Which open-source tools support NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes, and what they cannot do
When a customer or contract asks for CSF 2.0 alignment, a small set of self-hosted open-source tools can deliver technical outcomes and produce evidence for specific Subcategories, but the organization owns its controls and only an independent assessor issues results. NIST does not certify products, implementations or services, so no tool can make an environment "CSF 2.0 compliant" on its own. CSWP 29 states that the Functions, Categories and Subcategories apply to all ICT an organization uses, including IT, Internet of Things, operational technology, cloud, mobile and artificial intelligence environments, so tool coverage will always be partial and depends on what you run and which Profile you set as your target.
The six tools in this topic map to different parts of the Core. Keycloak supports passkeys, recovery codes and TOTP or HOTP one-time passwords, which bear on PR.AA identity and authentication. Wazuh's Syscollector inventory and its rule-based alerts, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, bear on ID.AM and DE.CM. Greenbone (OpenVAS) supports ID.RA vulnerability identification, DFIR-IRIS supports RS.MA and RS.AN case handling with SHA-256 evidence logging, restic supports PR.DS backups, and its check --read-data option verifies stored data, which is relevant to RC.RP. CISO Assistant supports Govern-level assessments. Confirm each claim against your own configuration, since a tool that is installed but not tuned, monitored or reviewed does not satisfy a Subcategory by itself.
The tools also leave gaps. Governance outcomes such as GV.OC, GV.RM, GV.PO and GV.SC depend on policies, decisions and supplier reviews that no scanner or log platform produces. Before any tool is deployed, the organization should write its Target Profile, assign an owner for each Subcategory, and decide which evidence each owner will retain. Ask any implementation partner to show, in writing, which Subcategories each tool covers and which remain with people and process.
Which CSF Functions each tool supports
Each open-source tool below produces evidence for a specific part of the CSF 2.0 Core. None of them satisfies a Category on its own, and each covers only some Subcategories within the Categories named. Read the cards as a starting map for where a tool contributes, then confirm the coverage against your own Subcategory-level requirements.
Keycloak for identity and MFA
Keycloak primarily supports PR.AA, the Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control Category, by providing two-factor authentication with passkeys, recovery codes and TOTP or HOTP codes, along with configurable one-time password policies and W3C WebAuthn settings. It covers authentication and identity assertions, but not identity proofing of people or the access permissions your business owners approve. Check which Subcategories your authentication design actually reaches and where HR or manual processes still apply.
Wazuh for detection and inventory
Wazuh primarily supports DE.CM, Continuous Monitoring, and ID.AM, Asset Management. Its log analysis compares events against a ruleset of over 3,000 built-in rules and decoders plus custom rules, and its Syscollector module records hardware, software, open ports, services and accounts for each endpoint. Inventory data supports ID.AM only where the collected scope matches your asset register, so confirm coverage for network devices, cloud resources and data flows.
Greenbone for vulnerability scanning
Greenbone Community Edition primarily supports ID.RA, Risk Assessment, through vulnerability identification. The OpenVAS Scanner runs tests from the daily updated Greenbone Community Feed against target systems, with gvmd controlling scans. Scan results inform ID.RA only in part, because risk assessment also requires threat intelligence, likelihood and impact analysis, and risk response. Confirm scan scope, credentialed scanning and the review process that turns findings into decisions.
DFIR-IRIS for incident handling
DFIR-IRIS primarily supports RS.AN, Incident Analysis, and RS.MA, Incident Management. It keeps each case as one record of assets, IOCs, tasks and evidence with a full audit trail, triages alerts from SIEM, EDR and REST sources, and logs evidence with SHA-256 verification and chain of custody. Response planning, communication and root cause decisions remain with your incident team, so check which parts of RS.MA your playbooks and staffing cover.
restic for backups
restic primarily supports PR.DS, Data Security, and RC.RP, Incident Recovery Plan Execution. Its check command verifies the structural consistency of snapshots, trees and pack files, and with --read-data or --read-data-subset it reads pack files back to confirm the stored data is unmodified. Backup verification supports RC.RP only when restores are also tested against recovery objectives, and PR.DS covers only the backup part of data protection, not encryption in transit or in use.
