What ID.RA-09 hardware and software authenticity asks for
ID.RA-09 asks the organization to assess whether the hardware and software it acquires and uses are authentic and have not been tampered with, before it relies on them. It is a Subcategory of the Risk Assessment (ID.RA) Category in the Identify Function of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0. Its purpose is to protect against counterfeit or altered components entering the environment through purchasing. A customer questionnaire, an auditor or an internal risk owner may ask how you know a server, network appliance, firmware image or software package is genuine and unmodified. The honest answer should be a documented check made before acquisition and before deployment, not an assumption based on the reseller's name. NIST's published Implementation Example focuses on assessing the authenticity and cybersecurity of critical technology products and services before acquiring and using them, so start your scope with the systems whose compromise would hurt most. The Subcategory also absorbs part or all of CSF 1.1 PR.DS-8, so teams that previously mapped integrity checks to that item should review their mappings. Remember that NIST does not certify organizations or products against CSF 2.0, so no document from a framework body will show that you meet this Subcategory.
The difficulty is that no single test establishes authenticity. Evidence is spread across procurement, which holds purchase channels and contracts, engineering, which holds hardware and software bills of materials and signing checks, and operations, which holds baselines and change records. Each group sees part of the picture, and few organizations have connected them. Much of the proof also depends on what suppliers provide: certificates of conformance, signed firmware, hash values and software bills of materials. The quality of that documentation varies widely, so the organization should confirm what each supplier delivers, how it is verified on receipt, and who approves exceptions. Confirm these points with your own procurement and engineering leads before writing the evidence plan, because the controls that apply depend on your suppliers and environment.
Which hardware, software and suppliers ID.RA-09 covers
ID.RA-09 applies to whatever your organization acquires and runs, so the first job is deciding which items sit inside the outcome. Each decision below changes the inventory, the checks and the evidence you will need, and each should be traced back to the assets and suppliers recorded in your own CSF Current Profile.
Hardware bought or refreshed
Every server, endpoint, network device and storage array that enters the estate is an acquisition. The decision is whether all hardware is in scope or only critical technology products, which NIST's Implementation Example for ID.RA-09 singles out. A tiered rule keeps effort proportionate, but the tiers must be written down and tied to the asset records in ID.AM. Confirm who checks authenticity at receipt, such as serial verification against the vendor record or tamper inspection, and whether that check is recorded.
Third-party and open-source software
Commercial packages, libraries and open-source components all count as software you acquire and use. The decision is whether a component is in scope only when you install it directly or also when it arrives as a transitive dependency. Scoping the full dependency graph is harder, but it is where tampered or unexpectedly modified components usually hide. Ask whether you can produce a software bill of materials for each deployed system and whether that inventory is checked against the source.
Container images and build pipelines
Container images, base images and the pipelines that produce them change what acquisition means. The decision is whether a build pipeline that pulls packages and publishes an image counts as acquisition, and whether images pulled from public registries need signature or digest checks before deployment. If your pipeline runs third-party build steps, those steps belong in scope. Record which images are approved, where they come from and how their integrity is verified before they reach production.
Cloud-provided images and managed services
Machine images, managed database engines and platform components supplied by a cloud provider raise the question of whether they are acquired by you. Illustratively, a cloud marketplace image you deploy is a software acquisition even though the provider maintains it. The decision is whether to treat provider-supplied images as in scope, and how you verify their origin and integrity. Confirm what the provider documents about image provenance and what you must check yourself.
Firmware and vendor updates
Firmware, BIOS, controller and appliance updates are often pushed by vendors outside normal change windows. The decision is whether each update is an acquisition requiring authenticity checks before installation, or a routine maintenance item. Treating updates as acquisitions means verifying the vendor signature or published hash and recording the result. Ask the vendor how updates are signed and where the public keys or hashes are published, and confirm that your change process routes these updates through the same check.
Suppliers that deliver the components
Resellers, distributors, integrators and open-source maintainers determine where components actually come from. The decision is which suppliers are in scope for authenticity checks and whether the check starts before purchase. Critical supplier assessment belongs to ID.RA-10, but the sourcing channel is part of ID.RA-09. Record which channels are authorized, what purchase terms require (such as authorized-reseller status or chain-of-custody statements), and who approves an exception for an unlisted channel.
