What SI-14 non-persistence requires and why it is easy to miss
If a tailored baseline, an overlay or an assessor has handed you SI-14, the first thing to know is that the control asks for something most teams never configured on purpose. SI-14 requires the components and services you define to be non-persistent: each one starts from a known state and is terminated at the end of a session or on another trigger you set. The attacker risk it addresses is simple. An intruder who gets a foothold in a long-lived workload, virtual machine or endpoint can plant a backdoor, change configuration or stash tooling that survives for weeks. A component that is rebuilt from a trusted image on a schedule or per session gives that persistence much less room to survive. Because your organization chooses the components and triggers, the control is only as strong as those choices.
SI-14 is absent from every SP 800-53B baseline (low, moderate, high and privacy), so it appears only when your organization or an overlay selects it. Appendix C of SP 800-53 Rev. 5 marks it as organization-implemented and as an assurance-related control, which means the evidence an assessor expects comes from your design decisions and their operation, not from a vendor feature. In Release 5.2.0 the control has three organization-defined parameters and three control enhancements, all active, and none of those enhancements is assigned to a baseline. Read the catalog entry in the OSCAL content before you scope it, and confirm with the tailoring authority which parameters they expect you to fill in and whether they want any enhancement implemented.
The practical decision is which components to make non-persistent and what the trigger is. Ask whether the scope covers only containers and virtual machines or also endpoints, and whether the reset is a fixed schedule, a session end or a condition such as a failed integrity check. Once those are written down, the evidence set is design documentation, configuration settings and audit records showing rebuilds happening as stated. The assessment procedure for SI-14 in NIST SP 800-53A uses examine, interview and test methods against exactly those artifacts, so plan to produce them from the start.
Which systems and teams SI-14 applies to once it is selected
SI-14 does not reach any baseline, so the organization decides which components must be non-persistent, what triggers a rebuild and who answers for each one. Those choices are documented scope, not a default, and they determine how much rebuild work the control creates.
Container and stateless workloads
Containerized application tiers that hold no local state are the most common candidates, because a fresh container from a known image is the natural form of non-persistence. Check whether each workload writes to its own filesystem, keeps session data in memory or relies on node-local caches. Any of these must be moved out of the container before the workload can be defined as non-persistent. Record the decision for each service in the system design documentation.
Virtual desktops and session hosts
Virtual desktop sessions that reset to a golden image at logoff are a classic SI-14 design, since a browser or document compromise cannot survive the reset. The control requires that user profiles, downloads and application data live outside the session. Confirm whether users can save files locally, whether printers or redirected drives keep state, and how the image is patched and reissued.
Build agents and ephemeral runners
CI build agents are attractive candidates because a compromised runner can poison later builds. Scope them by deciding whether each job gets a fresh instance, how caches and dependency stores are handled and whether secrets are injected per job instead of stored on disk. Build outputs and signing keys usually need their own controls, so confirm that the rebuild does not remove the evidence that the pipeline must keep.
Administrative jump hosts
Privileged access paths are high-value targets, and rebuilding them per session limits what an intruder can keep. The scope decision is whether the jump host resets after each administrative session and where session recordings, audit records and access approvals are written. Those records must leave the host, or the reset will also erase the evidence an assessor will examine under the SI-14 procedures.
Externalized data and state
Non-persistence only works when the data a component needs is kept somewhere else. Inventory the databases, object stores, configuration sources, secrets stores and logs that each candidate depends on, and confirm that each is backed up, access-controlled and outside the rebuilt component. Logs and audit records also need a destination that survives the reset, which ties this card to the audit family.
Owners of images, pipelines and exceptions
Name one owner for each golden image or base image, one for the rebuild pipeline and one for every documented exception. Platform engineering commonly owns the pipeline, security owns the rebuild triggers and the business owner signs off on exceptions for components that must keep state. Write these assignments into the control implementation statement so an assessor can trace each component to an accountable team.
