Which open-source tools cover ISO 27001 controls and evidence
Open-source tools can run and record many of the technical controls in ISO 27001 Annex A, which lists 93 controls, but the organization still owns those controls, and only an accredited certification body can certify the management system. A customer asking for ISO 27001 is really asking for two things: a working set of controls that operate every day, and records that prove they operated. Self-hosted tools can supply much of the second part, especially for identity, logging, access reviews, secrets, vulnerability scanning and asset inventory, provided someone has decided what each tool must prove and where its output is kept.
Whether open source is enough depends on three factors: the scope of the ISMS, what systems already exist, and how much evidence the team must assemble by hand. A small product with one cloud account and a handful of staff may need few tools, while a multi-site organization with legacy applications will face gaps in identity federation, log coverage and asset records. Start by mapping each Annex A control in scope to a named owner, a system of record and a recurring evidence artifact, then check which of those artifacts a tool exports on its own and which the team must screenshot, export or file manually.
Confirm three things before committing. First, check each tool's license and edition limits, because some features that matter for audits, such as certain administration or audit-log functions, may sit only in paid editions or outside the license you plan to use. Second, confirm that the tool can export its records in a form an auditor can sample, with timestamps and user attribution. Third, decide who operates the tools after go-live, since logs that nobody reviews will not satisfy a control on monitoring. The sections below work through the specific tools, their licenses and the evidence each one keeps.
Tools by control area: identity, logging, access reviews, secrets, scanning, inventory and documentation
Identity controls in Annex A cover how users are authenticated and how access to systems is granted and withdrawn. Keycloak (Apache-2.0) fits this area by acting as a single sign-on layer, so users authenticate once with Keycloak rather than separately into each application. It supports OpenID Connect, OAuth 2.0 and SAML 2.0, and it can broker logins to existing OpenID Connect or SAML 2.0 identity providers, which helps when you already run a corporate directory.
- Central authentication point: applications delegate login to Keycloak, so the authentication policy is configured once and applied consistently.
- Federation to existing directories: brokered identity providers let you keep your current source of truth for identities.
- Protocol coverage: OpenID Connect, OAuth 2.0 and SAML 2.0 let you onboard both modern and legacy applications under one control point.
- Evidence kept: realm configuration, client definitions and administrative event logs can be exported and retained as proof of how authentication is set up.
- Multi-factor enforcement: confirm with the Keycloak documentation which second-factor methods and required-action settings your version supports, and test them in your own environment.
Confirm that your authentication policy, password and MFA requirements, and privileged account rules are written down and approved, because Keycloak enforces settings but does not decide what they should be.
Logging and monitoring controls ask that security-relevant events be recorded, protected and reviewed. Wazuh (GPL-2.0-only) collects and decodes logs, then compares each event against a ruleset of over 3,000 built-in rules and decoders plus any custom rules you add. Matching events become alerts written to alerts.log and alerts.json, and each alert can be mapped to MITRE ATT&CK and forwarded to the Wazuh indexer for review in the dashboard.
- Rule-based detection: the built-in ruleset covers many common log sources, and custom rules can cover internal applications.
- Alert records: alerts.log and alerts.json give a plain, timestamped record of what fired and when.
- ATT&CK mapping: alerts carry technique references, which helps you explain detection coverage to an assessor.
- Central review: the dashboard and indexer give reviewers one place to triage alerts and document their decisions.
- Log protection: confirm how retention, access to the indexer and integrity of stored logs are configured, since those settings determine whether the logs themselves are trustworthy evidence.
The organization still decides which systems must log, how long logs are kept, who reviews alerts and how reviews are recorded. Ask your implementation partner to show a sample of reviewed alerts with the reviewer's disposition, because an alert feed without follow-up does not demonstrate that monitoring operates.
Access review controls require that access rights are checked at intervals and adjusted when they are no longer needed. midPoint (EUPL-1.2+) supports access certification campaigns in which designated reviewers decide within a set timeframe whether to keep, change or revoke access items such as role assignments. This counters access accumulation, where people keep rights from earlier roles, and supports segregation of duties by surfacing conflicting assignments.
- Campaign records: each campaign records who reviewed which items and what decision they made.
- Defined reviewers and deadlines: the campaign structure forces a named owner and a timeframe for each decision.
- Revocation actions: items marked for removal can be actioned in the identity system rather than left in a spreadsheet.
