCI SSC's 2022 *Guidance for Containers and Container Orchestration Tools* helps assessors and teams interpret those requirements for containers without replacing them. Your organization owns its controls. A Qualified Security Assessor (QSA) issues the Report on Compliance (ROC) or a Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ) and the Attestation of Compliance (AOC), and no vendor, platform or implementation partner can issue either one. If a customer or acquirer is asking for validation now, the first task is to confirm with them whether a ROC or an SAQ applies, because that choice sets the depth of evidence you need.
Cost and effort depend on three things: how much of the cluster sits inside the cardholder data environment, how many clusters and namespaces are in scope, and how mature your evidence already is. A single cluster with clear network segmentation and codified configuration usually produces a smaller evidence set than a shared multi-tenant platform where scope is unclear. Ask any QSA or partner to price the work from a written scope that names each cluster, its node pools, its admission and monitoring tooling, and the owners of each control. Separate one-time work (cluster hardening, pipeline changes, policy authoring, initial inventories) from recurring work (scan review, policy exception handling, quarterly access reviews, and assessor time each cycle). Also ask who produces each piece of evidence, because a partner can prepare configurations and reports while the assessor only tests them.
Confirm early which evidence your assessor will accept for ephemeral workloads, since pods and nodes may not exist long enough to be sampled in the usual way. The SSC's 2024 information supplement on scoping and segmentation for modern architectures, which covers inventories of ephemeral cloud systems, is the right document to bring to that conversation. Plan for the configuration standards required by Requirement 2.2.1 and the infrastructure-as-code expectations in the SAQ D notes for Requirement 1.2.8, because both will be tested against your manifests, Helm charts and Terraform modules. If you intend to use a customized approach for any requirement, document the objective and your risk analysis before the assessment starts, since that work is one of the larger hidden costs.
Which PCI DSS requirements a Kubernetes platform touches
A Kubernetes platform that runs cardholder data workloads touches several PCI DSS requirements at once, and each one produces its own evidence. The cards below group those requirements by the question an assessor asks and the artifact the cluster can show in response.
Cluster and node configuration baselines
Requirement 2.2.1 expects configuration standards that cover every system component, address known vulnerabilities and follow accepted hardening guidance. For Kubernetes, this means documented baselines for control plane components, worker nodes, namespaces and default pod settings. Check that each baseline is versioned, applied when new nodes or clusters are built, and revisited when vulnerabilities are identified. See the sibling pages on Requirement 2 for the wider expectations.
Infrastructure as code as configuration files
The notes to Requirement 1.2.8 treat infrastructure as code, scripts and automated controls that configure network security controls as configuration files. In a Kubernetes platform, that covers Helm charts, manifests, Terraform modules and GitOps repositories. Assessors will expect these files to be access-controlled, reviewed before change and consistent with what is running. Confirm that the repository state matches the live cluster and that backups of these settings are protected.
Image and cluster vulnerability work
Requirements 6.3.1 and 11.3 require the organization to identify vulnerabilities and test for them on a recurring basis. For containers, this means scanning base images, application layers and running cluster resources for known vulnerabilities and misconfigurations, then tracking remediation. Ask who owns the findings, how fast critical issues move into a patched image, and whether scan results are kept as evidence for assessors.
Admission and access controls
Requirements 7 and 8 cover least-privilege access and identification of users and system accounts. In Kubernetes, those controls appear as role bindings, service accounts, and admission policies that block privileged pods, unapproved images or unsigned workloads before they start. Document which policies are enforced rather than only reported, and keep the policy definitions under change control so assessors can see what was in force on a given date.
Audit logging and detection
Requirement 10 expects audit logs from system components, protected from change and reviewed for security events. In a cluster, this means shipping Kubernetes API audit logs, node logs and runtime detection events to a central store with restricted write access. Confirm that log sources cover every cluster in scope, that timestamps are synchronized, and that a named team reviews alerts on a defined schedule.
How the SSC container guidance feeds an assessment
The sequence below turns the PCI SSC's container guidance into the records a QSA reads during a PCI DSS assessment. Each step produces an artifact that shows what is in scope, how it is configured, and how it is kept under control. The guidance informs this work but does not replace any PCI DSS requirement.