How an assessor tests SI-14 against SP 800-53A
This table maps each SP 800-53A Release 5.2.0 assessment method for SI-14 to the objects an assessor requests, the evidence that passes and the findings that appear most often. Read it as a preparation checklist: the organization should be able to show its defined components, its rebuild configuration and its audit trail before the assessor asks.
| Method or statement | What the assessor requests | Evidence that passes | Common finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Both determination statements | Confirmation that each organization-defined non-persistent component and trigger is met in practice | A written list of defined components with the rebuild trigger for each | Defined list does not match what actually runs in production |
| Examine: system design documentation | Architecture showing which components are rebuilt, and how a clean state is established | Design documents that name each non-persistent component and its base image | Design describes a persistent host that is never reimaged |
| Examine: configuration settings and documentation | Settings that enforce rebuild or session termination, and the procedures that describe them | Golden image or template settings, session timeout values and the matching runbook | Settings exist but the runbook was never updated after a change |
| Examine: system audit records | Logs showing rebuilds, session ends and the trigger that started each one | Timestamped records that link a terminated instance to its replacement | Rebuild events cannot be shown in audit records |
| Interview: operations and platform staff | Explanation of how rebuilds are initiated, approved and verified | Consistent answers that match the design and configuration documents | Staff describe a manual process that the documents do not mention |
| Test: observed rebuild or session end | Observation of a component being terminated and recreated from its known state | Recorded run showing the instance returns to the approved baseline | Replacement carries over state, data or configuration drift |
| Scope check against tailoring decision | Evidence that SI-14 was selected through tailoring or an overlay, since no SP 800-53B baseline assigns it | Tailoring record that explains the selection and the components in scope | Control is claimed without a documented selection decision |
Implementing SI-14 in the order an assessor will check it
This sequence takes SI-14 from an organization's decision to use non-persistent components through to a tested rebuild and a documented exception rule, so each step leaves evidence an assessor can examine. Because SI-14 is not in any SP 800-53B baseline, the first step is confirming that the organization has selected it through tailoring or an overlay.
Confirm selection and define the parameters
Start by confirming that SI-14 is in scope, either because the organization tailored it into its control set or because an overlay requires it, since no SP 800-53B baseline assigns it. Then define the organization-defined parameters for the components and services that must be non-persistent and the triggers that end a session or force a rebuild, such as session termination or a scheduled interval. The output is a signed parameter record that names each component, its trigger and its owner. Ask the assessor's expected format for this record before writing it, and confirm the current parameter count against the Release 5.2.0 catalog.
Document the known-state source and its change control
A non-persistent component is only as trustworthy as the image or template it starts from, so define the golden source for each component type, such as a hardened machine image, a base container image or a configuration-managed template. Record who may change that source, how changes are reviewed and how the source is versioned. The output is a documented known-state baseline with a change log, which connects SI-14 to the configuration management records the organization already keeps. Confirm with the assessor whether the baseline must be reviewed on a defined cycle.
Build the rebuild mechanism
Implement the mechanism that recreates components from the known-state source. Depending on the environment, this is reimaging physical or virtual hosts, redeploying virtual machines from templates or redeploying containers from signed images. Open-source platforms that run in the client's own infrastructure can supply much of this layer, and DeployOpen can prepare and configure it as part of a fixed-scope engagement. The output is a working mechanism and a configuration record showing which triggers call it. Confirm with the platform vendor which rebuild features are native and which need custom automation.
Externalize state that must survive a rebuild
Non-persistence only works if data that must be kept is stored outside the rebuilt component. Identify logs, configuration secrets, application data and audit records that must survive a rebuild, then move them to externally managed storage with its own protections. Record the data classification and storage location for each item. The output is a state inventory that shows what is lost on rebuild and what is retained, which an assessor can compare against the parameter record. Check that state moved off the component still meets the organization's controls for protection, retention and access.