How an assessor tests ID.RA-09 and what they ask to see
This table sets out four typical assessor tests for ID.RA-09, the evidence each one asks for and the gaps that come up most often. Assessors test against your organization's own Profile and the outcome wording, not against any text reproduced here, so use the rows as a checklist of what to prepare. The main takeaway is that a written procedure alone rarely passes; assessors want dated records showing the checks were carried out on real acquisitions and that alerts were acted on.
| Test area | Evidence requested | Common findings |
|---|---|---|
| Acquisition procedure includes authenticity checks | Written procedure covering hardware and software acquisition, named owner, approved checks such as vendor verification, signature or checksum validation, and approval records | Procedure exists but does not mention authenticity or integrity; checks depend on individual memory |
| Sampling of recent acquisitions for documented verification | A sample of recent purchases and software downloads with records of source, checksum or signature verification, and who approved the install | Verification not recorded for some items; downloads taken from unofficial mirrors without a documented check |
| Review of SBOM or component inventory against deployed systems | Current SBOMs for in-house and supplied software, inventory of deployed hardware and software, and a reconciliation showing the two match | SBOMs are out of date, missing for purchased products, or do not match what is running in production |
| Review of integrity monitoring configuration and alert handling | Monitored file and directory list, baseline records, alert samples, and tickets showing who reviewed each alert and what was done | Monitoring is enabled but scope omits critical binaries; alerts are generated but never triaged or closed |
| Supplier and vendor authenticity commitments | Contract clauses or supplier documentation describing provenance, signing practices and notification of tampering | Contracts silent on provenance; no evidence the organization checked supplier claims |
Implementing ID.RA-09 step by step
This sequence turns the ID.RA-09 outcome into working controls: criteria for what counts as authentic, verification built into buying and onboarding, an inventory that shows what is running, integrity baselines on critical systems, and a defined path for deviations, all reviewed on a schedule.
Define authenticity criteria for each product class
Start by sorting the hardware and software you acquire into product classes, such as operating systems, container images, firmware, network appliances and third-party libraries. For each class, write the criteria that establish authenticity and integrity: the trusted publisher, the signature or checksum method, the accepted distribution channel and the approved version range. The product owner and the security lead sign off on the document. The artifact is a short authenticity standard, one table row per product class, that procurement and engineering can both apply without asking follow-up questions.
Add verification requirements to procurement
Write the authenticity criteria into purchase requirements, supplier onboarding questionnaires and contract language. Ask suppliers to state how they sign releases, where they publish checksums, how they disclose tampering and whether they provide a software bill of materials for delivered software. Procurement records the answers before the first purchase order. The artifact is a completed supplier verification record for each new supplier, held with the contract file, and a clause that lets you reject a delivery that fails verification.
Build and maintain a component inventory
Create a register of the hardware and software components in each system, including versions, sources and the supplier that provided them. Where a component is a software package, the inventory should capture its dependencies as well. The asset owner maintains the register, and the platform team updates it as part of change management. The artifact is a current inventory that can be exported in a standard format, such as a CycloneDX software bill of materials for applications, and that a reviewer can match against the authenticity standard from the first step.
Scan and analyze the inventory
Run scanning tools against the inventory to identify OS packages and software dependencies, then check the results against known vulnerabilities, unexpected versions and license risk. Open-source options include Trivy, which can produce a software bill of materials and scan existing SBOMs, and OWASP Dependency-Track, which consumes and produces CycloneDX SBOMs and VEX and flags outdated or modified components. Confirm that each tool covers your product classes before relying on it. The artifact is a scan report per system with each finding assigned to an owner or closed with a documented reason.
Establish integrity baselines on critical systems
For critical systems, record a baseline of file checksums and attributes after a verified build or deployment, then monitor those files for unplanned change. Wazuh file integrity monitoring can keep a baseline of monitored files and alert when a user or process creates, modifies or deletes one, in real time or on a schedule. Bareos Verify jobs can compare files against previously cataloged attributes. Confirm which monitoring option suits each system's change pattern. The artifact is a signed baseline record for each critical system, stored outside the system it describes, and a test alert that shows the monitoring works.
Define deviation triage and incident handoff
Write the rules for what happens when a scan or integrity check finds a mismatch. Define who triages each alert, how the team confirms whether the change was authorized through change management, and the conditions under which the event moves to incident response. Include the evidence to preserve before any remediation. The security operations lead owns the procedure and tests it with at least one tabletop or simulated mismatch. The artifact is a triage runbook with escalation criteria, plus a record of the test showing the handoff worked.
