SA-24 design for cyber resiliency: what the requirement asks
SA-24 is a new base control in Release 5.2.0 that no SP 800-53B baseline selects, so if your system must meet it, the requirement arrives through tailoring, an overlay or a contract clause, not through a baseline you already adopted. The control asks the organization to design systems, components or services for cyber resiliency: to define resiliency goals, objectives, techniques, implementation approaches and design principles, and then to build them in through a risk management or systems security engineering process. Its aim is that essential functions keep operating under adverse conditions, can be restored, and can adapt as conditions change. NIST added it in the final 5.2.0 release in response to stakeholder feedback, so most existing SP 800-53 programs have no SA-24 content yet. Confirm early whether your authorizing official, contracting officer or overlay owner has selected it, and whether the parameters (the five organization-defined values) are already set.
Cyber resiliency is a design question as much as an operations question. Where a control like CP-10 asks whether you can recover, SA-24 asks whether the architecture was shaped from the start to keep mission or business functions running when a component fails, is degraded or is compromised. In practice, the work is to name the essential functions, state what resiliency means for each one, choose techniques such as redundancy, segmentation, graceful degradation or rapid reconstitution, and record why those choices fit the risk. Teams find this hard to evidence because design intent lives in conversations, whiteboard sketches and tickets that were never linked to requirements. An assessor applying SP 800-53A will look for the requirements and specifications for the system, the privacy and risk assessment documentation, and the system design documentation, and will test whether they connect.
Start by mapping which system documents already state resiliency goals, and where the decisions behind your recovery and segmentation designs are recorded. Then ask your team to confirm which essential functions are in scope and who signs off on the design principles. A self-hosted platform such as a Git-based repository can hold the design records under protected branches, so that changes to them leave a reviewable history, but that only helps if the records exist. Read the SP 800-53 Release 5.2.0 catalog for the parameter wording, and confirm with your overlay or contract owner what they expect the evidence to look like before work starts.
Which systems and decisions bring SA-24 into scope
SA-24 applies only when an organization selects it through tailoring or an overlay, because SP 800-53B assigns it to no baseline. The cards below cover the choices that determine how much work it creates, starting with the scoping decision itself and then the systems, functions and suppliers it reaches.
The selection decision comes first
SA-24 is not in the low, moderate, high or privacy baseline, so it enters a system's control set only when someone chooses it during tailoring or through an overlay. Record that choice and its rationale in the system security and privacy plan. If the decision is left implicit, assessors will ask why a control that addresses resiliency by design is absent. FedRAMP's Rev5 baselines do not require SA-24 at Class B, C or D, so an authorization under those baselines does not bring it in by default.
Which systems receive resiliency goals
Decide whether SA-24 covers the whole system boundary or only specific systems, components or services. A narrow scope might cover a payment routing service while leaving internal reporting tools out. Document the boundary against the system inventory so the resiliency goals map to real components. Ask whether shared platforms, such as identity or logging services, fall inside the boundary or are inherited from another authorization.
Mission essential functions named explicitly
SA-24 is built around keeping essential functions running through adversity, so the scope depends on which functions the organization treats as essential. Name them in writing, along with the acceptable disruption for each. For example, an illustrative claims-processing service might be essential while its archive reporting is not. Without a named function list, design goals tend to become generic, and the assessor has no basis for testing them.
Third-party and cloud services
External services that support an essential function raise a separate scoping question. Confirm whether the provider's resiliency design is evidenced by the provider, by the organization, or by a combination, and whether the provider's documentation can be used as design information. Pair this with the SA-9 external services work and the contract terms agreed for each service. Confirm these responsibilities with the provider in writing rather than assuming them.
Acquired and open-source components
Components bought or adopted from open-source projects are part of the design, so decide how they are assessed against the resiliency goals. Identify which components can be restored from known good copies, which need an alternate source, and which lack the vendor or community support needed to remediate them. Components that are unsupported also interact with SA-22, so record both decisions together.
Design documentation to be produced
Scope also determines which design records must exist before an assessor can test SA-24. Under SP 800-53A, the examine methods look at security and privacy requirements, system design documentation, and privacy risk documentation. Decide early which documents will be produced for each in-scope system and who owns them. Ask the team that will build the platform to confirm the document list and the review cycle before work starts.
