What SI.L2-3.14.4 requires and why assessors check it closely
A CUI contractor preparing for a Level 2 assessment needs to show one thing for SI.L2-3.14.4: its malicious code protection mechanisms are updated whenever new releases are available. The requirement is the Level 2 form of NIST SP 800-171 Rev. 2 requirement 3.14.4, and the assessment objective in NIST SP 800-171A is equally narrow. The assessor checks whether the anti-malware engines and definitions on in-scope systems are current against what the vendor has released. Because the objective is singular, a partial result is not a partial credit. The requirement is either MET with evidence in final form or it is NOT MET. The weight matters more than the wording. Under the CMMC Scoring Methodology in 32 CFR 170.24, SI.L2-3.14.4 is worth 5 points, which is subtracted from the maximum score of 110 if it is not met. Because it is worth more than 1 point, it cannot go on a Plan of Action and Milestones under 32 CFR 170.21(a)(2). A compliance lead should treat it as a gate: no open item is acceptable at assessment time. The Level 1 counterpart, SI.L1-b.1.xiv, comes from FAR 52.204-21 and asks the same question for Federal contract information, so a contractor that already passes Level 1 on this point has a head start on the same evidence. The difficulty is cadence. The CMMC Assessment Guide Level 2 notes that malware changes hourly or daily, and gives daily definition checks as an example of a configuration that works. Manual patch rounds cannot keep pace with that, and an assessor will ask for proof of the update process, not just a current version number. Confirm with your endpoint and mail gateway vendors how definition updates are delivered, whether automatic update settings are enforced by policy, and how a failed update is alerted and logged. Those settings, and the records they generate, are what turn SI.L2-3.14.4 from a claim into evidence.
Which systems and teams fall under SI.L2-3.14.4 scope
SI.L2-3.14.4 applies to every system inside the CUI boundary that runs malicious code protection, so scope starts with a precise inventory of those assets. The decisions below determine which endpoints, offline systems and third parties must show updated protection when an assessor asks for evidence.
Endpoints and servers inside the boundary
Every workstation, laptop, server and virtual machine that stores, processes or transmits CUI needs malicious code protection that receives new releases. Check the asset inventory against the boundary diagram, because a forgotten build server or engineering laptop that touches CUI is still in scope. Confirm for each host which engine and definition set it runs, who approves updates, and how the update is recorded.
Gateways and email filters
Firewalls, email gateways and web proxies that inspect traffic at the boundary often carry their own malware engines and signature feeds. Their update cadence can differ from endpoint products, so they need separate entries in the evidence set. Confirm that each gateway's signature or engine updates are enabled, that failed updates raise an alert, and that the update history can be exported.
Specialized, offline and test equipment
Operational technology controllers, lab instruments and air-gapped test systems may not accept vendor updates on the normal schedule, or may accept them only through a controlled transfer. These assets are still within scope if they handle CUI or connect to the boundary. Document the reason for any deviation, the compensating measure, the transfer procedure for offline updates and the record that shows when definitions were last applied.
Managed service providers and administrators
When a managed service provider pushes definitions, runs the endpoint console or manages the firewall, the organization still owns the requirement, and the provider's update activity becomes part of the evidence. Confirm in the service agreement who applies updates, how often, and who receives the records. Ask the provider to show update logs for in-scope assets and identify any assets it cannot reach.
Cloud hosts and shared platforms
Cloud-hosted virtual machines, managed container platforms and software-as-a-service tools that store CUI may rely on the provider for malware protection. Determine which layer is the organization's responsibility and which the provider performs, and obtain the provider's documentation for that layer. Where the organization runs its own agent on a cloud instance, that agent's update records belong in the evidence package.
Asset discovery and update monitoring
Scope is only as complete as the inventory behind it, and new hosts appear through projects, mergers and emergency purchases. Use a repeatable discovery method, such as an endpoint query tool that reports installed security agents and their definition versions across the fleet. Osquery can report running processes and installed software across hosts, which helps confirm that every in-scope system is covered and reporting current definitions.