Enable logging of session ends and rebuilds
Configure logging so every session end, trigger and rebuild produces an audit record. Without these records, an assessor cannot confirm that the control operated, and the organization cannot investigate an event that happened on a component that no longer exists. Send these records to a central store outside the rebuilt components, and confirm they are retained under the organization's audit policy. Runtime monitoring tools such as Falco, which can evaluate Linux system calls against rules, may help detect unexpected changes before a rebuild. The output is a log source list and sample records showing a session end and a rebuild.
Test a rebuild end to end
Run a full rebuild test on a representative component: trigger the rebuild, confirm the component starts from the known-state source, confirm externalized state is restored correctly, confirm the audit records were written, and confirm the component returns to service with its expected configuration. Record the result, including any deviations and how they were resolved. The output is a tested rebuild runbook with dated test results signed by the owner. An assessor will expect the evidence to come from an actual run, so keep the test record and the logs it produced together.
Write the exception rule
Some components cannot be non-persistent, such as systems that hold long-lived state or legacy hardware. Write a rule that defines who may approve an exception, what compensating controls must apply, how long an exception may last and how it is reviewed. Record each approved exception in the parameter record or a linked register. The output is an approved exception policy and a register of current exceptions, which an assessor will check against the defined components. Confirm the review frequency with the organization's own policy owner and any assessor requirements before finalizing the rule.
Open-source tools that produce SI-14 evidence
Falco is an Apache-2.0 licensed runtime security tool. It parses Linux system calls, by default through an eBPF probe, and evaluates them against YAML rules. For SI-14, its value is evidence that a workload behaved as expected during its session and that unexpected changes were recorded. Its alerts can show unauthorized file modification or suspicious process execution on a node that was supposed to be rebuilt from a known state.
- Runtime alerts: Falco can emit alerts for events such as unauthorized file modification, unexpected network connections and privilege escalation, which an assessor can compare against the expected session lifecycle.
- Container and Kubernetes context: Events are enriched with container and Kubernetes metadata, so records can be tied to a specific workload.
- Output destinations: Alerts can go to stdout, files, syslog, HTTP endpoints or programs, so you can retain them in your own log system.
- What it does not prove: Falco does not show that a component was reimaged or terminated at session end. Pair its records with deployment and teardown logs.
- License caveat: Apache-2.0 permits use, but confirm the rule sets and any add-on content you adopt carry terms you accept.
Confirm in your own environment that the eBPF probe runs on your kernel and node images, and that alerts reach your retention store before relying on them as SI-14 evidence.
GitLab Community Edition (MIT) includes container scanning that uses Trivy to find vulnerabilities in container images, including base images and OS packages. It writes a JSON report as a job artifact and a CycloneDX SBOM file. For SI-14, this evidence concerns the image source: it shows what a rebuilt component was made from, which supports a claim that each non-persistent start begins from a defined, scanned image.
- Vulnerability report: The JSON report lists findings for each scanned image, which can be linked to the image digest used in a build.
- CycloneDX SBOM: The SBOM file records the components in the image, giving assessors an inventory of what the known state contains.
- Pipeline artifacts: Job artifacts keep a record of each build, so you can show which image was approved for deployment and when.
- What it does not prove: A scan shows the image contents at scan time. It does not show that running instances were replaced on schedule or that they discarded state.
- License caveat: GitLab Community Edition is MIT licensed, but confirm which scanning features your tier includes and whether Trivy and its database updates meet your sourcing rules.
Confirm in your own environment that scans run on every image that reaches production and that the scan job fails or blocks promotion when your policy requires it.
Wazuh is GPL-2.0-only. Its Security Configuration Assessment (SCA) scans monitored endpoints for misconfigurations using YAML policies. The policies are mostly based on CIS benchmarks and can be extended with custom checks covering files, directories, registry keys and running processes. For SI-14, SCA evidence shows that rebuilt endpoints match an approved configuration baseline, which supports the claim that each reconstruction starts from a known state.
- Policy results: SCA reports show pass and fail results per check for each monitored endpoint, which an assessor can sample against the baseline.
