What SI-10 information input validation requires in SP 800-53
SI-10 requires the organization to check the validity of defined information inputs. An assessor or a FedRAMP annual assessment asking for SI-10 evidence wants to see which inputs the organization has decided must be validated, how the system checks them, and proof that those checks run. The control is about the system's handling of data it accepts from users, other systems, files and APIs, so it covers the points where untrusted content enters an application or a service. The risk is easy to describe. When an application passes text, numbers or file contents straight into a database query, a command, a template or another system without checking their form and meaning, an attacker can supply input that changes how that component behaves. SQL injection, cross-site scripting and command injection are the familiar examples, and malformed input can also crash parsers or push a system into states nobody designed for. SI-10 has a single base requirement with one organization-defined parameter, which is the set of information inputs that require validity checks. The organization fills in that parameter, so the control is only as specific as the list it writes. Teams find SI-10 hard for one main reason: the list of inputs is often never written down. Developers know their own forms and endpoints, but no single document names every input that needs checking, and the list drifts as new APIs, integrations and import jobs are added. Before any tooling discussion, confirm who owns that list, where it is recorded and how it is reviewed when the system changes. An assessor will ask for it first, and the rest of the evidence depends on it.
Which inputs, systems and teams SI-10 covers in your scope
SI-10 applies to whatever the organization defines as an information input, so the first scoping task is an inventory of where data enters each system. The baseline decision sets the boundary: SP 800-53B assigns SI-10 to the moderate and high baselines, and FedRAMP applies it at Classes C and D. The cards below cover the input paths that most often need to be on that list.
User-facing forms and web APIs
Forms, search boxes, query parameters and JSON bodies are the inputs most people picture when they hear input validation. For SI-10, document each field, its expected syntax (type, length, format) and its semantic rules, such as a date that cannot precede the account opening date. Check that validation runs on the server, not only in the browser, because client-side checks can be bypassed. Confirm which endpoints are public and which are reachable only by authenticated users.
File uploads and document parsing
Uploaded files carry inputs that are hard to validate by extension alone, including content type, size, archive contents and embedded metadata. Parsers for spreadsheets, images or PDFs are a common source of defects, so the scope should name each parser and the libraries behind it. Record where uploads are stored and whether a file is validated before it reaches downstream processing. Ask the product team which file types the business actually needs and reject the rest.
Message queues and service-to-service calls
Internal calls often assume their callers are trusted, yet a compromised service or a malformed producer can send data that later triggers injection in a consumer. Include queue payloads, gRPC or REST calls between services, and scheduled jobs that read database rows written by other applications. Document the schema each consumer expects and the action taken when a message fails validation, such as rejecting it to a dead-letter queue and logging the event.
Administrative interfaces and configuration input
Admin consoles, deployment parameters and infrastructure-as-code variables often sit outside the normal user flow and receive less review. Because these inputs can change access rules or execute commands, they belong in scope even when the user population is small. Confirm whether administrative functions are reachable only from a management network and whether their inputs follow the same validation standard as customer-facing forms.
Third-party and integration feeds
Data pulled from partners, payment processors, identity providers or public data sources arrives with assumptions the organization did not write. Each feed should appear in the inventory with its owner, format, update frequency and the checks applied on receipt. Where the provider supplies a contract or interface specification, use it as the baseline for syntax checks and record any semantic rules agreed with the provider. Ask the business owner who can change the feed format and how changes are communicated.
Teams that own each input path
An input list is only useful if someone maintains it. Assign an owner for each input path across application development, platform engineering, integration and security operations, and agree who approves changes to validation rules. The assessor will look for design documentation and a current list of inputs requiring validity checks, so the owner should be able to produce both on request. Confirm the review cycle for the list and what triggers an update, such as a new endpoint or a new partner.
How an assessor tests SI-10 against SP 800-53A procedures
This table breaks down the single SP 800-53A determination statement for SI-10 by assessment method and object, showing what an assessor looks for and what evidence supports each part. Read it as a checklist of what to prepare before an assessment starts, and note that the assessor, not the organization or DeployOpen, decides whether the control is satisfied.
