03.14.03 Security alerts, advisories, and directives: evidence

What 03.14.03 security alerts requirement asks for in NIST SP 800-171

When a contract requires NIST SP 800-171, the question behind 03.14.03 is simple: how does your organization learn about threats to its systems, and what does it do once it knows? Requirement 03.14.03, Security alerts, advisories, and directives, has two halves. The first is to receive security alerts, advisories and directives from external organizations on an ongoing basis. The second is to generate internal alerts and disseminate them, along with directives, as necessary. The requirement is traced to the SI-5 control in SP 800-53 Rev. 5 and to Rev. 2 requirement 3.14.3, which is the version that current DoD contracts and CMMC Level 2 still assess. That means the same expectation applies under either version, even though Rev. 3 rewrote the wording and added more detail to it.

The risk this addresses is delay. A vulnerability advisory that reaches the right engineer three weeks late is a patching problem that became an exposure. Under the first half, the organization must show a standing intake for external sources such as vendor security bulletins, government advisories and information sharing feeds, with named people who watch them. Under the second half, it must show that when an internal finding matters to others, such as a compromised credential or a malicious indicator seen on the network, an alert goes out to the people who need it through a defined path. Assessors look for the written procedure, the records of alerts received and actioned, and the people who can explain how it works.

This is harder than it looks because the process must be owned, repeated and provable. Ownership means a named role is accountable, not a shared inbox that nobody checks. Repetition means the intake runs every week and every month, not only when someone remembers. Proof means records exist for each alert: the source, the date received, who assessed it and what changed as a result. Confirm with your assessor which records they will request and how far back they expect the history to go. Then test the process with a real advisory from a source you already monitor, and keep the ticket. That single record often demonstrates more than a policy document.

Which systems, teams and feeds fall under the alerts process

The alerts process in 03.14.03 is only as complete as its scope. Each decision below determines which systems, people and sources the organization must cover, and each one can be checked against records an assessor will ask to see. Work through them before writing procedures so the process matches the actual CUI environment.

CUI systems and enclaves in scope

Decide whether alerts apply only to the CUI enclave or also to every system that connects to it, shares identity services with it, or stores its backups. Anything that can affect CUI confidentiality or integrity should be on the list. Check the system security plan boundary against the asset inventory, and confirm that each in-scope component has a named owner who receives alerts about it. Components left off the inventory are the ones most often missed in an assessment.

Vendor advisory subscriptions

List every vendor whose products run inside the boundary, including operating systems, hypervisors, network devices, endpoint tools and open-source components. For each vendor, record the advisory channel, such as a security mailing list, portal or feed, and who subscribed. A vendor with no subscription is a gap an examiner can find by comparing the product list to the subscriptions. Revisit the list whenever the component inventory changes.

Government and CERT sources

Decide which public security bodies the organization will monitor, such as the national computer emergency response team that serves its country or sector and the bulletins from agencies it contracts with. These sources often publish alerts for widely exploited flaws before vendors reach the customer list. Record which sources were chosen and why, and retain evidence that the feed was checked on a defined schedule.

Sector sharing groups

Decide whether to join an information sharing and analysis organization or similar group for the industry. Membership can add indicators and advisories that are specific to the sector, but it also adds obligations on handling shared material. Confirm the terms of membership, who may receive shared information, and how it is stored. Any group chosen should be reflected in the procedure so the handling of its alerts can be shown.

Teams that receive and act

Name the roles that receive alerts, decide who triages them, and who approves the response. Security operations, system administrators, application owners and the CUI program lead often need different alerts. Write down the handoff from receipt to action, and confirm that each named role has been trained on it. Assessors commonly interview these people to test whether the process works in practice.

Third-party managed services

When a managed service provider monitors or administers any in-scope system, decide who receives the alerts and who is accountable for acting on them. The contract and the shared responsibility matrix should state this in writing, and the organization should retain the provider's alert records or reports as evidence. Ask the provider how it notifies customers, how quickly, and through which channel, and confirm that the answers match the procedure.

How an assessor tests 03.14.03 under SP 800-171A

This table shows how an assessor approaches 03.14.03 under SP 800-171A Rev. 3, which uses three determination statements and the examine, interview and test methods. Read each row as one assessment angle, with the evidence it expects and the gaps assessors most often record. The main takeaway is that a written procedure alone does not pass; assessors look for records showing alerts were received, acted on and shared.