Review the process on a schedule
Set a recurring review of the authenticity standard, the supplier records, the inventory coverage, the monitoring rules and the triage outcomes. The review checks whether new product classes entered the environment without criteria, whether scanners still cover them and whether recent deviations exposed gaps. Record changes to the standard through the policy approval process. The artifact is a dated review record with the decisions made, the owners assigned and the updated standard or runbook versions, which an assessor can trace back to earlier evidence.
Evidence that passes an ID.RA-09 test
An assessor testing ID.RA-09 looks for proof that hardware and software were checked for authenticity and integrity before they were acquired and while they run. The artifacts below connect acquisition records, component inventories, vulnerability and license decisions, and change detection, so each one can be traced back to a specific system and date.
Acquisition verification procedure
A written procedure that states how each hardware or software item is checked before it enters production: which checks apply to which product class, who performs them, and what happens when a check fails. For ID.RA-09, the procedure should cover checksum or signature verification of software packages, serial and provenance checks for hardware, and approval before installation. Review it when the purchasing or build process changes, and keep prior versions so an assessor can see what applied at the time of each purchase.
Supplier attestations and verification records
Signed statements from suppliers, or records of verification performed against them, showing that a delivered product is genuine and unaltered. Keep one record per acquisition, linked to the purchase order and the asset identifier. Ask suppliers for their assurance documents at contract signature and again when a product version changes, because a record from an earlier release does not cover a later build. Store the records where they can be retrieved by asset, not only by supplier.
Current SBOM for each system
A software bill of materials for each production system, in a machine-readable format, that lists the components and versions actually deployed. Dependency-Track consumes and produces CycloneDX SBOMs, and Trivy can generate an SBOM from a target or scan an existing one. Regenerate the SBOM on every build or deployment and on a fixed schedule for systems that change rarely, then retain past versions so an assessor can compare what ran on a given date.
Vulnerability and license analysis with triage
Reports from the SBOM analysis showing known vulnerabilities, outdated or modified components, and license risk, each with a documented triage decision such as fix, accept with an owner and expiry date, or not affected. Dependency-Track identifies components with known vulnerabilities and tracks license use by SPDX license ID. Schedule the analysis to rerun when vulnerability data updates, not only at audit time, and keep the triage history so a closed finding can be traced to its reason.
Integrity monitoring baselines and alerts
Recorded baselines of checksums and attributes for critical binaries, configuration files and firmware, with the alert history from comparing current state against them. Wazuh file integrity monitoring records a baseline and raises an alert when a user or process creates, modifies or deletes a monitored file, including who made the change and when. Bareos Verify jobs can compare files against catalog attributes. Document which paths are monitored, how often checks run, and how baselines are reapproved after authorized changes.
Sampled deviation tickets
Tickets showing that when a check failed, such as a checksum mismatch, an unexpected component or an integrity alert, someone investigated, recorded the cause and decided on containment or removal. An assessor typically samples these tickets and traces each one back to the alert or analysis that raised it. Keep the ticket linked to the affected asset and the relevant baseline or SBOM version, and retain closed tickets for the period your policy and any external obligations require.
How Dependency-Track, Trivy, Wazuh and Bareos produce the evidence
OWASP Dependency-Track is an Apache-2.0 licensed platform that ingests software bill of materials (SBOM) data and tracks the components inside your applications over time. It consumes and produces CycloneDX SBOMs and VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) documents, so the component inventory it holds can be exported as evidence for a reviewer. For ID.RA-09, the useful output is a versioned record of which components entered a product, where they came from in your build pipeline, and whether any of them carry known vulnerabilities, are outdated, or appear modified relative to the version they claim to be.
- Component inventory: Each uploaded CycloneDX SBOM becomes a project record with its components, versions and package identifiers, which you can export and retain.
- Known vulnerabilities: Components are matched against vulnerability sources so you can show what was flagged and how the team responded.
- Outdated and modified components: The platform reports components behind their latest available version and flags certain component identities that do not match published records, which supports a review of unexpected changes.
- License risk: License use is tracked by component using SPDX license IDs, giving a record for legal and procurement review.
- VEX statements: Analysts can record whether a vulnerability is exploitable in your context, and that justification can be exported.
The limits matter. Dependency-Track shows what is in the software you built or imported and what changed in the inventory, but it cannot prove the original manufacturer or the integrity of a binary you never built. Confirm current matching sources, supported SBOM versions and modified-component detection against the Dependency-Track documentation before you describe them in an assessment.