- Segregation of duties visibility: role assignments make conflicting combinations easier to spot during review.
- Scope limits: confirm which target systems midPoint connects to in your environment, because a review covers only the resources it can see.
The organization must decide review frequency, reviewer selection, escalation for missed reviews and how privileged access is treated. Show an assessor at least one completed campaign with its decisions and the follow-up changes, since that record is the evidence of operation.
Secrets controls concern how credentials, keys and tokens are stored, issued and revoked. OpenBao (MPL-2.0) stores secrets encrypted in one place and can generate dynamic, short-lived credentials for systems such as databases, so applications do not hold long-lived passwords. Each credential is issued with a lease that revokes it automatically on expiry, and secrets can be revoked individually or as whole trees of related credentials.
- Encrypted central store: secrets are kept in one controlled location instead of configuration files and scripts.
- Dynamic credentials: database users can be created on request with short lifetimes, reducing standing access.
- Lease-based expiry: leases give a verifiable expiry point for each issued credential.
- Bulk revocation: revoking a parent credential can remove its dependent credentials, which supports fast response to a suspected compromise.
- Audit trail: confirm which audit devices and log destinations your deployment enables, because the audit record depends on that setup.
The organization must still define rotation rules, who may request secrets, how root and unseal material is protected and how emergency access is handled. Ask your implementation partner for a dated record of a credential issuance and its automatic expiry or revocation.
Vulnerability management controls require that technical weaknesses are identified, tracked and fixed within the organization's own timeframes. Greenbone Community Edition (OpenVAS), licensed AGPL-3.0-or-later, runs the OpenVAS Scanner, which executes vulnerability tests from the Greenbone Community Feed against target systems. The feed is updated daily, and gvmd controls the scanner over the Open Scanner Protocol.
- Scheduled scans: recurring scans against defined target lists produce dated reports.
- Current test content: the daily feed update keeps vulnerability tests aligned with newly published issues.
- Report history: each scan report records findings, severities and the targets scanned, which can serve as evidence of operation.
- Credentialed scanning: confirm which authenticated scan options your edition supports, since they change the depth of findings.
- Edition boundaries: check the Greenbone documentation for features that belong to commercial editions before you rely on them in scope.
The organization must define scan scope, frequency, severity thresholds, remediation deadlines and exception approval. Show that findings move to tracked remediation and that rescans confirm closure, because a scanner report alone does not show that weaknesses were fixed.
Asset inventory controls ask that the organization knows what information and technology it holds, who owns each asset and how it is maintained. GLPI (GPL-3.0-or-later) manages an inventory through its Assets module, which covers computers, monitors, software, network equipment, peripherals, printers, phones and racks. Records can be entered manually or pushed automatically by the GLPI Agent through native inventory built into GLPI since version 10.
- Automated discovery: the GLPI Agent reports hardware and software from endpoints, reducing reliance on manual lists.
- Broad asset types: the module covers network gear, peripherals and racks, not only laptops and servers.
- Ownership fields: assets can be linked to users, locations and groups, which supports clear ownership.
- Change history: inventory updates leave a record that can show when an asset appeared or changed.
- Coverage gaps: cloud resources and SaaS applications usually need separate sources, so confirm what your deployment can and cannot discover.
The organization must define what counts as an asset, who owns it, how classification is recorded and how the inventory is reviewed. Show an assessor a reconciliation between the inventory and a sample of live systems, since an inventory that has not been compared with reality is weak evidence.
Documentation controls require policies, procedures and records that are approved, current and retrievable. XWiki (LGPL-2.1-or-later) keeps every change to a page under version control, recording what changed, when and by whom. Users can compare any two versions and roll back to an earlier one, which gives a clear history for policies that auditors will ask about. CISO Assistant (AGPL-3.0-only) ships more than 200 frameworks, including ISO 27001, and supports audits and compliance assessments with automatic mapping between frameworks.
- Version history in XWiki: approval and revision records can be traced through page history.
- Attribution: each change shows the author and time, which supports document control expectations.
- Framework library in CISO Assistant: the ISO 27001 library provides a starting structure for the Statement of Applicability and assessments.
- Assessment records: CISO Assistant holds assessment status and evidence links for each requirement.
- Mapping limits: automatic mappings are a convenience, so confirm each mapping against the standard and your own interpretation before relying on it.