Define the cluster scope and boundary
Your team, with input from the QSA, identifies which clusters, namespaces, nodes, registries, CI pipelines and supporting services store, process or transmit cardholder data or could affect the security of that environment. Include the control plane, the image registry and the management tooling, not just the workloads. The output is a dated scope document and a data-flow diagram that a QSA can trace from ingress to storage. The step is complete when every workload in scope is named and every connection into or out of the boundary is recorded. The SSC's 2022 guidance and its 2024 scoping supplement on modern network architectures both help frame this work.
Baseline cluster and node configuration
Platform engineers write configuration standards for the nodes, the Kubernetes control plane, the container runtime and the workloads, then align them with hardening guidance from the platform vendor or an industry-accepted benchmark. Requirement 2.2.1 expects these standards to cover all system components and to be applied when new systems are configured. Infrastructure as code, Helm charts and admission configuration are versioned in source control, which the SAQ D notes treat as configuration files that must be secured and kept consistent with the live state. The output is the versioned standard and a drift report comparing live clusters against it. The step is done when a new cluster can be built from the standard without manual edits.
Build and scan container images
Build pipelines produce images from approved base images, then scan each image before it reaches the registry. Trivy (Apache-2.0) can scan images and Kubernetes manifests for known vulnerabilities, infrastructure as code misconfigurations, secrets and licenses. Scan results must map to your vulnerability management process under Requirement 6, including how critical findings are triaged and patched. The output is a scan report tied to each image digest, plus a recorded decision for any accepted finding. The step is complete when no image can be promoted without a scan record that the assessor can match to the deployed digest.
Enforce admission policy on deployments
Admission controls stop non-conforming workloads before they run. Kyverno (Apache-2.0) validates, mutates or generates Kubernetes resources at admission and can verify container image signatures, for example to block unscanned or unapproved images and privileged containers. Policies are kept in the same repository as the configuration standard so changes are reviewed. The output is the policy set, the change history of each policy, and audit or enforcement logs showing rejected requests. The step is done when a test deployment that breaks a rule is rejected and the rejection is logged.
Monitor runtime behavior in the cluster
Runtime detection watches what containers actually do after deployment. Falco (Apache-2.0) parses Linux system calls, by default through an eBPF probe, evaluates them against YAML rules, and enriches events with container and Kubernetes metadata. Rules should cover privilege escalation, unauthorized file modification, unexpected network connections and suspicious process execution, and alerts should go to a system your security team monitors. The output is the rule set, alert routing configuration, and sample alerts with their investigation records. Confirm with your QSA how runtime alerts relate to the log review and file integrity expectations in Requirements 10 and 11, since Falco alone does not satisfy those requirements.
Retain records for the assessor
Your team stores the outputs of the earlier steps in a location with access control and retention rules that match your log and evidence policies. This includes the scope document, configuration standards and their change history, image scan reports, admission policy logs, runtime alerts and the reviews that show someone acted on them. The output is an evidence index that maps each record to the PCI DSS requirement it supports. The step is complete when a QSA can sample a deployed workload and trace it back to its approved image, its configuration standard and the alerts raised about it. Ask the QSA which formats and retention periods they expect before you set the schedule.
Open-source tools for images, admission and runtime
Trivy is an Apache-2.0 scanner that examines container images, Kubernetes clusters, infrastructure as code files, secrets and software licenses. In a cardholder data environment it is most useful as the build-time and periodic check that shows you know what is inside your images and manifests before they run. Its output, typically a report per image or cluster scan, can serve as dated evidence for vulnerability review and configuration checks.
- Image scans: Run against each image in your registry and record the image digest, scan date and findings, so the report ties to exactly one artifact.
- Cluster scans: Assess running Kubernetes resources for known vulnerabilities and misconfigurations, which supports reviews of configuration standards.
- Infrastructure as code checks: Flag misconfigurations in manifests and templates before they reach the cluster, a useful input for configuration standards.
- Secrets and licenses: Detect exposed credentials and license issues, but triage is yours; a detected secret still needs rotation and a record.
- Still your decision: Severity thresholds that block a build, who may accept a risk, how long accepted findings stay open and where reports are retained.
Confirm current scanner coverage, output formats and database update behavior against the Trivy repository README before you design your evidence trail.
Kyverno is an Apache-2.0 policy engine that runs at Kubernetes admission. It can validate resources against rules, mutate them to add required settings, generate supporting resources, remove resources, and verify container image signatures. For a cardholder data environment, admission policies are how a documented configuration standard becomes something the cluster enforces rather than something people are asked to remember.
- Validation policies: Reject workloads that run privileged, mount host paths or omit required labels, giving you a reviewable rule set tied to your standard.