Trivy is an Apache-2.0 licensed scanner that identifies the operating system packages and software dependencies present in a target such as a container image, file system or repository. It can produce those findings as a software bill of materials and it can also scan an SBOM that someone else produced. For ID.RA-09, Trivy is most useful as a repeatable inventory step at acquisition and before deployment, giving you a dated record of what a specific artifact contains at the moment you accepted it.
- Dated inventory of an artifact: A scan of a specific image or file system records the packages and dependencies present at that time, which you can file with the change record.
- SBOM generation: Trivy can output an SBOM, which can then feed Dependency-Track or other tools.
- Scanning supplied SBOMs: Where a supplier provides an SBOM, Trivy can scan it, so you can compare the supplier's stated contents against your own results.
- Comparison across versions: Retaining scan outputs for each release lets reviewers see what changed between two accepted artifacts.
Trivy does not establish provenance. A clean scan shows that the listed packages match known data at the time of the scan. It does not show that the artifact came from an authorized source, that a signature verified, or that a binary matches an official build. Those checks need separate evidence, such as signature and digest verification in your pipeline. Confirm current output formats and the scanning sources it uses in the Trivy repository README before you rely on them.
Wazuh is a GPL-2.0-only security platform whose file integrity monitoring (FIM) module records a baseline of checksums and attributes for the files and directories you choose to monitor. After the baseline exists, Wazuh raises an alert when a user or process creates, modifies or deletes a monitored file. Monitoring can run on a schedule or in real time, and the alert records how and when the change happened and, where the operating system reports it, who made it. For ID.RA-09, this produces evidence that installed software and configuration on a host have not changed outside approved processes after acceptance.
- Baseline records: The checksum and attribute baseline for monitored paths is the reference point an assessor can compare against your change records.
- Change alerts: Each creation, modification or deletion produces an event that can be reviewed, tied to a ticket, and retained.
- Change detail: Alerts carry what changed, when and by which account or process, which supports investigation.
- Scheduled or real-time scans: Your monitoring schedule is evidence in itself, so document the frequency and the monitored paths.
Wazuh shows that a monitored file changed after the baseline. It does not show that the baseline itself was correct, and it cannot tell you the original manufacturer of the software. If the baseline was taken from an already compromised host, the evidence is weak. Confirm supported platforms, monitoring options and alert fields against the Wazuh file integrity monitoring documentation before you describe them to an assessor.
Bareos is an AGPL-3.0-only backup system. Its Verify jobs compare files on a system against attributes that were cataloged when the files were backed up, which gives you a Tripwire-like check for changes that happened after a break-in. For ID.RA-09, a Verify job produces a dated comparison showing whether files on a host still match the attributes recorded at a known point. That is useful for showing that accepted software and configuration files have not been silently altered, provided the backup catalog itself is protected.
- Catalog-based comparison: Verify jobs compare current files with the attributes stored in the catalog, and the job report is retainable evidence.
- Scheduled verification: Recurring Verify jobs document how often integrity was checked against the catalog.
- Restore-linked baseline: A backup taken after acceptance can serve as the reference point for later comparisons.
- Separation of duties: Keeping the catalog and job definitions under a separate administrative control makes the record harder to alter.
Bareos depends on the integrity of its catalog. If an attacker can change both the files and the catalog, the Verify result is not reliable, and the tool cannot identify the original supplier of any component. It also checks against what was cataloged, not against an external reference of authentic releases. Because Bareos is AGPL-3.0-only, review the license obligations if you modify and distribute it, and confirm the exact Verify options and attributes in the Bareos documentation before you rely on them.
What meeting ID.RA-09 costs in money and effort
This table lists the cost components of an ID.RA-09 program, who is paid for each, whether it is one-time or recurring, and what drives it up or down. Use it to compare written quotes line by line. The main takeaway is that the named open-source tools remove license spend, but hosting, engineering time and supplier verification still carry the cost.