The organization must write the policies, assign owners, approve the Statement of Applicability and decide what evidence each control requires. Ask your implementation partner to show an approved policy's version history alongside the assessment entry that cites it.
License and edition limits to check before choosing a tool
Open-source tools for ISO 27001 evidence come under different licenses, and those licenses set what your team must do if it changes the software. Check the license and the edition limits before you commit, because the features that produce evidence are not always in the free version.
Permissive licenses: Apache-2.0 and MPL-2.0
Keycloak is licensed under Apache-2.0, and OpenBao is licensed under MPL-2.0. Both let you use, modify and run the software internally without publishing your changes, though MPL-2.0 keeps modifications to its own source files under the same license if you distribute them. Read the license text for your use case, and confirm with counsel if you plan to ship modified builds to customers.
Copyleft licenses: GPL-2.0-only and GPL-3.0-or-later
Wazuh is licensed under GPL-2.0-only and GLPI under GPL-3.0-or-later. Running these tools unmodified inside your own organization creates no duty to publish anything. If your team changes the code and distributes the result, for example to a managed service provider or a customer, the recipients receive source code rights under the same license.
Network copyleft: AGPL-3.0-or-later and AGPL-3.0-only
Greenbone Community Edition is licensed under AGPL-3.0-or-later and CISO Assistant under AGPL-3.0-only. The AGPL extends source obligations to software accessed over a network, so a modified version offered to users through a web interface may trigger a duty to offer them the modified source. Teams that patch these tools should record their changes and ask counsel how the obligation applies to internal and external users.
Weak copyleft and EU licenses: LGPL-2.1 and EUPL-1.2+
XWiki is licensed under LGPL-2.1-or-later, which lets you link the library into other software with fewer conditions than full GPL terms. midPoint is licensed under EUPL-1.2 or later, an EU copyleft license with its own compatibility list. Confirm with counsel which obligations apply when you combine these components with proprietary code or other open-source projects.
Why eramba Community is not open source
Since a June 2024 license update, eramba Community is free to use under eramba's own license, which forbids modifying, selling, licensing or distributing the software. eramba staff state it should not be called open source for that reason. Treat it as a free product with restrictions, and confirm the current terms with the vendor before you build evidence processes around it.
Paid edition limits to confirm
The supplied facts do not list which features each vendor holds back for paid editions, so do not assume a free tier covers audit logs, access certification, retention or support. Ask each vendor in writing which features, retention periods and integrations the free edition includes, and which need a subscription. Record the answer, because a missing feature can leave a control without evidence.
What evidence an auditor tests from these tools
An assessor does not accept a tool because it is installed. They sample records that show the control operated during the audit period, and they check that the records are complete, dated and attributable to a person or process. For the tools in this topic, the samples usually look like configuration exports from the identity provider and secrets store, alert records from the log platform, access review records with reviewer decisions and dates, rotation and revocation logs for credentials, vulnerability scan reports, inventory exports from the asset register, and version-controlled documents such as policies and procedures. Ask your team which of these each Annex A control you own would produce, who exports them, and how often. A control with no recurring record is hard to evidence, however well the tool is configured.
A tool's log counts as evidence only if it shows the control working across the whole period under review, not just on the day of the audit. A single screenshot of a dashboard is a weak sample. A continuous export covering the full period, with the same settings throughout, is a stronger one. Confirm that the reviews you run, such as a quarterly access certification in midPoint or a monthly scan cycle in Greenbone, leave a decision trail that names the reviewer and the outcome. Retention and access to these logs are the organization's responsibility, not the tool vendor's. Decide how long records are kept, who can read or alter them, and how you show that the logs themselves have not been changed. Check the retention rules in your own policy against what the standard and your certification body expect, because the period is set by your environment and contracts, not by the software.
Document the export method for each record before the audit starts, so you can reproduce it on request. A sample of configuration exports, alert files such as the alerts.json output from Wazuh, and version history from XWiki will be asked for with dates attached. Keep a short register that links each Annex A control to its evidence source, the owner, and the export schedule. This is the work an implementation partner can help prepare, but the organization owns the records, and only the independent certification body decides whether they are sufficient.
Gaps open-source tools leave that the organization must close
Open-source tools collect logs, enforce access and keep inventories, but they cannot decide what the organization's security policy says, which risks it accepts or why each Annex A control applies. These gaps are organizational work, owned by the organization, and they should be finished and evidenced before an assessor arrives.
