03.03.08 Protection of audit information: evidence guide

What 03.03.08 protection of audit information asks for in plain words

03.03.08 requires you to protect your audit information and your audit logging tools from unauthorized access, modification and deletion, and to limit who can manage audit logging to a defined subset of privileged users or roles. In practice, an assessor will expect to see that the people who run your systems cannot quietly change what those systems recorded, and that the logs themselves sit behind access controls that match their sensitivity. The requirement is written around the outcome, so the way you achieve it, through permissions, separate storage, integrity checks or a combination, is your decision to document and defend. The risk is straightforward. An attacker who gets administrator rights will often try to erase or alter the logs that show how they got in, and an insider who wants to hide an action has the same goal. If the audit trail can be edited by the account being investigated, it stops being evidence. The problem is harder than it sounds because logs frequently live on the same hosts, in the same storage and under the same administrators as the systems they record. Protecting them therefore means deciding who can change logging settings, where records are copied, and how a change to a log would be noticed.

Rev. 3 folded Rev. 2's requirement 3.3.9, which covered limiting audit logging management to privileged users, into this requirement, so 03.03.08 now carries both the protection and the access limits. NIST lists AU-9 and AU-9(4) from SP 800-53 Rev. 5 as the source controls. Before you scope the work, confirm with your contracting officer or prime which version of SP 800-171 applies to your contract, because the DoD's current class deviation names Revision 2 and a pending FAR rule would set Rev. 3 with organization-defined values. Then list every place audit records are written, stored, forwarded and administered, and confirm who holds rights to each one.

Which systems, logs and people fall under 03.03.08 in your environment

Protection of audit information applies wherever audit records are created, moved, stored or administered for systems that handle CUI. The cards below follow the audit trail from its sources through the tools that hold it to the people and third parties who can change it, which is where most scoping gaps appear.

CUI systems and their audit sources

Start with every system that stores, processes or transmits CUI, then list what each one writes to its audit log: operating system security logs, application logs, database audit trails and network device logs. A system that never touches CUI but sends logs to the same collector can still change what an assessor sees, so record that connection in the system security plan. Confirm whether each source is in scope or explicitly excluded with a reason.

Log collectors and forwarding paths

Agents, syslog relays and forwarders sit between the source and the log store and are a common place for records to be dropped, altered or redirected. Check who can change collector configuration, whether transport is encrypted, and whether a collector outage triggers an alert. These paths belong in scope because an attacker who controls them can hide activity before it reaches the central store.

SIEM and central log stores

The SIEM or log repository is the primary target for 03.03.08 because it holds the record of everything else. Identify where it runs, who holds administrative rights, whether write-once or immutable storage is used, and how deletion or retention changes are approved. Ask your platform team to show the access list for the index or bucket, not only the console roles.

Backup copies of logs

Log backups, archives and replicas are audit information too, and they often sit in a separate backup tool with its own administrators. Confirm that restores cannot overwrite live records without authorization and that backup jobs cannot purge audit archives early. Bareos verify jobs compare files against cataloged attributes, which is one way to detect later changes to stored copies if your backup platform is in scope.

Logging administrator consoles and tools

Consoles that configure audit devices, change retention, edit alert rules or disable log sources are the functionality that 03.03.08 limits to a subset of privileged users. Inventory each console, its admin accounts, and whether changes to logging settings generate their own audit records. Many organizations find that a general administration role can switch off logging, which is the gap to close first.

People and third parties who can touch logs

Your staff, a managed SOC, the cloud provider, and the log platform vendor may each reach audit data through support access, managed service roles or vendor-hosted tenants. Record each party, the access it holds, and the contract terms that govern it. Organization-defined parameters for who may manage logging must be assigned by your organization if the federal agency does not specify them, so document that decision with its approver.