| Cost component | One-time or recurring | What drives it | How to reduce it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tooling licenses | Recurring if commercial tools are added | The named tools (Dependency-Track, Trivy, Wazuh, Bareos) are open source under Apache-2.0, GPL-2.0-only and AGPL-3.0-only, so license fees can be avoided | Confirm each license and version in your own environment, and check whether any commercial add-on is part of the design |
| Hosting and infrastructure | Recurring | Number of scanned assets, SBOM volume, retention period for integrity baselines and alert data | Size the stack from the agreed asset inventory and set retention in the written scope |
| Engineering time for the inventory and baselines | One-time, then periodic updates | Number of hardware and software items, how many systems need file integrity baselines, and how clean the existing asset register is | Start from the ID.AM asset inventory where it exists and baseline the most critical systems first |
| Procurement process changes | One-time, then recurring for each new acquisition | Number of purchasing routes, whether authenticity questions are added to request forms and contracts, and approval steps | Use one standard authenticity question set and a single approval path for critical technology products |
| Supplier verification effort | Recurring per acquisition and per supplier review | Number of suppliers, complexity of hardware and firmware, and whether vendors provide SBOMs, checksums or signed releases | Require verification artifacts in the purchase terms and reuse results for repeat products |
| Evidence upkeep | Recurring | Frequency of SBOM regeneration, integrity scan schedules, alert triage and record keeping | Automate SBOM generation and scan reports, and define the evidence set before work begins |
| External testing or review | Recurring or per engagement | Scope of independent review of your authenticity process, sampled systems and whether a tester checks tamper resistance | Agree in writing whether testing is included and which systems it covers |
| Auditor sampling effort | Recurring per assessment cycle | Number of items the assessor samples, how traceable the evidence is, and whether records cover the full life cycle | Keep dated, linked records from acquisition through verification and monitoring so samples can be retrieved quickly |
Who owns ID.RA-09 and what an implementation partner can take on
Your organization owns ID.RA-09 in full. NIST CSF 2.0 describes outcomes, not who must perform them, so the accountable owner is whoever runs cybersecurity risk for the organization, usually the CISO or equivalent, working with procurement and engineering leads. Decisions about which hardware and software are critical enough to verify, which suppliers you trust, and what residual risk you accept stay with your leadership and cannot be delegated to a vendor.
- Acquisition policy: Define the authenticity and integrity checks required before a product is bought or deployed, and who may approve an exception.
- Supplier decisions: Choose which suppliers and distribution channels you rely on, and document why.
- Risk acceptance: Record any unverified component you choose to run, with an owner, a review date and a compensating control.
- Control operation: Run the SBOM review, scan triage and integrity alert handling day to day, or assign them to named staff.
- Contracts: Require provenance information, SBOM delivery and vulnerability notification from suppliers in purchase terms.
Confirm that these owners exist by name before any partner starts work, because a partner can build the tooling but cannot accept risk on your behalf.
An implementation partner such as DeployOpen works inside your infrastructure to prepare the technical side of ID.RA-09. Under a fixed-scope written agreement, the partner plans, deploys and hardens the tooling, then documents the procedures and assembles the evidence your team and auditor will review. The partner does not decide what your organization accepts, and it does not issue audit reports or certifications. NIST does not certify CSF implementations either, so no partner can offer that.
- SBOM and component inventory: Deploy open-source tools such as Trivy to generate software bills of materials and OWASP Dependency-Track to track components, vulnerabilities and license data.
- Integrity monitoring: Configure Wazuh file integrity monitoring or Bareos Verify jobs against agreed baselines inside your environment.
- Procedures: Write runbooks for intake checks, alert handling and exception records.
- Evidence preparation: Produce configuration exports, scan outputs, alert samples and change records that show the controls operate.
- Handover: Train your staff and agree in writing which operational tasks remain with you or move to a retainer.
Ask any partner to state in the written scope which deliverables it will not perform, including report issuance.
An independent auditor, assessor or certification body tests whether ID.RA-09 operates as your documentation says. Where a framework requires a formal report, only that independent party issues it. The assessor must remain independent of the work it tests, so it cannot be the same firm that designed or deployed the controls, and it should confirm that the partner's role was limited to preparation.
- Test design: The assessor selects samples of acquisitions, SBOM records and integrity alerts and checks them against your policy.
- Evidence review: It looks for dated, attributable and complete records, not screenshots prepared for the audit.
- Reporting: It issues any report, attestation or finding in its own name.
- Independence: Engagement letters should show the assessor has no role in building the tooling it reviews.
- Scope boundaries: Agree in advance which suppliers and systems fall in scope.
Before engaging an assessor, confirm which framework or customer requirement applies, since the acceptable evidence depends on it.