How an assessor tests SA-24 design for cyber resiliency
This table maps the examine objects named in the SP 800-53A Release 5.2.0 procedure for SA-24 to the evidence an assessor will ask for and the common gaps that cause findings. Read it as a preparation checklist: each row names what the assessor looks at, what to have ready, and where teams usually fall short.
| Assessment element | Evidence an assessor expects | Common finding |
|---|---|---|
| Determination statements (10 in total) | A written traceable path from each statement to a document, owner and design decision in the system file | Statements are answered in a checklist without pointing to any artifact the assessor can sample |
| Examine: security and privacy requirements and specifications | Requirements that name cyber resiliency goals, objectives and the essential functions they protect, approved by the system owner | Goals are stated as general aspirations with no link to the functions the system must keep running |
| Examine: system design documentation | Design documents that show the resiliency techniques, implementation approaches and design principles selected, with their version and approval date | Techniques are named but the design never shows where or how they are implemented in the architecture |
| Examine: privacy impact assessment | Privacy impact assessment entries that consider how resiliency measures such as failover, replication or restoration handle personal data | Resiliency designs replicate or restore personal data to locations or stores that the privacy assessment never considered |
| Examine: privacy risk assessment documentation | Risk assessment records that carry resiliency-related risks into the risk register and tie them to accepted or treated decisions | Resiliency risks are identified in design discussions but never recorded in the organization's risk documentation |
| Interview: system owner and designers | Consistent answers from the system owner and the engineers on how the design handles disruption, recovery and adaptation | Owners describe resiliency as a backup schedule, and designers describe a different architecture |
| Test: design walkthrough or exercise results | Evidence that the designed resiliency behavior works in practice, such as recorded restore tests or failover exercises tied to the design | No test evidence exists, or tests cover backups only and not the essential functions the design claims to keep running |
| Design document reach | Proof that the design and its approval reached the system owner and the teams that operate and change the system | Design documents sit with the architecture team and never reach the system owner or the operations runbooks |
| Reference for exact wording | The OSCAL procedure for SA-24 in the NIST usnistgov/oscal-content repository, read alongside the 800-53A text | Teams work from a paraphrase of the control and miss a determination statement the assessor will test |
Implementing SA-24 design for cyber resiliency in steps
The sequence turns SA-24 from a selected control into a documented design that shows how essential functions keep running, recover and adapt under adverse conditions. Each step produces a record that an independent assessor can examine against the SA-24 assessment procedures.
Confirm scope and tailoring decision
Start by confirming whether SA-24 applies at all. SP 800-53B does not assign SA-24 to the low, moderate, high or privacy baseline, so it is in scope only when the organization selects it through tailoring or an overlay. The authorizing official or system owner records that decision, the system boundary it covers and the rationale in the security plan. Ask your assessor early whether they expect the control, because a control selected without a documented reason is hard to defend. The output is a tailoring entry in the system security and privacy plan that names the components and services in scope.
Define resiliency goals for essential functions
Identify the mission or business functions that must continue through adversity, then write cyber resiliency goals for each one. Goals describe outcomes such as continued operation, controlled degradation or restoration within a defined recovery expectation. Assign owners from the business side, not only from engineering, since they decide which functions matter most. SA-24 requires the organization to define these goals itself, so the values for any organization-defined parameters must come from the organization. The output is a goals register that lists each essential function, its goal, its owner and the systems it depends on.
Set resiliency objectives and measurable criteria
Translate each goal into objectives that an engineer and a tester can check. An objective states what the system must do under a named adverse condition, such as losing a component, a region or a set of credentials. Where the organization already uses recovery objectives from its contingency planning, reuse them so the two records agree. Owners should confirm that each objective is achievable with the current architecture before it is accepted. The output is an objectives table linked to the goals register, with the adverse conditions each objective covers.
Select techniques and implementation approaches
For each objective, choose the cyber resiliency techniques and implementation approaches that will be used, such as redundancy, segmentation, diversity of components, backup and restoration paths, or the ability to reconfigure a system while it runs. Record why each option was chosen over the alternatives considered, and note the cost and operational trade-offs that the decision owner accepted. The choice of techniques belongs to the organization, and an implementation partner can prepare options but should not make the decision. The output is a technique selection record mapped to each objective.