How Rev. 3 folded 3.3.9 into 03.03.08 and what that changes for you

Rev. 3 combines two Rev. 2 requirements into one. Rev. 2 split this work across 3.3.8, which requires protecting audit information and audit logging tools from unauthorized access, modification and deletion, and 3.3.9, which limits management of audit logging functionality to a subset of privileged users. Rev. 3 withdrew 3.3.9 and incorporated it into 03.03.08, so the single Rev. 3 requirement now covers both protecting the audit data and restricting who can change the logging configuration. NIST's Rev. 2 to Rev. 3 change analysis traces 03.03.08 back to 3.3.8 and classifies the change as significant, describing it as more detail and foundational tasks. For a system owner, that classification means the requirement is no longer a single protection check with a separate access check attached to it.

The practical consequence shows up in the assessment. Under Rev. 3, an assessor working from SP 800-171A Rev. 3 will look for protection of audit information and management restriction under the same requirement, using three determination statements and the examine, interview and test methods. Evidence should therefore show both halves together: the protected location and integrity controls for audit records and logging tools, and the list of privileged roles allowed to change logging settings, with the way that list is enforced. Before you start, confirm with your contracting officer or assessor which NIST version applies to your contract, and avoid assuming the Rev. 3 structure applies to you until that is confirmed.

The Rev. 2 numbering still matters if your work is measured under CMMC Level 2. That program still assesses AU.L2-3.3.8 and AU.L2-3.3.9 as separate practices, each worth 1 point in the 32 CFR 170.24 scoring methodology, so a single control in your environment may need two entries in your Rev. 2 mapping. Keep your evidence organized so one artifact, such as a role-restricted logging configuration, can be cited against both the Rev. 2 pair and the Rev. 3 requirement. Ask your assessor how they want that cross-reference documented.

How assessors test 03.03.08 protection of audit information

This table maps each SP 800-171A Rev. 3 assessment method to the objects an assessor examines, interviews or tests for 03.03.08, the evidence to prepare and the findings that commonly come up. Read it as a preparation checklist: each row shows what the assessor will ask to see before the assessment starts.

Assessment method	What the assessor looks at	Evidence to prepare	Common findings
Examine: policy and procedures	Audit and accountability policy, access control policy, and procedures for protecting audit information	Approved policies with owners and review dates, and procedures that name who manages audit logs and how log protection is set up	Procedures describe log protection in general terms without naming systems, roles or settings
Examine: system configuration settings	File permissions, log storage locations, forwarding settings and audit tool configuration on in-scope systems	Configuration exports or screenshots showing log file ownership, permissions, immutability settings and forwarding targets	Local log files writable by administrators, or audit configuration that differs from the documented design
Examine: system audit records	Audit records themselves, checked for completeness and for evidence that protection controls operated	Sample log extracts, integrity check results and records of changes to audit settings	No record of who changed audit settings, or gaps in the audit trail for administrator actions
Interview: personnel with audit and accountability responsibilities	How audit logs are managed day to day, who can change logging settings and how exceptions are handled	Named role assignments and a walk-through of how log access requests are approved	Staff cannot explain who holds audit administration rights or how they are reviewed
Interview: personnel with information security responsibilities	How access to audit functionality is granted, reviewed and removed, and how log tampering would be detected	Access review records for audit tool administrators and alert rules tied to changes in logs	Security staff assume the logging platform team controls audit access without documented confirmation
Interview: system developers	How logging features were built, whether audit data can be altered through application functions and how changes are controlled	Design notes showing separation of audit data from application administration and change tickets for logging code	Application admin pages can delete or edit audit entries with no separate authorization
Test: mechanisms for audit information protection	Whether protections actually stop unauthorized modification or deletion of audit records	Test results showing an unprivileged account cannot edit or remove records, and that integrity monitoring raises alerts	Protections exist on paper but were never tested, or a privileged user can delete logs without an alert
Test: mechanisms for managing access to audit functionality	Whether only a defined subset of privileged users or roles can turn logging on, off or change its settings	Test evidence of denied attempts by non-authorized accounts and a list of accounts holding audit management rights	No separate logging role exists, so system administrators hold audit management by default
Test: log forwarding and collection	Whether records sent to a central store arrive complete and whether the central copy is protected from the source system	Forwarding verification records comparing source and central counts, and access controls on the central store	Log forwarding is configured but never verified, so gaps go unnoticed until an investigation

Implementation sequence for protecting audit information

This sequence turns 03.03.08 into a working set of protections: scoped audit records, named administrators, separated storage, tamper resistance and monitoring of the logging layer itself. Each step ends with a document or configuration output that an assessor can examine.