| Assessment element | What the assessor checks | Evidence that usually satisfies it |
|---|---|---|
| Determination statement | Whether the organization has defined the information inputs that require validity checks and the system checks them for validity | Documented input list, validation design, and test results showing checks run on the server side |
| Examine: documentation for automated tools and applications | Whether the documentation describes the tools and application logic that verify input validity and how they are configured | Developer documentation, validation library references, and WAF or API gateway rule documentation |
| Examine: list of information inputs requiring validity checks | Whether the list exists, is current, and covers user-facing forms, APIs, file uploads, and integration interfaces | Versioned input inventory tied to system components and reviewed at a defined frequency |
| Examine: system design documentation | Whether the design places validation at trust boundaries and describes how syntax and semantic checks are performed | Architecture diagrams, data flow diagrams, and design notes showing where validation sits |
| Examine: system configuration settings and associated documentation | Whether runtime settings enforce the validation rules, such as schema enforcement, request size limits and WAF rule sets | Exported configuration files, WAF rule set versions, and change records for those settings |
| Interview | Whether developers and operators can explain which inputs are checked, how rules are maintained, and who approves changes | Consistent answers that match the documented input list and configuration records |
| Test | Whether crafted invalid, malformed and malicious inputs are rejected or handled safely at the server | Test scripts, DAST or API fuzzing results, and retained evidence of rejected requests |
| Common finding: undefined input list | The organization cannot show which inputs it considers in scope for validation | Build an inventory before the assessment, not during it |
| Common finding: validation only in the client | Checks exist in browser code but the server accepts invalid or malicious input | Server-side validation tests that send requests directly to the API, bypassing the front end |
How to implement SI-10 in six steps
This sequence turns SI-10 from a policy statement into validation logic, tests and reviewable evidence that an assessor can trace from each defined input to a rule, a test and a configuration setting.
Define the organization-defined parameter and input inventory
The system owner and the security team first fill in SI-10's organization-defined parameter, which sets the information inputs that require validity checks. They then build the list of inputs requiring checks by walking every entry point: web forms, API parameters, message queues, file uploads, configuration imports and administrative consoles. Each input is recorded with its data type, source, trust level and the component that receives it. The step is done when the list is approved by the system owner and the parameter wording matches the list, because assessors test the list against the system design. Confirm the exact parameter wording against the current SP 800-53 Rev. 5.2.0 catalog before you finalize it.
Document syntax and semantic validation rules
Engineering and application owners write a validation rule for each listed input. Syntax rules cover type, length, character set, format and encoding. Semantic rules check that a value makes sense in context, such as a date range, a permitted account for a transaction or a value that matches the current user's role. Rules are written as a specification the team can test, not as prose. The output is a validation specification that names the rule, the failure behavior (reject, sanitize or flag) and the owner for each input. This document is the artifact that a SI-10 examine step will look for under documentation for automated tools and applications.
Implement validation in application code and at the edge
Developers implement the specified rules in application code, using server-side validation on every trust boundary, because client-side checks alone do not protect the system. Platform teams add a second layer at the network edge, such as a web application firewall in front of the application. Coraza, an Apache-2.0 web application firewall compatible with ModSecurity SecLang rules and the OWASP Core Rule Set, is one open-source option for this layer, and HAProxy, Nginx, Traefik and Caddy have integrations listed in its documentation. Edge rules complement application validation and do not replace it. The step is complete when each specified input has a code path that enforces its rule and the edge rules are deployed and logged.
Add automated tests and code scanning to the pipeline
The team writes unit and integration tests that send valid, malformed and hostile values to each input and confirm the expected accept or reject result. These tests run in the CI/CD pipeline on every change. Semgrep Community Edition can scan repositories in that pipeline with community or custom rules, which helps catch unvalidated sinks such as raw query construction. GitLab protected branches can require that changes reach the main branch only through the reviewed pipeline, which preserves the test history. The output is a passing test suite, a scan report for each release and a record of any findings and their disposition.
Set review of rejected-input errors
Rejected inputs generate errors, and those errors are only useful if someone reviews them. The operations team defines which validation failures are logged, how they are aggregated, who reviews them and how often, and which patterns trigger escalation to the security team. Error messages returned to users must stay generic so they do not reveal the rule set or internal details. OPNsense firewall rules can also log matched traffic for review in its live log view, which supports review of edge rejections. The step is done when a named reviewer, a review cadence and an escalation path are documented, and when a sample review record exists.
Record design and configuration evidence
The team assembles the evidence an assessor will request: the input inventory, the validation specification, design documentation showing where validation sits in the architecture, configuration settings for the edge and application layers, test results, scan reports and review records. Each artifact carries a version and an owner. The evidence is organized so that each defined input traces to a rule, a test, a configuration item and a review entry. Confirm with the independent assessor which evidence format and retention period they expect before collection starts, since assessors and FedRAMP rules may differ on presentation. The output is an evidence package that can be reproduced from the pipeline and repository history.