How an assessor tests SI.L2-3.14.4 against SP 800-171A
This table breaks down the single SP 800-171A objective for SI.L2-3.14.4 into the examine and test activities an assessor performs, the evidence they request, and the findings that most often keep the requirement from being marked MET. Read it as a checklist of what your records must show before an assessor arrives, since a requirement worth 5 points cannot sit on a POA&M.
| Assessment element | What the assessor does or checks | Common finding to avoid |
|---|---|---|
| Assessment objective | Confirms that malicious code protection mechanisms are updated when new releases are available. This is the only objective SP 800-171A lists for 3.14.4. | Protection is installed and running, but nobody can show that updates follow vendor releases. |
| Examine: update configuration | Reviews how the anti-malware product is configured to check for and apply definition and engine updates, including update frequency and source. | Automatic updates are disabled on some endpoints or set to a schedule that does not match vendor release cadence. |
| Examine: definition dates | Compares the date of each sampled host's current definitions with the dates of vendor releases in the same period. | Definitions are weeks or months behind the latest vendor release on a subset of hosts. |
| Examine: update records | Reviews logs or reports that show when updates were applied, which mechanisms they reached and whether any failed. | Update logs are missing, overwritten or cover only the management console, not the endpoints. |
| Examine: scan and detection records | Reviews scan results and records of actions taken on detections, which SP 800-171A lists as potential evidence. | Detections are logged but no record shows the action taken or the update that followed. |
| Test: update process and mechanism | Tests the process and mechanisms for updating and configuring malicious code protection, often by triggering or observing an update on a sample system. | The written process says updates are daily, but the tool was never tested against that process. |
| Test: host sampling | Selects a sample of hosts across the system boundary and checks each one's protection status and definition currency. | Unmanaged hosts, servers or test equipment outside the console are not counted in the population. |
| Evidence in final form | Accepts evidence that is final and current. Drafts, screenshots without dates or undocumented exports do not satisfy the objective. | Update procedures exist only as drafts or as an informal practice no one has written down. |
Implementing malicious code protection updates step by step
This sequence turns the SI.L2-3.14.4 objective into a repeatable routine: every protected host is known, receives definition and engine updates on a schedule that matches vendor release cadence, is configured centrally, is checked for successful updates, and has any exceptions documented. Each step leaves a record an assessor can test.
Inventory every host that needs protection
Start with a complete list of the systems that run malicious code protection or should run it: servers, workstations, laptops, virtual machines, and any in-scope systems that process CUI. Record the host name, operating system, owner, location and the protection product installed. Compare the list against directory and asset records so that no endpoint is missing. The output is a protection inventory that the organization owns and keeps current, and it becomes the denominator for every later update check.
Set update schedules from vendor release cadence
Document how often each product's definitions and engine versions are released, then set the update check frequency to match. The CMMC Assessment Guide for Level 2 notes that malware changes hourly or daily and gives daily definition checks as an example, so many organizations use at least daily definition updates and confirm engine release timing with the vendor. Write the schedule into the system security plan or the protection standard. The output is a approved update standard that names each product, its cadence and its owner.
Enforce update configuration centrally
Configure update settings from a central management point rather than on each host by hand. Set the update source, the check interval, automatic engine upgrades where your change process allows them, and the behavior when a host is offline. Lock these settings so local users cannot disable them, and place the configuration under configuration management change control. Export the policy or configuration baseline and retain it. The output is a versioned policy export that shows the settings in force on each host group.
Monitor update success across the fleet
Query each host for the installed engine version and definition date, then compare the results with the inventory and the schedule. Osquery can run scheduled queries across a fleet to report running processes and file hashes, which helps confirm that the protection service is active and that its files are present, though the protection product's own console is usually the authoritative source for definition dates. Flag hosts whose definitions are older than the schedule allows. The output is a dated update report that lists compliant hosts and every host that fell behind.