Assessment angle	What the assessor does	Evidence expected	Where it usually fails
Policy and procedures (examine)	Reads the system and information integrity policy and the procedures for security alerts, advisories and directives, and checks they name owners, sources and timing.	Approved policy, procedure for receiving and disseminating alerts, assigned roles	Procedure exists but names no owner, or was never reviewed after systems changed
Alert records (examine)	Samples records of alerts and advisories and traces each one to an action taken or a decision not to act.	Log of received alerts, dated triage notes, change or ticket references	Records stop months before the assessment date, showing receipt was not ongoing
Sources of alerts (examine and interview)	Confirms which external sources the organization subscribes to, such as vendors, CERTs and sector bodies, and how each feed is monitored.	Subscription list, mailing list membership, feed configuration	Sources are named in policy but nobody can show an active subscription
Personnel with alert duties (interview)	Asks the people who receive and triage alerts how they find out about new advisories and who they tell.	Consistent answers that match the written procedure	Staff describe informal email forwarding that is not in the procedure
Internal alert sharing (interview and test)	Checks whether internal alerts reach system administrators and affected system owners in time to act.	Distribution lists, internal notices, acknowledgments from recipients	Alerts were generated but never disseminated to the teams that operate affected systems
Process testing (test)	Walks through a recent advisory from receipt to dissemination and compliance, observing the process as it runs.	Walkthrough record, timestamps, evidence of compliance with the directive	Process exists on paper but the walkthrough cannot be completed end to end
Directive compliance (test)	Verifies that directives received from external organizations were followed or formally tracked where they did not apply.	Directive register, applicability decisions, remediation or exception records	Directives marked as received but no applicability decision or follow-up is recorded

Building the alert intake and dissemination process

This sequence turns 03.14.03 from a policy statement into a working cycle: know which external sources matter, receive and triage what arrives, push relevant warnings to the people who act on them, connect those actions to incident response and patching, and keep a record that an assessor can follow from source to outcome.

Define alert sources and owners
Start with a source register that lists every external body whose alerts or directives apply to your systems, such as vendors of products in your CUI boundary, US-CERT and CISA advisories where relevant, and any agency or prime contractor notices your contract requires you to follow. For each source, record the channel (email list, portal, feed), the named owner who monitors it, and the systems it covers. The step is done when every in-scope product has at least one source and one accountable owner, and an assessor can trace a product in the system security plan back to a listed source.
Set up intake and subscriptions
Subscribe the named owners to each source using a shared mailbox or ticket queue rather than personal inboxes, so coverage survives staff changes. Where a source publishes machine-readable feeds, decide whether they are ingested into a tool or read by people, and document that choice. Confirm with each vendor how and when it notifies customers, because some publish only through account portals. The output is an intake configuration record listing each subscription, its destination queue and the person responsible for checking it.
Write the triage runbook
Write a short runbook that defines how each incoming alert is classified: whether it affects an in-scope system, how severe it is by your own criteria, who decides, and what outcomes are allowed, such as no action with rationale, a patch or configuration change, a compensating control, or escalation to incident response. The runbook should also say what to do when an alert arrives outside business hours. Test the runbook on a few past or sample advisories so owners can see how it works. It is complete when every alert has a defined path to a documented decision.
Define internal alert generation and distribution
Specify when your own team creates an internal security alert or advisory, for example after a triage decision that affects other teams, after a finding from monitoring or scanning, or when a directive from a customer or regulator must be passed on. Define the template, the distribution list for each type of alert, and the approval step before release. Confirm that recipients include system administrators and anyone who must apply or verify the action. The output is a distribution matrix that maps alert types to recipients and channels.
Tie alerts to incident response and patching
Connect each triage outcome to the processes that carry it out. Alerts that indicate active exploitation or a possible compromise should open an incident under your incident response plan. Alerts that call for a fix should create a tracked change under your flaw remediation and change control processes, with the owner and target date recorded in the ticket. Where an alert leads to a finding, record it in the same vulnerability or findings process used for scanning results. The check is that a sample alert can be followed from receipt to a ticket, an incident or a documented decision without manual reconstruction.
Record each alert and its disposition
Keep a distribution and disposition log with the source, date received, classification, decision, linked ticket or incident, and the date the internal alert was sent and to whom. Use the same log to show that the process runs on an ongoing basis. Review the log periodically with the owners to find sources that have gone quiet, alerts that were closed without rationale, and recipients who did not confirm receipt. The output is the evidence an assessor will ask for under 03.14.03, so store it in a system that cannot be silently edited.
Confirm tooling fit for the scale of alerts
Once the process is running, decide whether the volume justifies a threat intelligence or findings platform. Open-source options such as MISP and OpenCTI can ingest and organize indicators and advisories, and DefectDojo can track findings that alerts generate. Confirm each platform's capabilities against the vendor documentation before you rely on them, and self-host them within your boundary if they will store CUI-related records. Tooling supports the process but does not replace the source register, runbook and log, which are what an assessor tests.