What the six SI-10 enhancements add beyond the base requirement
The six enhancements extend the base requirement in three directions: authorized people can intervene in validation, rejected inputs are reviewed and resolved, and the system fails in a defined way. The first theme is manual override. An enhancement of this kind asks whether a documented, authorized process exists for an operator to accept an input that automated validation rejected, who may approve it, and how the decision is recorded. In practice that means an approval step in your ticketing or case system, with the reason, the approver and the rejected input's identifier stored together. The review theme asks that rejected inputs be collected, examined on a set schedule and resolved, so that repeated failures point to a defect or an attack instead of disappearing into logs.
The remaining themes concern behavior under invalid input. Predictable behavior means the system returns a defined response after a rejection and does not partially process the input or expose internal state. Timing interactions address the case where validation happens in one component while a later component trusts the result, so a reordered pipeline or a race condition can bypass the check. Test both with negative cases in your CI pipeline and in a staging environment that mirrors production request ordering. Your architecture documentation, which the SP 800-53A examine objects call for, should show where validation is enforced for each input path.
No SP 800-53B baseline assigns any of the six enhancements, so the moderate and high baselines require only the base SI-10 control. Adopting an enhancement or leaving it out is a documented risk decision, and the system security plan should record the rationale for each one. FedRAMP's Rev5 rules require SI-10 at Classes C and D and in every annual assessment, but the supplied facts do not establish that any enhancement is required. Before you scope enhancements out, ask your FedRAMP assessor for a written position, and confirm the exact enhancement wording in the NIST OSCAL catalog for your release.
Evidence that passes an SI-10 test and how to keep it current
An assessor testing SI-10 wants to see which inputs were identified, how validity checks were designed and configured, and whether those checks still work after the last assessment. The six artifacts below connect design intent to running configuration and to records of what happened when inputs failed validation.
Inventory of inputs requiring validity checks
This is the list the single SI-10 determination statement is measured against. It names each entry point that accepts information, such as web forms, API parameters, file uploads, message queues and administrative consoles, and records the expected syntax and semantic rules for each. Keep it in version control next to the code it describes so every new endpoint must add a row before it ships. Review it at each assessment and check it against the routes actually exposed by the edge filter and application. An inventory that omits an endpoint is the most common gap an assessor finds.
System design and validation rule documentation
Design documentation explains how validation is layered, for example whether type and length checks happen at the gateway, the application and the database, and which library or schema defines each rule. It also records the decisions behind allowlists versus denylists and how manual overrides are authorized. Assessors use it to judge whether the design is predictable and whether the rules match the inventory. Update it whenever a validation library, schema or trust boundary changes, and tie each revision to a change record.
Edge filter and application configuration settings
Export the live configuration of the components that enforce validation, such as the web application firewall rule set, its paranoia or anomaly settings, the reverse proxy limits and the application framework's validation switches. Store these exports with a timestamp and the hash of the deployed rule set so an assessor can see what was running on a given date. The Coraza tutorial describes the ModSecurity SecLang rule format used in such configurations. Confirm which settings your chosen product exposes for export before you promise this evidence to an assessor.
Automated validation test results
Unit, integration and negative tests that send malformed, oversized, out-of-range and injection-style inputs show whether validation rejects them. Keep the test suite in the pipeline and archive each run with the commit identifier, the date and the pass or fail counts. Negative tests matter more than happy-path tests here, because they demonstrate what the system refuses. Record any test that was skipped or marked as expected to fail, along with the approver and the planned fix.
Code scanning results for injection flaws
Static analysis reports show whether developers introduced unsafe input handling, such as concatenating user data into queries or commands. Semgrep Community Edition can run in CI/CD and scan repositories continuously, using community or custom rules across languages including Java, Python, JavaScript and Go. Retain each scan report with the rule set version and the triage decisions for every finding. Confirm the language coverage against your codebase, since the supported language list is the limit of what this evidence can show.
Error review and rejected input records
Logs of rejected inputs and validation errors show the control operating in production and reveal patterns that point to attack attempts or broken clients. Review them on a defined schedule, record who reviewed them and what action followed, and keep the reviewer's notes with the logs. Confirm that error responses returned to users do not disclose internal details, since the error handling control covers that separately. Ask your team to confirm the retention period for these logs against your assessment and contract obligations before you set it.