- Remediation guidance: Failed checks come with recommended remediation, which can be tracked to closure.
- Custom policies: You can write checks for organization-specific settings, such as the golden image configuration you expect after a rebuild.
- What it does not prove: A passing scan shows configuration at the scan time. It does not prove the endpoint was recreated from scratch or that changes were removed at session end.
- License caveat: GPL-2.0-only has copyleft terms. Review how your use, modification and distribution of the agent and any changes fit your obligations before embedding it in products.
Confirm in your own environment that the endpoints you rebuild are enrolled in SCA and that policy results are retained for the period your assessor will review.
Fleet is MIT licensed. Its policies ask yes or no questions of devices as osquery queries. The policies page shows which devices in each fleet pass or fail each policy. For SI-14, this gives a current, per-device view of whether a device matches the expected state, such as a required agent running, or a check that persistence mechanisms are absent after a rebuild.
- Per-device status: The policies page shows which devices pass or fail each policy, giving a point-in-time population view.
- Custom queries: You can write osquery queries that check for conditions your non-persistence design relies on, such as an agent present or an unexpected startup item absent.
- Fleet grouping: Policies apply per fleet, so you can separate ephemeral workloads from long-lived endpoints.
- What it does not prove: A policy result is a snapshot. It does not show the device's history between checks or that it was rebuilt on schedule. Pair it with rebuild records.
- License caveat: Fleet is MIT licensed. Confirm which Fleet features and hosting options you use, and whether the osquery query packs you adopt come with terms you need to review.
Confirm in your own environment that devices are checked often enough to match your rebuild schedule and that failing results generate tickets with owners and closure dates.
Evidence that passes an SI-14 assessment and how to keep it current
An assessor testing SI-14 looks for proof that the organization defined which components are non-persistent, what known state they start from, and that the rebuilds actually happen. Each artifact below should be generated or updated through normal operations rather than rebuilt for each audit, so the evidence stays accurate between assessments.
Defined component and trigger list
This is the organization-defined list of components and services that must be non-persistent, along with the trigger for each one, such as session end or a fixed schedule. Assessors check that the list matches what is deployed. Regenerate it from the platform's inventory or orchestrator (for example, the list of pods, virtual machine templates or session hosts) on a defined cadence, and record who approved changes to it. A list written once and never compared with live systems is the most common gap.
Known-state image and definition
The golden image, container image or infrastructure template that every rebuild starts from must be identifiable by version and checksum. Keep its build definition in version control, record the change history with reviewer sign-off, and confirm that each running instance traces back to a specific approved version. Ask the assessor which image sources they will accept as the known state, and confirm your own build pipeline produces signed, reproducible artifacts before the audit.
Configuration settings for non-persistence
Capture the settings that make persistence impossible or limited: read-only root filesystems, ephemeral storage, disabled writable mounts, and session-bound profile handling. Export these from the platform configuration and store the output with its documentation, so a reviewer can see the setting values as they were at a given date. Re-export after every change to the platform and compare against the last approved baseline.
Rebuild and session-end records from audit logs
Audit records should show each component being destroyed or reimaged at its trigger, with timestamps and the identity of the automation or operator. Forward these events from the orchestrator and host to a central log store that the organization controls, and set retention to cover the audit period. Sampling the log for a few components across the period is how an assessor tests that the trigger actually fired.
Rebuild exercise test records
Run a planned rebuild of selected components from the known-state image and record the outcome: time taken, configuration drift found, failed steps and how they were resolved. Keep the test plan, the results and the remediation tickets together. Repeat the exercise after major image or platform changes so the records reflect current behavior, not the state at the first test.
Exception approvals
Some components cannot be non-persistent, such as those that hold state by design. Each exception needs a documented justification, a named risk owner, compensating controls, and an expiry or review date. Tie exceptions to the change process so that a component's removal from the non-persistent list is approved and logged. Confirm with your assessor how they expect exceptions to be recorded, since the wording of acceptance is an organizational decision.
