What SI-5 requires and why assessors test the paper trail
If an audit, customer contract or FedRAMP authorization requires SI-5, the organization must show that it receives security alerts, advisories and directives from defined sources, issues its own internal alerts when needed, passes them to defined recipients, and either implements each directive within its required time frame or tells the issuer that it cannot. SI-5 asks for a working alert process with records of every step, not a particular product. The control has four parts: receive alerts from defined external organizations on an ongoing basis, generate internal alerts as needed, disseminate them to defined recipients, and implement directives within established time frames or notify the issuer of noncompliance. The organization sets the sources, recipients and time frames itself, so those choices are the first thing an assessor will read.
The risk behind the control is simple: a vulnerability advisory that reaches no one, or reaches an inbox nobody reads, leaves a known weakness open. SP 800-53B assigns SI-5 to the low, moderate and high baselines, so it applies at every impact level. Each of the control's five organization-defined parameters must be set to a specific value before the control can be assessed, including the sources, the recipients and the time frames. Confirm with your assessor which parameter values they expect to see written in your system security plan, and whether the high baseline's SI-5(1) enhancement, which covers automated alerting, applies to your system.
SI-5 is hard because no single tool satisfies it. A feed subscription, a ticketing system or a chat channel can support the process, but the assessor's tests look for evidence that a named person received a specific advisory, that it reached the right recipients, and that a directive was acted on or escalated before its deadline. SP 800-53A checks this through examination of records of security alerts and advisories, interviews with the people who handle them, and review of how the process works in practice. Build the paper trail from the first alert: date received, source, recipients, decision, action taken and closure. Then sample it before the assessor does.
Which sources, teams and systems SI-5 reaches in practice
SI-5 is only as large as the sources, recipients and systems an organization decides to bring into scope. The decisions below determine how much alert traffic arrives, who must act on it, and which assets an assessor will expect to see covered. Each one should be written down and approved before the control is evidenced.
External alert sources
SI-5 requires the organization to define the external organizations it receives alerts and advisories from. Typical choices include CISA alerts, national computer emergency response teams, software vendor security bulletins and sector information sharing and analysis centers. Record each source, how it is received (email, feed, portal or API), and who monitors it. An assessor will compare the defined list against the records of alerts actually received.
Internal dissemination recipients
Alerts only reduce risk when the right people read them. Define recipients by role, such as system owners, platform engineering, the security operations team, application owners and the help desk for user-facing advice. Map each alert category to its recipients and keep distribution records. Check that new system owners and on-call rotations are added to the list when staffing changes.
Systems and components in scope
An alert is only actionable if the organization can match it to an asset. Build the list of systems, operating systems, firmware, container images, libraries and third-party components that alerts can affect, drawn from the asset inventory and software bill of materials. Confirm that the inventory covers cloud accounts and self-hosted open-source platforms, because gaps there are where unmatched advisories tend to stall.
Binding directives and their routing
Directives from binding sources, such as emergency directives issued to federal agencies by CISA, carry deadlines that the organization must meet or formally answer. Decide which sources issue directives that bind your organization, who owns the response, and how the deadline is tracked. Document how noncompliance is reported back to the issuer, since SI-5 allows that route when a directive cannot be implemented in time.
Linking alerts to vulnerability workflows
Received advisories feed vulnerability scanning, patching and risk acceptance. Decide which tool records each alert, how it is matched to scan findings, and which ticket queue receives it. Tools such as DefectDojo can hold findings from many scanners in one place, while Greenbone can schedule scans against the affected assets, but the routing rules must be set by the organization. Confirm that every alert ends in a recorded decision.