Record design principles and build the design
Document the design principles that guide the system, such as isolating essential functions, avoiding single points of failure and keeping restoration paths independent of the systems they restore. Connect these principles to the security engineering principles already adopted under SA-8 so the records do not conflict. Then build the design into the architecture documents, configuration baselines and infrastructure code. Engineers should be able to trace each design element back to an objective. The output is a design record that links each principle and element to its goal, objective and risk entry.
Review the design through the risk management process
Run the design through the organization's risk assessment and risk response process. Reviewers check whether the chosen techniques actually reduce the risks tied to each essential function, and whether any residual risk has been accepted by the right owner. Gaps are logged as plan of action and milestones items with named owners. Review should happen again when the architecture changes, so the design record stays current with the system. The output is a signed review record and any open risk or POA&M entries that the design review created.
Test restoration and adaptation
Test the design against its objectives under realistic failure scenarios chosen in advance. Tests should exercise the restoration path, confirm that essential functions continue during the adverse condition and check that the system adapts as the design intends. Backup and restore tooling can supply part of the evidence. For example, Bareos can show that restore jobs complete from a chosen point in time, and restic's check command with read-data options can confirm that stored backup data has not been altered. Record what passed, what failed and what was changed as a result. The output is a resiliency test report that maps each result to an objective and a risk entry, which the organization's assessor can examine.
Evidence that passes an SA-24 review
SA-24 is assessed through documents and records, not a single technical test, so an assessor looks for a chain: stated resiliency goals, design choices that trace back to them, risks accepted where the design falls short, and exercises that show essential functions actually continue and recover. The artifacts below connect those links. Each one is only useful if it names specific systems, functions and owners that an assessor can check against the system design.
Resiliency goals and objectives record
This is the organization-defined baseline for the control: the cyber resiliency goals, the objectives under each goal, and the essential functions they protect. An assessor testing SA-24 will compare the design against this record, so the goals must be written for a named system rather than as a general statement of intent. Check that each objective states what must keep running, what it must recover from, and who approved it. Confirm that the organization-defined parameters for SA-24 are filled in and match what the record says.
Design documentation for resiliency techniques
Design documentation shows which cyber resiliency techniques were chosen and where each one sits in the architecture, such as redundancy, segmentation, graceful degradation or restoration paths. The examine methods for SA-24 include system design documentation, so the record must map each technique to a component and each component to a goal. A useful test is whether an assessor can pick one essential function and follow the design to the technique, the component and the recovery path that supports it.
Privacy impact and privacy risk assessments
SA-24 lists privacy impact assessments and privacy risk assessment documentation among its examine objects, so these records must exist where the design touches personal information. Resiliency measures such as failover replicas, backups and restored data copies can multiply where personal data lives, and the assessment should show how those copies are protected and disposed of. Check that the assessment refers to the same system boundary and component list as the design documentation, so the two records do not describe different systems.
Risk decisions tied to design choices
Where the design cannot meet a resiliency objective, the gap needs a documented risk decision with a named owner, the compensating measure and a review date. Assessors look for this record because it shows the organization made a deliberate choice rather than overlooking the objective. Each decision should cite the design element it concerns, such as a single-region dependency or a system that cannot fail over, and state what residual risk remains. Confirm that the decision is linked to the plan of action and milestones where remediation is planned.
Test and exercise results for continuity and recovery
Tests show whether essential functions continue during an adverse event and recover within the objectives set in the goals record. Keep dated results from failover tests, restore tests and tabletop exercises, with the scenario, the functions tested, the measured outcome and the findings. For backup-based recovery, restore results can come from tooling logs, such as a Bareos restore job report or a restic check run with --read-data, which show the stored data was readable and unmodified. Confirm that each finding has an owner and a closure record.
Review cadence that keeps the record current
The design, goals and risk decisions change as systems change, so the record needs a defined review cadence and a trigger for ad hoc review. Tie reviews to change control so that a new service, a changed dependency or a failed exercise prompts an update to the goals and design records. Assessors check the review dates against the change history, so a record last reviewed before a major architecture change is a finding. Ask the organization to show the schedule, the reviewers and the most recent changes made after review.