Investigate and remediate lagging hosts
For each host flagged in the update report, identify the cause, such as a stopped service, a network path blocked from the update source, an expired certificate, or a machine that has been offline. Correct the cause and force an update, then confirm the new definition date in the next report. Keep the ticket that shows the investigation and the correction. The output is a closed exception log entry for each lagging host, with the root cause and the date the host returned to the schedule.
Record exceptions with approval and expiry
Some hosts cannot take updates on the standard schedule, for example isolated test equipment or operational technology with vendor restrictions. Record each exception with the host, the reason, the compensating measures, the approving owner and a review date. Confirm with the vendor and your assessor how exceptions will be evaluated, because a requirement must be MET for all applicable systems and a documented exception does not by itself satisfy the objective. The output is an approved exception register that is reviewed on a set cycle.
Retain evidence for the assessor
Assemble the artifacts that show the requirement is met: the update standard, the central configuration exports, the update reports from several points in time, the exception register, and the investigation records. Assessors test the processes and mechanisms for updating and configuring protection, so the evidence must show the routine operating over time, not a single snapshot. Keep final versions only, since drafts do not count as evidence. The output is an evidence folder mapped to the SI.L2-3.14.4 assessment objective and stored under your retention rules.
Evidence that proves malicious code protection stays current
SP 800-171A names the artifacts an assessor uses to test SI.L2-3.14.4, and each one answers a different question: is the protection in place, is it updated, does it catch threats, and what happened when it did. Keep these records final and dated so the picture holds between assessments, not just on the day of the review.
Protection mechanism inventory
Start with a current list of every malicious code protection mechanism in scope: endpoint agents, server agents, email and web gateways, and any scanning appliance. For each one, record the product, version, host or location, and the owner responsible for its updates. An assessor cannot test whether updates happen on a mechanism that is missing from the inventory. Check the list against your asset inventory, since a host with no agent is a gap the assessor will find.
Definition and engine update records
Keep dated logs showing when signature definitions and engine versions were updated on each mechanism. The assessment objective turns on whether updates occur when new releases are available, so these logs are the core proof. Export them from the management console on a regular schedule rather than relying on screenshots taken during the assessment. Note any update that failed and the retry that followed.
Update configuration evidence
Capture the policy settings that govern how often and how definitions are pulled, such as an automatic update schedule or check-in interval. The CMMC Assessment Guide gives daily definition checks as an example of a configured cadence. Assessors also test the process and mechanism itself, so show the settings exported from the console and the change record for any time they were altered.
Scan results and detection logs
Retain scan results and detection events from the protection mechanisms, showing what was scanned, when, and what was found. These records demonstrate that the protection is working against current definitions, which is the reason the updates matter. Confirm that logs are forwarded to a central store and retained long enough to cover the assessment period, and ask your assessor which retention window they expect.
Actions taken on detections
For every detection, keep a record of the response: quarantine, removal, isolation of the host, or a documented false positive. SP 800-171A lists records of actions taken on detections as potential evidence. A detection with no recorded response looks like an unmanaged event, even when the mechanism blocked it. Tie each record to the incident or ticket that followed, so the chain from detection to action is visible.
Final-form records and periodic review
A requirement is MET only when the evidence is in final form, so drafts, unsigned reviews and screenshots without dates will not count. Set a recurring review, at a cadence you define in your policy, where an owner confirms update logs and mechanism coverage and signs the result. Store the signed reviews with the rest of the evidence set so the record of currency exists for every period, not only the one before the assessment.