What meeting SI-14 costs in money and effort
This table lists the cost components of putting SI-14 Non-persistence in place, who is paid for each, whether it is one-time or recurring, and what pushes it up or down. NIST does not estimate compliance costs, so no figures appear here; use the drivers to structure a written quote and compare like with like.
| Cost component | Who is paid or who carries it | One-time or recurring | What drives it up or down |
|---|---|---|---|
| Engineering to build the rebuild mechanism | Internal platform engineers or an implementation partner under a fixed-scope agreement | One-time, with later changes recurring | Number of component types, how many images or builds must be rebuilt, and whether reimaging or virtualization is already in place |
| State externalization | Internal engineers or implementation partner | One-time, then recurring as data flows change | How much state must move out of the component (logs, configuration, secrets, persistent data) and how many services depend on it |
| Tooling and licenses | Vendors for commercial products; no license fee for Apache-2.0, MIT or GPL-2.0 tools, though hosting and staff time still apply | Recurring for commercial tools; infrastructure recurring for self-hosted tools | Choice of commercial versus open-source tooling, number of endpoints or nodes monitored, and retention of audit records |
| Evidence upkeep | Internal compliance and platform teams | Recurring | Frequency of rebuilds and changes to golden images, how often configuration settings are re-exported, and how many systems must be evidenced |
| External testing or review | Independent testers or consultants, scoped in writing | Recurring at each test cycle | Whether tests cover the rebuild process itself, the number of environments, and whether findings require retesting |
| Auditor or assessor sampling | Independent auditor or assessor, quoted per engagement | Recurring at each assessment | Number of systems selected, how clearly rebuild schedules are documented, and whether audit records are easy to retrieve |
| Internal coordination and change approvals | Internal staff across operations, security and application owners | Recurring | Frequency of change windows, number of teams that own components, and whether rebuilds are automated |
Where SI-14 implementations usually fall short
SI-14 Non-persistence is a short control with a lot of implied infrastructure behind it. Most shortfalls come from the same place: the organization never wrote down which components are meant to reset, what they reset to, and who approves that known state. The cards below cover five gaps that assessors tend to find and the specific action that closes each one.
Undefined component list
SI-14 requires the organization to define which system components and services are non-persistent, and an assessor cannot test a boundary nobody wrote down. Teams often assume that container workloads or virtual desktops are covered, while the hosts beneath them or a few long-lived service VMs are not. Close it by producing a named inventory of non-persistent components, each with its owner, its reset trigger and its session or schedule boundary, and reconciling that list against the system security plan.
Rebuilds with no record
A reimage or redeploy that happens silently cannot be shown to have happened, so the assessor's examine methods have nothing to read. SP 800-53A points assessors toward system audit records for this control. Close it by configuring the rebuild pipeline to log every reset with the component ID, the image or known-state reference, the trigger and the timestamp, and retaining those logs under the organization's audit policy.
Persistent state on the component
Non-persistence fails quietly when application data, credentials, logs or cached secrets live on the component that is supposed to reset. A rebuild then restores the attacker's foothold along with the operating system. Close it by moving state to external stores the component connects to, mounting writable paths as ephemeral, and running a check after each reset that confirms no unexpected files or configuration survived the rebuild.
Known-state source outside change control
The known state is only as trustworthy as the golden image, template or build script it comes from. If those artifacts can be edited without review, an attacker or an unreviewed change can make every rebuild reproduce the compromise. Close it by placing images and build definitions under configuration management with approval, versioning and integrity checks, and recording which approved version each component was rebuilt from.
Undocumented SI-14 decision
SP 800-53B does not assign SI-14 to any baseline, so many systems never select it and nobody records that decision. An assessor then asks why a sensitive workload was not made non-persistent and receives no answer. Close it by recording an explicit selection or rejection of SI-14 in the control implementation statement, with the rationale, the risk accepted and the reviewer, and revisiting that decision whenever the system boundary or threat profile changes.