- Mutation policies: Add defaults such as security contexts or resource settings. Assessors will want to know exactly what the policy changes.
- Image verification: Admit only images that meet your signing or provenance rules, which supports change and software control reviews.
- Policy reports: Kyverno can record pass and fail results per resource, which is evidence that enforcement ran, not just that a policy file exists.
- Still your decision: Which rules are enforced versus audited, the exception process for legitimate workloads, who owns policy changes and how policy history is versioned and retained.
Confirm the current admission and reporting features against the Kyverno introduction documentation, and test each policy in audit mode before enforcing it.
Falco is an Apache-2.0 runtime detection tool. It parses Linux system calls, by default through an eBPF probe, and evaluates them against YAML rules. It flags events such as privilege escalation, unauthorized file modification, unexpected network connections and suspicious process execution, then enriches each alert with container and Kubernetes metadata. For a cardholder data environment it provides the runtime detection layer that admission controls cannot see once a workload is running.
- Rule-based detection: Rules for privilege escalation, file changes and unexpected network activity map to the threats your container risk assessment identifies.
- Metadata enrichment: Alerts carry container and pod context, so responders can identify the workload without manual lookup.
- Alert outputs: Alerts can go to stdout, files, syslog, HTTP endpoints or programs, which determines where your evidence actually lives.
- Tuning records: Rule changes and suppressions should be documented, since an unreviewed suppression is a gap an assessor will ask about.
- Still your decision: Alert routing to a monitored queue, who triages and how quickly, retention of alert records, and the response procedure for confirmed events.
Confirm supported kernels, the eBPF driver requirements and current output options against the Falco documentation before committing to a deployment model.
What must be in place before the assessor arrives
A QSA reviewing a containerized cardholder data environment will trace each workload back to a documented scope, a known configuration and a recorded response to findings. The six items below are the evidence that connects those steps, and each one can be checked before the assessment starts.
Current scope and cluster inventory
Keep a current inventory of every cluster, namespace, node pool and workload that stores, processes or transmits cardholder data, or that could affect the security of that environment. Ephemeral pods and autoscaled nodes change daily, so the inventory should be generated from the cluster and reconciled against your data-flow diagrams. Check that a namespace missing from the inventory cannot reach a cardholder data namespace, and confirm the scoping logic against the SSC's 2024 segmentation guidance for modern architectures.
Versioned configuration standards
Each cluster, node image and workload needs a documented configuration standard that covers all system components and addresses known vulnerabilities. Store the standard, the infrastructure as code that applies it and any Helm charts or manifests in version control with reviewed changes. Check that the running cluster matches the committed state, because drift between Git and the live configuration is a common gap an assessor will find.
Scan results and remediation records
Keep dated scan output for container images, Kubernetes manifests and cluster configuration, along with the ticket or change record that shows each finding was fixed, accepted or excepted. Scanners such as Trivy report vulnerabilities, infrastructure as code issues and misconfigurations, so the evidence should show which scan ran against which image digest. Check that a scan gap is visible: an image deployed without a recent scan should trigger an alert, not pass silently.
Admission policy with documented exceptions
An admission controller such as Kyverno can block privileged containers, untrusted registries and unsigned images before they run. Export the active policies, show that they are enforced rather than only audited, and keep a register of exceptions with an owner, a justification, a compensating measure and an expiry date. Check the exception register against the cluster, since a policy exception that no longer matches a workload is a stale control.
Runtime alert handling records
Runtime detection only counts as evidence when alerts are triaged. Falco rules can flag privilege escalation, unauthorized file changes, unexpected network connections and suspicious process execution, and each alert should route to a monitored destination. Keep the rule set under version control, sample tickets showing triage and closure, and records of tuning decisions. Check that alerts reach a person or case system during off-hours, not only a log file nobody reads.
Responsibility split with managed Kubernetes
If a managed Kubernetes service runs the control plane, the provider's PCI DSS attestation covers only the parts it operates, and your team still owns node configuration, workload settings, identity and logging. Obtain the provider's current attestation and responsibility matrix, then mark each container control as provider, shared or customer. Confirm with the provider and your QSA where the boundary sits, because the matrix alone does not settle the question.
Who owns the controls, who prepares the evidence, who validates
The organization that stores, processes or transmits cardholder data owns its PCI DSS obligations, including every control that runs on its container platform. Ownership covers the decisions that no outside party can make for it: which systems are in scope, which risks are accepted, which compensating or customized approaches are justified, and how alerts are answered when they fire. The organization also has to keep the controls working after any engagement ends, because PCI DSS is assessed on what runs in production, not on what was delivered.