Where organizations fall short on ID.RA-09 and how to close each gap
ID.RA-09 asks whether hardware and software are checked for authenticity and integrity before they are acquired and used. Most shortfalls are not missing tools but missing steps: a check that never happens, an inventory that drifts, or a record that lives in the wrong place. Each card below names one gap, the practical fix and the artifact an assessor can review.
Authenticity taken on vendor's word
Procurement often accepts a vendor's statement that a product is genuine and unmodified, with no verification step. For ID.RA-09, the check should happen before acquisition and use. Fix this by requiring a documented verification step in the purchase workflow, such as confirming published checksums or signatures, validating the chain of custody for hardware, and confirming the vendor's distribution channel. The artifact is a signed acceptance record per purchase showing who verified what and when.
Stale or partial component inventories
Inventories that cover only servers miss endpoints, network devices, firmware, containers and third-party software. An authenticity check cannot cover a component nobody recorded. Fix this by extending the asset inventory to all hardware and software classes, tying each item to its source and version, and reconciling the list against procurement records and discovery scans on a set schedule. The artifact is a dated inventory export with a reconciliation log showing what was added, removed or unverified.
SBOMs generated once and never refreshed
A software bill of materials produced at release describes only the build it came from. Dependencies change, and new vulnerabilities or modified components appear later. Fix this by regenerating SBOMs at each build and deployment, and loading them into a component analysis tool such as OWASP Dependency-Track, which consumes CycloneDX SBOMs and flags components with known vulnerabilities, outdated versions or modifications. The artifact is a versioned SBOM per release with the analysis history that shows when each component was last checked.
Integrity baselines with no one watching
File integrity monitoring can record checksums and attributes of critical files, but a baseline that raises alerts into an unread mailbox does not verify anything. Fix this by routing integrity alerts to a named queue, defining who triages them and how unexpected changes escalate to incident handling, and reviewing baselines after approved changes. Wazuh file integrity monitoring can record who changed a monitored file and when. The artifact is the alert log with triage notes and the change ticket that approved or rejected each event.
Supplier attestations collected but not reviewed
Suppliers often return attestations of authenticity or secure delivery that nobody reads against the contract or the product received. A signed form proves little if it is not compared with what arrived. Fix this by setting the attestation content in the contract, assigning a reviewer, and checking each attestation against the delivered serial numbers, hashes or SBOM. Gaps should produce a documented follow-up with the supplier. The artifact is the reviewed attestation with the reviewer's sign-off and the comparison record.
Evidence scattered across tickets and chat
When verification results sit in tickets, chat threads and personal folders, an assessor cannot trace a single component from purchase to deployment. Fix this by defining one evidence record per component, linking the inventory entry, verification step, SBOM, integrity baseline and review decision, and storing it in a controlled repository with retention rules. Teams can then answer an assessor's sample request without reconstruction. The artifact is a per-component evidence index with links to each source record.
Common questions about ID.RA-09 cost, effort and outsourcing
How much effort does ID.RA-09 take and what drives it?
The effort depends on how many hardware and software products the organization acquires, how many of them are critical, and how mature its supplier and asset records already are. ID.RA-09 asks that authenticity and integrity be assessed before acquisition and use, so the work has two parts: a one-time build of the intake process, and a recurring cost of running it for each new purchase or release. Effort rises when asset inventories are incomplete, when software arrives through many channels, or when suppliers do not provide hashes, signatures or software bills of materials. Ask any quote to split the work into design, tooling, integration with procurement, and ongoing intake reviews, so each cost component is visible.
How long does an ID.RA-09 project usually take?
The timing depends on scope, including the number of asset classes, the systems involved and the state of existing inventories and procurement workflows. No public benchmark is supplied for this subcategory, so treat any single duration with caution. A written plan sets the timeline: it names the scope, the deliverables, the dependencies on procurement and asset teams, and the dates for each review. Organizations usually find that the longest phase is agreeing on which purchases count as critical, not the technical checks themselves. Ask for milestones tied to evidence, such as a documented intake procedure and a first set of reviewed acquisitions.
What does ID.RA-09 need from our own staff?
Your staff owns the control, so the work needs named people from several functions. Procurement needs to route critical purchases through the intake step. Asset management needs accurate records of hardware and software. Security engineers decide which checks apply, such as verifying signatures, comparing checksums or reviewing a software bill of materials. System owners approve exceptions. Legal or contract teams add supplier obligations on provenance and vulnerability disclosure. Expect a recurring time commitment from these roles after launch, because each new acquisition needs a decision and a record. Confirm the named owners and their time before work starts.