Who does what for SI-14: your team, a partner and the auditor
Your organization owns SI-14. Only you can decide whether the control applies, because SP 800-53B does not assign SI-14 to any baseline and it applies only when you select it through tailoring or an overlay. Once selected, you must define the system components or services that will be non-persistent, the trigger that ends their life (such as end of session or a scheduled rebuild) and the parameters the control leaves for you to set. Accepting the residual risk and signing the system security plan stay with your leadership, not with any vendor.
- Selection decision: Record in the tailoring rationale why SI-14 is in or out for each system, referencing the system's threat model.
- Parameter values: Set the organization-defined parameters for which components reset, how often and from which known-good image.
- Golden image authority: Name the owner who approves the baseline image or template that every rebuild starts from.
- Exception handling: Decide who may grant exceptions for stateful workloads such as databases and who reviews them.
- Acceptance: Review the evidence package and accept or reject the control before the assessor begins testing.
Before engaging anyone, confirm internally that you can name each of these owners, because the assessor will ask who approved the parameters.
An implementation partner such as DeployOpen prepares the technical means for SI-14 inside your own infrastructure: the rebuild pipeline, the non-persistent configuration, the logging that shows resets happened and the documentation an assessor will read. The partner works from a written scope that names the systems, the platforms and the deliverables. The partner does not decide the control's parameters or accept the risk, and it does not test or certify the control.
- Rebuild mechanism: Build the reimaging or virtualization approach, for example ephemeral virtual machines or containers recreated from a versioned image.
- Image pipeline: Automate creation and patching of the known-state image so each rebuild starts from an approved baseline.
- Evidence preparation: Configure audit records, configuration settings and reset logs so they can be examined later.
- Documentation: Write the design documents and configuration references that an assessor examines.
- Retainers: Offer ongoing upgrades and support as a separate, written agreement if you need them after the initial build.
Usually outsourced work includes the pipeline and evidence collection, which are time-consuming to build. Ask any partner to state in writing which deliverables it will not perform, such as accepting risk or issuing reports.
The independent assessor or auditor tests whether SI-14 works and reports findings. SP 800-53A gives the procedure: SI-14 has 2 determination statements, assessed through examine, interview and test methods. The examine objects include system design documentation, system configuration settings and associated documentation, and system audit records. The assessor must be independent of the team that built the system, and only the assessor issues the assessment report or any attestation.
- Examine: Reviews design documents, configuration settings and audit records showing resets occurred as defined.
- Interview: Asks administrators how components are rebuilt and who approves the golden image.
- Test: Observes or repeats a rebuild and checks that the component returns to the known state.
- Findings: Records each gap against the determination statement in the assessment report.
- Independence: Keeps design and assessment roles apart, so a partner should not also serve as the assessor.
Before the assessment, ask the assessor which evidence formats it accepts and how it will treat automated logs. Confirm the assessment scope in writing so the partner and the assessor test the same system boundary.
Common questions about SI-14 non-persistence
Is SI-14 non-persistence required in any NIST SP 800-53 baseline?
No. SP 800-53B does not assign SI-14 to the low, moderate or high baselines or to the privacy baseline, so it applies only when your organization selects it through tailoring or an overlay. Appendix C of SP 800-53 Rev. 5 lists it as implemented by the organization and marks it as an assurance-related control. FedRAMP's Rev5 baselines also do not require it at Class B, C or D. If a contract, agency or assessor asks for SI-14, the requirement usually comes from the tailoring decision or from a specific overlay, so ask for that document before scoping the work.
How much effort does SI-14 take, and what drives it?
Effort depends mostly on how many components you decide must be non-persistent and how often they are rebuilt. SI-14 has three organization-defined parameters and three control enhancements in Release 5.2.0, so the policy decisions alone can take time before any technical work starts. Other drivers include whether workloads already run from immutable images, how much state lives outside the rebuilt components, and how well the build pipeline is documented. Ask any provider to break the effort into design, build pipeline changes, testing and evidence collection, and to state which components are in scope.