Define audit records and logging tools in scope
Start by listing every audit record source in the system boundary, including application audit logs, the audit log files on each host, log shippers, collectors, SIEM or log storage, and any tool that can change logging settings. Record the file paths, service names and storage locations for each. The output is an audit information inventory that names each record store and tool, and the system security plan should reference it. Confirm the inventory matches the event types selected under 03.03.01 so no source is left unprotected.
Document logging administrators and assign parameters
Write down which roles may view, change, enable, disable or delete logging functionality, and which roles may only read audit records. Assign the organization-defined parameters that 03.03.08 depends on in your environment, such as the defined subset of privileged roles and the protections applied to each store, since NIST does not assign ODP values for nonfederal organizations. The output is an audit administration standard approved by the system owner, plus a parameter record that your contracting agency or assessor can compare against the requirement.
Separate log storage from logged systems
Move audit record storage onto infrastructure that the administrators of the logged systems cannot freely alter. This usually means a central log collector or repository in a separate account, project or network segment, with its own credentials. The output is an architecture diagram and a access matrix showing that the logged system's administrators have no write or delete rights on the central store. Confirm this with a test in which a standard administrator of the source system attempts to edit or remove a record.
Restrict logging administration to named roles
Configure access so that only the roles named in the administration standard can change logging settings, and require an approval step for those changes, such as a ticket or a second approver. Enable logging of the administrators' own actions so that changes to audit configuration generate records in a location they cannot erase. The output is a role-based access configuration export, a change approval procedure and a sample of logged administrative actions that show who changed what and when.
Protect audit records against modification and deletion
Apply technical protections to stored records. Options include write-once or append-only storage, forwarding records to a separate store in near real time, hashing or signing batches so later changes are detectable, and restricting delete permissions to a defined role. Record which option each store uses and why it fits the system. The output is a protection configuration record per store and a test log showing that an attempted edit or deletion is blocked or detected. Ask any tool vendor or integrator to confirm in writing which of these capabilities the product actually provides.
Monitor logging configuration and files for changes
Set up alerting for changes to the logging configuration files, service settings, audit log directories and the audit storage itself. File integrity monitoring tools can baseline checksums and attributes of monitored paths and alert when a user or process creates, modifies or deletes them. Scheduled verification jobs can compare files against cataloged attributes. The output is a monitored-paths list, alert rules routed to designated personnel, and a test event that proves an alert fires for a change to a logging file.
Document the audit protection procedure
Write a procedure that ties the previous steps together: the inventory, the administrator roles, the storage separation, the protection settings, the approval and alerting workflow, and the review of exceptions. Include who performs each recurring check and what evidence each check produces. The output is an approved audit protection procedure, cross-referenced to the audit and accountability policy and to the system security plan, that an assessor can examine alongside the configuration evidence.

Evidence that proves 03.03.08 protection of audit information

An assessor testing 03.03.08 looks for policy that states the protection rule, configuration that enforces it, a short list of people allowed to manage logging, and test results that show the rule holds in practice. The cards below cover those six artifacts and how to keep each one current between assessments.

Audit and access control policies

The audit and accountability policy and the access control policy should state who may view, change or delete audit information and who may manage the logging function. The assessment method for 03.03.08 starts with examining these documents, so they must name roles, not individuals. Check that the policies match what the systems actually do. Review them at the defined frequency and record the approval and version history, since an assessor will compare the dates to the configuration exports.

Documented audit protection procedure

A written procedure for protecting audit information should describe the steps that keep logs intact: where logs are written, how permissions are set, how logs are forwarded to a protected store, and who checks each step. Assessors examine this procedure directly, and interviewers test whether the people who run logging can explain it. Keep the procedure tied to the current platform versions, and update it whenever a log path or forwarding target changes.