Self-hosted tools that produce alert and intelligence evidence

MISP is an open-source threat intelligence platform licensed under AGPL-3.0-only. In a 03.14.03 context, it is most useful as a place where received advisories and indicators are recorded, correlated and distributed to the people or peer organizations that need them. Its records can show that an external alert came in, what it contained and who it was shared with, which supports the assessor's request for records of security alerts and advisories.

Indicator correlation: MISP matches indicators by exact value and by advanced patterns such as fuzzy hashes and CIDR overlaps, so a received indicator can be checked against prior events.
Sightings: Analysts can record that an indicator was observed in the environment, giving a dated trail from receipt to observation.
Sharing controls: Distribution levels and sharing groups govern which events reach which MISP instances or communities.
Export formats: The REST API exports to STIX 1 and 2, CSV, and Suricata, Snort and Zeek rule formats for downstream tools.

Confirm with your counsel and information-sharing agreements which feeds you may ingest and redistribute, and whether AGPL-3.0-only terms affect how you deploy or modify the platform for your environment.

Evidence that passes 03.14.03 and how to keep it current

An assessor testing 03.14.03 looks for a written procedure, a maintained list of sources, dated records of alerts and the actions taken on them, and proof that the alerts reached the right people. The cards below cover each artifact and the routine that keeps it current between formal assessments, so the evidence reflects how the organization actually operates.

Information system and integrity procedure

The written procedure defines who monitors external sources, how alerts are triaged, who approves and disseminates internal advisories, and how compliance with directives is verified. SP 800-171A Rev. 3 examines the procedures for security alerts, advisories and directives, so the document must match practice. Review it on a set schedule and after any change in staffing, tooling or contract scope, and record the review date and approver. Confirm that the named roles still exist and that the owners can be reached.

Source register of external feeds

A source register lists every external origin of alerts and directives, including vendor security bulletins, government advisories, information sharing communities and contract-mandated notices. For each source, record the owner, the subscription method, the review frequency and the systems it covers. Assessors use this register to test whether receipt is ongoing and tied to the actual technology in use. Update it whenever a product is added, retired or changes vendor.

Alert and advisory records with timestamps

Each received alert needs a record showing its source, the date and time of receipt, the affected components and the triage decision. Timestamps show that receipt is ongoing rather than a one-time exercise. Threat intelligence platforms such as MISP and OpenCTI can export ingestion logs and event histories, which reduces manual logging. Keep the exports with the register so an assessor can trace one alert from source to decision.

Internal dissemination records

Generating and sharing internal alerts requires proof that the right teams received them. Keep distribution lists, ticket references or messaging records showing which internal groups received each advisory, when they received it and whether acknowledgment was required. MISP records sharing groups and distribution levels, which can serve as a machine-readable trail. Check that distribution logs cover system administrators, the incident response team and any personnel who operate CUI systems.

Proof of action taken

An alert only satisfies the requirement when the organization can show what it did. Link each advisory to a change request, patch record, configuration update, compensating control or documented risk acceptance. Vulnerability findings imported into DefectDojo keep the link between a scanner result, its deduplicated finding and its remediation status. Track closure dates and reasons for any alert closed without action.

Periodic review between assessments

Between formal assessments, schedule a recurring review that samples alert records, confirms every source in the register still delivers, and checks that internal recipients remain current after staff changes. Use tool exports, such as Greenbone scan results stored in PostgreSQL and reviewed in its web interface, to show ongoing activity. Record each review with its findings and corrective actions, and feed the results into the system security plan and plan of action and milestones where gaps appear.

What meeting 03.14.03 costs in money and staff time

This table breaks down the cost components of running 03.14.03 alert and advisory handling, showing who is paid, whether each cost is one-time or recurring, and what drives it up. Use it to build a quote request, since no price is stated here and each component depends on the systems and sources in your own environment.