How an assessor tests SI-5 under SP 800-53A
This table maps the four SP 800-53A determination statements for SI-5 to the test methods an assessor uses and the records they will request. Read each row as a question the assessor asks, the artifact that answers it, and the gap that most often causes a finding.
| Assessment focus | What the assessor examines or asks | Records that satisfy it | Common finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alert sources are defined | Interview the owner and examine the list of external organizations the organization monitors for alerts, advisories and directives | Written list of sources (for example, CISA alerts, vendor security bulletins, sector information sharing bodies) with the review date and owner | Sources are named in policy but never documented, or the list has no owner or review date |
| Alerts are received and reviewed on an ongoing basis | Examine alert logs or mailing list archives across a sample period and interview staff on how alerts reach them | Subscription confirmations, alert intake logs, ticket or queue entries showing receipt and triage | Subscriptions lapsed or went to a departed employee's mailbox, leaving gaps in the log |
| Internal alerts are generated and disseminated to defined recipients | Examine distribution records for internal advisories and interview recipients to confirm they received and understood them | Distribution lists, sent messages with timestamps, acknowledgment records, and the defined recipient roles | Alerts exist but no recipient record shows who was told, or the distribution list does not match the organization's defined roles |
| Directives are implemented within time frames or the issuer is notified of noncompliance | Examine directive response tickets against the time frames the organization defined, and examine any noncompliance notices sent to the issuer | Directive response tickets with due dates, actions taken, verification evidence, and noncompliance notices where applicable | Directives closed without timeframe evidence, or deadlines missed with no notice to the issuer |
| Test of the alerting process | Test by tracing a sample alert from receipt through distribution to closure | Traceable record chain linking intake, distribution, action and closure for each sampled alert | Records exist in separate tools with no common identifier, so the assessor cannot trace a single alert end to end |
| Defined time frames and parameters | Examine the organization-defined parameters for SI-5 and confirm they match what the team actually does | Documented parameters, such as sources, recipients and response time frames, with approval and review dates | Parameters are blank or outdated, so the assessor has no yardstick for judging the records |
| Related controls | Examine how alert outputs feed vulnerability management and flaw remediation records | Cross-references from alert tickets to scan findings or patch tickets under the related controls | Alerts are closed without linking to the vulnerability or patch record that resolves them |
Implementing SI-5 step by step
This sequence turns SI-5 from a policy statement into a working intake, triage, distribution and directive-tracking process that an assessor can test with dated records.
Define alert sources and parameters
The control owner lists every external source the organization will receive alerts from, such as CISA advisories and directives, vendor security bulletins and sector information sharing bodies, and records the organization-defined parameters SI-5 leaves open: which external organizations apply, which recipients receive internal alerts and which time frames govern directives. Ask a compliance lead to review the list against the system's technology stack. The step closes with a signed source register that names each source, its subscription method and the parameter values chosen, because SI-5 has five parameters that must be filled in before anything else can be tested.
Assign an owner and triage process
Name one accountable role for receiving and triaging alerts, with a named deputy so coverage continues during absence. Document how an incoming alert is classified, which systems it affects according to the system inventory, who decides whether it is applicable and who approves the response. The output is a short triage procedure linked to the role assignments and to the incident response plan, so an alert that becomes an incident follows an existing path. Assessors will look for evidence that this owner exists and acts, not only that a policy names one.
Set recipient lists and distribution rules
Define who receives internal alerts, grouped by function such as system administrators, application owners, the security operations team and executives. Specify the channel for each group, for example a ticketing queue, a distribution mailbox or a chat channel, and the content each group needs. The output is a recipient matrix that the organization can show to an assessor, together with the mapping from alert type to recipient group. Keep the list current when staff change roles, since a stale list is one of the most common reasons an alert reaches no one.
Define directive timeframes and tracking
For each category of binding directive the organization may receive, record the time frame in which it must be implemented, or the notification it must send to the issuer if it cannot comply. Where a directive names its own deadline, copy that deadline into the register. Where the organization sets its own time frame, approve it through the risk owner and record the rationale. The output is a directive register with columns for issuer, directive identifier, applicable systems, deadline, owner, status and any noncompliance notice sent. Confirm the current directive obligations and their wording with the issuing agency or with your contract or regulator, since those sources define what binds your organization.