Log file permissions and forwarding configuration

Export the configuration that governs audit files, including the file system permissions on audit logs, the log paths and the forwarding settings to a separate collector. For example, a Nextcloud admin_audit log written to a dedicated path with restricted ownership shows that ordinary application users cannot edit it. Schedule these exports, store them with change history, and compare each export against the previous one so drift is visible before the assessment.

Role list for audit management

Keep a current list of roles allowed to manage audit functions, such as turning logging on or off, changing retention or editing forwarding. Each role should show the named people assigned, the approver for each grant and the date of the last access review. The requirement limits logging management to a subset of privileged users, so a role list with broad membership will fail the examination. Run a quarterly access review and retain the signed results.

Logging change and integrity alert records

Keep records of every change to the logging configuration, with the requester, approver and reason, along with alerts raised when monitored audit files are created, modified or deleted. Wazuh file integrity monitoring can record checksums and attributes for audit directories and alert on changes, showing who changed a file and when. Review these alerts on a schedule and document the disposition of each one, since an unexplained change to a log file is a finding.

Non-privileged alteration test results

Test results should show that a non-privileged account cannot alter or delete audit records and cannot disable logging. Run the test against each system in scope, record the account used, the attempted action and the resulting denial, and repeat it after every significant platform upgrade. Bareos Verify jobs can support this by comparing stored files with cataloged attributes, which helps show that backed-up audit records were not changed. Keep the raw output, not only a summary.

What meeting 03.03.08 costs in money and effort

This table lists the cost components of putting 03.03.08 in place and keeping its evidence current, showing who is paid, whether each cost is one-time or recurring, and what moves it up or down. No price or duration is stated because none is supplied for this requirement, so use the table to structure your questions and compare written quotes line by line.

Cost component	One-time or recurring	What drives it up or down	How to keep it down
Tooling or licenses for audit log protection	Recurring where commercial software is used, one-time for setup	Number of log sources, need for write-once storage or separate log hosts, and whether a SIEM or file integrity tool is already licensed	Use self-hosted open-source components already in scope, such as Wazuh for file integrity monitoring and Bareos verify jobs, which remove license spend for those functions; confirm feature fit first
Engineering time to restrict audit storage and access	One-time, with occasional rework	Number of systems writing audit data, how many separate log stores exist, and whether logging permissions are already role-based	Consolidate audit storage into a small number of protected repositories and define the privileged roles once, then reuse the pattern across systems
Engineering time to configure tamper detection and audit tool protection	One-time, then periodic tuning	Count of monitored files and directories, alert noise, and whether baselines must be rebuilt after each change	Scope monitoring to audit configuration, audit logs and logging binaries rather than whole file systems, and document the baseline process
Evidence upkeep (access lists, configuration exports, alert samples)	Recurring	How often privileged logging roles change, how many systems produce evidence, and whether evidence is collected by hand	Automate exports of access settings and logging configuration, and store them with dates so one collection serves several assessments
Internal review of the system security plan and procedures	Recurring, usually at each assessment cycle	Number of policies and procedures that mention audit protection, and how often the system changes	Keep the audit protection procedure in one document and cross-reference it from other policies instead of repeating it
External testing or review of audit protection	Recurring, typically tied to a testing schedule	Scope of the test, whether it covers attempts to alter or delete logs, and whether testers need to access audit tools	Agree the scope in writing up front so testers focus on the three determination statements and the specific tools in use
Assessor sampling and evidence review	Paid by the organization directly to the assessor, recurring per assessment	Number of systems in the boundary, sample size the assessor selects, and how complete the evidence package is	Package evidence by system and by determination statement so the assessor can sample quickly; assessor fees are not part of implementation work
Implementation partner scope	One-time, fixed-scope engagement	Number of systems to configure, custom integrations, and whether independent review is included	Ask for separate line items for configuration work, evidence packaging and any independent review, so each cost can be compared and scoped out

Which open-source tools can produce 03.03.08 evidence

Four self-hosted open-source tools can generate records that help show audit information and logging controls are protected. Each one supports part of 03.03.08 Protection of audit information, and none satisfies the requirement alone, because the organization still owns its access decisions, policies and evidence.