What meeting SI-10 costs in money and effort
This table breaks the cost of meeting SI-10 into its components, showing who is paid for each, whether it is one-time or recurring, and what moves it up or down. NIST does not estimate compliance costs, so use the table to shape a written scope and quote rather than as a budget. The main takeaway is that input inventory and validation engineering are the largest one-time items, while evidence upkeep and retesting after change drive ongoing effort.
| Cost component | Who is paid or who spends effort | One-time or recurring | What drives it up or down |
|---|---|---|---|
| Input inventory and design | Internal architects and developers, optionally an implementation partner | One-time, revisited on major change | Number of entry points, APIs, file uploads and integrations; a current, complete inventory lowers rework |
| Validation engineering | Internal developers or a partner building syntax and semantic checks | One-time plus change-driven | Count of input types, language and framework choices, and whether validation is centralized or copied per service |
| Testing of validation logic | Developers, QA and security testers | One-time plus change-driven | Coverage of negative test cases, fuzzing scope and how often releases touch inputs |
| Tooling licenses | Vendors of commercial scanners, WAFs or API gateways | Recurring subscription or support fees | Commercial versus open-source choice, number of seats or applications, and support tier; request the license terms in writing |
| Self-hosted open-source alternatives | Internal staff or partner for setup, tuning and operation | One-time setup plus recurring operation | Removes most license spend, but shifts cost to hosting, tuning, patching and rule maintenance |
| Evidence upkeep | Control owners and engineers producing and storing records | Recurring, each assessment cycle | Whether evidence is generated automatically from pipelines and logs or assembled by hand before each assessment |
| External testing or review | Independent penetration testers or security assessors | Recurring at the frequency the organization or program sets | Application count, complexity, and whether tests include input-focused cases such as injection and malformed payloads |
| Auditor sampling | Independent assessor or certification body | Recurring at each assessment | Number of samples the assessor selects and how quickly the organization can produce validation records and error-review logs |
Which self-hosted open-source tools support SI-10 evidence
Semgrep Community Edition, licensed under LGPL-2.1-only, scans source code for patterns that suggest unvalidated input reaches a sensitive sink. It supports many languages, including Java, JavaScript, TypeScript, Python, Go, Ruby, PHP and C#, and it can run in CI/CD pipelines so every change to input-handling code is scanned. For SI-10, the output shows that the organization checked inputs in code and can show the rules applied and the findings resolved.
- Language coverage: Confirm that every language used by your input-handling services appears in the supported language list before you rely on the scan.
- Custom rules: Write rules for your own validation libraries and data types, since community rules may not match your code.
- Pipeline runs: Keep scan logs and failed-build records as dated evidence that scanning happened on each change.
- Limits: A scan finds patterns it has rules for. It does not prove that validation is correct for business logic, nor that every input path is covered.
- License: Review LGPL-2.1-only terms with your legal team if you modify the tool and distribute it.
Confirm the rule set, the scan scope and how findings are triaged and closed in your own pipeline.
Coraza is a web application firewall under Apache-2.0 that runs rulesets written in ModSecurity SecLang syntax, including the OWASP Core Rule Set. It is designed to detect attacks such as SQL injection, cross-site scripting and code injection before requests reach the application. Coraza integrates with Caddy, HAProxy, Traefik and Nginx, so it can sit at the entry point of a self-hosted service. For SI-10, its logs can show that inputs were checked at the boundary, but it is a compensating layer rather than a replacement for validation inside the application.
- Rule sets: Document which rule set version you run, which rules are disabled and why, and who approved each exception.
- Blocking versus detection: Record whether rules block or only log, because an assessor will ask how the mode was chosen.
- Audit logs: Retain blocked-request logs under your audit and retention procedures so they can be sampled.
- Limits: Filters cannot know the semantics of your business rules, and attackers may find payloads that evade signatures.
- Integration: Confirm the integration with your chosen proxy version in your own test environment before production use.
Verify that the filter is tested against known attack samples and that the results are kept with the system security documentation.
GitLab Community Edition, licensed under MIT, supports protected branches. Maintainers can restrict which roles may push or merge, block direct pushes by setting push access to no one, and keep force pushes disabled unless explicitly allowed. For SI-10, this supports the control that changes to validation code are reviewed and traceable, so an unreviewed change cannot quietly weaken an input check.
- Push restrictions: Set push access on the protected branch so validation code moves only through merge requests.
- Force pushes: Keep force pushes disabled so history of review and change cannot be rewritten.