What meeting SA-24 costs in money and effort
This table breaks the cost of meeting SA-24 into components, showing who is paid, whether each cost is one-time or recurring, and what pushes it up or down. NIST does not estimate compliance costs and no figures are supplied for SA-24, so use the table to structure a request for a fixed-scope written quote rather than as a budget.
| Cost component | Who is paid or who spends effort | One-time or recurring | What drives it up or down |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tooling and licenses | Tool vendors, or no license spend with self-hosted open source such as GitLab Community Edition or Semgrep Community Edition | Recurring if commercial; open-source tools carry no license fee but still need hosting and upkeep | Number of systems in scope and CI/CD pipelines; self-hosting removes license spend but adds operations time |
| Engineering time for resiliency goals and design | Internal architects and security engineers, optionally an implementation partner under a written scope | One-time for the initial goals, objectives and design principles; revisited on significant design change | Number of essential functions to protect, degree of tailoring, and whether existing risk management or systems security engineering artifacts can be reused |
| Third-party dependency analysis | Internal architects, and sometimes the suppliers of external services who must provide design information | One-time for the first mapping, then recurring as suppliers change | Count of third-party dependencies behind each essential function; contractual access to supplier design information under SA-4 and SA-9 raises effort |
| Evidence upkeep | Control owners and compliance staff who keep design documentation, requirements and risk records current | Recurring with each release, architecture change or assessment cycle | Documentation maturity, whether design records live in version control, and how often the system changes |
| External resiliency testing or design review | Independent testing firms or reviewers engaged by the organization | Usually one-time per design baseline, repeated when major changes occur | Scope of essential functions tested, depth of recovery and adaptation scenarios, and whether internal red teaming can cover part of the work |
| Independent assessor sampling | The independent assessor, who selects design and requirement artifacts to examine | Recurring at each assessment cycle | Number of systems in the authorization boundary and how well design evidence is indexed for sampling |
| Restore and recovery evidence | Backup and recovery engineers who run and record restore tests | Recurring at test intervals set by the organization | Backup platform choice, such as Bareos or restic with verification options, and the number of recovery paths that must be shown to work |
| Quote preparation | Your procurement team and the vendor or partner preparing a fixed-scope written quote | One-time before work starts | Clear written scope covering essential functions, systems, third parties and deliverables; ask each provider to itemize these components separately |
Self-hosted open-source tools that produce SA-24 evidence
SA-24 expects cyber resiliency goals, objectives and design principles to be defined and then carried into system design. Assessors will look for design documentation that is versioned, approved and traceable to the resiliency decisions it records. GitLab Community Edition can host those design documents and the code or configuration they describe, and its protected branches help show who was allowed to change the approved baseline. Protected branches let maintainers restrict which roles can push or merge, block direct pushes by setting push access to no one, and keep force pushes disabled unless explicitly allowed. Those settings matter because a design record that anyone can silently rewrite is weak evidence.
- Protected branch rules: Restrict merges to the main branch to named maintainer roles and record the rule settings as configuration evidence.
- Blocked direct pushes: Set push access to no one on release branches so every design change passes through a merge request.
- Force pushes disabled: Keep history rewrites off so approved design revisions remain intact for an assessor.
- Merge request history: Use merge requests to link design changes to the resiliency goal or decision they support.
- Design documents as code: Store design decisions in the repository next to the systems they describe.
Before relying on these records, confirm with your own environment that the protected branch settings match your documented change control and that the license terms of the Community Edition suit your deployment. GitLab Community Edition is released under the MIT license.
Resilient design depends on whether implemented code and infrastructure definitions contain the weaknesses the design was meant to prevent. Semgrep Community Edition can scan code in many languages, including C/C++, C#, Go, Java, JavaScript, TypeScript, Python, Ruby, Rust, PHP, Kotlin, Swift and Terraform, using community or custom rules. Run inside CI/CD pipelines, it scans repositories on each change rather than only at a point in time. Its output gives an assessor a dated record that the organization checked its build against defined rules. The scan results do not show that the design is resilient; they show that particular checks ran.
- Pipeline integration: Run scans on every merge request so results attach to the change that introduced them.
- Custom rules: Write rules for resiliency-relevant patterns your design principles prohibit, such as hard-coded fallback credentials.
- Infrastructure coverage: Include Terraform so deployment definitions for redundancy and isolation are scanned too.
- Result retention: Store pipeline logs and scan reports in a system with defined retention so evidence survives the assessment period.
- Triage records: Document why each finding was fixed, accepted or marked false positive.
Confirm that the Community Edition rule set covers the languages in your estate, since not every rule in commercial offerings is available in the free edition. Semgrep Community Edition is licensed under LGPL-2.1-only, so review the terms with counsel before embedding or modifying it.