Build the intake and distribution workflow
Connect the sources to the triage queue. Subscriptions can be email lists, RSS feeds, vendor portals or machine-readable feeds. Where a team operates a threat intelligence platform, such as MISP or OpenCTI, the feed can be ingested there and routed to the recipient matrix. Vulnerability advisories relevant to the scanning program can be linked to findings in DefectDojo, so a received advisory and the resulting scan finding share one record. Each alert should receive a unique identifier, a timestamp and a status. The output is a working workflow with a test run recorded in the ticketing system, showing receipt, triage, distribution and closure.
Run a controlled test alert
Issue an internal test alert through the full workflow, from intake through triage, distribution, response and closure, and record the timestamps at each stage. Include a simulated directive so the register and notification path are exercised too. Record any gap, such as a missing recipient, a feed that did not arrive or a deadline field left blank, and fix it before the process is treated as operational. The output is a dated test record with findings and corrections, which is the evidence most useful to an assessor who asks whether the process has been exercised rather than only documented.
Set up periodic review of sources and records
Schedule a recurring review of the source register, recipient matrix and directive register. Check that every source still publishes, that subscriptions still reach the mailbox or queue, and that recipients still hold their roles. Review a sample of closed alerts to confirm that distribution and response happened within the time frames the organization set. The output is a dated review record with actions assigned, kept alongside the alert records so that the continuous monitoring program can show the control working over time. Confirm the review cadence with your assessor or authorizing official, since the baseline sets the control requirement but leaves the frequency to the organization's own parameters.
How an alert moves from source to closed action
An SI-5 alert starts when a security alert or advisory arrives from an external source the organization has defined, such as a government coordination body or a vendor advisory feed. The first step is triage: someone compares the alert against the asset inventory to find out whether any affected product, version or configuration exists in the environment. If nothing matches, the record is closed with the reason noted. If something matches, the alert is distributed to the defined recipients, usually the system owner, the patching or platform team and the security operations function, and a decision is recorded: act, accept the risk, or track the item until a fix or change is available. Accepting risk should go through the same documented approval as any other risk decision, not a verbal agreement in a chat thread.
When the decision is to act, the work moves into the flaw remediation process under SI-2, where the fix is tested, installed within the timeframe the organization has defined and verified. The SI-5 record should link to the remediation ticket, the change record and the scan result that confirms the fix, so an assessor can follow one alert from receipt to closure. A directive differs from an advisory in one key way: it carries a deadline set by the issuer and a required path for noncompliance. An advisory asks for attention, while a directive obliges the organization to act by a stated date or to notify the issuer that it cannot. Teams should confirm which of their sources issue directives, record each deadline in the tracking system, and keep a documented notification route for the case where the deadline cannot be met.
Evidence that passes an SI-5 review
An assessor testing SI-5 looks for proof that the organization received alerts from named sources, shared them with the right people, and acted on directives on time. The artifacts below connect those steps, so each one should point to the next. Keep them current between assessments, not just when an audit is scheduled.
Documented list of alert sources
This is the organization-defined set of external sources the SI-5 parameters name, such as CISA alerts, vendor security bulletins, information sharing communities and relevant national computer emergency response teams. For each source, record the owner, the channel (email list, feed, portal), and the reason it applies to your systems. Review the list at the frequency your own policy sets, and record who approved changes. An assessor will compare this list against the subscriptions you can actually show.
Subscription confirmations
Keep proof that each listed source is subscribed and delivering to a monitored mailbox or feed. Screenshots of subscription pages, confirmation emails and feed configuration files all serve. Check each quarter that addresses still reach a live, monitored inbox, because staff turnover often leaves alerts going to a departed employee. Note any source that stopped publishing or changed its channel, and update the list when it does.
Timestamped alert logs
Alert logs show when each advisory was received, who triaged it, and what was decided. Timestamps let an assessor check that receipt and triage happened promptly after publication. A shared ticket queue or a threat intelligence platform such as OpenCTI can hold these records, provided the platform keeps original timestamps and an audit trail of edits. Confirm the log is protected from silent modification, because an assessor will ask.