Policy content and approval
Each policy must reflect how the organization actually works, be approved by management with a named owner, and show a review date. A wiki page with version history proves when a text changed, but it does not prove that leadership agreed to it. Check that approvals are recorded with names, dates and the version approved, and that staff acknowledged the current version.
Risk assessment decisions
The risk register in a GRC tool records scores, but the decision to accept, treat, transfer or avoid each risk belongs to a manager with authority to make it. Assessors look for the rationale behind each decision and evidence that treatment plans were funded and tracked. Confirm that the method you use is defined, repeatable and applied consistently across assets.
Statement of Applicability justification
Every Annex A control must be marked as applicable or excluded in the Statement of Applicability, and each marking needs a reason tied to the risk assessment. A tool can hold the text, but it cannot judge whether a control is relevant to your business. Review each justification with the control owner, and confirm that exclusions are explained rather than left blank.
Supplier and physical controls
Supplier due diligence, contract clauses and reviews of third-party security reports happen outside any technical tool. Physical controls such as badge access, visitor logs, secure disposal of media and environmental monitoring of server rooms also depend on people and sites. Ask for a named owner for each, a schedule of reviews, and records that show the review happened.
Staff training records
Awareness training, role-specific instruction and records of attendance are required evidence, and most open-source tools do not deliver or track them. Keep a register that lists each employee, the training completed, the date and the assessment result. Confirm that new joiners and contractors receive training before they gain access to systems.
Nonconformity handling
When an audit, internal review or security event finds a gap, the organization must record the nonconformity, find its root cause, choose a corrective action and check that the action worked. Monitoring tools can raise alerts, but they cannot close the loop. Keep one log that links each finding to its action, owner and closure evidence.
How to roll out the tools before an ISO 27001 audit
This sequence moves from defining what is in scope to running the GRC tool against the Statement of Applicability, so each tool produces evidence that maps to a specific Annex A control and the auditor can trace it back to a named owner and a dated record.
Confirm scope and build the asset inventory
Before deploying anything, the organization fixes the ISMS scope and the assets inside it: users, applications, servers, network equipment, and cloud accounts. GLPI's Assets module can hold this inventory, populated manually or pushed by the GLPI Agent through native inventory available since version 10. Your team owns the scope decision; DeployOpen can help record it. The step is done when the inventory has an owner for each asset class and the scope statement matches what the inventory covers. That inventory export becomes the first evidence for asset-related controls and the base for every later step.
Deploy identity and single sign-on first
Next, route user logins through a central identity provider so applications stop managing their own credentials. Keycloak (Apache-2.0) supports OpenID Connect, OAuth 2.0 and SAML 2.0 and can broker logins to an existing identity provider, which often lets you keep current directories while adding one control point. Confirm multi-factor authentication settings in your own configuration, since the features you need depend on your deployment. The step closes when a test account cannot reach an in-scope application without going through the central login, and the realm configuration is exported and stored under change control.
Turn on centralized logging and alerting
Collect authentication, administrative and system logs from the in-scope assets and send them to a single monitoring point. Wazuh (GPL-2.0-only) decodes events and compares them against its built-in rules and decoders plus any custom rules you write, then writes alerts to alerts.log and alerts.json and forwards them to the Wazuh indexer for review in the dashboard. Confirm which log sources your environment produces and which rules you have enabled. The step is done when a deliberate test event, such as a failed login, appears as an alert with a timestamp, and the rule set version is recorded. Those alert records and review history are the evidence for logging and monitoring controls.
Set up access reviews and secrets handling
With identities and logs in place, schedule access certification campaigns in midPoint (EUPL-1.2+). Designated reviewers decide within a set timeframe whether to keep, change or revoke each role assignment, which counters access accumulation and supports segregation of duties. In parallel, move database and service credentials into OpenBao (MPL-2.0), which stores secrets encrypted, issues dynamic short-lived credentials and revokes them when leases expire. The step closes when one review campaign has run to completion with signed decisions and revoked items are confirmed gone, and when a sample of service credentials shows leases rather than static passwords.