Cost component	Who is paid or who bears it	One-time or recurring	What drives the cost
Staff time to triage advisories	Internal security staff, or a managed service you contract	Recurring	Volume of advisories from your vendors and sources, and how many products you run
Source and feed subscriptions	Commercial intelligence or advisory providers, if you buy them	Recurring	Number of paid sources and whether they include sharing or API access
Tooling and licenses	Software vendors for commercial platforms; none for most open-source components	Mostly recurring for commercial tools	Self-hosted open-source platforms remove most license spend but add hosting and admin effort
Implementation of the alert workflow	Internal staff or an implementation partner under a written scope	One-time	Number of intake channels, integrations with ticketing and asset inventory, and approval steps
Evidence upkeep	Internal compliance or security staff	Recurring	How often records of alerts, actions and directives must be kept current for assessment
Independent review or readiness check	An outside assessor or consultant you engage	Periodic	Scope of systems in the CUI boundary and how many sources feed your process
Assessor time	The independent assessor or the government body that assesses your environment	Periodic	Assessment type, scope and the quality of evidence already prepared
Hosting and maintenance of self-hosted tools	Your infrastructure team or a support retainer	Recurring	Number of platforms, upgrade frequency and whether the tools run in your enclave

Who owns the alerts process, the partner and the assessor

The organization owns the alerts, advisories and directives process and every decision inside it. Leadership must decide which external sources the organization subscribes to, who reviews incoming notices, how quickly a notice becomes an internal alert, and who approves a directive before it reaches system owners. NIST places the application and implementation of SP 800-171, and any compliance issues, with the federal agency that holds the contract or agreement with the nonfederal organization, irrespective of the organization's size, so the contracting relationship sets the expectations the organization must meet.

Source selection: Name the external sources (vendor bulletins, CERT feeds, sector sharing groups) and record why each is trusted.
Decision rights: Assign who can declare an internal alert and who can order compensating action.
Policy and procedures: Approve the written policy and the procedure that the assessor will examine.
Records: Keep a log of notices received, actions taken and the date each action closed.
Accountability: Name an owner who answers to the contracting agency for this requirement.

Confirm with your contracting officer which parts of the process the agreement expects you to document in the system security plan.

Where 03.14.03 processes usually fall short

Most 03.14.03 gaps are not missing tools. They are missing ownership, records and links between the advisories an organization receives and the work it does afterward. The four cards below cover the gaps assessors most often find when they interview personnel and examine alert records, with a fix for each.

Alert intake depends on one person

When a single engineer subscribes to vendor and government feeds and reads them, the process stops the day that person is on leave or leaves the company. Assessors interview the personnel who receive and act on alerts, so the answer to who reads the feeds must be a named role, not a person. Close the gap by assigning a primary and a backup to each alert source, writing the handoff into the procedure, and testing it by checking whether the backup can show the last month of advisories received.

Internal alerts are sent but not recorded

Many teams email a warning to engineers or post it in a chat channel and consider the job done. SP 800-171A asks the assessor to examine records of security alerts and advisories, so an unlogged internal notice is evidence of nothing. Keep a register that records the alert, the date it was issued, the audience, the systems affected and the acknowledgment. Your alert register should be the single place an assessor can sample from.

Advisories are not tied to patching

An advisory that is read but never converted into a change ticket cannot show that the organization acted on it. Flaw remediation under 03.14.01 depends on advisories being traced to a specific fix, so the link has to exist in both directions. Give each advisory a ticket reference in the alert register, and set a rule that an advisory is closed only when the ticket is closed or the risk is formally accepted. Confirm this with a sample of recent advisories before an assessment.

Vendor advisories not mapped to assets

A vendor warning about a product matters only if the organization knows where that product runs. Without an current inventory, teams cannot say whether an advisory applies, which is the first question an assessor asks when reviewing alert handling. Map each vendor and product to the components in your system security plan and asset inventory, and record the owner of each. Your asset list should be searchable by product and version so the mapping takes minutes, not days.

Questions about 03.14.03 cost, effort and outside help

How much effort does 03.14.03 take to implement?

The effort is mostly process work, not tooling. Requirement 03.14.03 asks the organization to receive security alerts, advisories and directives from external organizations on an ongoing basis, and to generate and disseminate internal alerts when needed. No researched figure gives a person-day estimate for this requirement, so ask any advisor for a written effort breakdown tied to your environment. Expect the work to fall into a few parts: naming the sources you will subscribe to, assigning who triages each alert, writing the procedure, and keeping records that show alerts were acted on. Effort rises with the number of systems, vendors and sources in scope and with how many people must review each alert.