Distribution records
SI-5 requires internal dissemination to defined recipients, so keep records showing which roles received each alert and when. Distribution lists, group messages and ticket assignments each count as evidence when they show the recipient set. Tie each distribution to the affected asset owners where possible. Confirm that the recipient list matches the roles your policy defines, and that changes to those roles update the list.
Directive tickets with deadlines and outcomes
When a binding directive arrives, open a tracked ticket that records the required action, the deadline, the owner, the systems affected and the closure evidence. Closure evidence might be patch records, configuration changes or a documented exception. Compare each deadline with the time frame the directive sets, since missed deadlines are the finding an assessor is most likely to write up. Keep closed tickets and their evidence together so the trail is complete.
Noncompliance notices
Where a directive cannot be implemented within its time frame, SI-5 expects the organization to notify the issuer. Keep the notice, the reason, the compensating measures and the agreed next step. If your organization never needs to send one, keep a short record showing the directive review that reached that conclusion. Ask your assessor early which notice channel and format they will accept, since the requirement does not dictate one.
What meeting SI-5 costs in money and effort
An in-house model runs the subscriptions, triage and distribution with the organization's own staff and self-hosted tools. The main cost is staff time, since the open-source software itself carries no license fee. Tools such as MISP, OpenCTI and DefectDojo still need hosting, patching, storage and administration, and those tasks recur every year.
- Platform hosting and upkeep: Servers or cloud capacity, database backups, upgrades and access control for the threat intelligence and tracking systems. Most of this recurs.
- Triage time: Analysts review each advisory, decide whether it applies to the environment and record the decision. Volume grows with the number of sources.
- Setup effort: Connector configuration, feed mapping and tuning of sharing groups is largely one-time, but it must be revisited when sources change.
- Evidence upkeep: Keeping dated records of alerts received, internal distribution and directive compliance is a recurring task that assessors will sample.
- Training: Staff need to learn the tools and keep up with them, which is an ongoing cost.
Ask your team to estimate hours per week for triage and evidence before comparing this model with the others. Confirm the staffing and hosting costs against your own internal rates.
This model buys threat intelligence feeds or a commercial platform and keeps the response work in house. Subscription fees are the largest visible cost and are usually recurring, priced by the vendor. Staff time for triage and evidence still applies, and the subscription does not remove it.
- Subscription fees: Annual or multi-year licenses for feeds, platforms or advisory services. Obtain the price in a written quote that lists the modules and data sources included.
- Integration: Connecting the feed to ticketing, vulnerability management and the internal alert list. This is usually one-time, with changes when the feed or tooling changes.
- Triage and distribution time: Vendor tooling reduces filtering effort, but someone must still decide what applies and who must act.
- Evidence and directive tracking: Recording receipt, distribution and implementation of directives is the organization's responsibility and recurs with each directive.
- Contract terms: Check data retention, export and renewal terms, since they affect the cost of leaving the vendor later.
Cost drivers include the number of subscribed sources, user seats and the volume of directives the organization must act on. Ask the vendor to state which SI-5 evidence the platform keeps and what must be exported for an assessment.
In a partner-assisted model, an implementation partner designs and sets up the alert intake, distribution and tracking process, and may run parts of it on a retainer. The organization still owns the control, approves the process and makes the final decisions on directives. Partner fees depend on a written scope, so the quote should show which tasks are fixed-scope and which are ongoing.
- Fixed-scope setup: Defining sources, building the intake and distribution workflow, and producing procedures and evidence templates. This is typically one-time work agreed in writing before it starts.
- Ongoing support: A retainer for upgrades, feed changes and periodic review, which recurs. Confirm what the retainer covers and how changes are priced.
- Internal staff time: Owners still approve procedures, act on directives and handle exceptions, so this cost does not disappear.
- External review: An independent auditor or assessor tests the control and samples evidence. The partner prepares the evidence but does not issue any report, and the auditor's fees are separate.
- Sampling and re-testing: Assessors may sample alert records across a period, so the cost of gathering evidence recurs at each assessment.