How long does implementing SI-14 usually take?
The timeline is set by the scope you agree, not by the control itself, and no supplied source gives a standard duration. The main factors are the number of component types, the maturity of your image and configuration pipelines, the state that must be separated from rebuilt systems, and the change approval process for production. Teams that already manage infrastructure as code often move faster than teams relying on manual builds. Request a written timeline tied to named deliverables, and confirm which dependencies, such as access to cloud accounts or change windows, sit with your team.
What does the internal team need to provide for SI-14?
The internal team owns the decisions that the control depends on. Expect to supply the list of components to be non-persistent, the defined triggers such as session end or a rebuild schedule, the location of persistent data and logs, and approval for changes to production build and deployment processes. Your team also owns the system security plan entries and the evidence the assessor will examine, including system design documentation, configuration settings and audit records. An implementation partner can prepare systems and evidence, but your organization remains responsible for the control.
Can we implement SI-14 in-house with open-source tools?
Often yes, if your team already runs automated builds and has the skills to maintain them. Open-source tools cover parts of the evidence trail. Falco, which is Apache-2.0 licensed, can detect unexpected changes at runtime through an eBPF probe and send alerts to your logging systems. Wazuh, which is GPL-2.0-only, can check endpoints against YAML configuration policies. Fleet, which is MIT licensed, can run osquery policies that show which devices pass or fail a check. These tools help show behavior, but they do not rebuild systems by themselves, so confirm each tool's capabilities against your own environment before relying on it.
How does SI-14 relate to SC-30, SC-34 and SI-21?
SI-14 is related to SC-30, SC-34 and SI-21 in the Release 5.2.0 catalog. SC-30 covers concealment and misinformation, SC-34 covers non-modifiable executable programs, and SI-21 covers information refresh, which regenerates or deletes information on a schedule. Together they address the same goal from different angles: limiting how long an attacker can keep a foothold in a component or in stored information. Because these are separate controls, each needs its own assessment, its own evidence and its own organization-defined parameters, so do not treat one implementation as satisfying all four.
What evidence will an assessor ask for to test SI-14?
SP 800-53A Release 5.2.0 assesses SI-14 through two determination statements using the examine, interview and test methods. The examine objects named for this control include system design documentation, system configuration settings with their associated documentation, and system audit records. In practice, that means documented non-persistence decisions, build and rebuild configuration, records showing components were restarted from a known state, and logs that confirm the schedule or session triggers ran. Confirm with your assessor which test methods they will use and what sample of records they expect.
How DeployOpen scopes and prepares SI-14 evidence
DeployOpen works on SI-14 Non-persistence as a fixed-scope engagement inside your own infrastructure. We prepare the systems and evidence an assessor would examine, while your organization owns the control decision and an independent assessor issues any findings.
How we scope
- Confirm in writing whether SI-14 is selected through tailoring or an overlay, since no SP 800-53B baseline includes it.
- Name the defined components and services that must be non-persistent, plus the session or schedule trigger for each.
- List the three organization-defined parameters and which of the three enhancements your organization has chosen to adopt.
How we build
- Design rebuild-from-known-state workflows, such as reimaging or ephemeral virtual machines, for the components in scope.
- Deploy self-hosted runtime monitoring such as Falco to record changes that would otherwise persist between rebuilds.
- Configure audit logging so rebuild events and configuration settings can be examined against the SI-14 assessment objects.
How we hand over
- Document system design, configuration settings and rebuild procedures so an assessor can examine them directly.
- Provide audit record samples and test results showing that components return to the defined known state.
- Deliver a written mapping of each SI-14 determination statement to the artifact and owner that supports it.
How we support
- Offer ongoing support, upgrades and continuous testing for rebuild pipelines and monitoring as a retainer.
- Review configuration drift after platform upgrades so evidence stays current with the deployed environment.
- Confirm with your assessor which evidence format and sampling they expect before the assessment begins.