Design for cyber resiliency only has value if essential functions can be restored after adversity. Bareos can provide the operational evidence for that: its Director schedules and supervises backup, restore, verify and archive jobs, and keeps a SQL catalog of backed-up files. Because it can restore files selected from the current backup or from a backup taken before a given date and time, it supports recovery to a known state, such as before a suspected intrusion. Job logs, catalog entries and restore test results form the record that shows recovery was rehearsed, not only configured.
- Scheduled jobs: Define backup and verify jobs in the Director so each job's schedule and retention are documented.
- Point-in-time restores: Test restores to a date before a simulated compromise and record the result.
- Catalog as inventory: Use the SQL catalog to show which systems and files are protected at a given time.
- Restore exercises: Keep dated records of restores to an isolated environment, including time taken and issues found.
- Separation of duties: Limit who can run restores and who can alter job definitions.
Confirm the retention periods, storage location and protection of the backup media against the resiliency goals you have defined. Bareos is licensed under AGPL-3.0-only, which carries network-use obligations for modified versions, so confirm the terms with your legal team before deployment.
A backup that cannot be read or has been altered is not a recovery option. restic provides a check command that verifies the structural consistency of snapshots, trees and pack files. Adding the --read-data or --read-data-subset option makes it read pack files back to confirm the stored backup data is unmodified. Running these checks on a schedule produces a record that the recovery copies remain intact, which supports the SA-24 expectation that essential functions are restored after adversity. The check confirms integrity; it does not confirm that the restored system will meet the resiliency goals.
- Structural checks: Run the standard check command on a regular schedule and keep the output with timestamps.
- Full data reads: Use the read-data option periodically, since it reads pack files back and takes longer than structural checks.
- Subset reads: Use read-data-subset where full reads are impractical, and rotate the subset so coverage accumulates over time.
- Failure handling: Document the response to any integrity error, including which snapshots are retired and how replacements are taken.
- Repository access control: Restrict who can run prune or forget operations, since these change what recovery points remain.
Confirm how often checks must run to meet your own resiliency objectives and whether your storage backend preserves the repository without modification. restic is licensed under BSD-2-Clause, a permissive license that generally requires retaining the copyright notice in redistributed copies.
Where SA-24 programs usually fall short
SA-24 asks for resiliency to be designed in, not documented afterward. The gaps below recur because goals, techniques, design decisions and recovery tests often live in separate documents owned by separate teams. Each card names one gap and the practical fix that links them back to essential functions.
Goals not tied to essential functions
Resiliency goals are often written as generic statements such as maintaining availability or recovering quickly. SA-24 expects goals and objectives that connect to the functions the mission cannot lose. Start by listing the essential functions, the conditions under which each must continue, and the acceptable degradation for each. Then check that every goal names the function it protects. A goal that cannot be traced to a function is hard to test and hard to fund.
Techniques named but not assigned
A design document may list techniques such as redundancy, segmentation or diversity without stating which component carries each one. An assessor reviewing SA-24 will look for that allocation. For each technique, record the component, the owner and the failure it addresses. Confirm that the allocation appears in the system design documentation, because that is the artifact the assessment procedure examines.
Design reviews without risk decisions
Design reviews often approve architecture diagrams without recording which resiliency risks were accepted, mitigated or transferred. SA-24 is implemented through a risk management or systems security engineering process, so the review should produce decisions. Record each accepted residual risk, the approver and the condition for revisiting it. Keep these entries with the privacy and security risk documentation so the trail is complete.
Backups tested, restoration not
Teams frequently verify that backup jobs complete and that data files are readable, then call recovery tested. That shows the data exists, not that an essential function can run again. Test restoration of the service chain in the order the function needs it, and measure whether the function resumes within the goal. Open-source tools such as Bareos for restore jobs and restic for data verification can supply part of that evidence, but the function-level test still has to be designed and recorded.
No plan for adaptation after incidents
SA-24 covers systems that adapt as well as those that resist and recover. Many programs stop at restoration and never revisit the design. After each significant incident or test, record which technique failed, which assumption was wrong and which component changes are needed. Feed those changes into the design baseline and the risk register. Without that loop, the same weakness reappears in the next release.