- Scope and risk decisions: Deciding which clusters, namespaces, registries and CI pipelines touch the cardholder data environment, and recording the reasoning.
- Policy and standards: Approving the configuration standards for nodes, clusters and images, and the policies that define who may change them.
- Alert response: Staffing the people and on-call process that triage runtime detections, scanner findings and admission denials.
- Vulnerability and exception management: Owning the remediation decisions, deadlines and any documented exceptions.
- Operations after handover: Running upgrades, rotating credentials, reviewing access and keeping inventories current.
Before engaging anyone, confirm internally who signs the evidence and who answers to the assessor for each control.
An implementation partner such as DeployOpen plans, builds and hardens the self-hosted platform inside the client's own cloud accounts or data centers, then prepares the configuration, scanning and evidence that the organization and its assessor will review. The partner works to a written scope with agreed deliverables. It does not own the controls, does not decide scope, and does not issue reports, attestations or certificates. Only the independent QSA or assessor performs that role. Hiring a partner does not guarantee a compliant result or a favorable assessment.
- Platform build: Deploying Kubernetes, the container runtime and supporting components according to a documented configuration standard.
- Hardening and admission policy: Configuring cluster settings and policy engines such as Kyverno so non-conforming workloads are blocked or flagged.
- Scanning and runtime detection: Setting up image and cluster scanning with Trivy and runtime rules with Falco, and wiring their output to the client's alerting.
- Evidence preparation: Producing configuration files, scan reports, change records and architecture diagrams in a form the assessor can sample.
- Documentation and handover: Writing runbooks and recording which controls the client must still operate.
Ask for the written scope, the list of deliverables and the named evidence before work starts, and confirm that the partner's role excludes any validation activity.
A Qualified Security Assessor (QSA) or other assessor independent of the implementation work tests the environment and documents the result. For organizations that need a Report on Compliance, the QSA completes the ROC, and for those that qualify for a Self-Assessment Questionnaire, the SAQ is completed and signed with an Attestation of Compliance. The assessor decides whether each requirement is met, using samples of configurations, logs, scan results and interviews. Certificates are not accepted as validation under PCI DSS, so the AOC or ROC is the document that counts.
- Independent testing: Sampling running clusters, images and policies rather than relying on documents alone.
- Reporting: Issuing the ROC or completing the SAQ and AOC on official PCI SSC templates.
- Compensating and customized approaches: Judging whether an alternative control meets the stated objective, with the supporting analysis supplied by the organization.
- Changes during the year: Reviewing whether significant changes to the cardholder data environment affect scope.
- Scope confirmation: Agreeing the scope with the organization before testing begins.
Confirm early which assessor is needed for your validation type, and whether the assessor has agreed to rely on the evidence you plan to provide.
What makes a Kubernetes PCI DSS project larger or longer
Most of the effort in a containerized cardholder data environment comes from how much of the cluster estate the assessor must examine, not from the cluster itself. The cards below cover the decisions that widen or narrow that examination, and each one names the control you can use to keep it contained.
Number of clusters and environments
Every cluster that stores, processes or transmits cardholder data, or could affect that data, falls inside scope. Teams that run separate clusters for development, staging and production often find that non-production clusters pull in the same configuration, logging and access reviews as production when they share images, secrets or network paths. Count clusters and namespaces early and document which ones hold account data. Segmentation between clusters, backed by tested network controls, is the main way to keep the number of in-scope clusters small. Ask your QSA which segmentation evidence they will accept before you split the estate.
Managed or self-managed control planes
With a managed control plane, the cloud provider operates the API server and etcd, and your team owns the worker nodes, workloads, configuration and access. With a self-managed control plane, your team also owns patching, certificate rotation, etcd backup and control plane hardening, which adds requirements to the configuration standards and vulnerability management that your assessor will test. Confirm in writing which control plane responsibilities the provider covers and obtain the provider's attestation and responsibility documentation for the services you use.
Multi-cloud or on-premises nodes
A cluster that spans two clouds or extends into a data center adds separate network paths, identity systems, logging pipelines and administrative tools for each location. Each location needs its own inventory of ephemeral and persistent systems and its own evidence of configuration consistency. The information supplement on scoping and segmentation for modern network architectures covers zero trust, micro-segmentation, multi-cloud and inventories of ephemeral cloud systems, so review it with your assessor before you commit to a multi-location design.