What meeting SI.L2-3.14.4 costs in money and effort
This table breaks down the cost and effort components of keeping malicious code protection updated for SI.L2-3.14.4, showing who is paid, whether each cost is one-time or recurring, and what moves it up or down. Use it to build a quote request, because no prices or durations for these components are published here and each figure depends on your own environment and scope.
| Cost component | Who is paid or who does the work | One-time or recurring | What drives it up or down |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anti-malware licenses | The software vendor or reseller | Recurring (subscription or maintenance) | Number of endpoints and servers, license tier, and whether management consoles are bundled. Open-source engines can remove or reduce this line, but support and tuning still need budget. |
| Central update policy setup | Internal engineers or an implementation partner | One-time, with occasional rework | Number of sites, operating systems, and disconnected or air-gapped segments that need a separate update path. Standardizing on one console keeps setup smaller. |
| Update compliance monitoring | Internal security or operations staff, or a managed service | Recurring | Fleet size, how often definitions change, and whether dashboards report version and definition age per host. Automated alerts reduce manual checks. |
| Evidence upkeep | Internal compliance staff, with input from engineers | Recurring | Frequency of exports (update logs, scan results, detection actions), how many systems are in the assessment boundary, and how well records are retained automatically. |
| Detection response records | Internal security team | Recurring, driven by detection volume | Number of detections and how many need documented action. Clear response procedures keep records consistent. |
| External review or consultant support | Independent consultant or implementation partner | One-time for readiness, optional recurring for reviews | Size of the environment, prior assessment history, and whether the consultant only reviews evidence or also configures systems. Ask for a fixed scope in writing. |
| Assessor fees for certification assessments | The C3PAO that performs the Level 2 assessment | One-time per assessment cycle | Assessment scope, number of systems and sites in scope, and assessor availability. Confirm current Phase II status with the DoW before budgeting. |
| Open-source tooling (illustrative) | Internal staff or implementation partner for deployment and tuning | One-time setup, recurring operations | Lower license spend shifts cost toward engineering, testing, and support. Ask whether the tool's update mechanism is documented and tested for your environment. |
How osquery and Velociraptor produce SI.L2-3.14.4 evidence
osquery exposes operating system state as SQL tables, and its osqueryd daemon can run the same queries on a schedule across an entire fleet of hosts. For SI.L2-3.14.4, the useful question is whether the malicious code protection engine is running, and whether the process and file state on each endpoint is consistent with a current, updated install. Queries against running processes, loaded kernel modules and file hashes give you recurring, host-level data that you can review and retain as evidence of operation. The tool does not read anti-malware vendor update logs by itself, so the definition version check usually depends on a query against files or an application-specific table that you confirm for your product.
- Process presence: Scheduled queries can show whether the endpoint protection service process is running on each host and when the state last changed.
- Kernel and driver state: Loaded kernel modules help confirm that endpoint protection drivers are present on systems where your product requires them.
- File hashes: Hashing the protection engine and definition files lets you show that files changed between collection cycles, which supports update tracking.
- Result retention: Route osqueryd output to a log store you control so that results from prior periods remain available to the assessor.
- License: osquery is licensed under Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-only, so confirm that the license choice fits how your organization distributes or modifies it.
Confirm which tables and paths expose definition versions for your specific anti-malware product before you rely on this approach.
Velociraptor collects forensic artifacts defined in VQL from endpoints. A hunt runs one or more artifacts across a group of systems, and Velociraptor schedules collection on offline machines when they reconnect. Each hunt can be analyzed in a notebook that combines the results from all hosts. For SI.L2-3.14.4, hunts are most useful for point-in-time verification: when you need to prove that a population of systems shows a given engine or definition state, or when you need to investigate a host that reports a stale update. Results from the hunt and the notebook become records you can present, provided you define which artifacts are run and preserve the output.
- Targeted artifacts: Write or select artifacts that read the protection product's version and definition metadata, and document the VQL for the assessor.
- Offline coverage: Hunts that wait for systems to reconnect help show whether laptops and remote endpoints were checked, not just those online at one moment.
- Combined analysis: A notebook per hunt lets you compare definition versions across the population and identify outliers.
- Preserved output: Export hunt results and notebook content on a schedule so that the evidence reflects the period under assessment.
- License: Velociraptor is licensed under AGPL-3.0-only, which has network-use obligations that legal counsel should review before deployment.