Drivers include the number of systems in scope, the number of sources and the frequency of directive changes. Ask the partner which deliverables are fixed, which are retainer-based and what the organization must provide.
Open-source tools that support SI-5 evidence
This table compares four self-hosted open-source tools against the SI-5 evidence they can generate, along with their license terms. Read each row as a question: what record does the tool keep, and which part of the alert and directive process still needs a human-owned record. The main takeaway is that these tools produce technical evidence of intake and remediation, while distribution decisions and directive responses must be documented separately.
| Tool | Evidence it can produce for SI-5 | License caveat and what to confirm |
|---|---|---|
| MISP | Indicator and event records with sharing groups, sightings and exports to STIX 1 and 2, CSV and Suricata, Snort and Zeek formats, showing what was received and shared | AGPL-3.0-only. Confirm with counsel whether network-facing modifications trigger source release obligations in your deployment |
| OpenCTI | STIX-based records of advisories ingested through connectors, TAXII, RSS, CSV and JSON feeds, with relationships to affected entities | Apache-2.0. Permissive license; confirm connector licenses individually, since third-party connectors may differ |
| DefectDojo | Imported scanner and advisory-driven findings with deduplication, showing when each finding was raised and how it was handled | BSD-3-Clause. Permissive; confirm which features are in the open source edition for your required workflows |
| Greenbone Community Edition (OpenVAS) | Scheduled scan tasks and stored results in PostgreSQL, showing which assets were checked against which vulnerability tests and when | AGPL-3.0-or-later. Confirm license obligations if you modify the software or offer it to third parties |
| Alert distribution and directive decisions | Not produced by these tools. Keep written distribution lists, acknowledgment records, directive deadlines and noncompliance notices as process records | Owned by the organization. Tools can link to these records, but the decision and notification must be documented by the responsible role |
Who owns SI-5 and who can help
Your organization owns SI-5 in full. The control is an organizational obligation: you decide which external organizations are authoritative sources, who receives internal alerts, how quickly directives must be acted on, and who accepts or documents noncompliance. No partner or auditor can make those decisions for you, and an assessor will ask who made each one, when, and where the decision is recorded.
- Source selection: Name the external sources you subscribe to, such as CISA advisories relevant to your sector and vendor security bulletins for the software you run, and record why each source is in scope.
- Recipients and dissemination: Define who receives each alert type, through which channel, and who covers when the primary recipient is unavailable.
- Directive deadlines: Set the time frames your organization will meet for binding directives, and name the owner who signs off on each action or exception.
- Noncompliance notices: Decide when and how you notify the issuer if you cannot meet a directive, and keep the correspondence on file.
- Evidence retention: Keep subscription records, distribution logs and directive tracking tickets so the process can be tested later.
Confirm that every organization-defined parameter in your SI-5 procedure has a named owner and a recorded decision date, and if you are a FedRAMP provider, confirm which impact class applies, since SI-5 is required at Classes B, C and D.
An implementation partner such as DeployOpen can prepare the systems that carry out the process: feed ingestion, internal distribution, ticketing, tracking and the records an assessor will examine. Engagements are usually fixed-scope, with deliverables agreed in writing before work starts. The partner builds the workflow your team defines. It does not choose the sources that matter, accept risk on your behalf, or issue any assessment result.
- Ingestion and intake: Deploy self-hosted feeds and collectors so advisories arrive in a known place, for example through a threat intelligence platform such as OpenCTI, which ingests TAXII, RSS and CSV feeds.
- Vulnerability linkage: Connect advisories to asset inventory and scan results, for example by importing scanner output into DefectDojo so that findings can be tied to a directive.
- Distribution workflow: Build the routing, tickets and escalation paths your team specifies, then test that alerts reach the named recipients within the defined time frames.
- Evidence capture: Configure logs and reports that show when each alert was received, distributed, actioned and closed.
- Testing and handover: Run tests of the workflow, document how to operate it, and train the staff who will run it after handover.
Ask for a written scope that lists each item as delivered by the partner, delivered jointly, or retained by your team, so no part of the process is left without an owner.