- Review records: Keep merge request approvals and comments as evidence that a second person reviewed each validation change.
- Limits: Protected branches control how code changes. They do not test whether the validation logic works.
- Configuration: Confirm the protection settings on each branch that ships validation code, because defaults may differ by project.
Export the protection settings and a sample of merge requests as evidence, and confirm who can change the protection settings themselves.
OPNsense, licensed under BSD-2-Clause, is a stateful packet filter. Its rules pass, block or reject traffic by source, destination, port and protocol, and aliases group addresses for easier review. Each rule can log its matches, and those entries appear in the live log view. For SI-10, the value is supporting network evidence: it shows which traffic was allowed to reach an application and which was refused, which helps an assessor check that only expected inputs reach the service. It does not inspect the content of application inputs.
- Rule design: Restrict inbound rules to the ports and sources the application needs, and document the purpose of each alias.
- Logging: Enable logging on the rules that front validated services, and confirm that matches are retained beyond the live view.
- Change control: Keep exported configuration backups and record each rule change with a reason and an approver.
- Limits: Packet filtering cannot see whether a permitted request carries a malicious payload, so it does not prove input validation.
- Retention: Confirm how long logs are kept and where they are forwarded in your environment.
Sample logged rule matches against the documented rule set to confirm the logs reflect the rules you intended.
Where SI-10 evidence usually fails
Assessors testing SI-10 usually start by asking for the list of inputs that require validity checks and then trace each one through the design and the code. The gaps below tend to surface at that point, and each one can be closed before an assessment begins.
No written list of inputs
The SI-10 examine objects include a list of the information inputs that require validity checks. Many systems have validation scattered across handlers, forms and API schemas, but no single inventory that names each input, its source and its expected format. Without that list, an assessor cannot confirm coverage. Close this by generating an inventory from API specifications, form definitions and message queues, then assigning an owner to review it each release.
Validation only in the browser
Client-side checks improve usability but do not protect the server, because any request can bypass the browser. Assessors look for validation that runs on the server or API gateway for every input in the inventory. Close this by testing each endpoint with requests that skip the front end, and confirm the server rejects malformed syntax and out-of-range values.
Error messages that leak detail
When validation fails, a verbose response can reveal database engines, query fragments, stack traces or internal field names, which helps an attacker refine an injection. The validation control and the error handling control are assessed together in many programs. Close this by reviewing rejection responses for each endpoint and returning generic messages to users while logging the full detail server-side.
No review of rejected inputs
Rejected inputs can signal probing, broken clients or a faulty rule. Programs that log rejections but never review them cannot show that the validation rules are working as intended. Close this by sending rejection events to the central log, setting a recurring review with a named owner, and keeping the review record as evidence.
Design documents out of date
The examine objects also include system design documentation and configuration settings. When a new field or endpoint ships without an update to the design or the input list, the documents describe a system that no longer exists. Close this by making the input inventory a required artifact in the change process, so a pull request that adds an input also updates the documentation it depends on.
SI-10 questions buyers ask before hiring help
How long does SI-10 input validation work take?
No fixed duration applies to SI-10, and no researched figure is available to quote. The timeline depends on how many systems accept input that needs validation, how well those inputs are documented, how much custom code exists, and whether the input validation design is already written down. A system with a short list of well-defined inputs and existing design documentation moves faster than one with many legacy interfaces and no inventory. Ask any partner to base the timeline on a written inventory of inputs and systems, and to state which steps depend on your team's availability. Because engagements are fixed-scope, the schedule should be agreed in writing before work starts.
Can our team handle SI-10 without an outside partner?
Yes, many organizations do this internally, and an outside partner is optional. SI-10 has one determination statement in SP 800-53A Release 5.2.0, so the assessment itself is narrow. The effort lies in building the list of information inputs that need validity checks, documenting the validation rules, and showing that automated tools and application configurations enforce them. Teams that already maintain architecture documents, code review practices and a web application firewall have a head start. Bring in a partner when the input inventory is incomplete, when the team lacks time to produce evidence, or when an independent reviewer should test the design before an assessor does.
What does SI-10 require from engineering and compliance staff?
SI-10 needs both groups, with different jobs. Engineering owns the technical work: identifying every interface that accepts input, defining the syntax and semantic checks for each, and confirming that the application or gateway enforces them. Compliance owns the control record: the system security and privacy plan entry, the list of inputs requiring validity checks, and the evidence that assessors will examine. Typical engineering tasks include:
- Mapping APIs, forms, file uploads and message queues to their expected formats
- Reviewing how validation errors are logged and reviewed
- Confirming that configuration settings match the documented design
Compliance staff should confirm which assessment objects their assessor expects and keep the documentation current with each release.