Confirm that your chosen artifacts return the definition timestamp and engine version your anti-malware product records.
Neither osquery nor Velociraptor replaces the malicious code protection mechanism. The requirement is that the protection itself is updated when new releases are available, and the engine and its definitions must come from the vendor product your organization has chosen and configured. These tools observe and record state. They do not download definitions, block malware or apply updates. If you use them as the only source for SI.L2-3.14.4, an assessor will still expect records from the anti-malware product, such as its update logs and scan results, and they will want to see the process that governs how updates are applied.
- Observation, not enforcement: Both tools report state. Enforcement and update delivery remain with your endpoint protection product.
- Gap for unmanaged hosts: A host that lacks the agent cannot report protection state through either tool, so inventory must show which systems are in scope.
- Product records still required: Keep the anti-malware product's own update history and detection records alongside query and hunt output.
- Process evidence: Document the update process, schedule and owner. Query results alone do not show that the process exists.
- Assessor independence: An implementation partner can configure these tools, but only the independent assessor decides whether the evidence meets the objective.
Confirm with your assessor which records they will accept as final evidence before you design your collection.
Who owns SI.L2-3.14.4 and what a partner can take on
Your organization owns SI.L2-3.14.4. That means the decision about how often malicious code protection updates, who approves the configuration, and who answers for a missed update sits with your security and IT leadership, not with a vendor. The evidence has to come from your environment and be in final form when the assessor asks for it. Assessors test the update process itself, so the people who run it must be able to explain it.
- Policy and update standard: Define which malicious code protection mechanisms are in scope and what "new release available" means for each, including signature feeds and engine versions.
- Accountable roles: Name the individual who owns updates on each platform and the backup who covers absences.
- Operating records: Keep update logs, detection records and the actions taken on each detection for the assessment period.
- Exception decisions: Document any deferred update, who approved it and the compensating control in place.
- Final-form evidence: Work from approved, dated documents, not drafts, because the assessment looks for final evidence.
Before you engage anyone, confirm that a named owner can walk an assessor through the update workflow from release notice to verified deployment.
An implementation partner such as DeployOpen can prepare the systems and the evidence your organization will present. Under a fixed-scope agreement, the partner might configure update schedules, set up osquery or Velociraptor queries that report on malicious code protection state across hosts, and assemble evidence packs. The partner does not decide whether the requirement is MET, and it does not write the assessment finding. Your organization remains accountable for operating the controls after handover.
- Update configuration: Set the malicious code protection engines and definitions to check for updates on the cadence your standard requires, and document the settings.
- Query and hunt setup: Build repeatable queries that show installed versions, last update times and running protection processes, and schedule hunts that cover offline machines when they reconnect.
- Evidence packs: Organize configuration exports, update records and scan results into a structure your assessor can navigate.
- Knowledge transfer: Train your staff to run and review the queries so the evidence stays current after the engagement ends.
- Scope boundaries: Confirm in writing which systems, cadences and deliverables are included, and what is excluded, such as specialized or OT assets.
Ask any partner to show the written scope and to name which deliverables are configuration and which are evidence.
Only an independent assessor reaches a finding on SI.L2-3.14.4. For Level 2 certification, that is a C3PAO authorized or accredited by the CMMC Accreditation Body, currently The Cyber AB. For a self-assessment, the organization performs the assessment itself against the assessment objectives in NIST SP 800-171A. Either way, the person judging whether the objective is satisfied must be separate from anyone who built the controls or the evidence.
- Objective testing: The assessor checks whether malicious code protection mechanisms are updated when new releases are available, using examination and interviews.
- Independent sampling: The assessor selects systems and records, which may differ from the ones your partner prepared.
- Finding authority: Only the assessor records MET or NOT MET for the requirement.
- Consultant limits: A consultant who prepared the evidence may explain it but should not be the person who scores it.