Baseline assumptions not checked
SP 800-53B does not assign SA-24 to any baseline, so teams often treat it as optional and skip the tailoring decision. If a system supports an essential function, document why SA-24 is selected or why it is not, and who approved that choice. Confirm the decision with the authorizing official or your assessor before design work starts, because a missing rationale is an easy finding.
Who does what for SA-24: your team, a partner and the auditor
Your organization owns SA-24. The control asks for cyber resiliency goals, objectives, techniques, implementation approaches and design principles, and for those to be built into the system through a risk management or systems security engineering process. Choosing what the system must keep doing under adversity, and accepting the residual risk, are management decisions that no partner or auditor can make for you. Your team therefore sets the goals, approves the design and signs off as the system owner.
- Resiliency goals and objectives: Decide which essential functions must continue, be restored or adapt, and how that is measured for your mission.
- Design approval: Review the design principles and techniques selected, and record why each was accepted or rejected.
- Risk decisions: Accept, mitigate or transfer the residual risk, and document who made the call.
- System owner sign-off: Confirm in writing that the implemented design matches the approved design.
- Ongoing ownership: Revisit the goals when the system, threat picture or tailoring changes.
Before engaging anyone, confirm that a named owner exists for each goal and that the decision records are kept where an assessor can find them.
An implementation partner can take on the preparation work under a written scope. This includes drafting design records, assembling the evidence pack, configuring the tools that produce evidence, and running restoration tests. The partner works for your organization and does not decide the goals or accept risk. Most engagements of this kind are fixed-scope, so the deliverables and the systems they cover are agreed before work begins.
- Design records: Draft system design documentation that traces each goal to the techniques and components that implement it.
- Evidence packs: Assemble configuration exports, change records and test results organized by the procedures in SP 800-53A.
- Tool configuration: Set up self-hosted tools such as GitLab protected branches, Semgrep scanning in CI/CD, Bareos backup jobs and restic repository checks.
- Restoration tests: Run restore exercises and record the results, including failures and remediation.
- Written scope: Define the systems, dates and deliverables in advance, and state what the partner will not do.
Before engaging a partner, ask for the scope document and confirm that it states the partner does not issue findings or certify the control.
An independent auditor or assessor tests whether SA-24 is implemented and produces the findings. The assessor examines documentation, interviews staff and tests the system, following the procedures in SP 800-53A. To keep the test credible, the assessor must not have designed the control or prepared the evidence it reviews. Where a partner has done preparation work, the assessor reviews it as any other input.
- Examine: Review requirements, system design documentation, privacy risk documentation and the resiliency goals your team approved.
- Interview: Speak with the system owner and the staff who run restoration and design reviews.
- Test: Observe or repeat restoration and design tests, and check that results match the claims made.
- Findings: Issue the assessment results and any findings, which your organization then tracks in its plan of action and milestones.
- Independence line: An assessor cannot design the goals, write the design, or select the techniques it later tests.
Before engaging an assessor, confirm which party is paying for and receiving the report, and whether the assessor has any prior design role on the system.
SA-24 questions buyers ask before hiring help
How much effort does SA-24 design for cyber resiliency take?
The effort depends mainly on how many systems fall under SA-24 and how much design documentation already exists. SA-24 asks you to define cyber resiliency goals, objectives, techniques, implementation approaches and design principles, then build them into systems, components or services through a risk management or systems security engineering process. Most of the work is one-time: agreeing the goals, mapping them to the system's essential functions, and writing the design rationale. Recurring effort comes from revisiting the design when the system changes. SP 800-53A Release 5.2.0 lists 10 determination statements for SA-24, so an assessor will expect traceable design documentation for each one. Ask a partner to estimate effort against the systems in scope, not against the control in general.
Can our in-house team implement SA-24 without outside help?
Often yes, if your team already runs a systems security engineering process and can speak to resilience design. SA-24 is not in any SP 800-53B baseline, so it usually appears only when your organization or an authorizing body selects it through tailoring or an overlay. Start by confirming whether it is in scope at all. If it is, the hard parts are usually the goals and the traceability: linking each resiliency technique to a specific system function and to evidence an assessor can examine. An outside partner can prepare system design documentation, architecture diagrams and test records, but your organization still owns the design decisions and the risk acceptance. Independent assessors, not implementation partners, issue assessment results.
How long does an SA-24 engagement usually take?