Add vulnerability scanning and configuration evidence
Schedule vulnerability scans against in-scope systems with Greenbone Community Edition (OpenVAS), which runs tests from the daily updated Greenbone Community Feed under gvmd control. Agree with your team who triages findings and what remediation window applies, and document that decision in the policy set rather than assuming it. Also collect configuration baselines for servers and cloud resources. The step is done when a scan report exists for each in-scope asset group, findings have assigned owners and dispositions, and the scan configuration and feed date are recorded. Scan reports and triage tickets are the evidence for vulnerability management controls.
Publish controlled documentation
Move policies, procedures, and the risk treatment records into XWiki, which keeps every page change under version control with what changed, when, and by whom. Approval and review steps belong to your management team, and the wiki only records them. The step is done when each mandatory ISMS document has a named owner, an approved version, and a visible revision history, and when a test rollback to an earlier version has been performed and logged. Version histories and approval records become the documentary evidence auditors sample.
Load the Statement of Applicability into the GRC tool
Finally, enter the ISMS scope, risk register, and Annex A selections into a GRC tool. CISO Assistant (AGPL-3.0-only) ships an ISO 27001 framework among more than 200 frameworks and can run assessments against it. eramba Community is free to use but is not open source, and its license forbids modifying or redistributing the software, so check that restriction against your plans. Link each control to the evidence from earlier steps. The step closes when every Annex A control in the Statement of Applicability points to a named owner, an implementation status, and at least one evidence item, and when internal reviewers have walked the list. Confirm the framework version and mapping in your tool before relying on it, since the output is only as current as the library you load.
Questions buyers ask about open-source tools for ISO 27001
Are open-source tools enough to get ISO 27001 certified?
Open-source tools can run many technical controls and keep their evidence, but they do not make an organization certified. Certification depends on an ISMS that covers the full scope: risk assessment, the Statement of Applicability, documented policies, management review, internal audit and the clauses 4 to 10 requirements. Tools cover parts of that work, such as identity, logging, scanning and inventory. The organization still owns its controls and decisions, and only an accredited certification body issues the certificate after an audit. Ask the certification body which evidence it expects before you choose tools, since its sampling and documentation preferences shape what the tools must produce.
How much effort does an open-source setup take, and who should do it?
Effort depends mostly on how many systems the tools must cover, how well your identity and network layout is documented, and whether your team has run similar platforms before. Setup usually involves hosting, integration with existing identity providers, log sources, scanning scope, and writing the procedures that explain who reviews what and how often. Your internal engineers own the decisions and the operating routine. An implementation partner can take on the build and hardening work under a fixed written scope if your team lacks capacity. Ask any partner for a written scope, the list of deliverables, and which tasks remain with your staff before work starts.
Can open-source tools produce audit evidence on their own?
Tools produce records, but an auditor needs evidence that ties each record to a documented control, an owner and a review. Keycloak logs authentication events and midPoint keeps access certification campaign results, while Wazuh writes alerts to alerts.log and alerts.json and GLPI keeps asset records. XWiki version history shows who changed a policy and when. Auditors also look for proof that someone reviewed the output and acted on exceptions, and that the configuration was approved. Plan the evidence package per control, decide how exports are stored and labeled, and confirm with your certification body how it will sample that material.
What does an open-source license mean for internal use?
Most licenses listed for these tools permit internal use without a license fee, but the obligations differ. Apache-2.0 (Keycloak) and MPL-2.0 (OpenBao) carry different conditions from GPL-2.0-only (Wazuh) or AGPL-3.0 (Greenbone Community Edition and CISO Assistant), and copyleft terms can apply when you modify and distribute the software or offer it over a network. For internal use inside your own infrastructure, the main questions are whether you modify the code, whether you give it to third parties, and which features sit in paid editions. Have your legal team review the exact license text for each product and version you deploy, and confirm which features are in community editions.
Can eramba Community be used for ISO 27001 work?
eramba Community can be used under its own license, but it is not open source. Since a June 2024 update, that license forbids modifying, selling, licensing or otherwise distributing the software, and eramba staff have said it should not be called open source for that reason. Whether it fits your ISO 27001 work depends on the features you need in the community edition compared with paid editions, such as risk management or audit workflows. Before you adopt it, read the current license terms, list the features your risk register and Statement of Applicability need, and confirm with eramba which of them are included free of charge.
How does the three-year cycle affect how long evidence is kept?