- Independence checks: Ask your C3PAO how it handles conflicts when a consultant has also worked on your environment.
Before assessment, confirm which assessor type your contract requires and whether the assessor has disclosed any relationship with your preparation team.
Common gaps that cause SI.L2-3.14.4 to fail
SI.L2-3.14.4 is worth 5 points and cannot go on a POA&M, so a gap in malicious code protection updates can move a contractor below Conditional or Final Level 2 status. The gaps below share one root cause: the organization cannot show, with dated records, that every protected system received new definitions and engines when releases were available.
Definitions updated only by manual checks
When an administrator logs in and clicks update when they remember to, the update cadence depends on memory rather than configuration. The assessment objective asks whether mechanisms are updated when new releases are available, and malware changes hourly or daily according to the CMMC Assessment Guide. Check that automatic definition updates are enabled in the product's policy, that the schedule is recorded in the configuration baseline, and that the console shows last-update timestamps for each engine and definition set.
Unmanaged hosts missing from the console
Laptops, lab machines, engineering workstations and servers built outside the standard image often never enroll in the update console, so they run stale definitions while the dashboard shows green. Assessors will ask for the complete population of in-scope assets and compare it to the protection console. Reconcile the asset inventory against enrolled endpoints each month, and treat any host that does not report as a finding to close, not a footnote.
Offline and air-gapped systems without an update process
Systems that never reach the internet still need new definitions, so a missing transfer process is a common failure. Define how signatures are obtained, validated and moved across the boundary, who approves the import, and how each import is logged. Confirm with the product vendor which update packages are available for offline use and how their integrity is verified before they are placed on a restricted network.
Current product with no dated update records
An assessor may see a current engine version and current definitions, yet find no history showing when they were applied. SP 800-171A lists records of updates and scan results as potential evidence, so a snapshot alone does not show that updates happen when releases appear. Export update logs or console histories on a schedule, retain them, and keep the timestamps that show each release was applied, including the gap between availability and deployment.
Update failures with no follow-up
Definition pushes fail when a host is offline, disk space runs out, a service is stopped, or a policy conflict blocks the agent. These failures often show up as errors in a console nobody reviews. Set an alert for hosts whose definitions fall behind the policy window, assign an owner to clear each exception, and record the corrective action so the failure and its resolution both appear in the evidence.
SI.L2-3.14.4 questions buyers ask before hiring help
How much does outside help for SI.L2-3.14.4 usually cost?
No single price applies to this control, so the cost depends on the written scope. Costs come from three sources: partner time to configure the malicious code protection tool, document the update procedure and organize evidence; your own staff time; and the independent assessor, who is paid separately. Most of the setup cost is one-time, such as configuration, testing and writing the procedure. Recurring cost is smaller and comes from keeping definitions current, reviewing update records and any ongoing retainer. Costs rise with the number of endpoints and servers in scope, the number of tools involved, and the number of sites or enclaves that need coverage. Ask for a quote that names the systems covered, the deliverables and the evidence you will receive, then compare quotes against that scope.
How long does it take to get ready for SI.L2-3.14.4?
The timeline depends mainly on how mature your update process already is, and no duration for this control has been established here. If your protection product already updates automatically and logs each update, the work is mostly testing and documenting that evidence. If updates are manual or some hosts are unmanaged, expect more time to inventory assets, standardize configuration and collect several cycles of records. Federal timing also matters. The Department of War suspended CMMC Phase II on 13 July 2026, so confirm the current schedule on the official DoW CIO page before you set an internal deadline. Ask any partner for a milestone plan in the written scope, with each milestone tied to a specific piece of evidence.
What does our team need to provide for this control?
Your team owns the control, so the partner needs named people who can make decisions and grant access. Name an owner for malicious code protection, usually in IT operations or the security team, and someone who can approve configuration changes. The partner will need administrator-level access to the management console, a current inventory of endpoints and servers, your existing change process, and copies of update logs and scan results. Staff time goes into reviewing configuration, confirming that every in-scope host is covered, and approving written procedures. Without these inputs and approvals, the work stalls on access requests instead of moving forward on technical tasks.