CISO Assistant for governance
CISO Assistant primarily supports the Govern Function (GV), where it ships more than 200 frameworks, including NIST CSF, and runs audits and compliance assessments with automatic mapping between frameworks. It helps record how your organization measures its Current and Target Profiles, but it does not set risk appetite, approve policy or assign roles for you. Ask which CSF Categories in GV and ID your team will populate, and whether the mappings have been reviewed against the framework text.
How each tool produces evidence an assessor can test
Govern and identify outcomes are mostly decisions, records and inventories, so these tools hold and date the evidence rather than make the decisions. CISO Assistant can hold NIST CSF 2.0 assessment results, owners and linked evidence, while Wazuh Syscollector and Greenbone supply the asset and vulnerability data that the Identify Categories depend on.
- Assessment records in CISO Assistant: the platform ships NIST CSF among more than 200 frameworks and runs assessments against them, so each Subcategory result can carry an owner, a status and linked evidence. Confirm how the CSF 2.0 library is loaded in your version.
- Syscollector inventory exports (ID.AM): exports of hardware, operating system, installed software, network interfaces, open ports and users give the assessor a dated view of the asset base. The export only shows what each agent reports, so compare it with the asset register.
- Scan reports for risk assessment (ID.RA): Greenbone scan results built on the Community Feed show tested vulnerabilities per target. The assessor will want the scan scope, the feed date and how findings became risk decisions.
- Items the assessor still asks for: an approved cybersecurity risk management policy, named roles and authorities, data flow maps, supplier lists and risk acceptances signed by leadership. No scanner or inventory produces these.
Check that each inventory export is dated, limited to the systems in your assessment boundary, and linked to a named owner in the risk record.
Protect outcomes are tested through configuration and access evidence. Keycloak produces the authentication settings, Wazuh Syscollector shows account and software state on endpoints, and restic records the backup repository behind the data security Subcategories. The assessor then checks whether those settings match the approved standard and operated across the assessment period.
- Keycloak MFA policy settings: realm configuration covering two-factor authentication, passkeys, recovery codes and TOTP or HOTP settings, including one-time password policy values and W3C WebAuthn settings. Keep a dated export and the change history for each setting.
- Enrollment and access records: user and group listings showing who has MFA enrolled and who holds privileged access. The assessor will sample accounts and compare them with HR records and access approvals.
- restic check output:
restic checkverifies the structural consistency of snapshots, trees and pack files. Adding--read-dataor--read-data-subsetreads pack files back to confirm the stored data is unmodified, and the log of each run becomes evidence. - Items still needed: an approved authentication standard, exception approvals for any account without MFA, configuration change approvals, and security awareness and role-based training records for the PR.AT Subcategories.
Confirm that the Keycloak export and restic logs cover the full assessment period, not a single day selected for the audit.
Detect evidence is high in volume, so assessors focus on three questions: is monitoring configured, are alerts reviewed, and can the review be traced. Wazuh supplies both the rule logic and the alert trail, while scheduled Greenbone scans can add periodic checks for exposed services that monitoring alone may miss.
- Rule coverage: Wazuh decodes collected logs and compares each event against more than 3,000 built-in rules and decoders plus any custom rules. Export the rule set in use and show which log sources feed it, since the Continuous Monitoring Subcategories expect coverage of networks, endpoints and personnel activity.
- Alert trail: matching alerts are written to alerts.log and alerts.json and mapped to MITRE ATT&CK. These files show what fired and when, but they do not show who reviewed each alert.
- Dashboard review records: alerts forwarded to the Wazuh indexer are reviewed in the dashboard. Keep triage notes or ticket references so the assessor can follow an alert to its disposition.
- Items the assessor still asks for: a log source inventory, retention settings, monitoring of external service providers, and proof that detection rules were adjusted after tests or incidents.
Sample a set of alerts and confirm that each has a documented disposition, then confirm the rules that fired were active on the date shown.