Third parties in the payment flow
Each registry, CI service, managed database, logging vendor, secrets manager or managed Kubernetes provider that touches the cardholder data environment is a third party your assessor must account for. Some of them store or process account data, and others can only affect its security through access or configuration. Build a list of every third party in the deployment path, record whether each one is a service provider, and collect the attestation or responsibility matrix for each. The number of third parties determines how much of the assessment depends on evidence you do not produce yourself.
Evidence maturity
Ephemeral workloads are created and destroyed by automation, so evidence has to come from the pipeline and the cluster state rather than from a person reviewing a server. Teams that keep infrastructure as code in version control, store deployment logs centrally and retain image scan results with the image digest can answer assessor questions quickly. Teams that configure clusters by hand and rely on screenshots usually spend more time reconstructing history. Remember that infrastructure as code, scripts and backed-up settings that configure network security controls are treated as configuration files that must be secured and kept consistent with the active configuration.
Custom admission rules
Admission policies decide which workloads can run, so every custom rule becomes something you must document, test and keep current. A small set of rules covering privileged containers, approved registries, image signature checks and required labels is easier to justify than a large set written for each team. Each rule that you rely on to meet a requirement should have a stated purpose, a test that proves it blocks what it claims to block, and an owner. If you use a customized approach for any requirement, the rule set becomes part of the evidence the QSA must examine, which adds effort. Kyverno policies can be scanned from its CLI, which helps teams test rules before they reach the cluster.
Questions buyers ask about PCI DSS on Kubernetes
Does PCI DSS have a container-specific requirement?
No. PCI DSS v4.0.1 does not contain a separate requirement for containers or Kubernetes. Its requirements apply to every system component in scope, and a container, pod, node or cluster control plane counts as a system component when it stores, processes or transmits cardholder data or could affect the security of that environment. The PCI SSC's *Guidance for Containers and Container Orchestration Tools* explains threats and best practices for these platforms, but it does not replace the standard's requirements. Ask your QSA how they want container inventories, configuration standards and image provenance documented for your cluster before you design the evidence trail.
Will an assessor accept Trivy or Falco output as evidence?
An assessor accepts evidence that shows a control operates, and the tool that produced it matters less than whether the output is complete, dated, repeatable and tied to your in-scope systems. Trivy can scan container images, Kubernetes clusters, infrastructure as code and configuration for misconfigurations, and Falco can alert on runtime events such as privilege escalation or unexpected network connections. Keep the scan configuration, the scope of each run, the retained reports and the ticket trail for every finding. Your organization owns the decision to rely on open-source output, so confirm the approach with your QSA before the assessment begins.
What drives the cost and effort of PCI DSS on Kubernetes?
Cost follows the size and number of in-scope clusters, how many environments you run, how much segmentation separates cardholder workloads from the rest of the platform, and how mature your pipelines already are. The main cost components are your internal engineering time, any tooling and hosting you run, the implementation partner's fixed-scope work if you buy help, and the QSA's assessment fee. Some costs are one-time, such as building admission policies and configuration baselines, while others recur, such as scan operations, rule tuning, evidence collection and annual assessment. Ask any provider for a written scope listing clusters, environments, deliverables and the evidence each one produces. DeployOpen does not publish prices and gives a quote after the written scope is agreed.
Can our team implement PCI DSS controls on Kubernetes alone?
Many teams can, provided they have engineers who understand Kubernetes security, infrastructure as code and the PCI DSS requirements that touch their platform. The hard part is usually not installing tools but proving that configuration standards, admission policies, image scanning and runtime detection work together and are reviewed on schedule. A useful self-check is whether you can name the owner of each control, show its evidence without a rebuild, and explain how a finding moves from detection to closure. If any of those answers is unclear, an implementation partner can prepare systems and evidence in your infrastructure, while the QSA performs the independent assessment and issues the Report on Compliance and Attestation of Compliance.
How much of our staff time will the Kubernetes work need?
The time depends on the number of clusters, how much of your delivery pipeline is already automated, and how many teams own workloads in the cardholder data environment. Expect sustained involvement from platform engineers during design and configuration, then a smaller recurring load for reviewing scan results, tuning Falco rules, approving policy exceptions and supplying evidence to the assessor. Security and compliance staff also need time to map each control to an owner and a schedule. No fixed duration applies to every environment, so ask for an effort estimate in your written scope and check which assumptions it depends on, including the number of environments and the state of your current infrastructure as code.