Nextcloud admin_audit logging

The admin_audit app in Nextcloud writes additional event information to an audit.log file in the data directory, or to a path set with logfile_audit. For 03.03.08, the useful question is who can read, change or delete that file and whether it is shipped off the application host. Check the logging configuration for your release, confirm where the file lands, and test whether a Nextcloud administrator can edit it without leaving a trace elsewhere. The application logs events, but protecting the file is still an operational task.

OpenBao audit devices

OpenBao audit devices keep a detailed JSON log of every API request and response, including errors, with most sensitive values hashed using HMAC-SHA256. This gives assessors a record of who changed secrets and access policies. Confirm which audit device types your deployment enables, that at least one device is always active so requests are not served unlogged, and that only designated roles can enable, disable or alter devices. Hashing protects values in the log, not the log file itself.

Wazuh file integrity monitoring

Wazuh file integrity monitoring records a baseline of checksums and attributes for monitored files and directories, then alerts when a user or process creates, modifies or deletes a monitored file. Alerts can run on a schedule or in real time and include how and when a file changed and who changed it. Point it at audit log directories and the configuration of logging tools, then confirm that alerts reach a role outside the administrators who manage those systems. Verify the monitoring scope on your own version before relying on it.

Bareos verify jobs

Bareos verify jobs compare files against previously cataloged attributes, giving a Tripwire-like check for changes after a suspected break-in. For 03.03.08, verify jobs can show whether stored audit logs and backups of them still match what was recorded at backup time. Confirm the verify level you schedule, that the catalog itself is protected from the same administrators who could alter the logs, and that a failed verification triggers a documented response. Bareos detects changes after the fact, so it complements prevention rather than replacing it.

Who does what: your team, an implementation partner and the auditor

Your organization owns requirement 03.03.08 under the contract, whoever does the technical work. Under NIST's guidance, the application and implementation of SP 800-171, and any compliance issues, rest with the federal agency that holds the contract with you, regardless of your size. That means your team decides what protection the audit records need, who may manage audit logging, and how those decisions are written down and approved.

Role assignments: Name the individuals or roles allowed to view, change, or turn off audit logging, and document why each one needs that access.
Policy and procedures: Own the audit and accountability policy and the procedures for protecting audit information, and keep them current.
Sign-off: Approve configuration changes to logging, log retention settings, and exceptions to the privileged-user list.
Review of partner output: Read the evidence package before it goes to an assessor and confirm it matches how your systems actually run.
Ongoing operation: Review alerts from integrity monitoring and act on tampering attempts, since no partner can own that daily duty.

Before signing a scope, confirm which of these decisions your staff will make and which a partner will only prepare for review.

Common gaps in 03.03.08 and how to close them

Most 03.03.08 findings come from the same few weaknesses: the people who run systems can also change their logs, and the protection that exists lives in policy rather than configuration. Each card below names one gap, the fix, and the evidence an assessor can examine to confirm it is closed.

Administrators can edit or delete local logs

When the same local administrator who runs a system can edit or remove its audit records, the logs stop being a reliable record of that administrator's own activity. Check whether audit files are writable by administrative accounts and whether file permissions, ownership and append-only attributes restrict changes. The fix is to restrict write and delete rights on audit directories to the logging service account and to keep a copy outside the system. Evidence is the permission listing of the audit directory, the configuration showing who can write, and a test where an administrator attempts to modify a record and is refused.

Logging administration shares a role with system administration

If one role can change system settings and also turn off or reconfigure audit logging, a single compromised or careless account can hide its own activity. 03.03.08 expects management of audit functionality to be limited to a subset of privileged users or roles. Check whether the account that patches servers can also disable audit policies or the logging agent. The fix is a separate logging administrator role with its own assignments. Evidence is the role definitions, the list of members, and access control entries showing that only the logging role can change audit settings.