Respond outcomes are tested through the incident record. DFIR-IRIS keeps each case as one record, so an assessor can trace an alert from intake through triage, investigation tasks, evidence and reporting. The tool supports the incident management, incident analysis and reporting Categories, but the assessor will still need the response plan and the decisions on notifications.
- Case records: each case holds assets, indicators of compromise, tasks and evidence with a full audit trail that shows who changed what and when.
- Triage intake: alerts from SIEM, EDR and REST sources are triaged into cases, which provides evidence of the categorization and prioritization step.
- Evidence integrity: evidence is logged with SHA-256 verification and chain of custody. Record the hash at intake and verify it again whenever the evidence is used or handed over.
- Timeline and reports: the consolidated investigation timeline and reports generated from case data support root cause analysis and stakeholder communication records.
- Items still needed: the approved incident response plan, decision records for regulator or customer notifications, communication logs, and lessons-learned records after each incident.
Test one closed case end to end, from alert intake to the final report, and confirm that the audit trail and evidence hashes are intact.
Recover evidence depends on showing that backups are restorable and unmodified. restic's check command confirms repository structure, and its data-reading options confirm that stored pack files are intact. These results prove backup integrity, but the recovery Subcategories also ask whether systems were restored and recovery was declared complete, which needs records beyond the backup tool.
- Structural check output:
restic checkverifies the consistency of snapshots, trees and pack files. Save each output with the repository name and the run date. - Data read verification:
restic check --read-datareads every pack file, while--read-data-subsetchecks part of the repository. Record which option ran and how often, because a subset does not prove the whole repository is intact. - Restore test records: the backup tool does not show that a system was restored. Keep records of test restores, including what was restored, the outcome and any defects found, to support verification of restored assets.
- Items still needed: recovery objectives set by the business, the recovery plan and its priorities, sign-off that recovery is complete, and communication records for stakeholders.
Confirm that backup check logs and restore test records reference the same repository and period, so the assessor can connect them.
How Keycloak and Wazuh support identity and detection outcomes
Keycloak and Wazuh give an organization evidence for two CSF 2.0 areas that assessors examine closely: how people prove who they are, and how the environment is watched and inventoried. Keycloak's two-factor support, including passkeys, recovery codes and TOTP or HOTP codes from apps such as Google Authenticator or FreeOTP, supports the authentication Subcategories in PR.AA. Its configurable one-time password policies and W3C WebAuthn settings are where the organization decides which factors are allowed, how codes are generated, and which methods are retired. Those settings are the organization's decisions. Record the chosen authentication flows, the password and OTP policies, the recovery code process and who may approve exceptions, then export the realm configuration on a schedule so the evidence matches what is running.
Wazuh's ruleset supports DE.CM, which asks whether networks, endpoints and runtime environments are monitored. Its decoders and more than 3,000 built-in rules, together with custom rules, produce alerts that are written to alerts.log and alerts.json and mapped to MITRE ATT&CK. The Syscollector module collects hardware, operating system, installed software, open ports, services, users and groups from each endpoint, which gives inventory evidence relevant to ID.AM. Whether a given rule is enabled, how it is tuned to reduce noise, and how long alerts and inventory data are kept in the Wazuh indexer are decisions the organization must make and justify. Document the rule set in use, the tuning changes with their approvers, the retention period and the agents in scope, and confirm with your assessor what coverage they expect before relying on the output as evidence.
How to sequence the tools in a first deployment
The sequence builds the asset and identity foundation first, then adds detection, scanning, incident handling, backups and governance records, so each later tool has a known inventory and access model to work from. The order should follow the Target Profile the organization has chosen, so the first deployment covers the outcomes that matter most to it.
Confirm the Target Profile and scope
Before installing anything, the organization decides which systems, sites and cloud accounts fall inside the deployment and which CSF 2.0 Subcategories it is targeting first. Leadership, the security lead and the platform owner agree on this in writing. The output is a short scope statement and a prioritized list of outcomes that sets the order for the steps below. Confirm the Target Profile with the people who own the risk decisions, because this list drives every later choice.