Does a managed Kubernetes provider's AOC cover our cluster?
Usually only part of it. A provider's Attestation of Compliance can cover the controls that the provider operates, such as parts of the physical infrastructure and the managed control plane, but it does not transfer responsibility for your workloads, configurations, identities, network policies, images or the admission rules you set. Ask the provider for its current AOC and responsibility matrix, then map each requirement to the party that operates it and the evidence each party holds. Your QSA decides what they can rely on from the provider's report, so confirm that scope with them before you design the cluster.
Do we still need an ASV scan for our container platform?
Confirm this with your QSA, because external scanning requirements depend on the systems exposed to the internet and how your scope is defined. Internal scanning with Trivy or similar tools addresses vulnerability discovery inside your environment, but it does not replace a requirement that calls for a scan by a listed provider where one applies. Check which public endpoints, ingress controllers and load balancers belong to the cardholder data environment, and document that boundary before the assessment.
How to choose a QSA and an implementation partner
A container-based cardholder data environment is assessed like any other, but the evidence lives in clusters, pipelines and ephemeral workloads that assessors must trust. The four checks below help you confirm who will assess your environment, who will build and document it, and what each party delivers before anyone starts work.
Confirm the assessor is a listed QSA company
Only a Qualified Security Assessor company can complete a Report on Compliance, and the assessor issuing the report must be listed by the PCI SSC for that purpose. Ask for the company's listing and the name of the individual QSA who will lead your assessment. Confirm that the assessor will accept container evidence from your cluster, image registry and pipeline before you commit to a timeline, since an assessor who has not reviewed orchestrated workloads may need more sampling and interviews than you expect.
Ask for container assessment experience
Request specific examples of how the assessor has tested Kubernetes namespaces, image provenance, admission controls and node-level logging in past engagements, without client names. Ask which evidence they expect for ephemeral pods that exist for minutes, and how they sample workloads that are replaced on every deployment. A useful answer names the artifacts they will request, such as cluster configuration exports, policy reports and build logs, rather than general statements about cloud security.
Separate the implementer from the assessor
The organization owns its controls and its compliance decision. An implementation partner can build clusters, pipelines, policies and monitoring, but the assessor must test that work independently. Do not ask the same firm to design a control and then certify it. Agree in writing which party writes the configuration standards, which party collects evidence and which party reviews it, so that the assessor's independence is preserved and no one is surprised at the review stage.
Require a written scope and deliverables
Before work starts, ask for a written scope that lists the clusters, namespaces, registries, CI/CD systems and nodes in the cardholder data environment, along with the deliverables for each. Good scope documents name the configuration standards, the policy-as-code rules, the scanning schedules, the runtime alerting setup and the evidence packs handed to your assessor. Confirm how changes to scope are approved, because a new namespace or cluster can alter which systems are in scope.
How DeployOpen prepares Kubernetes evidence for your assessor
DeployOpen plans, implements, hardens and documents self-hosted open-source platforms inside your own cloud accounts, data centers or air-gapped networks. For PCI DSS for containers and Kubernetes, we prepare the systems and evidence your assessor will review, while your organization owns its controls and only an independent QSA issues the Report on Compliance or Attestation of Compliance.
How we scope
- Agree in writing which clusters, namespaces, images and pipelines fall inside the cardholder data environment before work starts.
- Map cluster network paths, ingress and egress controls against the scope boundaries your QSA will accept.
- Confirm the responsibility split for managed Kubernetes services with your cloud provider and your assessor before design begins.
How we build
- Define configuration standards for nodes, clusters and workloads, and keep infrastructure as code consistent with the active configuration.
- Set up Trivy scanning in build pipelines for images, Kubernetes manifests and cluster misconfigurations, with results retained as evidence.
- Deploy Kyverno admission policies to block non-compliant workloads and Falco runtime detection rules with alerts routed to your logging platform.
How we hand over
- Deliver an inventory of ephemeral workloads, images and cluster components, with how each is created, changed and retired.
- Document configuration standards, policy definitions, scan results and runtime rules in a form your QSA can sample and re-perform.
- Walk your team and assessor through the evidence trail, including where each record is stored and who can access it.
How we support
- Support is available as a retainer for upgrades, rule tuning, and periodic re-scanning after platform or policy changes.
- Review changes that could alter scope or controls, so your team can judge whether an assessor needs to be informed.
- Confirm with your QSA which ongoing evidence they expect between assessments, and schedule those tasks in the retainer scope.