NIST does not set implementation timelines for SP 800-53. It leaves timing to OMB Circular A-130 for federal systems and to the authorizing body that reviews your system. Duration therefore depends on the system's size, the number of components in scope, the state of existing design documentation, and how quickly your authorizing body reviews deliverables. Ask any partner to base the schedule on a written scope with defined systems and deliverables, and confirm the required timeline directly with your authorizing official or contract officer before committing to dates. Engagements for DeployOpen are typically fixed-scope, with scope, deliverables and timelines agreed in writing before work starts.
What does SA-24 need from our engineering and security staff?
SA-24 needs people who can explain how your system keeps essential functions running during an attack and how it recovers. The most useful inputs are:
- Architects who can describe the system's essential functions, dependencies and failure modes.
- Security engineers who can map resiliency techniques to threats and to the risk management process.
- Operations staff who can confirm recovery procedures and test results, including backup and restore records.
- A privacy or compliance lead who can confirm whether privacy risk assessment documentation is referenced, since SA-24 assessment objects include privacy impact and privacy risk assessments.
Expect to spend time in working sessions to agree the goals before any documentation is written.
Does FedRAMP require SA-24 for cloud services?
No. FedRAMP's Rev5 baselines do not require SA-24 at Class B, C or D under the Consolidated Rules for 2026. That said, SA-24 is only in the Release 5.2.0 catalog, so FedRAMP's position may change, and your sponsoring agency or assessor may still ask for it through tailoring or a specific contract requirement. Confirm the current FedRAMP baseline and any agency-specific requirement with your authorizing official before you decide the control's scope. Do not assume a FedRAMP authorization covers SA-24 by default.
What should a partner put in a written scope for SA-24?
A written scope should state exactly what the partner will deliver and what you will provide. Ask for:
- The list of systems, components or services covered and the reason SA-24 applies to each.
- The resiliency goals, objectives and design principles the partner will document, and who approves them.
- The deliverables, such as design documentation, traceability to essential functions, and test records for recovery.
- The evidence mapped to each of the 10 SP 800-53A determination statements for SA-24.
- Your responsibilities, including staff time, access to architecture records, and risk acceptance decisions.
- The acceptance criteria, schedule and change process for scope adjustments.
A partner should not promise an assessment outcome, because only an independent assessor can issue one.
What evidence will an assessor expect for SA-24?
An assessor will look for documents and records that show your design decisions are deliberate and traceable. For SA-24, SP 800-53A Release 5.2.0 includes examine objects such as security and privacy requirements and specifications for the system, privacy impact assessments, privacy risk assessment documentation and system design documentation. Interview and test methods will check that staff understand the design and that recovery actions work as described. Useful evidence includes the resiliency goals document, architecture diagrams annotated with resiliency techniques, risk management records linking decisions to threats, and restore test results. Open-source tools such as Bareos and restic can produce backup and restore records, but confirm with your assessor which records they accept.
How DeployOpen scopes and prepares SA-24 evidence
DeployOpen plans, implements and documents self-hosted open-source platforms inside your own infrastructure, and prepares the design evidence that SA-24 asks for. The organization owns its resiliency goals and risk decisions, and an independent assessor decides whether the control is met.
How we scope
- Engagements are fixed-scope, with the SA-24 systems, components and services named in writing before work starts.
- The written scope states which resiliency goals, objectives and design principles the organization has adopted and which will be built.
- Scope records which essential functions must continue through adversity and which recovery and adaptation expectations apply to them.
How we build
- Resiliency techniques are mapped to specific platform components, such as backup, restore and alternate processing, and documented per component.
- Design decisions are traced to the risk management or systems security engineering record the organization already maintains.
- Testing of restore and recovery paths is set up with open-source tooling where the scope calls for it, with results captured as evidence.
How we hand over
- Handover includes resiliency design documentation, the mapping to SA-24 parameters and the test results that support the design claims.
- Evidence is packaged for the assessor's examine, interview and test methods, with open items recorded in a plan of action and milestones.
- Your staff receive documented procedures so they can run the restore and verification steps without DeployOpen involved.
How we support
- Ongoing support, upgrades and continuous testing are available as retainers once the initial scope is delivered.
- Design documentation is updated when systems, components or resiliency goals change, so the evidence stays current.
- DeployOpen prepares systems and evidence only. Audit reports and assessment conclusions come from the independent assessor you engage.