An independent auditor, assessor or certification body tests whether SI-5 operates as documented and issues the report or certificate. The auditor reviews evidence against the SP 800-53A assessment procedures for the control, which use examine, interview and test methods. The auditor cannot design the process it reviews, because a design role would remove the independence the report depends on.
- Examine: Reviews subscription records, distribution logs and directive tickets for the period under assessment.
- Interview: Speaks with the people named as recipients and owners to confirm they understand their roles and the time frames they must meet.
- Test: Observes or replays a sample alert through the workflow to see whether it reaches recipients as the procedure states.
- Report: Documents findings and exceptions. Your organization decides how to respond to each one, typically through a plan of action and milestones.
- Boundaries: An auditor who wrote your procedure or configured your tooling generally cannot then assess it, so ask the auditor which advisory work it can and cannot provide before engaging a partner.
Confirm the auditor's scope, independence arrangements and the evidence list in writing before the partner begins work, so the workflow is built to produce what the assessment will examine.
Where SI-5 programs usually fall short
SI-5 looks simple on paper: subscribe to sources, distribute alerts, act on directives. Most gaps appear in the handoffs between those steps, where a feed has no owner, an alert never reaches an affected system, or a directive has no deadline. The cards below describe where assessors tend to find those breaks and what to check first.
No documented source list
SI-5 requires receiving alerts and advisories from defined external organizations, so the organization must name them. Many programs rely on whatever a team member happens to read, which leaves an assessor unable to tell which sources the control covers. Check that the defined sources, such as CISA and the relevant vendors, appear in a written list tied to the SI-5 parameters, with a record of who approved it. An undocumented source list is the first finding most assessors raise.
Subscriptions with no owner
A feed subscription that nobody is accountable for will go quiet when an employee leaves or changes role, and nobody notices. Each source should have a named owner, a backup, and a documented triage routine that states how often the feed is checked. Ask for the subscription register and confirm that each entry shows an owner and the date the owner last confirmed it still works. Silent failures in this layer are hard to detect later.
Alerts not tied to the asset inventory
An advisory only matters once the organization knows whether it affects a system it runs. Programs often forward notices to a mailing list without matching them against the component inventory, so teams argue about relevance while the patch window closes. Check that each alert is recorded with the affected products, the systems found in inventory, and the decision taken. Related work in SI-2 and RA-5 depends on this link, so gaps here usually show up there too.
Directives without deadlines
When a binding directive arrives, SI-5 requires the organization to implement it within the time frame the directive sets, or to notify the issuer that it cannot comply. Many programs log the directive and then stop tracking it. Confirm that every directive has a named owner, a due date taken from the directive text, and a status record. Where the organization cannot meet the date, the notification to the issuer should be on file.
No proof of distribution
SI-5 expects alerts to reach defined recipients, and assessors test this by examining records of alerts and advisories. A message sent to a shared inbox proves little about who acted on it. Look for distribution records that show the recipients, the date sent, and any acknowledgments or tickets opened from the alert. Ticketing or case management tools with an audit trail make this evidence easier to produce than email threads.
Sources that change without review
Sources get added, dropped, or re-scoped over time, often during a tool migration or a vendor change. If those changes happen without review, the source list in the documentation no longer matches what the organization actually receives. Require a change record for every addition or removal, approved by the control owner, and check that the list is reviewed on the schedule set in the SI-1 policy. A stale list is easy to miss until an assessor compares it against the feed configuration.
Questions buyers ask about SI-5
How much effort does SI-5 take to meet?
SI-5 is mostly an operating process, so the effort comes from running it every day rather than from a one-off build. The organization must receive alerts and advisories from the external sources it has defined, issue internal alerts when needed, pass them to the right recipients, and track each directive to completion within the time frame it sets. The recurring work is triage, assignment, tracking and keeping records of what was received and what was done. Effort rises with the number of sources, the size of the asset inventory that must be checked against each advisory, and the number of teams that need to act. Ask any partner to show how they would size this against your environment before you accept a quote.