Can a small team handle ID.RA-09 alone with open-source tools?
A small team can cover the core activities with open-source tools, although the scope it can handle depends on its size and the number of products. Dependency-Track consumes and produces CycloneDX software bill of materials and VEX data, identifies components with known vulnerabilities, outdated or modified components, and license risk. Trivy can produce a software bill of materials for a target and scan existing SBOMs. Wazuh file integrity monitoring records a baseline of checksums and attributes and alerts on changes to monitored files. Bareos Verify jobs compare files against cataloged attributes. Each tool needs configuration, maintenance and staff time, so a small team should confirm its capacity against a written scope before committing.
What will an assessor sample when testing ID.RA-09?
An assessor usually samples recent acquisitions of in-scope hardware and software and asks for the intake record for each one. Expect requests for the written procedure, the list of critical products, evidence that checks such as signature or checksum verification were performed before use, and records of exceptions and their approvals. Assessors also look for integrity monitoring output showing how monitored files are baselined and reviewed. The sample size and method come from the assessor and its own standard, so confirm them with the assessor before the engagement. An implementation partner can prepare the records, but only the independent assessor reaches a conclusion.
Does NIST or any body certify that we meet ID.RA-09?
No. NIST does not offer certifications or endorsements of CSF-related products, implementations or services, and it has no plans for a conformity assessment program. An organization that adopts CSF 2.0 demonstrates its own alignment, and a customer, regulator or independent assessor may review that evidence. Where an external review is needed, an independent auditor, assessor or certification body issues the report or certificate. DeployOpen prepares systems, controls and evidence for assessment, but it does not issue audit reports, attestations or certifications.
What should we ask an implementation partner to include in a quote?
Ask for a written scope that lists the asset classes, the products and suppliers covered, and the systems that will hold the evidence. The quote should separate one-time work, such as designing the intake procedure and configuring tooling, from recurring work, such as reviewing new acquisitions or maintaining SBOM and monitoring feeds. Ask who owns each deliverable, which items the client's staff must supply, what documentation will be handed over, and what happens to exceptions and scope changes. DeployOpen plans and implements inside the client's own infrastructure and agrees scope, deliverables and timelines in writing before work starts, and no price list is published, so a quote follows from that scope.
How do we keep ID.RA-09 evidence current between audits?
Keep the evidence flowing as part of normal purchasing rather than assembling it before an assessment. Each acquisition should produce a short intake record with the supplier, the checks performed, the result and the approver. Store SBOMs and vulnerability reports from Dependency-Track or Trivy with the asset record, and review file integrity alerts from Wazuh on a set schedule. Revisit the critical product list whenever a supplier changes or a new product class enters use. Assign an owner to run a periodic review of the records, and confirm the retention period with your assessor, since the required evidence window depends on the assessment you face.
How DeployOpen works on this
DeployOpen prepares the systems, software inventories and integrity records that show hardware and software were assessed before acquisition and use under ID.RA-09. The organization owns the assessment decisions, and an independent auditor or assessor decides whether the evidence is sufficient.
How we scope
- Agree in writing which hardware, software and critical technology products fall within the ID.RA-09 scope.
- Confirm which self-hosted platforms, cloud accounts or air-gapped networks hold the assets to be inventoried and monitored.
- Document which authenticity checks the organization already performs and which gaps the engagement will close.
How we build
- Deploy software bill of materials generation and component analysis, such as Trivy and OWASP Dependency-Track, inside your environment.
- Configure file integrity monitoring with Wazuh to baseline checksums of approved binaries, configuration files and firmware-related directories.
- Set up Bareos Verify jobs against cataloged attributes so changes to protected systems can be compared against known good states.
How we hand over
- Deliver written procedures for verifying supplier provenance, checksums and SBOMs before new hardware or software enters service.
- Provide an evidence map linking each tool output, alert record and approval to the ID.RA-09 Subcategory and its informative references.
- Train your operators to review alerts, reconcile SBOM changes and record exceptions, so the process runs after handover.
How we support
- Support is available as a retainer for tuning baselines, upgrading tools and reviewing new supplier components as they arrive.
- Ask for the scope, deliverables and handover timeline in writing before work starts, since engagements are fixed-scope.
- Confirm with your auditor which artifacts they will sample, because DeployOpen prepares evidence but does not issue assessment reports.