How long does it take to stand up 03.14.03?

The timeline depends on whether a receiving process already exists. No researched duration is available for this requirement, so confirm estimates with your assessor, implementation partner or internal team against your own environment. A team that already reads vendor advisories and has a ticketing workflow may need to document and test the process. A team starting from scratch must also choose sources, define roles and set up internal dissemination. Fixed-scope engagements are agreed in writing before work starts, so the scope document is where the timeline should be stated.

What does the team need to provide for 03.14.03?

The team needs named owners, a documented procedure and records. The assessment method for 03.14.03 examines the system and information integrity policy, the procedures for security alerts and the records of alerts and advisories. It also interviews personnel who handle alerts and those who operate and use the system, and tests the processes for receiving, generating, disseminating and complying with alerts. Your team therefore needs people who can explain the process in an interview, a ticket trail that proves alerts were handled, and a way to show that internal alerts reached the people who needed them.

Can we do 03.14.03 in-house without an outside partner?

Yes, an organization can implement 03.14.03 with its own staff, and the organization owns its controls either way. Outside help is most useful for preparing systems and evidence, such as wiring feeds into a tracking platform, writing the procedure, or organizing records for an assessment. Only an independent assessor or certification body issues reports or certificates, so an advisor cannot tell you that the requirement is met. Ask any partner to state in writing which parts they prepare and which parts remain your responsibility.

What does an implementation partner add for this requirement?

A partner adds technical preparation and documentation capacity. DeployOpen plans, implements, integrates and documents self-hosted open-source platforms inside the client's own infrastructure. For 03.14.03, that can include setting up a threat intelligence platform, a vulnerability management service and a findings tracker so that alerts are recorded and routed. DeployOpen does not issue audit reports or attestations, and it does not own your controls. Engagements are fixed-scope, with deliverables agreed in writing before work starts, and ongoing support is available as a retainer.

What recurring costs should we expect for 03.14.03?

Recurring costs come from keeping the process running, not from a one-time setup. These include staff time to triage alerts, maintenance of feed connectors and platform upgrades, and periodic review of the procedure. Open-source components listed for this requirement, such as MISP, OpenCTI, DefectDojo and Greenbone Community Edition, have their own license terms, so review them with counsel. Ask any quote to separate one-time setup from recurring operations and to state which party carries each cost.

How does 03.14.03 differ from its Rev. 2 equivalent?

In NIST's change analysis, the Rev. 3 requirement 03.14.03 traces to Rev. 2 requirement 3.14.3, and NIST classifies the change as significant, with more detail and foundational tasks. CMMC Level 2 still uses Rev. 2, where 3.14.3 is assessed as SI.L2-3.14.3 and carries 5 points under the 32 CFR 170.24 scoring methodology. Under 32 CFR 170.21, that item cannot be placed on a plan of action and milestones to reach Conditional status. Confirm with your contracting officer which revision applies to your contract before you build your evidence set.

How DeployOpen prepares alert evidence for 03.14.03

DeployOpen plans and implements self-hosted open-source platforms that help an organization receive external security alerts and advisories, generate internal alerts, and keep records of both. The organization still owns the requirement and its procedures, while DeployOpen prepares the systems, workflows and documentation an assessor will examine, interview against and test.

How we scope

The written scope names which alert sources, advisory feeds and directives the organization must track for 03.14.03.
Scope defines which systems, teams and personnel receive, triage and act on alerts within the CUI environment.
Engagements are fixed-scope, with deliverables and timelines agreed in writing before any work starts.

How we build

We deploy self-hosted threat intelligence and vulnerability tooling inside the client's own infrastructure, such as MISP or OpenCTI for indicator sharing.
We configure ingestion from external feeds and map received advisories to internal asset records for triage.
We set up records of alerts, sightings and dissemination so the assessment procedure's records have a clear source to point to.

How we hand over

Handover includes written procedures for receiving, generating, disseminating and acting on alerts, owned by the client.
Deliverables include configuration documentation and sample alert records for the examine method, prepared for the client's own review.
We walk through the evidence with responsible staff so they can answer the interview questions for 03.14.03 themselves.

How we support

Ongoing support, upgrades and continuous testing are available as retainers after the initial handover.
Retainers can cover feed connector maintenance, tool upgrades and periodic review of alert records before an assessment.
Ask the auditor or assessing body which evidence format and sampling they expect, and confirm it with DeployOpen during scoping.