Can a small team handle SI.L2-3.14.4 in-house?
Often yes, because SI.L2-3.14.4 has a single assessment objective: malicious code protection mechanisms are updated when new releases are available. The practical test is whether one person can show, for every in-scope system, that the protection is installed, updates on the vendor's release cycle and leaves a record. The CMMC Assessment Guide Level 2 notes that malware changes hourly or daily, so plan for updates at that frequency. Small teams most often miss unmanaged laptops, servers in a separate enclave and systems that stay offline for long periods. Outside help is useful for a configuration review against the assessment objective, a practice assessment or evidence packaging. Your team still owns the control, and the independent assessor still tests it.
What does a partner do versus the assessor for this control?
A partner prepares the systems, controls and evidence, and an independent assessor tests them and issues the outcome. DeployOpen plans, configures, documents and supports self-hosted platforms in your environment and helps prepare SI.L2-3.14.4 evidence, but it does not issue assessment reports, attestations or certifications. For Level 2 certification, a C3PAO authorized or accredited by The Cyber AB performs the assessment against the NIST SP 800-171A objectives. Because the Department of War suspended Phase II on 13 July 2026, confirm which assessment path currently applies to your contracts before you engage anyone. Scope the partner to build and document the control, and scope the assessor to test it independently.
Can SI.L2-3.14.4 be placed on a POA&M?
No. SI.L2-3.14.4 is worth 5 points, and under 32 CFR 170.21(a)(2) a requirement worth more than 1 point cannot be placed on a plan of action and milestones. It must be MET to reach Conditional or Final Level 2 status. If it is NOT MET, its 5 points are subtracted from the maximum score of 110, so this control cannot be deferred with a POA&M. Plan to test it early, before any formal assessment, and keep a dated record of each update on every in-scope system. Confirm the current rule text in the eCFR, since it is the authoritative source for POA&M eligibility.
Which open-source tools can produce evidence for SI.L2-3.14.4?
osquery and Velociraptor can help you check coverage, but neither replaces the malicious code protection product itself. osquery exposes running processes, loaded kernel modules, open network connections and file hashes as SQL tables, and osqueryd can schedule those queries across a fleet of hosts. This helps confirm that protection is running and that hosts report in. Velociraptor collects forensic artifacts through hunts, schedules collection for offline machines when they reconnect, and creates a notebook per hunt for analysis. Confirm with your protection vendor which update history and definition versions the product exposes, and ask whether the platform can export that history in a form an assessor can review.
How DeployOpen prepares SI.L2-3.14.4 systems and evidence
DeployOpen plans, implements and documents self-hosted open-source platforms inside your own infrastructure, so update mechanisms for malicious code protection run on your systems and produce records you control. We prepare the systems and evidence for SI.L2-3.14.4, while your organization owns the control and an independent assessor makes the determination.
How we scope
- Written scope names the endpoints, servers and gateways where malicious code protection must update.
- We confirm which update sources, release cadence and configuration settings apply in your environment.
- Scope lists the evidence each assessment objective needs, such as update records and scan results.
How we build
- We configure malicious code protection to check for and apply new definitions and engine releases on a defined schedule.
- We set up osquery queries that report agent versions and definition status across the fleet.
- We test update mechanisms on sample hosts, including systems that are offline for extended periods.
How we hand over
- Handover includes configuration records, update logs and runbooks that your staff can operate after delivery.
- We document test results against the SP 800-171A objective so your team can review them before assessment.
- Evidence is delivered in final form, with dated records that your assessor can trace to each system.
How we support
- Ongoing support is available as a retainer for monitoring update health and handling changes to the platform.
- Retainers can cover periodic checks of update records ahead of your assessment or annual review.
- Confirm with us in writing which support tasks, response expectations and review frequency apply to your engagement.