An ISO 27001 certificate runs on a three-year cycle, and the certification body must audit in every calendar year, either as a surveillance audit or as the recertification audit. Evidence therefore has to cover the whole period since the last audit, not just the most recent quarter. Your retention rules should keep access reviews, log exports, scan reports, asset records and change approvals long enough for the certification body to sample them across the cycle. Decide retention periods with your certification body and your own legal obligations, and make sure logs stored in self-hosted platforms are backed up and remain readable for that period.
When should we bring in an implementation partner?
Bring in a partner when your team lacks time or skills to deploy, integrate and document the tools against a fixed scope, or when several systems must be connected at once. DeployOpen plans, implements, integrates, hardens, backs up and documents self-hosted open-source platforms inside your own cloud accounts, data centers or air-gapped networks, and prepares systems and evidence for assessments. It does not issue audit reports or certificates, and the independent certification body makes that decision. Most engagements are fixed-scope, and a quote follows from a written scope. Ask any partner to confirm which tasks it performs and which remain with your team.
What to ask an implementation partner about tooling
An implementation partner can build and configure open-source tools, but the organization keeps ownership of its controls and evidence. The checks below help you confirm that the partner's work stays inside your environment, can be operated by your team, and produces evidence a certification body can trace. The partner prepares systems and evidence only; it does not issue reports or certificates, which only an independent auditor or certification body can do.
Deployment inside your infrastructure
Ask whether every tool will run in your own cloud accounts, data centers or air-gapped network, with your identity provider and your logging destinations. Confirm that no production logs, credentials or evidence leave your boundary to a partner-hosted service. Ask for a written list of hosts, accounts and network paths the deployment will touch, so your security team can review it before work begins.
Ownership after handover
Ask who holds administrator credentials, source repositories, configuration files and backup keys when the engagement ends. A clean handover names an internal owner for each tool, a documented upgrade path and a list of what the partner did not transfer. Check the license of each component too, because some editions restrict modification or redistribution and that limits what your team can change later.
Documentation of control operation
Ask how the partner records what each tool does for each Annex A control, who operates it, how often it runs and where its output is stored. Good documentation separates the design of a control from proof that it operated during the audit period. Request a sample control record and confirm that it names the internal owner who reviews the output, not only the engineer who configured the tool.
Testing of the controls
Ask how the partner tests that each configured control works as designed, such as confirming that an MFA policy blocks a sign-in without a second factor or that a scan flags a known test finding. Ask for the test scripts or steps, the dates they ran and the results recorded. Independent testing by a separate security team or your own internal audit function is a stronger signal than a configuration check performed by the person who built the system.
An unbroken evidence chain
Ask how logs, scan reports, access review decisions and change records are kept with timestamps, identities and version history, so an assessor can trace each sample from the control to its source. Confirm retention periods, storage integrity controls and how exports are produced for the auditor. Ask the partner to walk through one sample request from start to finish, so you can see whether the chain holds without manual reconstruction.
How DeployOpen deploys these tools and prepares evidence
DeployOpen plans, implements, hardens, documents and supports self-hosted open-source platforms inside your own cloud accounts, data centers or air-gapped networks. For ISO 27001, we prepare the systems and evidence that your controls depend on, while your organization owns its controls and an independent certification body issues any certificate.
How we scope
- We agree a written scope listing which tools, Annex A controls and environments the engagement covers before work starts.
- We confirm each tool's license and edition limits against the features the evidence needs, such as audit logging or access reviews.
- We identify which evidence each control needs, who owns it, and which steps remain with your team or your auditor.
How we build
- We deploy the chosen platforms, such as identity, logging, secrets, vulnerability scanning and asset inventory, into your infrastructure.
- We configure integrations and hardening settings so each tool records the events, reviews and changes that auditors sample.
- We run security testing against the deployed systems and document the findings and remediation steps in the agreed scope.
How we hand over
- We deliver configuration documentation, runbooks and an evidence map linking each control to the tool output that supports it.
- We walk your team through how to export evidence, review alerts and run access certification campaigns on their own.
- We hand over the system and documentation to your staff, and your organization decides how to present them to the auditor.
How we support
- Ongoing support, upgrades, backups and continuous testing are available as a retainer after the fixed-scope engagement ends.
- Retainer terms, response expectations and service levels are set in writing, so confirm them against your own requirements in the quote.
- Support covers the tools we deployed, and we tell you in writing where a question falls outside that scope or belongs to your auditor.