Establish identity and multi-factor authentication
Deploy Keycloak as the central identity provider and connect the applications and administrator consoles that will be used in later steps. Configure MFA with passkeys, TOTP or HOTP, recovery codes and the one-time password policies the organization has approved. Maps mainly to the PR.AA Subcategories. The step is done when administrator accounts cannot sign in without a second factor, and a test sign-in and a documented recovery procedure have been reviewed.
Build the asset and software inventory
Deploy the Wazuh agents with the Syscollector module on in-scope endpoints and servers so hardware, operating systems, installed software, open ports, users and services are collected into the Wazuh indexer. Reconcile the results with cloud account listings and any manual registers the organization already keeps. Maps mainly to ID.AM. The output is a reviewed inventory with named owners and gaps that have been assigned, and the team knows which systems are not yet reporting.
Enable detection and log review
Configure Wazuh to collect the logs from the identity provider, endpoints and key servers, and confirm that the built-in rules and decoders match the log sources in use. Add custom rules for events the organization cares about and route alerts to the dashboard for review. Maps mainly to DE.CM and PR.PS log generation. The step is done when test events generate alerts that appear in the dashboard and the review owner has confirmed the alert handling procedure.
Schedule vulnerability scanning against the inventory
Install Greenbone Community Edition, keep the Community Feed updated, and set scan targets from the inventory produced in the earlier step. Agree on who triages findings, how they are assigned and how accepted risks are recorded. Maps mainly to ID.RA vulnerability identification. The output is a repeatable scan schedule, a triage queue with owners, and a record of the first scan results compared with the inventory to confirm coverage.
Set up incident handling in DFIR-IRIS
Deploy DFIR-IRIS and connect alert sources such as Wazuh so that alerts can be triaged into cases. Define case templates, evidence handling with SHA-256 verification and chain of custody, and the roles that can open and close cases. Maps mainly to RS.MA and RS.AN. The step is done when a tabletop-style test alert has been triaged into a case, evidence has been logged with its hash, and the investigation timeline and report have been reviewed by the incident lead.
Protect backups and test restores
Deploy restic against the approved backup targets for in-scope data and configure retention and access controls. Run restic check on a schedule, including read-data checks on a sample of pack files, to confirm the stored backups are structurally sound and unmodified. Maps mainly to PR.DS and RC.RP verification of backups. The output is a verified backup record and a documented restore test with the results kept with the recovery plan.
Record governance and assessment evidence
Load the chosen CSF 2.0 framework into CISO Assistant, or the organization's approved GRC tool, and record the Current Profile, owners, policies, risk register entries and evidence links from the earlier steps. Confirm that the mapped Subcategories point to real artifacts such as inventories, alert records and restore tests. Maps to the GV Categories. The step is done when the governance record shows which outcomes are met, which are open and who owns each gap, and the independent assessor has been given access if one is engaged.
What to confirm before relying on these tools as evidence
Self-hosted tools can generate strong operational records, but an assessor will ask whether those records are licensed, complete, kept long enough and owned by someone accountable. The cards below set out the checks to complete before any tool output is cited as evidence for a CSF 2.0 outcome.
Confirm licensing for each tool
Each tool in this stack carries its own license, and the terms govern how you may deploy, modify, distribute or host it for others. Keycloak is Apache-2.0, Wazuh is GPL-2.0-only, Greenbone Community Edition is AGPL-3.0-or-later, DFIR-IRIS is LGPL-3.0-or-later, restic is BSD-2-Clause and CISO Assistant is AGPL-3.0-only. Ask legal to review how each license applies to your planned use, including any managed service you add around it.
Confirm environment scope per Category
A control result only counts for the environment it was tested in. Confirm whether each Category covers cloud accounts, data center networks, endpoints, operational technology or air-gapped segments, and record which of those a given Wazuh agent, Greenbone scan or restic repository actually reaches. Gaps usually appear where an asset is outside the scanner's target list or outside the agent rollout.