No defined list of privileged logging roles

Organizations often grant audit management rights informally, so nobody can say who holds them. An assessor interviewing personnel will ask for the list and expect it to match the systems. Define the roles that may configure, disable or read audit functionality, name the accountable owner for each, and review membership at a set frequency. The fix is a written role matrix tied to the system security plan. Evidence is the approved role matrix, the access reports from each system that match it, and records of recent reviews with dated sign-off.

Logs are not forwarded to a store the local administrator cannot alter

Local logs remain exposed to anyone with root on the host that produced them. Forwarding audit records to a central collector that the local administrator cannot change gives a second copy that survives tampering on the source. Confirm that the forwarder can send but not delete, that the collector has separate credentials, and that gaps in delivery are detected. The fix is a forwarding pipeline with a restricted write-only account on the source and a retention policy on the central store. Evidence is the forwarder configuration, the collector access list, and a test showing that a locally deleted record still appears centrally.

Integrity of log files is not monitored

Protection controls can fail, and a change to an audit file may go unnoticed without a check on the files themselves. File integrity monitoring records a baseline of checksums and attributes for audit directories, then alerts when a user or process creates, modifies or deletes a monitored file, with details on who made the change. Wazuh's file integrity monitoring is one open-source option for this, and Bareos verify jobs can compare files against previously cataloged attributes. Confirm that alerts reach someone who responds. Evidence is the monitored path list, a sample alert from a test change, and the ticket showing the response.

Policies exist but the protection procedure is missing

Many organizations have an audit and accountability policy but no procedure that says how audit information is protected day to day. 03.03.08 assessments examine procedures for protecting audit information and access control procedures, so a policy alone leaves the assessor without a method to test. Write a procedure that names the systems, the protected paths, the roles allowed to manage logging, the monitoring method and the review steps. The fix is a procedure approved by the accountable owner and linked to the system security plan. Evidence is the signed procedure, the version history, and proof that staff followed it during the last review cycle.

Questions buyers ask about 03.03.08 before hiring outside help

How much effort does 03.03.08 take compared with the rest of the audit family?

It is one of the narrower requirements in the audit and accountability family, but it touches more of the environment than its length suggests. SP 800-171A Rev. 3 gives 03.03.08 three determination statements, which is a small assessment surface next to the family's logging, review and time stamp requirements. The effort comes from the mechanics: every audit log location, every logging tool and every account that can change logging settings must be found, restricted and shown to an assessor. Effort rises with the number of log sources, the number of admins who touch logging, and how many systems share the same log store. Ask any partner to list the log sources and privileged logging roles it expects to review before estimating effort.

Can a small team implement 03.03.08 on its own?

Often yes, if the team has someone who administers the systems that hold audit data and the authority to change permissions on them. The work is mostly configuration: separating who can read, write and delete audit records, moving logs to a location the system administrators cannot silently alter, and limiting who can change logging settings. A small team usually struggles with documentation and proof rather than the settings themselves, because the assessor will look for procedures, a defined subset of privileged roles and test evidence. Where the team lacks time or experience with access control design, a fixed-scope engagement can cover that gap. Confirm early whether the team has the skills to produce test evidence, not only configurations.

What does 03.03.08 require from our own staff?

It requires named people in three roles: an owner for the audit and accountability policy and procedures, administrators who will carry out the restrictions, and staff who can explain how logs are protected during an assessment interview. The assessment procedure also looks for personnel with information security responsibilities and system developers, so the people who build or change logging tools must be available to answer questions. Your staff must also be able to produce system configuration settings, access control records and sample audit records on request. Plan time for these people in the schedule, because an external partner cannot speak for your administrators or approve your role assignments.

How long does 03.03.08 take to implement?