Does FedRAMP's annual assessment change the SI-10 work?
Yes, for systems at FedRAMP Classes C and D, SI-10 is part of the annual assessment cycle, not a one-time check. FedRAMP's Rev5 baselines require SI-10 at those classes, and its annual assessment rule requires SI-10 in a FedRAMP independent assessment every year. That means the evidence must stay current across the year, and changes to input handling must be reflected in the documentation before the next assessment. Confirm the current classes and rules with FedRAMP and your authorizing official, since the rule set is versioned and updated. A partner can prepare the evidence for each annual cycle, but the assessment itself is performed by an independent assessor.
Can a consultant or partner issue the SI-10 evidence or certify compliance?
No. A DeployOpen engagement prepares systems, controls and evidence for an assessment, but DeployOpen does not issue audit reports, attestations or certifications. Only an independent assessor, auditor or certification body can conclude that SI-10 is satisfied, and the organization remains responsible for its own controls. In practice, the partner can configure validation rules, set up logging of validation failures, document the input inventory and gather artifacts such as design documentation and configuration records. Ask any firm, including DeployOpen, to state in writing which deliverables are preparation and which are independent assessment outputs.
What should a fixed-scope quote for SI-10 include?
A fixed-scope quote should follow from a written scope, not from a generic price. DeployOpen does not publish a price list, and a quote follows from the agreed scope. Ask for these items in writing:
- The list of systems and interfaces in scope, with the inputs covered for each
- The validation controls, tools and configuration changes to be delivered
- The evidence package, including documentation and artifacts for the assessor
- What the client must provide, such as access, staff time and existing design documents
- Which work is one-time and which recurs, such as retainers for upgrades or annual assessment support
- Exclusions, including the independent assessment itself
Compare quotes on these points rather than on headline totals, since the same control can be scoped very differently.
Which SI-10 tools can produce evidence on self-hosted systems?
Several open-source tools can support the evidence for input validation, though none replaces the control itself. A web application firewall such as Coraza, which is compatible with ModSecurity SecLang rulesets and the OWASP Core Rule Set, can block injection attempts such as SQL injection, cross-site scripting and code injection at the edge, and integrates with Nginx, HAProxy, Caddy and Traefik. Semgrep Community Edition can scan code for unsafe handling of input in many languages and can run in CI/CD pipelines. GitLab protected branches can enforce that validation changes receive review before merging. Confirm with your assessor which artifacts they accept, such as rule sets, scan reports and merge records, and test that each tool performs as your design states before relying on it.
How DeployOpen prepares SI-10 systems and evidence
DeployOpen prepares the systems and evidence for SI-10, but it does not assess them. In practice, that means working with your application, security and platform teams to agree the list of information inputs that need validity checks, then implementing or hardening the validation points that sit on those inputs. Typical points include web and API gateways, the application frameworks that parse request bodies, and the message queues and file importers that accept data from other systems. Where the open-source tooling you choose is self-hosted, DeployOpen deploys it inside your cloud accounts, data centers or air-gapped network, and documents the configuration so an assessor can trace each input to the control that checks it. Work is scoped in writing before it starts, so the input list, the platforms in scope and the deliverables are fixed.
The evidence an assessor will look for under SP 800-53A is mostly design and configuration material: the list of inputs requiring validity checks, system design documentation, configuration settings with their change history, and documentation for any automated tools that verify input validity. DeployOpen can prepare that material alongside the working controls, and can run and record testing of the validation rules against defined malformed and malicious inputs. Confirm with your assessor which artifacts they expect and in what format, since the form of acceptable evidence is set by the assessment, not by the implementation partner. Also confirm who owns the input list after handover and how it is kept current as new interfaces are added.
DeployOpen does not issue audit reports, attestations or certifications. Those come only from an independent assessor, auditor or certification body, which for FedRAMP work must also be engaged through the applicable FedRAMP process. The division of responsibility is simple: your organization owns the SI-10 control and its decisions, DeployOpen prepares and documents the system and evidence within the agreed scope, and the independent assessor tests the control and reports on it. Ask any implementation partner to state this split in the written scope, and ask your assessor early whether they will test the input list and validation configuration as delivered.