Confirm log and backup retention
Detection and recovery evidence is only useful if it still exists when an assessor asks for it. Compare your retention settings for Wazuh alerts, DFIR-IRIS case records and restic snapshots against the periods set by your contracts, regulators and internal policy. Confirm also that restore tests are recorded, since a backup repository alone does not show that data can be recovered.
Confirm a named evidence owner
Tool output is not evidence until a person accountable for the control has reviewed it, decided what it shows and signed off on exceptions. Name an owner for each Category, define how often reviews happen, and keep the review record alongside the export. Without a named owner, dashboards become assumptions that no one has tested.
Confirm the Profile scope
A Current Profile and a Target Profile define which Subcategories your organization claims. Check that the Profile covers every system the tools protect, and that Subcategories marked not applicable have a documented reason. A tool that performs well inside a narrow Profile can still leave the claimed scope incomplete.
Confirm capabilities in current documentation
Feature sets change between releases, and this page describes general capabilities rather than the version you will deploy. Before you cite a function as evidence, read the current documentation for your exact version, test it in a non-production environment and record the result. Where a capability is unclear, treat it as unconfirmed until the vendor or project verifies it.
Questions teams ask about open-source tools and NIST CSF 2.0
Does NIST certify any tool for NIST CSF 2.0?
No. NIST states that it does not offer certifications or endorsements of CSF-related products, implementations or services, and it has no plans for a conformity assessment program. A tool such as Keycloak, Wazuh or CISO Assistant can help produce evidence for CSF outcomes, but no tool makes an organization compliant or aligned on its own. Alignment is a claim the organization makes about its own program, and any independent assurance comes from an outside assessor the organization chooses. Ask any vendor or partner to show you the basis for any statement about NIST endorsement, and treat claims that a product is "NIST certified" as a red flag.
Can open-source tools alone reach a target Tier?
Tools alone do not set a Tier. The CSF 2.0 Tiers (Partial, Risk Informed, Repeatable and Adaptive) describe how well an organization applies risk management, including governance, processes and the use of consistent, repeatable practices. Tools supply the technical outcomes and the data behind them, such as identity controls, log-based detection, asset inventory, vulnerability scanning, case records and tested backups. Reaching a higher Tier also depends on whether risk decisions are made by named people, whether policies are reviewed and whether lessons from incidents change how the program works. Assess the Tier after the processes are running, and expect the tools to be one input among several.
What does the organization still need to do itself?
The organization still owns its controls, risk decisions and evidence. Leadership must set risk appetite, approve the cybersecurity risk management policy and assign roles. Staff must review access decisions, triage alerts, approve changes to scanning scope and run restore tests on a schedule. Only the organization can decide which Subcategories apply to its environment, what its Target Profile is and how exceptions are approved. Tools record these actions, but a tool cannot make the decisions. Before starting, confirm internally who will operate each tool after the initial setup and who signs off on the results.
Who does the setup work and what does an implementation partner prepare?
The organization's own staff or an implementation partner can do the setup, depending on internal skills and capacity. An implementation partner such as DeployOpen plans, installs, configures, hardens, integrates and documents self-hosted platforms inside the client's own cloud accounts, data centers or air-gapped networks. The partner can also prepare systems and evidence, such as configuration records, log samples, scan reports and restore test results, for an assessment. The partner does not issue audit reports or certifications, and it does not decide the organization's risk posture. Most engagements are fixed-scope, so ask for the scope, deliverables and timeline in writing before work starts.
Does a tool's license affect the assessment?
The license affects how you can deploy, modify and distribute a tool, but it does not change what the tool proves about a CSF outcome. Keycloak is Apache-2.0, Wazuh is GPL-2.0-only, Greenbone Community Edition is AGPL-3.0-or-later, DFIR-IRIS is LGPL-3.0-or-later, restic is BSD-2-Clause and CISO Assistant is AGPL-3.0-only. Assessors look at whether the tool's output is complete, consistent and traceable, not at its license. Still, check with counsel whether your modifications, hosting model or distribution to third parties trigger obligations under the license. Also confirm which features are in the community edition and which require a paid edition, because a missing feature can leave an evidence gap.