No duration is given here, because the time depends on the scope your organization and partner agree in writing. Timing is driven by the number of log stores, the complexity of current privilege assignments, whether logs already leave the system to a central repository, and how much of the procedure documentation exists. Changes that touch production logging also need change control and testing, which adds schedule time. Ask for a timeline that lists each log source, the change window for each, and the evidence collection step. Treat any timeline without those items as incomplete.

Can the assessor configure our audit protections for us?

No. An assessor who configures the controls it will later test cannot assess them independently. Assessment bodies, including DCMA DIBCAC when it performs a review, must stay independent of the systems they examine. The implementation partner prepares the systems, configuration and evidence, and the organization owns the controls and the results. Keep the roles separate in your contract so the party that configures logging is not the party that issues any assessment report or attestation. Ask each vendor to state which role it occupies in writing.

Which open-source tools can reduce license costs for 03.03.08?

Several self-hosted open-source platforms produce evidence relevant to 03.03.08, which can offset commercial licensing. Nextcloud's admin_audit app writes additional event information to audit.log, which can be placed on a protected path. OpenBao's audit devices keep a detailed JSON record of API requests and responses, with most sensitive values hashed. Wazuh's file integrity monitoring alerts when a user or process creates, modifies or deletes a monitored file, which helps detect tampering with audit files. Bareos Verify jobs compare files against cataloged attributes. Software licensing is only one cost, so ask for hosting, configuration, testing and support fees alongside any saved licence spend, and confirm each tool's current license terms with its maintainer.

Does the Rev. 2 wording of this requirement differ from Rev. 3?

Yes, the change is significant. NIST's change analysis traces 03.03.08 to Rev. 2 requirement 3.3.8 and classifies the change as significant, adding more detail and foundational tasks. Rev. 3 also withdrew 03.03.09 and folded it into 03.03.08, so the Rev. 2 protection of audit information requirement and the limit on managing audit functionality now sit under one requirement. DoD contractors remain assessed against Rev. 2 for CMMC Level 2, where the practice is AU.L2-3.3.8, worth 1 point under the scoring method. Confirm which revision your contract cites before you map controls, because the wording and the evidence you need can differ.

What should go into a quote for 03.03.08 work?

A quote should follow from a written scope and list the log sources, systems and privileged roles covered, the configuration changes planned, the procedure documents to be written or updated, and the evidence package to be prepared. It should state which items are one-time, such as design and initial configuration, and which recur, such as periodic reviews of privileged access to logging. Ask for explicit exclusions, the assumptions about your environment, the staff time required from your side, and who performs each task. DeployOpen does not publish a price list, and its quotes follow from the agreed scope. Ask any provider to confirm that it does not issue assessment reports or certifications.

How DeployOpen scopes, implements and prepares 03.03.08 evidence

DeployOpen is a Chainscore Labs company that implements self-hosted open-source platforms inside the client's own infrastructure. For 03.03.08, we protect audit logs and logging tools in those systems and prepare the evidence an assessor will examine, while the organization keeps ownership of its controls and the assessment itself stays with independent parties.

How we scope

We agree a written scope listing which systems, audit stores and logging tools fall under 03.03.08.
We confirm which roles may manage audit logging functionality and document that subset of privileged users.
We identify the policies and procedures for audit information protection that the organization must already hold or write.

How we build

We restrict write and delete access to audit logs so that ordinary administrators cannot alter them.
We configure audit logging tools, such as admin audit logs and audit devices, to record access and changes to their own settings.
We test that modification or deletion attempts on protected audit data are blocked or alerted, and record the results.

How we hand over

We deliver configuration records, access lists and test results mapped to the 03.03.08 determination statements.
We document the procedures for protecting audit information so that the organization's staff can operate them after handover.
We list the evidence the organization must collect itself, such as interview notes and ongoing review records, and where each item is stored.

How we support

Ongoing support, upgrades and continuous testing are available as a retainer after the fixed-scope work ends.
We can re-run protection tests after platform upgrades so that changes to logging tools do not silently weaken 03.03.08.
Questions about assessment method or scope interpretation should be confirmed with the contracting agency or the independent assessor.