Can a security tool alone satisfy SI-5?
No. A tool can receive and store alerts, but SI-5 also requires defined external sources, defined recipients, a way to disseminate internal alerts and a documented response to directives. Those are organizational decisions that the assessor will test through policy, procedure and records. A threat intelligence platform or vulnerability management tool can supply much of the evidence, such as logs of received advisories, distribution records and remediation tickets, but the organization still has to define how these are used. Treat tooling as the evidence engine and the process as the control.
What does the team need to run SI-5 well?
The team needs a named owner for the control, documented sources and distribution lists, someone who can assess each alert against the asset inventory, and a clear path to the people who fix systems. Security operations or vulnerability management usually run intake and tracking, while system owners carry out the fixes. Leadership should approve the scope of sources and the time frames for directives. Engineers who maintain the tooling need enough time to keep feeds, integrations and records working. If your team lacks these roles, the gap is a planning question to resolve before any implementation starts.
How long does it take to set up SI-5 processes?
The setup time depends on scope: how many external sources you subscribe to, how many systems and teams are affected, whether feeds and ticketing need integration, and how much existing process you can reuse. Most engagements are fixed-scope, so the timeline is agreed in writing before work starts. Ask for the scope, deliverables and timeline in the same document, and confirm which evidence will be produced for the assessor.
Does FedRAMP add requirements for SI-5?
Yes. FedRAMP's Rev5 baselines require SI-5 at Classes B, C and D, and they also require enhancement SI-5(1) at Class D. The FedRAMP rules and communications guidance should be checked directly, because the requirements can change over time. Confirm which class applies to your authorization boundary before you scope the work, since the Class D requirement adds scope.
Can DeployOpen issue a report that SI-5 is met?
No. DeployOpen plans, implements and documents the systems, processes and evidence that support SI-5, but it does not issue audit reports, attestations or certifications. The organization owns its controls, and an independent assessor or certification body tests them and issues any formal report. A good preparation engagement leaves the assessor with clear records to review.
How do I request a quote for SI-5 work?
DeployOpen does not publish a price list. A quote follows from a written scope, so start by listing the external sources you plan to use, the systems in scope, the teams involved, any FedRAMP class that applies, and the tools you already run. Ask for the scope, deliverables, timeline, assumptions and what is excluded, including whether ongoing support or retainers are needed after the initial work. Share this information with the team that will receive the quote so the estimate reflects your environment.
How DeployOpen scopes SI-5 work
A DeployOpen engagement for SI-5 starts with a written scope that fixes three things before any tool is installed: which external alert and advisory sources the organization must receive from, which internal recipients need each category of alert, and which organization-defined parameters the policy will set, including the time frames for implementing directives or notifying the issuer of noncompliance. The organization owns those decisions. DeployOpen's role is to document them, check them against the baseline the system is assessed under, and turn them into a configuration the team can run and an assessor can trace. Confirm early whether a FedRAMP or other agency requirement adds directive handling that the general SI-5 wording does not spell out.
Deployment happens inside the client's own cloud accounts, data center or air-gapped network. Typical components are a self-hosted threat intelligence platform such as MISP for indicator and advisory sharing, OpenCTI for organizing ingested feeds and TAXII or RSS sources, and DefectDojo for tracking findings that an advisory triggers against the asset inventory. DeployOpen configures ingestion, distribution groups, and the ticketing or notification path, then tests that a sample advisory reaches the defined recipients and that its disposition is recorded. Licensing, hosting and staff time are the main cost lines, and they should be stated separately in the quote so the client can see what recurs after handoff.
The handoff package covers the subscription list, the parameter values, the distribution records, the directive tracking log and the test results, along with runbooks for the people who will keep the process running. DeployOpen does not issue audit reports, attestations or certifications. The organization's independent assessor or auditor decides whether SI-5 is met, using the examine, interview and test methods that SP 800-53A describes. Before work starts, ask the assessor which records they expect to sample so the evidence is organized for that review, and agree in writing who maintains the subscriptions and the log after the engagement closes.