How do these tools fit with CSET or NIST's Profile template?
CSET and NIST's free Profile template help organizations record Current and Target Profiles, compare them and capture a gap analysis in a structured way. Open-source tools run the controls and produce the evidence that backs each answer. Use the template or CSET to decide what you are measuring and to record your scores, then point each answer to the logs, scans, inventories or restore reports the tools produce. CISO Assistant is a larger option for teams that want assessments, evidence and framework mappings in one self-hosted application. Choose the lighter method when a spreadsheet-style record is enough, and the heavier one when several frameworks must be assessed from the same evidence.
Who owns the controls, who implements the tools, and who issues results
The organization owns its CSF outcomes and every risk decision behind them. Its leadership decides which Subcategories are in scope, which Target Profile it is aiming for, which risks it accepts and which it treats. Keycloak settings, Wazuh alert rules, Greenbone scan schedules and restic retention periods all reflect those decisions, so they must be signed off by the people accountable for the program, not delegated silently to whoever installs the software. NIST does not offer certifications or endorsements of CSF-related products, implementations or services, and it has no plans for a conformity assessment program, so no product or vendor can confer CSF compliance on an organization.
An implementation partner such as DeployOpen works on the organization's side of that line. It plans the deployment inside the organization's own cloud accounts, data centers or air-gapped networks, configures and hardens the tools, integrates them with existing identity, logging and ticketing systems, and documents how each one produces evidence for the Subcategories it supports. Before work starts, the organization should confirm in writing which systems, Subcategories and evidence artifacts are in scope, who maintains the configuration after handover, and who keeps the risk register and policies current. Those ongoing duties are where internal ownership is most often underestimated.
Only an independent assessor or auditor issues an assessment report or opinion. A self-assessment against the CSF Core, a gap analysis or a readiness review carried out with a partner is useful internal work, but it is not an external result, and it should be labeled that way in any board pack or customer questionnaire. Before engaging an assessor, ask who will test the evidence, whether they will rely on configuration exports from the self-hosted tools, and what they need from the organization to reproduce a result. Confirm those terms with the assessor directly, since their methods and fees are theirs to set.
How DeployOpen works on this
DeployOpen plans, implements, hardens, documents and supports self-hosted open-source platforms inside your own infrastructure, so the tools that produce CSF evidence run in your accounts, data centers or air-gapped networks. DeployOpen prepares systems and evidence for assessment, while your organization owns its controls and an independent assessor issues any report.
How we scope
- Agree which CSF 2.0 Subcategories each tool will support before any installation begins.
- Confirm which assets, identity sources, log feeds and backup targets fall inside the written scope.
- Engagements are fixed-scope, with deliverables and timelines agreed in writing first.
- Ask for a quote that lists each tool, environment and documentation item separately.
How we build
- Deploy Keycloak, Wazuh, Greenbone, DFIR-IRIS, restic and CISO Assistant in your environment.
- Configure MFA policies, Wazuh rules, scan schedules, case templates and backup retention to the scope.
- Test each control path, including restore checks with restic and alert handling in DFIR-IRIS, before handover.
How we hand over
- Document each configuration and map the resulting evidence to the CSF Subcategory it supports.
- Deliver runbooks showing where logs, scan reports, case records and backup verification results are stored.
- Walk your assessors and staff through the evidence sources so they can retrieve them without DeployOpen.
How we support
- Ongoing support, upgrades and continuous testing are available as a retainer after handover.
- Confirm with us how upgrades to each tool will be tested and documented before they reach production.
- Ask which evidence must be re-collected each review cycle, and who in your organization owns that task.
Sources and further reading
- NIST CSWP 29, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (PDF) ↗
- NIST CSF 2.0 Reference Tool export: Core, Implementation Examples and Informative References ↗
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework FAQs ↗
- Keycloak Server Administration Guide ↗
- Wazuh documentation: Ruleset ↗
- restic documentation: Working with repositories ↗

